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BEQUEST OF THE  
REV. THOMAS A. DAY, JR.





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A COMMENTARY  
ON THE  
FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.

BY  
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SECOND EDITION.

Ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ Πνεῦμά ἐστιν  
οὐ δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα Κυρίου, ἐλευθερία.

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Dedicated

TO TWO REVERED TEACHERS,

IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF WHAT I OWE THEM INTELLECTUALLY  
AND SPIRITUALLY :

TO

THE REV. BENJAMIN JOWETT, D.D. (LEYD.),

MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE,

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD :

AND TO

MY FATHER,

THE REV. LEWIS EDWARDS, D.D. (EDIN.),

PRINCIPAL OF THE WELSH PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE,

BALA.

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## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

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SEVERAL years ago I entered on a solitary and prolonged study of the Apostle Paul, from a desire to find out for myself, if possible, his real meaning and central principle. This principle seemed to me to spring first to the front in the Epistles to the Corinthian Church. But in the effort to understand it and the Apostle's application of it to the difficulties and faults of his readers, I found the truth of Wycliffe's remark "that Paulis wordis passen othere writingis in two thingis,—thei ben pure, sutil, and *plentenous to preche the puple*." As I proceeded, I was ever more convinced of the vitality and power of his doctrine of Christ, its sufficiency, its peculiar fitness, to rekindle our dying faith. To me its power was the evidence of its truth. It seemed, not merely to answer the anxious questions of the age, but also to raise the entire spiritual life into a higher sphere, in which doubt is put away with the things of the child and faith in the supernatural made human becomes a promise of strength and a pledge of victory. Not that St. Paul in any way represents our age. In a very true sense he does not represent his own. But the contrast itself gives a startling force to his strong and stirring thoughts. They come to us, as they came to the Corinthians, from afar, untarnished by the foibles and fashions of the hour, like the quickening voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord Christ;—in the wilderness, very far away from the petty strifes of sects

and parties, in touch anew with God. Here in Wales, at least, I am very sure that what we most need is to go outside our age and bring down into it a force not ourselves. I do not mean to say that the doctrines of our various Churches are false. They have been too much handled as excellent themes for controversy. But to determine the worth of a doctrine, we must ask, not whether it can be argued about, but whether it can be preached. Our truths need vitalising by contact with a larger truth; for living truths alone make the preacher. Must we, then, wait until the great idea rises out of the deep? I will not answer the question by reminding the reader that every renewal in the spiritual life of the West has hitherto been brought about by fresh contact with the East. Rather, let us again read for ourselves the New Testament, the book which is both Semitic and Aryan, ever belonging to the past, and always from the past swaying the present, to see if the new idea we are in search of may not, after all, be the truth which we have heard from the beginning—Jesus Christ, yesterday and to-day the same and for ever. At least, this is the very life of St. Paul's Christianity, the root of his personal character, the central truth of his theology, the infinite strength and triumph of his preaching to a weary and dejected generation.

I wish above all things, not merely to give results, but—if I may dare hope it—to guide and help those who are, like myself, students and disciples of St. Paul. Most of the grammatical notes were read to a class at this college. The more strictly exegetical portions formed the substance of lectures given at a theological college in North Wales. Ten years ago the Corinthian Epistles were comparatively neglected in this country. Of late several excellent commentaries have appeared, which might well discourage the hope of an unknown writer to win a hearing. I offer my contribution with the utmost diffidence. No one that pursues his studies in great centres of learning knows how difficult it is for persons

dwelling in a remote corner to acquaint themselves with the latest researches and speculations. I am very far from wishing to stave off criticism. But I am tempted by its almost perfect aptness to borrow the apology of Irenæus: *Οὐκ ἐπιζητήσεις παρ' ἡμῶν, τῶν ἐν Κελτοῖς διατριβόντων καὶ περὶ βάρβαρον διάλεκτον τὸ πλεῖστον ἀσχολουμένων, λόγων τέχνην ἣν οὐκ ἐμάθομεν* (*Adv. Hær. I., Præf.*). The spirit in which I have written finds utterance in the prayer of Augustine: "Coram Te est scientia et ignorantia mea: ubi mihi aperuisti, suscipe intrantem; ubi clausisti, aperi pulsanti" (*De Trin. XV. 28*).

T. C. E.

ABERYSTWYTH, *Feb. 4th*, 1885.

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## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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A SECOND edition of this commentary has been called for too soon after the publication of the first, to make it possible to reconsider, with advantage, the interpretation of any passage. But several mistakes have been corrected. The names of Dr. Hodge and Dean Stanley were inadvertently omitted in the Introduction. The reader will see that both have been consulted. They are opposites in almost every respect. Hodge is theological and has excellent judgment. His method recalls Calvin. Stanley will charm many, and irritate some, by concealing theology under unsurpassed power of description and wealth of illustration.

My hearty thanks are due to the reviewers. All have spoken of the book with friendliness, and shown that they can be just and generous, even when our points of view are wide apart.

T. C. E.

ABERYSTWYTH, *Feb. 4th*, 1885.



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## INTRODUCTION.

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§ 1. ST. PAUL at Corinth. § 2. Corinth in St. Paul's time. §§ 3, 4. The Corinthian Church founded by St. Paul. § 5. Apollos at Corinth. § 6. A second visit of St. Paul before A.D. 57 doubtful. § 7. St. Paul wrote a previous letter to the Corinthians. § 8. Factions in the Church. § 9. The Epistle written by St. Paul. §§ 10, 11. External evidence of its genuineness. § 12. Early citations. § 13. Internal evidence. § 14. Place of writing. § 15. Time of writing. § 16. The group of Epistles to which it belongs. § 17. Interest of the Epistle at the present time. § 18. St. Paul's characteristics as a thinker. § 19. The central idea of the Epistle. § 20. St. Paul's relation to Greek thought. § 21. Contrast between his method and the modern method. § 22. The Epistle in the Church. § 23. Tertullian. § 24. Origen. § 25. Eusebius, Didymus, etc. § 26. Theodore of Mopsuestia. § 27. Chrysostom, Theodoret. § 28. Pelagius. § 29. Ambrosiaster. § 30. Catenæ. § 31. Aquinas. § 32. De Lyra. § 33. Valla, Colet. § 34. Erasmus. § 35. Cajetan. § 36. Calvin. § 37. The Puritans, Peter Martyr. § 38. Estius. § 39. A Lapidé. § 40. Grotius. § 41. Bengel. § 42. Recent German expositors. § 43. F. C. Baur. § 44. Dean Alford, etc.

§ 1. St. Paul never preached to the scholars of Alexandria,<sup>1</sup> and apparently failed to make converts of the literary men of

<sup>1</sup> Why he did not visit Alexandria is an interesting but by no means easy question. It is not, however, surprising that the Alexandrian teachers, Clement and Origen, ascribe the so called Epistle of Barnabas to the companion of the Apostle. The supposed fitness of things demanded that the Apostle's doctrine of *γνώσις* should be introduced by an authoritative teacher.

Athens.<sup>1</sup> In neither place had the Jew lost his religious exclusiveness. In both cities the mantled philosophers still walked through the groves or sat in the porch, repeating the wise sayings and ingenious problems of other times, without originality even in their doubt, much less in their faith. But in Corinth the Apostle, who knew the anguish of conflict and the joy of spiritual victory, came into contact with the feverish agony of life. To men that sinned and suffered he preached Christ crucified. They heard him gladly and found peace.

§ 2. The Corinth of the apostle's time was, and was not, the Corinth of the Achæan League. Destroyed by the Roman general Mummius, B.C. 146, it lay in ruins for exactly one hundred years, when Julius Cæsar, in pursuance of a scheme to create an empire in the provinces that might balance the power of Rome, rebuilt and peopled it with a colony of veterans and freedmen.<sup>2</sup> Pausanias<sup>3</sup> gives us to understand that none of the descendants of the former inhabitants were reinstated in the restored city. This was of much less importance in Corinth than it would have been in Athens; for from Homer's days to its downfall, and after the Julian restoration, the prosperity of Corinth depended almost entirely on its geographical position. The Isthmus, which joined northern Greece to Peloponnesus, and cut off the Ægean Sea from the Corinthian Gulf, was necessarily the highway of commerce. Into Corinth flowed the wealth of East and of West. Here the intellectual forces of the age met. Hither streamed the licentiousness that had been either the shame or the religion, or both, of the lands of its birth. Of Greek cities the least Greek, it was at this time the least Roman of Roman colonies. The cult of Aphrodité, for which Corinth was famous, was Greek; but her priestly establishment, consisting of a thousand courtesans, was an attempt to acclimatise

<sup>1</sup> The narrative in Acts xvii. 15, 16 gives one the impression that St. Paul did not go to Athens with the express intention of preaching. He was there in hiding. But when he saw the city wholly given to idols, his spirit was stirred within him, and he could not keep silence. Even in Athens his labours were not altogether in vain. In the time of Hadrian one Christian apologist is a philosopher, and another is a bishop, in Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Dion. Cass. xliii. 50. Cf. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. i. § 8.

<sup>3</sup> Paus. ii. 1 and 3.

the worship of the Phœnician Astarte.<sup>1</sup> Politically Roman, socially Greek, religiously it was Roman, Greek, Oriental, all in one. When, therefore, the Apostle preached to the Corinthians, the Gospel spoke to the whole world and to the living present.

§ 3. That the Christian Church in Corinth was founded by St. Paul is abundantly evident from 1 Cor. iii. 6; iv. 15; 2 Cor. i. 19; x. 10, with which Acts xviii. 8 agrees. It is true that Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth in the latter half of the second century, asserts that St. Peter and St. Paul together planted the Corinthian Church.<sup>2</sup> It was probably one of the orthodox legends that sprang up in the second century in opposition to the Ebionitic theory of antagonism between St. Paul and the other Apostles.<sup>3</sup>

§ 4. The Apostle came to Corinth from Athens on his second missionary journey, A.D. 51. Cf. Acts xviii. 1. His first base of operations was the synagogue. Driven thence, but not before he had secured a foothold for Christianity, he preached to all comers in the house of a proselyte named Justus, who, with Crispus, the ruler of the synagogue, had believed. He made many converts, mostly persons of low birth, some Jews, but the greater number, as we may infer from 1 Cor. xii. 2, Gentiles. He established also several Churches outside Corinth, in the Province of Achaia. Cf. Rom. xvi. 1, 16; 2 Cor. i. 1. Before his departure he wrote the two Epistles to the Thessalonians. He left Corinth for Jerusalem in the summer of A.D. 53.

§ 5. We next hear of the arrival of Apollos from Ephesus. According to the narrative in the Book of Acts<sup>4</sup> this gifted Jew of Alexandria had been led by his study of Scripture, independently of apostolic teaching, to the conviction that Jesus was Messiah. He was an unbaptized believer. During his stay at Ephesus he received further instruction from Aquila and Prisca. But, though baptized, as we may suppose, by these faithful friends of St. Paul, he was still

<sup>1</sup> Strabo viii. 20; Athen. xiii. 32. Cf. Renan, *St. Paul*, p. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.* II. 25.

<sup>3</sup> This is Lipsius's plausible conjecture. Cf. *Dict. of Christ. Biography*, s.v. Acts.

<sup>4</sup> I may remark once for all that I take for granted throughout that the narrative is trustworthy history.

personally unknown to the Apostle, who did not reach Ephesus, on his third missionary journey, before Apollos left for Corinth. Here, then, we encounter a form of Christianity in a great measure independent of Pauline doctrine, consisting of a combination of Alexandrian theosophy and mysticism and a belief in the Messiahship of the historical Jesus of Nazareth. We are prepared to hear of a disturbing influence in the Corinthian Church, certainly not in conscious antagonism to St. Paul's teaching, but in comparative ignorance on the part of Apollos of its more characteristic features. Cf. the introductory remarks on i. 10. After a brief stay at Corinth Apollos returned to Ephesus, and saw St. Paul. He was there at the time our Epistle was written. Cf. 1 Cor. xvi. 12. The stronger mind of the Christian Apostle, illumined by frequent revelations, began to mould the half-enlightened spirit of the philosophical believer. Their evidently close agreement from the first is an intimation that the Apostle's fundamental conceptions were in some sort kith and kin with the speculations of Philo. That we know so little about Apollos is much to be regretted. If we had his history we should, in all probability, be better able to trace the formation and growth of St. Paul's theology.

§ 6. Chrysostom<sup>1</sup> places a second visit of the Apostle to Corinth, not mentioned in the Book of Acts, between A.D. 55 and A.D. 57. It was suggested also in modern times by Bleek,<sup>2</sup> and the supposition is accepted by Neander, Haus-rath, Meyer, Reuss, Klöpper, Alford, Conybeare and Howson, S. Davidson, etc. But De Wette, Baur, and Renan reject it. The word *τρίτον* in 2 Cor. xii. 14 and xiii. 1 does not prove it; for it may mean the third time to form the intention of coming to Corinth. Nor is it implied in the word *ἄρτι* (1 Cor. xvi. 7); for *ἄρτι* cannot mean "on this occasion," as distinguished from a former one. Nor can it be inferred from *πάλιν* (2 Cor. ii. 1); for *πάλιν* need not be joined with *λύπη*, as though the Apostle had been already at Corinth grieving over the dissensions which had broken out after his first visit. More weight attaches to the words *ὡς παρὼν τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἂπὼν νῦν* (2 Cor. xiii. 2). But even this is not conclusive; for the words may mean, "as if I were a second

<sup>1</sup> *Hom. in 2 Cor.* xii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, drittes Heft.

time present with you, though I am now absent." It is true the word *δεύρερον* is not decisive on the other side; for it may refer to the two visits he intended paying them, the one on his way to Macedonia, the other on his return. The supposed visit must have taken place after the departure of Apollos from Corinth. But the factions were occasioned, in part at least, by the preaching of Apollos. Now St. Paul says (1 Cor. i. 11) that he first heard of them in Ephesus from Chloe's servants. This seems to be inconsistent with the supposition of an intermediate visit. May we not conjecture that he abandoned the intention of going to Corinth that he might visit Crete?

§ 7. In A.D. 56 the Apostle wrote a letter to the Corinthians which is now lost, of which indeed there is no trace in the early Church. Clement of Alexandria<sup>1</sup> and Tertullian<sup>2</sup> call our Epistle the First to the Corinthians. That such an epistle was written may be inferred from 1 Cor. v. 9, *ἔγραψα*, and from the statement in 2 Cor. ix. 2 that the Churches of Achaia had already a year before completed the collection for the poor saints in Jerusalem. For St. Paul had not, when he first visited Corinth, promised the Apostles that he would make this collection. He wrote, therefore, perhaps by Titus, to request the Church to contribute. It may also be inferred with some probability from 2 Cor. i. 15–17, where he rebuts a charge of fickleness brought against him, because he had at one time purposed coming to Corinth before going to Macedonia, but afterwards decided to pass through Macedonia on his way to Corinth. When did he inform the Corinthians of his former intention? It is implied in the first part of our Epistle, and probably, therefore, it was explicitly stated in a previous epistle not now extant.

§ 8. In less than a twelvemonth (A.D. 57) news of a distressing nature comes to the Apostle's ears. The Christian society in Corinth is rent by factions; scandalous immorality is suffered in the Church; Christians go to law with Christians before heathen tribunals; and disorder prevails in the Church assemblies. He makes no delay to send Timotheus, who was with him at Corinth and has rejoined him at Ephesus, and Erastus, himself a Corinthian, to admonish the Church (cf.

<sup>1</sup> *Pædag.* i. p. 117, Potter. *Vide infra.*      <sup>2</sup> *Ad Uxor.* ii. p. 2, et al.

note on iv. 17). Not long after, messengers are sent by the Corinthians to seek the Apostle's advice on some matters of practical difficulty. He replies to their questions, and seizes the opportunity to endeavour at the same time to put an end to their dissensions by entering into an elaborate and characteristic series of arguments as to the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, and its bearing on practical life. This reply is our First Epistle.

§ 9. That it is written by St. Paul is beyond doubt. I am not aware that it has ever been questioned except by Bruno Bauer<sup>1</sup> and the Jewish historian Grätz. Origen says<sup>2</sup> he never heard that anybody considered it spurious. It is one of the four Epistles of which critics of the school of F. C. Baur admit the Pauline authorship.

§ 10. External testimonies to its genuineness abound, and are much stronger than in the case of any one of the other Epistles which Baur acknowledges to have been written by St. Paul. It will be enough to indicate the most important.

§ 11. Among many references to the Epistle in the writings of Clement, who was head of the catechetical school of Alexandria towards the close of the second century, the following is noteworthy: *Σαφέστατα γοῦν ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος ἀπήλλαξεν ἡμᾶς τῆς ζητήσεως, ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πρὸς Κορινθίους ἐπιστολῇ ὧδε πως γράφων· Ἀδελφοί, μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσίν. . . . Ἐπειδὴ γέγονα, φησίν, ἀνὴρ, πάλιν ὁ Παῦλος λέγει, κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου.*<sup>3</sup> Tatian, who was at one time a follower of Justin Martyr and lived in the latter half of the second century, is said by Jerome<sup>4</sup> to have rejected some of Paul's Epistles; but he cites 1 Cor. xv. 22, to prove, says Irenæus,<sup>5</sup> that Adam was not saved. Tertullian<sup>6</sup> speaks of himself as writing about 160 years after the date of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, that is, about A.D. 217. He ascribes it repeatedly to Paul. "Ipsum Paulum," he says,<sup>7</sup> "dixisse factum se esse omnibus omnia, Judæis Judæum, non Judæis non Judæum, ut omnes lucrificeret." Athenagoras<sup>8</sup> (circa A.D. 177) ascribes the statement made in 1 Cor. xv. 54

<sup>1</sup> *Kritik der Paulinischen Briefe*, 1851. Zweite Abth.

<sup>2</sup> *Comm. in Matt.* xxvii. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Pædag.*, ut sup.

<sup>4</sup> *Ep. ad Tit.*, Præf.

<sup>5</sup> *Adv. Hær.* III. xxxix. (xxviii.), 8.

<sup>6</sup> *De Moog.* 3.

<sup>7</sup> *De Præscript. Hæret.* 24.

<sup>8</sup> *De Resur. Mort.* 18.

to "the Apostle." In Polycarp's Epistle to the Philippians (Latin version), which has been assigned to the year 155, the words, "Know ye not that the saints shall judge the earth?" are cited as Paul's. Marcion (*circa* A.D. 135-142) admits the Epistle into his canon, and asserts its genuineness. If Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthians belongs to the reign of Domitian, between A.D. 93 and 97,<sup>1</sup> ample testimony to the genuineness of our Epistle ascends to within forty years after it was written: Ἀναλάβετε, says Clement,<sup>2</sup> τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, . . . ἐπέστειλεν ἡμῖν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ Ἀπολλῶ καὶ Κηφᾶ.

§ 12. Early citations from the Epistle, without special ascription of it to St. Paul, are plentiful. For instance, Justin Martyr<sup>3</sup> (*d.* A.D. 148) cites 1 Cor. v. 7. Hermas (*circa* 92-101) appears to be citing 1 Cor. vii. 9 in *Mand.* iv. 4. Several words occur in the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" (*circa* 100-120) which are not found in the New Testament except in our Epistle, such as ἀποδείξεις, διαίρεσις, ὄσφρησις, παρεδρεύειν. If we assign some of the Ignatian Epistles to A.D. 116 at latest, 1 Cor. i. 20 and iv. 13 are unquestionably in the writer's eye when he says,<sup>4</sup> Περίψημα τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ σταυροῦ, ὃ ἐστὶν σκάνδαλον τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν. . . . Ποῦ σοφός; ποῦ συζητητής; ποῦ καύχησις τῶν λεγομένων συνετῶν; I find a few allusions in the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," which Harnack assigns to A.D. 140-165, Bryennius to A.D. 120-160, and some to a still earlier date. The Homily, which passed formerly as Clement of Rome's Second Letter, but was in all probability written at Corinth between A.D. 120 and 140, contains an allusion to 1 Cor. i. 28, in the words ἠθέλησεν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι ἡμᾶς.<sup>5</sup> Clement's Epistle alludes to iii. 23; xii. 18; xiii. 4-7; and xv. 37.

§ 13. If we had no patristic testimonies, we have what is still better, internal evidence of the strongest kind, traits that a forger of the second century could not have imitated. Assuming the authenticity of the Book of Acts, the writer of the Epistle and the historian's missionary Apostle present similar features,—the same rare combination of vehement energy and

<sup>1</sup> So Gebhardt, *Prolegomena*, p. lx.

<sup>2</sup> *Dial.* 14, p. 231 D. Also cf. note on xii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ad Ephes.* 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Cor.* 47.

<sup>5</sup> *Cap.* 1.

intellectual keenness. If the Epistle is compared with the other three which are universally acknowledged to have been written by St. Paul, we find in all of them the same effective use of superlative verbs, the same proneness, noticed by Chrysostom,<sup>1</sup> to "go off on a word," if Paley's phrase may once more be allowed, the same doctrinal basis, the same irony and tenderness combined, the same half-humorous, half-unconscious "play upon words" and "allusions to the witness of his own life."<sup>2</sup> The Epistle is Pauline from first to last. Here at least we have not "a page of Timothy."<sup>3</sup> As in the other Epistles of St. Paul, the meaning grows upon the reader. Superficially the language is correctly characterised by Renan as *broyée*. But it has this appearance only when we deny or lose sight of the Apostle's underlying principles. What appears on first reading to be broken and illogical proves in the end to be true and profound.

§ 14. The Epistle was written from Ephesus. We are safe in gathering this from 1 Cor. xvi. 8, 9. The Vatican MS. has the subscription, *ἐγράφη ἀπὸ Ἐφέσου*.

§ 15. The time of writing may be inferred approximately, supposing Festus to have entered on his procuratorship in the year 60.<sup>4</sup> For the Apostle's imprisonment in Cæsarea begins two years before the accession of Festus, and he tarried in Corinth immediately before his imprisonment three months. Cf. Acts xx. 3. He must therefore have arrived there in the beginning or middle of winter, A.D. 57. But the interval between his departure from Ephesus and arrival in Corinth was occupied in the journey to Troas, Philippi, and Illyricum, extending probably over the whole of summer. Cf. Acts xx. 1-3; Rom. xv. 19; 2 Cor. ii. 12, 13. In 1 Cor. xvi. 8 the Apostle says he did not intend leaving Ephesus before Pentecost. It follows that the Epistle was written before the beginning of summer, A.D. 57. How long before? A sufficient time must be allowed, after the return of Apollos from Corinth, for the subsequent rise of the factions in the Corinthian Church and

<sup>1</sup> *Hom.* 28 in 1 Cor. xi.: "Ἔθος τοῦτο τῷ Παύλῳ . . . ἐὰν ἕτερος παρεμπέσῃ λόγος τῇ ὑποθέσει, καὶ τούτῳ μετὰ πολλῆς ἐπεξιέναι τῆς σπουδῆς.

<sup>2</sup> Jowett, *Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 77.

<sup>3</sup> Renan, *St. Paul*, p. 232.

<sup>4</sup> It may have been in 61 or the beginning of 62. Cf. Joseph., *B. J.* VI. v. 3.

the journey of Chloe's servants from Corinth with tidings to the Apostle at Ephesus. Cf. 1 Cor. i. 11; xvi. 12. Again, Timotheus had been already sent to Corinth in consequence of these tidings. But this occurred not long before the Apostle himself left Ephesus. Cf. Acts xix. 22; xx. 1. We may infer that the Epistle was written shortly before his departure from Ephesus, that is, in the spring of A.D. 57. By extending the journey to Illyricum over a whole twelvemonth, some writers are led to assign the Epistle to the year 56. But this would give too short a time for the rise of the factions in Corinth. If, what is by no means unlikely, 1 Cor. v. 6-8 is an allusion to a recent celebration of Passover, then the Epistle was written on the eve of Pentecost. Cf. note on iv. 19.

§ 16. St. Paul's Epistles range themselves in groups. He writes first the two Epistles to the Thessalonians. After an interval of four or five years he writes the Epistles to the Corinthians, to the Galatians, and to the Romans. Our Epistle belongs, therefore, to the second group.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with this we naturally expect to find in it an advance on the teaching of the Epistles to the Thessalonians. During the four or five years that have elapsed few stirring events have occurred. The Apostle has spent a large portion of the time at Ephesus, with Apollos for his companion. Whether the influence of Alexandria, or closer acquaintance with Greek ideas, or his own insight gave him the clue, the result is the growth of a peculiar theology, which mainly rests on the conception of a mystical union between Christ and the believer. Never for a moment wavering in his belief in the supernatural facts of Christianity, which have brought to pass so great a revolution as the conversion of the persecutor into an Apostle, and always acknowledging their authority over his spirit, he has at length discovered a principle that will explain their inner meaning, transform his hopes of the speedy return of Christ in His kingdom from earthly to spiritual, and render love to Christ, not a short-lived affection or a mere feeling of thankfulness, but an undying, holy well-spring of zeal and absolute consecration to the service of the living and glorified Jesus, into communion

<sup>1</sup> The statement in the Muratorian Fragment that this was the first Epistle written by St. Paul has not, so far as I am aware, been satisfactorily explained.

with whom he has entered, and from whose abiding presence he derives all grace. In short, the difference between the two Epistles to the Thessalonians and the less simple and pathetic, but more profound, Epistles to the Corinthians lies in the new conception that sustains the keenly philosophical reasonings of the Apostle in the latter concerning Christ, whom he knows no more after the flesh, but after the spirit.

§ 17. The Epistle is, for this reason, especially interesting at the present time. It combines to a remarkable degree modern questions and ancient methods. It touches on several of the points around which the battle of Christianity in our day is fought,—the person of Jesus Christ, the supernatural element in the Church and in the Christian character, miracles, casuistry, and the resurrection of the dead. But the Apostle's statements on these and kindred topics are not conceived in the modern spirit. They are not tentative and inductive, but idealistic. He posits fundamental ideas, which he, like Christ, does not attempt to prove.<sup>1</sup> It is only when he raises a superstructure of truths on this foundation that discussion begins. If the reader rejects the assumptions as mystical unreason, the Apostle's entire doctrinal system must be unintelligible to him, except as the allegorical garb of practical exhortation.

§ 18. We have no safe ground, it is true, for the inference that St. Paul consciously formulated a purely philosophical system, which might be applied to the solution of all religious problems as they arose. But a thoughtful reader of his Epistles will have no difficulty to discover the bent of his mind, even when it acts most freely. He is ever seeking the one in the many; and when he has found it, the unifying principle assumes in his eyes an objectiveness of character, and becomes a real cosmical factor. His search for unity was partly the half-unconscious yearning of a profound intellect that remained to the end more or less a stranger to the conflict of the later Greek schools, partly it embodied the spirit of the age, which felt the reaction against scepticism and faced the ever-recurring question of dualism from the side of religion. Such a philosophy, however latent, could not fail to give birth

<sup>1</sup> Longinus, or whoever is the author of *Fragm. 1* that passes under his name, says the Apostle Paul was the first to excel in teaching doctrines of which he could offer no proof.

to a very pronounced theology. In that theology a conspicuous place would be assigned to such ideas as lend themselves to the gathering of many particulars under general principles. The Apostle's system of religious thought lay at the farthest distance from empiricism and individualism. The principle that no truth can be admitted except on the express warrant of consciousness is modern. St. Paul knows as little of it as Plato. Criticism of principles, in the modern sense of the term, by interrogating consciousness, there is none in his Epistles. In this sense he may be justly classed among mystical writers. He writes *ὡςπερ ποθὲν ἄνωθεν*, to borrow a Platonic phrase used by M. Antoninus (vii. 48). He appeals not even to the universal reason, but to the spiritual man; that is to say, his assumption is in part identical with that of Plato or Aristotle, but is carried a great way beyond the tendency to mysticism, which is all we can descry in their writings, into the land which is very far off. As the Greeks proclaimed the ultimate authority of the *σπουδαῖος*, so the Apostle refers all theological and moral questions to the *πνευματικός*, who judges all things because he has the mind or moral intellect of Christ. The source of St. Paul's ideas, therefore, is not invention, but revelation—an outward revelation of certain essential facts, and an inward revelation of the principles involved in them. Those facts and those principles centre in Jesus Christ. The Christ of Paul is at once the historical Jesus and the risen Lord in heaven. His fundamental philosophical assumptions would be accredited to his mind by their spiritual influence, their practical use, their consistency with his moral convictions, and their readiness to fit into the revelations which he believed himself to have received from God concerning the person of Jesus Christ and the meaning and power of His life, death, and resurrection. Plato's ideas "dwell in heaven." If they were on earth, they would be individual, and consequently imperfect. Similarly in St. Paul's teaching the Christ lives a heavenly life. He is spiritual, supernatural, absolute. What is of the earth is earthy, and what is of the flesh is flesh. By regarding the second Adam, not as a mere Adam or earthly man, but as a quickening Spirit and as the second Man from heaven, the Apostle finds place for the identification of Jesus Christ with the ideally and absolutely good. We admit that to the Greek

conception, that religion is the criterion of truth, we must add the Hebrew idea of religion as involving a moral law, the consciousness of sin, and the felt necessity of an atonement. The spiritual man is before all things a saved man. The Christ of heaven is the crucified Saviour. The gospel calls on men to repent and believe. But it is precisely in the union of salvation through an atonement and salvation unto spirituality that the true greatness of St. Paul's representation of Christianity lies. What corresponds most nearly in his teaching to the modern conception of consciousness as test of truth is faith; for it combines trust in God's mercy and a realization of Christ as a perfect ideal. Faith is both the cry of the terror-stricken sinner for pity, and the eye of the spiritual man that can look at the sun without blinking; and it is the one and the other because it unites the soul to Christ, who is at once the Saviour and the Example.

§ 19. The conception of a mystical union between Christ and the believer, as it is the pivot of the Apostle's entire theology,<sup>1</sup> is also the key to the intricacies of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. The main divisions of the Epistle treat successively of the factions in the Church; the case of incest; marriage; the eating meat offered to idols; the insubordination of women in the Church assemblies; the Lord's Supper; the resurrection of the dead. The doctrine of union with Christ is made to throw light on every one of these practical questions. Factions are inconsistent with it; impurity is destructive of it; marriage acquires a spiritual and mystical nature in virtue of the sanctification of the family life in Christ; eating meat offered to idols brings the man into sacramental union with demons, the antagonists of Christ; the Lord's Supper is the emblem of union and the means of communion with Christ's body and blood; finally, the headship of Christ over a restored humanity, based on His union with humanity, implies a subordination in the Church that demands order even in the assemblies, and brings about in the end a subjection of all created things to Christ that assures us of victory over death.

<sup>1</sup> "Toute la construction de l'apôtre repose, en dernière analyse, sur une identification mystique entre Jésus et les croyants."—Sabatier, *L'Apôtre Paul*, deuxième ed., p. 279.

§ 20. All this is conceived in right Platonic fashion. The question whether the Apostle fought with weapons borrowed from Plato's armoury, and was acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and the Stoics, will never, perhaps, be set at rest.<sup>1</sup> His language was not moulded by them to anything like the same degree in which it betrays the influence of Polybius. The seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans contains more than one Aristotelian conception, and there cannot be much doubt that the ruling ideas of the Greek schools had reached him. Hellenism was in the air. Aristobulus in Alexandria had long ago proclaimed himself a disciple of Aristotle, and led the way to the study of Greek philosophy.<sup>2</sup> The influence of Stoicism, again, is to be seen in Philo and the "Book of Wisdom." Alexandria in turn influenced Jerusalem, and Hellenic thought leavened in some measure all the Jewish communities in which the Greek language was spoken. That the Apostle was well acquainted with Philo's writings is certain.<sup>3</sup> Now what the idea is to Plato, and what the Wisdom and Word is to Philo and the author of the "Book of Wisdom," that Christ is to St. Paul no less than to St. John. But, whereas Plato's idea transcended existence, and the Alexandrian conception of God's Wisdom and Word is the poetical personification of an attribute, the ideal Christ of St. Paul is identical with the historical Jesus, who once died of weakness and rose from the dead in power, as the Spirit, the Lord, the glorified Redeemer, the new beginning of humanity. This saves the Apostle from the deadening effect of abstractions. He is in no danger of identifying God with τὸ ὄν, or of confounding, as was done by Philo and long afterwards by the Schoolmen, logical distinctions with differences of things. In his entire freedom from the tyranny of numbers and notions, in his thoroughly practical tone, he stands aloof from the herd of ancient thinkers, and writes in the modern spirit. Pre-disposed by a certain impetuosity of character and a natural

<sup>1</sup> Jerome (*In Galat.* iv. 24) says St. Paul's own words prove that he had an imperfect knowledge of secular literature.

<sup>2</sup> Euseb., *Præp. Evang.* VIII. ix. 23, *et al.*

<sup>3</sup> The reader will find a lucidly written discussion on the relation of St. Paul to Philo in Blanc-Milsaud's *Étude sur L'Origine et le Développement de la Théologie Apostolique.* Paris, 1884.

bent for active life and intercourse with men, he had no difficulty in throwing a bridge over the chasm between idea and person, theory and fact, when he so vividly realized to himself that God is become man, and that the crucified Jesus is the "second Man from heaven," now in heaven the quickening Spirit.

§ 21. Other Epistles are equally rich in spiritual thought, and some strike a higher key; but no portion of the New Testament discusses so directly the moral problems of that age or of our own. Yet few moralists of the present day would suggest the Apostle's point of view in proposing remedies for the debasing evils of society. His idea of sin is not that of a utilitarian, be he theorist or legislator. Nor, on the other hand, would the advocates of an independent morality find weapons to their hand in the arsenal of St. Paul. His account of sin is true only if the doctrine of a mystical relation between the individual soul and the powers of the spiritual world is true. To the mind of the Apostle sin has all the strength of a law deeply rooted in human nature, bringing the soul under the control of demons and defiling the temple of the Holy Ghost. All sin is one; all goodness is one. The "world" is an organised system of evil designed to overthrow the kingdom of God. Deliverance from sin is possible only through the interpenetration of the believer's life by the supernatural life of Christ. Such conceptions find no place in the ethical systems of our day; and the reason is not far to seek. We cannot arrive at them from the starting-point of a psychological analysis. But they are the very core of the Apostle's teaching, and the history of Christianity has proved again and again that, though these great thoughts have immeasurably elevated men's moral ideal, they have been powerful to make men holy.

§ 22. An unbiassed reader of early Christian literature will not be slow to acknowledge the wonderful largeness and subtlety of St. Paul's Epistles. The difference between them and the writings of the sub-apostolic age, which yet drew their best inspiration from the Apostle, amounts to a contrast. In no portion of the New Testament is the contrast more apparent than in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. St. Paul was not understood by the early Church, and in every instance his

teaching is more balanced and—if the expression be not misinterpreted—more advanced than that of his disciples. For example, the Church taught the doctrine of a literal resurrection of the flesh,<sup>1</sup> a doctrine expressly rejected by the Apostle. But, when the early Christians in this way proclaimed their belief in the sanctity of redeemed matter, they discountenanced marriage, under the influence of the Oriental and Platonic doctrine that matter is essentially evil. The Apostle shows no trace of this influence, which constantly meets us in Philo. Matter has the capacity of being sanctified and glorified. External nature, far from being either defiling or defiled, yearns for its development into an adequate expression of the glory of the sons of God. In perfect harmony with this he teaches that the spiritual is not the natural, but has been introduced into the sphere of humanity as its formative and regulative principle.

§ 23. The influence of our Epistle has, consequently, been broken and fitful. For some ages it failed to secure a leading position among St. Paul's writings. When the controversies on Church discipline and morals began to sway the minds of thoughtful men, this Epistle came to the front. The number of commentaries written upon it in the fourth century or thereabouts is not less surprising than the entire disappearance of most of them in subsequent times. In earlier ages we have scarcely anything with the exception of Tertullian's (*d.* 240) comments in the *Contra Marcionem* (V. 5–10). This treatise was written soon after 207 A.D., and is probably the first attempt at a continuous exposition. It was designed to refute Marcion's assertion that the teaching of St. Paul is inconsistent with that of the Old Testament. It is, therefore, we cannot say marred, but narrowed by speciality of purpose. Yet it is rich in original and striking thoughts, and occasionally offers a felicitous interpretation. Its classification of the spiritual gifts is an instance.

§ 24. A commentary of Origen (*d.* 254) on the Epistle is mentioned in his seventeenth Homily on St. Luke: "Memini cum interpretarer illud quod ad Corinthios scribitur" (p. 953). Discovered not long before in Paris, it was inserted by Cramer in his "Catena." In subtlety to find the clue to the more in-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tert. *De Resur.* 35; Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* V. xii. 3.

tricate connections of a passage it is worthy of Origen, one of the greatest, as he is also the first, of biblical critics. In the absence of allegorism it represents that side of Origen's literary influence which connects him with the School of Antioch. He stands alone among early writers in maintaining the spiritual nature of the resurrection body.<sup>1</sup> Yet he also is one-sided, in an opposite direction; for he fails to see the consistency of a spiritual resurrection with the sanctity of marriage.

§ 25. Jerome (*Ep.* 49, *Ad Pamphilum*.) tells us that copious commentaries on the Epistle were written by Origen, Dionysius, Pierius, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Didymus, and Apollinaris. Pierius is mentioned by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccles.* VII. 32) as a contemporary presbyter of Alexandria, distinguished for his exegetical works. One extract of Eusebius' Commentary is given in the "Catena" on iv. 5. It is interesting because it expresses what we may fairly suppose to have been the lifelong feeling of Eusebius himself: *Παραινεῖ μὴ σπουδαῖον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικεῖν, μηδὲ τὸ κρίνειν τοὺς ἡμαρτηκέναι δοκοῦντας*. Eusebius died about A.D. 340. Didymus was, no doubt, the "blind seer," who presided over the Catechetical School of Alexandria in Jerome's time. He died A.D. 395.

§ 26. Diodorus (*d.* 394), presbyter of Antioch, afterwards less illustrious as Bishop of Tarsis (Jerome, *De Vir. Illustr.*, c. 119), is said to have been the founder of the Antiochian School of Interpreters. He wrote on St. Paul's Epistles. But mere fragments in the Catenæ are extant. The greatest expositor of the school was Theodore (*d.* 429), Bishop of Mopsuestia.<sup>2</sup> He made an effectual stand against the allegorical method of Alexandria. With the theological tendencies of his teaching we are not at present concerned. But what has been left of his very original exposition raises a regret that so little has survived.

§ 27. Chrysostom (*d.* 407) was, like Theodore, a disciple of Diodorus, but stands somewhat apart from the Antiochian School. He did not altogether repudiate the allegorical

<sup>1</sup> *De Princ.* II. 10. But citations from this work of Origen must be accepted with caution.

<sup>2</sup> His exegetical fragments on the Epistle were collected by Fritzsche and published in the year 1847. For a careful estimate of Theodore as a commentator on St. Paul's Epistles the reader should by all means consult Swete's "*Theodori Commentarii*," vol. I. pp. lix. sqq.

method. In his 39th Homily on our Epistle he actually condemns the grammatical and historical interpretation of Scripture in the natural sense, as an attempt ἀνθρωπίνως καὶ μὴ θεοπρεπῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν τὰ λεγόμενα.<sup>1</sup> But his aim for the most part is to trace the logical connection of every passage, τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν εἰρημένων. He is judicious without loss of vehemence, and practical without any sacrifice of theological dogma. Though occasionally rhetorical and at times even coarse, his Homilies are models of expository preaching.<sup>2</sup> The commentary of Theodoret (*d.* 457), Bishop of Cyros in Syria, is very brief, and is borrowed mostly from Chrysostom. His fault is dogmatic partiality. Thus he finds in the word ἐκ (ii. 12) the doctrine of the Spirit's procession, and in the words "Christ is God's" (iii. 23) the doctrine of a personal subordination within the Trinity.

§ 28. Equally brief and less able are the notes of the celebrated Pelagius, inserted among Jerome's works. But Jerome himself says, in his "Catalogue," that he wrote only on Galatians, Philemon, Ephesians, and Titus. Augustine repeatedly cites the book as the work of Pelagius. For instance, in *De Peccat. Merit.* III. he ascribes to Pelagius the note on 1 Cor. vii. 14. It is not, however, altogether surprising that the book should have been assigned to Jerome, who held the synergistic or semi-Pelagian doctrine. The author writes as if the Apostle were consciously refuting the heresies of Apollinarius and Arius. He makes him teach the doctrines of free will, of the dependence of a continuance in a state of grace on men's continuing to obey God's commands, of salvation not being by faith alone, and of faith meriting the gift of the Spirit.

§ 29. Ambrosiaster is the conventional name of an unknown Latin expositor of St. Paul's Epistles. He is so named because his work was formerly ascribed to the great Archbishop of Milan.<sup>3</sup> We know from his note on 1 Tim. iii. 15<sup>4</sup> that the

<sup>1</sup> Simon's remark (*Hist. Crit.* p. 179) that Chrysostom "évite les allegories et tout ce qui est trop éloigné du sens literal" needs qualifying.

<sup>2</sup> An interesting comparison between him and Theodore will be found in Förster's "*Chrysostomus in seinem Verhältniss zur Antiochenischen Schule*" (Gotha, 1869).

<sup>3</sup> The Benedictine editors have published it in the form of an Appendix to the Works of Ambrose.

<sup>4</sup> "Ecclesia tamen domus ejus dicatur, cujus hodie rector est Damasus."

book was written in the episcopacy of Damasus, that is, between the years 366 and 384. It is now generally ascribed to the Roman deacon Hilary (who died after the year 380), because Augustine (*Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, IV. 7) cites as the words of a Hilary Ambrosiaster's comment on Rom. v. 12. The exposition of our Epistle is brief, but minute and, with the exception of some obscure places, to the point. Apparently influenced by Origen in forming his theological doctrines, Ambrosiaster is, nevertheless, entirely free from allegorism. For instance, in his note on v. 8 he rejects Origen's allegorical use of the word "passover," though, by the way, he falls into error in his attempt to correct his derivation of the word: "Pascha itaque immolatio est, non transitus, sicut quibusdam videtur." His strength lies in detecting the links of thought. In this he excels most of the ancient expositors. But he lacks perspective, as in his note on i. 13, where he refers to the heretics of his own time as if the Apostle had them in his mind. The commentary which used to be ascribed to Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, but is now thought to have been written by a monk Hervæus<sup>1</sup> in the twelfth century, or else by Anselm of Laon, is in many passages taken word for word from Ambrosiaster.

§ 30. The selected notes of John Damascene on this Epistle, in the former half of the eighth century, are taken from Chrysostom. Damascene is not the first, but he is one of the best, of the compilers. Sedulius was perhaps the worst.<sup>2</sup> Œcumenius, Bishop of Tricca in Thessaly in the tenth century, borrows from Chrysostom, Severian, Theodoret, and especially Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople. Theophylact, Archbishop of Acris in Bulgaria in the eleventh century, gives Chrysostom's interpretations, with an occasional excellent note that has the appearance of originality.

§ 31. The most independent commentator on St. Paul in the middle ages is Aquinas (*d.* 1274), though he draws largely from Augustine. In his Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians the reader is not vexed with "allegorical, moral, anagogical" senses. He explains the literal meaning "quem

<sup>1</sup> In the following pages the book is referred to as the production of Hervæus.

<sup>2</sup> His remark that Chloe was a city in Greece was, we may suppose, original.

auctor intendit.”<sup>1</sup> Rosenmüller<sup>2</sup> alleges that the commentaries of Aquinas are all “congesta ex patribus,” and that he is altogether unworthy the name of interpreter. I am unable to concur in this opinion. But it must be confessed a perusal of the book is no help to credit the story that St. Paul vouchsafed to appear to him and tell him that none had so well understood his Epistles. Aquinas is above all things a dogmatist, who seeks and, therefore, finds the doctrines of mediæval Christianity expressed in the Apostle’s words or underlying them, and makes Scripture fit into the scholastic framework. An egregious instance, in which, however, he is followed by De Lyra, of this departure from the “intentio Apostoli” is the ingenious scheme of doctrines that accounts, as Aquinas thinks, for the order in which St. Paul’s Epistles are arranged in the canon. He admits that the Epistle to the Romans was not the first written; but it occupies the foremost place “quia hoc exigit ordo doctrinæ,” because in this Epistle the foundation of Christian theology is laid in the doctrine of grace. Next follows the doctrine of the sacraments as the *media* of grace, and this he considers to be the leading truth in the First Epistle to the Corinthians.<sup>3</sup> His remarks on the dissensions in the Corinthian Church are very characteristic of a writer that really expounds his own times, and does not in any true sense understand the Apostle’s point of view.<sup>4</sup> But he often pierces deep into the Apostle’s thoughts. What he says, for example, on ii. 15, as to the influence of a spiritual disposition on the judgment contains noble and profound exegesis.

§ 32. Nicolaus de Lyra (*d.* 1340), a Franciscan monk of Normandy, has the reputation of having given a more scientific turn to the interpretation of Scripture.<sup>5</sup> He certainly anticipated some of Bengel’s happy suggestions (*cf.* note on i. 30); and the right understanding of vii. 16 is due to him. He owes his fame partly to the high esteem in which Luther held his

<sup>1</sup> Cf. “Summa,” P. I., Q. I. Art. X.

<sup>2</sup> “Hist. Interpret.” P. V. p. 276. A more just, though perhaps too partial, estimate of Aquinas as an interpreter of Scripture will be found in Vaughan’s “Life and Labours of St. Thomas of Aquin” (1872), vol. ii. pp. 567–602.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. his “Prologus.”

<sup>4</sup> For instance: “Putabant a meliori baptistâ meliorem baptismum dari, quasi virtus baptistæ in baptizatis operaretur.”

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Reuss, *Geschichte d. Heil. Schriften*, p. 556.

Commentary on the Book of Genesis. But if it is true that Luther would not have danced had not this "lyre" played, it is no less true that De Lyra borrows much from Aquinas, to whom he is inferior in penetration.

§ 33. The Renaissance, by putting the expositor of Scripture in possession of ancient Greek literature and the original language of the New Testament, created a classical taste, started the grammatical study of Greek, and paved the way to the comparative point of view, which is the best feature of our own age. The father of scientific criticism applied to the New Testament, and, after a lapse of a thousand years, the immediate successor of Jerome, is Valla (*d.* 1457), whose "Annotationes" was edited after his death by Erasmus and published in the year 1505. Valla was the first to compare the Vulgate with Greek manuscripts. One of the earliest exponents of the critical spirit north of the Alps was Colet (*d.* 1519). His lectures on St. Paul's Epistles were delivered in Oxford each successive term, beginning probably with the First Epistle to the Corinthians in 1496.<sup>1</sup> His transcendent merit is that, filled with heartiest veneration for the Apostle, and having very direct and deep religious feelings, he caught somewhat of his spirit.<sup>2</sup> But his exposition of the 12th chapter of our Epistle is disfigured with fanciful analogies—traces of the Neoplatonism of his Florentine teachers, Ficino and Mirandola—between the hierarchy of angels and the harmony of the revolving crystalline spheres.<sup>3</sup>

§ 34. From Colet Erasmus (*d.* 1536) gradually learned to

<sup>1</sup> His lectures on 1 Corinthians were edited by Lupton and published with an English translation in 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Seeböhm's *Oxford Reformers*, pp. 1-20. "He brought to his university," says Lupton, "the tidings of a Newfoundland, in religion and learning, as real as that discovered in the physical world by Sebastian Cabot" (Introduct. to Colet on Romans, p. xiv.).

<sup>3</sup> In Green's *History of the English People* (bk. V. ch. ii.) it is said that Colet was "utterly untouched by Platonic mysticism." This is not altogether correct. Cf. Colet on 1 Corinthians, pp. 127 sqq.; Seeböhm, *ut sup.*, p. 61. It would appear to be a mistake also to credit Colet with knowledge of Greek on his return from Italy. Cf. Hallam, *Literary History*, P. I. chap. iv. § 30 *note*. In his exposition of chap. xiii. he pens a few words in Greek letters. But in his note on x. 22 he is misled by the word *œmulamur* in the Vulgate, and explains the meaning to be that by going to heathen feasts we do not "emulate" the Lord.

break away from the fascination of allegorism, and find in the historical method the only guarantee for the living power of Scripture. His edition of the Greek Testament with Annotations was published at Basle in the year 1515. His Paraphrase of the First Epistle to the Corinthians appeared in 1519, the year in which Colet died. The notes of Erasmus are remarkable for candour and a boldness of utterance which his after life did not maintain.<sup>1</sup> They are often directed against the monks, as in his remarks on xiv. 19.

§ 35. Cajetan (*d.* 1534) also represents the reaction against allegorism. He professes to expound "*juxta sensum litteralem.*"<sup>2</sup> But it is abundantly evident from his book that he knew but little Greek.<sup>3</sup>

§ 36. Providentially the classical Renaissance was followed by a reformation of religion. Theology asserted her claims as well as grammar. The greatest expositor of the sixteenth century was produced by the united influence of learning and piety. Calvin's Commentary on Corinthians bears date 1546. Profound thoughtfulness, sobriety of judgment, fearless honesty, fine culture, and instinctive sense of proportion, all meet in this prince of commentators. In expounding St. Paul he holds converse with a kindred spirit. Perhaps the only qualification for such a task in which we may suppose him to have been deficient is passion. The light is clear and deep, but dry and cold. To appreciate Calvin we need only contrast his "*perspicuous brevity*" with the more ambitious and showy commentaries of Musculus and Peter Martyr, or his judicial fairness with his friend Beza's theological partisanship. The acknowledged superiority in exegesis of the early Reformed Church over the Lutherans is due to the influence of Calvin's method quite as much as to its fundamental doctrine, that the interpretation of Scripture must be entirely independent of all Church authority. Denial of this independence trammelled Lutheran

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Drummond, *Erasmus*, vol. I. pp. 307 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. his Dedication to Charles V.

<sup>3</sup> Estius (on 1 Cor. xv. 56) says that Cajetan knew no Greek, though he was otherwise a very learned man. But in his note on vi. 2 Cajetan corrects the Vulgate rendering of *κρινηλων*, and explains further that the Greek word for *secularia* means "*pertinentia ad usum vitæ.*" Lower down he says that the Greek for *sub nullius redigar potestatem* is of the same derivation as the word rendered *licent*. Did he depend on Erasmus?

divines down to the time of Bengel and even of Ernesti, who died in 1781. Calvin's influence on English exegesis has always been immense. His method, and even his interpretations, were handed down from one expositor to another, and men, some of whom had evidently never read him, learned from Calvin how to understand Scripture. What Chrysostom was to the exegesis of mediæval Catholicism, that Calvin has been to Protestantism down to the burst of exegetical insight in Schleiermacher. This is more especially true of England, though his Commentaries are said to have been themselves little read in Germany or England before Tholuck<sup>1</sup> drew attention to their merits. Calvin died in 1564.

§ 37. It may appear strange that, with one partial exception, we have no Puritan commentary on this Epistle.<sup>2</sup> The exception is the sensible, but unoriginal, "Annotations" of the Westminster Assembly. The truth is, the Puritans achieved nothing great in interpretation, with the sole exception of Dr. Owen's "Exposition of the Hebrews." The questions discussed in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and the method of handling lie for the most part outside the range of Puritan theology. It is a remarkable fact that the English Reformers of the Puritan type were sorely displeased with even Calvin's Commentary on this Epistle. "His Commentaries on the First Epistle to the Corinthians displeased me exceedingly," writes Hooper to Bucer in the year 1548.<sup>3</sup> He does not say what in particular offended him. We may, however, conjecture that it had reference to the use of things indifferent. Calvin charges those men with folly who allow Christians scarcely any liberty, and thus lays himself open to the suspicion of being an Adiaphorist. Hooper, on the other hand, went beyond Ridley, Bucer, and even Peter Martyr in his refusal to wear the vestments as things indifferent. However this may be, four years after the appearance of Calvin's Commentary, Peter Martyr, who belonged to the extreme

<sup>1</sup> *Vermischte Schriften*, 1839, zweiter Theil, pp. 330 sqq. A translation of Tholuck's Essay appears in the volume of the Calvin Translation Society that contains the Commentary on Joshua (Edinburgh, 1854).

<sup>2</sup> I pass by Sclater's Commentary, because, though he was Puritan in his sympathies, his book is scholastic in form and meagre in substance. It belongs to an age that had long before his time passed away.

<sup>3</sup> *Original Letters* (Parker Society), p. 48.

Puritan school, published, at the instigation of the famous John Cheke, an Exposition of the Epistle which was received in England with great applause.<sup>1</sup> Scaliger ranked Martyr next after Calvin as a theologian. His Commentary wears a scholastic garb. Yet he applies the Apostle's teaching, as he understands it, to the settlement of the burning questions of his own day. He declares that no other Epistle had so close a bearing on the controversies of his age. In saying this he refers apparently to the questions in dispute between Romanists and Protestants, not to the Puritan controversy. He denies all reference to purgatory in iii. 13. His theory of the Lord's supper stands midway between Calvin's and Zwingli's; for he maintains that a real union is effected through faith between the recipient and the body of Christ, but refuses to admit the mystery of a spiritual effluence flowing from the humanity of the exalted Christ into the person of the believer.

§ 38. Of Roman Catholic expositors of this Epistle after the age of the Reformers the best, to my mind, is Estius (*d.* 1613). He is original and independent, perfectly clear, and very judicial. His main defects are occasional digressions and a too evident wish to make the Apostle speak the language of Trent. Notwithstanding this, his commentary is correctly described by Reuss as a valuable exposition of St. Paul's Epistles in the Augustinian sense.

§ 39. Cornelius à Lapide's (*d.* 1637) reputation rests mainly, so far as I can form an opinion, on his acquaintance with patristic literature. His remark on ii. 15, that the spiritual judgment will lead the spiritual man, who judges all things, to have recourse to the better judgment of the Church in obscure questions of faith and morals, is a notable instance of the influence of a pre-conceived theory in making an honest expositor say almost the very opposite of what the Apostle means.

§ 40. Grotius (*d.* 1645) is the best of Dutch expositors. Valckenauer accuses him of purloining from Beza. It is easy to see that he had read Beza's notes; and if he did borrow, he only followed Beza's example, who owed much to Valla and Erasmus. Grotius differs from Beza quite as often as he

<sup>1</sup> He had lectured on the Epistle in Naples some years before he came to this country.

concur in his interpretations. The difference is sometimes for the better, as on v. 4, but more frequently, it must be confessed, for the worse, especially in the direction of un-spiritualising the meaning, as when he explains the words "demonstration of power and of spirit" (ii. 4) to mean the gifts of healing and prophecy. Beza's own explanation, that the words are a hendiadys for "spiritual power," is itself only less unsatisfactory. There is some truth in the remark that, if Cocceius saw Christ where He is not, Grotius refused at times to see Him where He is.

§ 41. Bengel founded, and could found, no school. His marvellous felicities must ever remain inimitable. He is mighty to quicken thought. Reading him often acts like a charm; and unless the reader is well on his guard against the fascination, he is in some danger of actually surrendering his own power of thought.

§ 42. The only influence on English exegesis comparable to that of Calvin has been exerted within the last fifty years by the great expositors of Germany. The reaction that set in against the dreary negations and euhemerism of the earlier rationalists was the effect of the believing, fervid rationalism of Schleiermacher. It gave birth to Neander, Olshausen, De Wette, Meyer, and others. Of these first-rate expositors the most judicial, I venture to think, is De Wette (*d.* 1849), the most useful Meyer (*d.* 1873). Osiander is laborious and full, rather than suggestive. Hofmann is striking and original, but often painfully ingenious and fanciful.

§ 43. Even this brief sketch cannot be concluded without mention of one who wrote no commentary. F. C. Baur, the founder of the Tübingen School, has by his profound learning and creative thoughtfulness left his mark, whether we accept or reject his conclusions, on the exegesis of this Epistle no less than of other books of the New Testament. Several important works on the life and theology of St. Paul have been written in recent years under his influence. Among commentaries the "Short Protestant Commentary"<sup>1</sup> of Lang on our Epistle may be regarded as representing the school. Its point of view and general character will be understood

<sup>1</sup> It has been translated into English by F. H. Jones, B.A. ("Theological Translation Fund").

from the following positions which it ascribes to the Apostle: 1. When God made Adam, the earthly man, He also made a second man in heaven of heavenly material, His own Son. 2. This pre-existing man came down upon earth, and assumed, instead of the heavenly body, another made of flesh and blood. 3. The earthly body was left on the cross, and the former heavenly body again assumed. 4. Paul saw Jesus in a vision only, within the depths of an excited mental life. 5. By "flesh" the Apostle means the finite and material constitution of our bodies, and this he considers to be the source of imperfection and sin. 6. Christ's work is to set free the whole creation from its burden of finiteness. 7. From the Apostle's conception of the flesh arose his doctrine of marriage, which is allowed only as a remedy for incontinence. In all these points—we shall consider them in their proper places—Lang really follows the leading of Baur. The expository notes disappoint the hopes raised by Lipsius's able introduction.

§ 44. The name of the late Dean Alford (*d.* 1871) deserves always to be mentioned with respect as one of the first to introduce into England some of the fruits of recent German exegesis. But he was greater as a textual critic than as an expositor. In his notes on Corinthians he relies too much on De Wette and Meyer. I make no remark on living English commentators, except that I desire to pay a tribute to the very original notes of Canon Evans, the scholarly little book of Mr. Lias, the carefully written works of Mr. Beet and Mr. Shore, and the popular expositions of Canon Farrar and Dr. David Brown.



# SUMMARY.

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INTRODUCTORY : i. 1-9.

FIRST DIVISION : THE FACTIONS IN THE CHURCH : i. 10-iv. 21.

A. *Statement of the Case* : i. 10-12.

B. *First Argument* : i. 13-ii. 5. The Gospel is primarily and essentially the proclamation of a salvation through Christ. After a personal digression (i. 13-17) this is proved.

(1) From the nature of the message : i. 17-25.

(2) From the character of the Church : i. 26-31.

(3) From the power of the ministry : ii. 1-5.

C. *Second Argument* : ii. 6-iii. 4. The Gospel is a Divine revelation through the Spirit. For—

(1) Christianity is God's wisdom : ii. 6-9.

(2) God's wisdom is inwardly revealed by the Spirit : ii. 10-13.

(3) The revelation of the Spirit is understood only by the spiritual man : ii. 14-iii. 4.

D. *Third Argument* : iii. 5-20. God has appointed teachers and defined their work.

(1) The Apostles and teachers are, not leaders of men, but servants of God : iii. 5-9.

(2) What is taught must be in character with the Divine foundation and plan : iii. 10-15.

(3) The worldly-wise teaching of party-leaders destroys God's temple and incurs His displeasure : iii. 16-20.

E. *Fourth Argument* : iii. 21-23. The factions are inconsistent with the prerogatives of the Church itself.

F. *Concluding Remarks* : iv. 1-21.

## SECOND DIVISION :—CHURCH DISCIPLINE : v. 1-vi. 20.

- A. The case of incest : v. 1-13.
- B. The practice of going to law before heathen tribunals : vi. 1-11.
- C. A statement of the difference between actions indifferent and actions in their very nature sinful : vi. 12-20.

## THIRD DIVISION :—MARRIAGE AND CELIBACY : vii. 1-40.

- A. General statement : vii. 1-7.
- B. Application of the doctrine to particular cases : vii. 8-38.
  - (1) The case of a Christian that has never been married or is in a state of widowhood : vii. 8, 9.
  - (2) The case of a Christian married to a Christian : vii. 10, 11.
  - (3) The case of a Christian married to an unbeliever that is willing to cohabit with the believer : vii. 12-14.
  - (4) The case of a Christian married to an unbeliever that refuses to cohabit with the believer : vii. 15, 16.
- (Digression on Christian liberty, with special reference—
  - (a) To Circumcision : vii. 18, 19 ;
  - (b) To Slavery : vii. 20-24.)
- (5) The case of virgins : vii. 25-38.
- (6) The case of widows : vii. 39, 40.

## FOURTH DIVISION :—CONCERNING THE EATING OF MEAT OFFERED TO IDOLS : viii. 1-xi. 1.

- A. The reconciliation of the two opposite Christian conceptions of liberty and love : viii. 1-13.
- B. This reconciliation exemplified in the Apostle's own conduct : ix. 1-27.
- C. The dangers to which the Corinthians exposed themselves by partaking of the idol-feasts shown by the example of the Israelites : x. 1-14.
- D. Partaking of the idol-feasts inconsistent with partaking of the Lord's Supper : x. 15-22.
- E. A practical summary of what has been said on the subject : x. 23-xi. 1.

FIFTH DIVISION :—CENSURE OF ABUSES IN THE CHURCH ASSEMBLIES : xi. 2-34.

A. In reference to women praying with head uncovered : xi. 2-16.

B. In reference to the Lord's Supper : xi. 17-34.

SIXTH DIVISION :—THE SPIRITUAL GIFTS : xii. 1-xiv. 40.

A. Description and Vindication of the Spiritual Gifts : xii. 1-31.

B. The Praise of Love : xiii. 1-13.

C. Superiority of Prophecy over Tongues : xiv. 1-40.

SEVENTH DIVISION :—THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD : xv. 1-58.

A. That the Gospel which the Apostle preached rested on the facts of Christ's death and resurrection, facts proved by eye-witnesses : 1-11.

B. The denial of the resurrection of the dead involves our denying the resurrection of Christ : 12-19.

C. Direct Proof : The resurrection of the dead necessary that the Christian order of the subjection of all things to Christ may be realized : 20-34.

D. The Proof confirmed by analogies : 35-44.

E. The Proof confirmed by Scripture : 45-49.

F. The change from psychical to spiritual necessary and universal : 50-54.

G. Refrain of triumph and concluding exhortation : 55-58.

EIGHTH DIVISION :—SUNDRY PERSONAL AND INCIDENTAL MATTERS : xvi. 1-24.

A. Of the Collection for the Church in Jerusalem : 1-4.

B. Of the Apostle's intention to come to Corinth : 5-9.

C. Of the coming of Timotheus and Apollos to Corinth : 10-12.

D. A summary of the practical lessons of the Epistle : 13, 14.

E. A kindly recommendation of Stephanas and others to their brotherly regard : 15-18.

F. Salutations : 19, 20.

G. Concluding warning and prayer : 21-24.



# A COMMENTARY

ON THE

## FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.

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### INTRODUCTORY.

(i. 1-9).

**Ch. I. 1-3.** *Salutation.* The Apostle vindicates his authority to address his readers, and acknowledges their claim upon him, as the Church of Christ. The attributes of the Church here mentioned correspond to the attributes of the apostleship. If he is a called apostle, they are called saints; if he is Christ's, they are sanctified in Christ; if he is an apostle through the will of God, they are the Church of God.

*κλητός.* Cf. Rom. i. 1. The same notion is expressed in 1 Timothy i. 1, by *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν Θεοῦ*. It is almost certain the word contains an allusion to the historical incident of his hearing the authoritative voice of Jesus on the way to Damascus. St. Paul nowhere separates his conversion from his apostleship. The word, therefore, while expressing personal humility (Chrys., Theophyl. on Rom. i. 1), is an assertion of the Divine authority of his office. But we must not suppose, with Meyer, that his having been "called" distinguished St. Paul's apostleship from that of the others, who are supposed to have come to Christ of their own choice, or been led to him by accidental circumstances. They also were called (cf. Matt. iv. 21; John vi. 70). But St. Paul vindicates his apostleship by saying that he was called no less directly by Christ Himself (cf. Gal. i. 12-16). He emphasizes the directness of his call, partly because it made him a witness for the resurrection of Jesus (cf. xv. 8; Acts xxvi. 16), partly because it conveyed to him his peculiar commission to preach to the Gentiles (cf. ix. 1; 2 Cor. xii. 1). It was a new starting-point

in the history of Christianity. It rang the knell of Judaism within the Church, and made Christianity a religion for the race and the ages. This second beginning was inaugurated with a miraculous call.

Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Genit. not only of the agent ("sent by Jesus Christ"), but also of possession. Cf. Rom. i. 1; Acts xxii. 3, ζηλωτῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ, "God's zealot."

ἀπόστολος. We observe the rise of the properly Christian usage of the word in Mark iii. 14, ἵνα ἀποστέλλῃ αὐτοὺς κηρύσσειν. Christ adopted it as the official name of the Twelve (cf. Luke vi. 13). The words κλητός and ἀπόστολος express the two opposite sides of one act of Christ. He called men to Himself out of the world in order to send them forth into the world. The idea, but not the word, occurs also in St. John's writings. Cf. John xvii. 18.<sup>1</sup>

διὰ. Cf. Gal. i. 1, where ἀπό expresses the source of his apostleship, διὰ the instrumentality by which his apostolical authority was actually bestowed upon him. Even in διὰ Θεοῦ, διὰ is not used loosely for ἀπό. It means that God acted directly. His own will was the only instrument of His action. Θέλημα and θέλησις do not occur in classical Greek.

Σωσθένης. De Wette, Meyer, etc., think this Sosthenes cannot have been identical with the ruler of the synagogue mentioned in Acts xviii. 17, because, in that case, we should have to make the gratuitous assumption that the Corinthian Sosthenes had accompanied the Apostle to Ephesus. But why, otherwise, is he mentioned here? He may have been the Apostle's amanuensis. But Tertius, his amanuensis, is not named as joint writer of the Epistle to the Romans.

ὁ ἀδελφός. It is interesting to mark, in Acts and the Epistles, the almost unconscious adoption by the Church of the few names which Christ had borrowed from the Jews, while He infused into them a deeper meaning (cf. Matt. v. 47; xxiii. 8). The Church is not only a πόλις, but also οἶκος Θεοῦ (cf. Eph. ii. 20; 1 Tim. iii. 15; Heb. ii. 10-17; Col. i. 2). The abstract term ἀδελφότης soon came into use in a collective sense, "the brotherhood" (cf. 1 Pet. ii. 17; Clem., *Ad Cor.* 2).

<sup>1</sup> If the fourth Gospel had been written in the second century, the name ἀπόστολος would not have been absent from it.

V. 2. Three notes of the Church are mentioned. *First*, it is God's. Θεοῦ is genit. of possession; not to distinguish the Church from the heathen ἐκκλησίαι—a name never used in profane Greek to denote a religious assembly—but to distinguish it from the κόσμος, which is the antagonist of the kingdom and out of which the Church is called. Though the name ἐκκλησία was most probably borrowed from the clubs or associations of the time, the Apostle discovers in it a Christian idea, that of separation from the world. To say that the Church is an ἐκκλησία is to say that it is God's. *Second*, as the result of its being an ἐκκλησία, the Church is "sanctified" (cf. John xvii. 16-19). The primary meaning is consecration. The Christian Church enters into the place hitherto occupied by the Jewish Church. But consecration in its Christian form resolves itself into holiness. Christ takes possession of every morality and raises it into spirituality. All goodness becomes a religion, binding the soul to God. Ἐν means that believers not only are sanctified "through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ" (Heb. x. 10), but also continue holy in virtue of union with Christ (cf. Rom. xv. 16). *Third*, the Church consists of men who are "called to be saints." They are saints by reason of a Divine call from without as well as of a Divine operation within (cf. Rom. i. 6; Lev. xxiii. 2). In Barn., Ep. iv. 13, the words ὡς κλητοί refer to the future kingdom. The notion of saintship is in Scripture inseparable from that of being reckoned, of being allotted a place by God. Cf. Wisd. v. 5, πῶς κατελογίσθη ἐν υἱοῖς Θεοῦ καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις ὁ κληρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστίν;

ἡγιασμένοις is plur. in apposition to the sing. ἐκκλησία by what the grammarians call σχῆμα κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον.

οὔση, redundant; a frequent Hellenistic usage, as in Acts xiii. 1, et al. Cf. also Xen., Hellen. I. i. 27, τὴν ὑμετέραν προθυμίαν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὑπάρχουσαν.

σὺν κ.τ.λ. That ἐπικαλεῖσθαι here means "to pray to Christ," not "to call themselves by the name of Christ" (Hammond, Locke, Semler), is proved from Zechariah xiii. 9, αὐτὸς ἐπικαλέσεται τὸ ὄνομα μου, κἀγὼ ἐπακούσομαι. Celsus reproached the Christians with praying to Christ (cf. Orig., c. Cels. viii. 13). The first Christian prayer uttered in the hearing of Saul of Tarsus was addressed to the Lord Jesus

(cf. Acts vii. 59). Origen held that prayer should not be made to Christ, and he read in our ver. "qui invocant nomen Domini" (cf. *Hom.* 18 in *Luc.*). The Apostle writes to the Church in Corinth and to all that pray to Christ (cf. 2 Cor. i. 1; ix. 2). The Church in the capital city of the province was perhaps the only visible centre. For example, there does not seem to have been at this time a Church in Athens. But many individual Christians were scattered through Achaia. The Apostle's expression implies that some believers were not enrolled in the visible communion of the Church, and he certainly does not unchurch them (cf. Luke ix. 49, 50). The external badge of a Christian society had not yet acquired the significance that attaches to it in the Epistle to the Hebrews (x. 25) and the Epistle of Jude (19). Living and working for Christ apart from the main body would in time assume the character of eccentricity, impracticableness and even heresy. (Cf. Ignat., *Trall.* vii. 2; Tert., *De Præscr. Hær.* 42). Such men would be ἐψωριακότες (Herm., *Past.* iii. 6). But the Apostle includes them among those to whom his letter is addressed. He thus connects the Corinthian Christians with the universal Church, to excite in them a lively realization of their oneness with all believers; for that oneness is symbolised and strengthened by the common act of all Christians, prayer to Christ.

αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμῶν. *Τε* is omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort, after **8 B D**. If *τε* is inserted, the words may mean "whether it belongs to them or to us;" but αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμῶν must mean "belonging as it does both to them and to us." (Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* vol. i. p. 100. Cf. Rom. xvi. 13). The words are to be connected with τόπω (so Osiand., Meyer, De Wette, Heinrici), not with Κυρίου (Chrys., Theod., Erasm., Billroth, Olshaus., Rev. Version). For the Apostle's purpose is to bring into prominence the universal character of the Church and, consequently, his right and duty to address them. Every place where Christians are belongs as such to the Apostle as well as to them.

**V. 3.** The Greek and the Jewish salutations are joined, but in a spiritual sense, which is suggested by the change of χαίρειν into χάρις. The occurrence of the peculiar phrase "grace and peace," in St. Paul, St. John, and St. Peter, intimates that we

have here the earliest Christian password or *symbolum*. Grace is the source, peace the consummation. The two together comprehend all the gifts of the Spirit. In the *εἰρήνη πᾶσιν*, *pax vobiscum*, of the early Church, peace includes all. (Cf. Tert., c. Marc. v. 5; Chrys., *Hom. 3 in Col.*). As God, whom all acknowledge to be Lord, is here designated Father, so the man Christ Jesus is designated Lord (cf. note on viii. 6).

**Vv. 4-9.** An epistle fraught with rebuke opens—the salutation over—with an expression of thankfulness to God for the wealth of spiritual gifts bestowed on the Corinthian Church. The foundation of all their endowments was the gift of sonship (ver. 9), or mystical union with Christ, given them once for all (aor. *δοθείση*) at their conversion. Even now the gifts of the Spirit were not lacking, especially the two gifts of discernment and utterance. These are specified here, because it was abuse of them that more than anything else led the Corinthians so far astray. Spiritual discernment had degenerated into worldly cleverness. Utterance was misused to decry the Apostle and serve the spirit of party jealousy. “Nevertheless God will re-establish in their hearts the witness of the Gospel, so that none will have aught to lay to their charge, as the Apostle now has.”

**V. 4.** *εὐχαριστέιν* does not occur before Polybius. Its occurrence in a psephism in Dem., *De Cor.* p. 257, is one proof of spuriousness. The class. phrase is *χαρίν εἰδέναι*.

*μου* is omitted in **Σ** (first hand) and B. So Westc. and Hort. But A and the first corrector of **Σ**, who was nearly coeval with the scribe, insert it. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg. Cf. Phil. i. 3. Thus to appropriate God is characteristic of the highest spiritual lives. It is the other side of consecration to God. *Τὸ κοινὸν ἰδιοποιούμενοι* is Chrysostom's fine expression (*Hom. 2 in Rom.*). The Apostle thanks his God for the grace supplied to the Corinthians, as if their grace were an addition to his own. This is the force of *μου*.

*ἐπὶ*, “for;” Vulg. rightly, *pro*; Beza less correctly, *de*. So Rev. Vers. has “concerning,” though it renders it by “for” in 1 Thess. iii. 9.

*ἐπὶ*, with dat. denoting the basis on which an action rests. The local signification is used ethically. Cf. Æschyl., *Prom.* 194, *ποιῶ ἐπ' αἰτιάματι αἰκίζεταί*. The several graces, for

the bestowal of which on the Corinthian Church the Apostle thanks God, are erected on the foundation grace, given them when they believed, which is union with Christ (cf. Phil. i. 5). The expression occurs in 1 Thess., but the notion is not subsequently made use of in that Epistle. (See *Intro.*)

**V. 5.** ἐπλουτίσθητε. The aor. covertly implies that they had since lost that wealth of grace and fallen into spiritual indigence (cf. Col. iii. 16). It is, therefore, unnecessary, as it is also incorrect, to suppose, with Chrysostom, that some only were enriched, or that it is, to use Augustine's words, "*Scripturæ mos ita loqui de parte tanquam de toto.*"

λόγος and γνῶσις are elsewhere found together. (Cf. xii. 8, λόγος γνώσεως). In 2 Cor. xi. 6 they are contrasted (cf. viii. 7). These passages show that λόγος is the utterance of Christian truth. (So Chrys., Theophyl., Bengel, Hofmann, Hodge, etc.) The two special gifts of the Corinthians consisted partly in the elevation and consecration of their national characteristics. Speech occupies no less prominent a place in the New Testament than it did among the Greeks. It has for its object to bear witness for Christ, and is a χάρισμα, a gift of God, for which the Apostle gives thanks. Christianity broke on the world as a new revelation, which, by being told and echoed on all sides, is powerful to regenerate men. This is the origin and life of preaching; for, as Pascal said, "the saints have never been silent." Calvin, De Wette, etc., understand λόγος in the sense of "doctrine." But a doctrine cannot be a χάρισμα bestowed on individuals, except in the form of γνῶσις, so that λόγος and γνῶσις would mean the same thing. In xii. 8 γνῶσις is distinguished from σοφία. Here it includes it and means all discernment of Christian truth.

**V. 6.** καθώς, "inasmuch as;" as in v. 7; Rom. i. 28. This illative use of καθώς and indeed καθώς itself are comparatively late Greek, for καθά. The cause of richness of spiritual endowment is a vivid, complete acceptance of God's testimony concerning Christ.

τοῦ Χριστοῦ, obj. genit., "the testimony concerning Christ." (Cf. Acts i. 8; 2 Tim. i. 8, where μαρτύριον is explained by εὐαγγέλιον; Matt. xxiv. 14; Rev. xix. 10.) In favour of subj. genit. Bengel aptly refers to Acts xviii. 8, where it is said that many in Corinth "believed the Lord" (cf. Acts

xiv. 3). But belief in the testimony which Christ gave, whether we understand it of the confession which He made through His sufferings (Phot.), or the revelation of God given by Christ (as in Rev. iii. 14), is not the acceptance which brings the believer into union with Christ. According to St. Paul, faith acts on Christ Himself, and Christ it finds in the *κήρυγμα* of the Gospel. (Cf. ii. 1.)

ἐβεβαιώθη, not “was confirmed among you intellectually,” but “was established in you spiritually;” “firmiter per fidem cordibus inhærens” (Aquinas). St. John has precisely the same idea (cf. 1 John iii. 19; v. 10). That this is the meaning is evident from the use of *βεβαιώσει* with *ἀνεγκλήτους* in ver. 8, as well as from the connection of the clause with ver. 5 (cf. 2 Cor. i. 21; Col. ii. 7). Only so far as the testimony concerning Christ had taken deep root in their hearts were they enriched in utterance of it. We must, therefore, reject as quite inadequate, Theophylact’s explanation, “through miracles and charismata.”

V. 7. To be closely connected with ver. 6. *Οὕτως* may be mentally supplied with *ἐβεβαιώθη*. The testimony concerning Christ had been so deeply fixed in their hearts that, for a time, they were not impoverished in any gift. The pres. *ὕστερεῖσθαι* refers to the time covered by *ἐβεβαιώθη*, not to the time at which the Apostle was writing. They had been rich, but now they were impoverished in every grace. This interpretation lends force to the Apostle’s subsequent expression of confidence that God would again firmly establish them to the end.

*ὕστερεῖσθαι ἐν τινι* is “to be impoverished in a thing,” opp. to *περισσεύειν*, as in Phil. iv. 12; *ὕστερεῖσθαι τινος* is “to want a thing altogether,” as in Rom. iii. 23. The word conveys the notion of poverty, in contrast to *ἐπλουτίσθητε*, ver. 5. (cf. Luke xv. 14). The act. *ὕστερεῖν* is more usual in this sense in class. Greek. A reminiscence of the Apostle’s words occurs in Ignat., *Smyrn.* 1, *ἀνυστερήτῳ οὔσῃ πάντος χαρίσματος*.

*χαρίσματι*. Estius, Olshaus., Wordsworth are right in saying that *χάρισμα* always denotes a special gift, but wrong in adding that *χάρις* always denotes grace in general. (Cf. Eph. iii. 8; Barn., *Ep.* i. 2, *τὴν ἔμφυτον τῆς δωρεᾶς πνευματικῆς χάριν εἰλήφατε*.)

ἀπεκδεχομένους, “inasmuch as ye were patiently expecting.” For the causal participle cf. Rom. iii. 24. The tense is imperfect. Now, on the contrary, far from earnestly waiting for the coming of the Lord, some in the Corinthian Church denied the doctrine of the resurrection and of the kingdom of Christ. The Apostle represents the expectation of the Church for the Lord’s appearance as the highest attainment of a soul that fully realizes the truth of the testimony concerning Christ. But in its lower aspects this expectation is Jewish and seeks an earthly return; in its better form, it is spiritual. Ἀπεκδέχεσθαι “*perseverante expectare notat.*” (Fritzsche, on Rom. viii. 19.)

ἀποκάλυψιν, that is, at Christ’s second coming. (Cf. 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 7, 13.) The more usual word, παρουσία, denotes the fact of Christ’s presence; the rare word, ἐπιφάνεια, its visibility, as in 2 Thess. ii. 8; ἀποκάλυψις, its inner meaning. Ἐπιφάνεια is used of the incarnation, never ἀποκάλυψις. The nearest approach to it is in Luke ii. 32. Nothing shows more clearly the powerful influence of the thought of Christ’s speedy return on the Apostle’s spiritual life than its introduction into the opening sentences of the Epistle.

V. 8. ὅς. That Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is repeated at the end of the verse is not enough to prove that Christ is not here meant. (cf. Eph. iv. 12; 2 Thess. iii. 5). The reference of ὅς to God, ver. 4 (Estius, Bengel, Olshaus.), is too far. The repetition of ὁ Θεός, ver. 9, makes it probable that Christ is meant, who acts in God’s behalf.

βεβαίωσει. An anticipatory allusion to the factions. The Corinthians were διακρινόμενοι in St. James’s meaning of the word (i. 6). (Cf. Phil. i. 6; 1 Thess. v. 24; Heb. vi. 10. Cf. φρουρουμένους, 1 Pet. i. 5.)

ἕως τέλους, that is, to the end of the present æon, at the revelation of Christ. (Cf. x. 11; 1 Pet. i. 13; iv. 7.)

ἀνεγκλήτους, a proleptic brachylogy for εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑμᾶς ἀνεγκλήτους. (Cf. Rom. viii. 29; Matt. xii. 13.) The word means, not “blameless in character,” but, “free from any charge” (cf. Rom. viii. 33). So Hesych., ἀνεύθυνος. It is, therefore, more forcible than ἄμεμπτος or ἄμωμος and virtually synonymous with ἀναμάρτητος (cf. Pseudo Justin M., *Quæstt. et Resp.* p. 489 D). It has a juridical reference. The revela-

tion of Christ will be a judgment of all men (cf. 1 John iii. 2; Col. iii. 4; 1 Pet. i. 13; Heb. ix. 28; 1 Thess. iv. 15). It by no means implies that a Christian can be, as Meyer says, morally defective at the day of judgment (cf. 1 Thess. v. 23). Rather it implies that the end of this æon will be determined by moral reasons. The course of history is a moral development, and the cosmical development depends on that of the individual Christian. The Apostle means to intimate that the Corinthians were not yet free from charge. He has himself grave charges to make against them; and he will do it with an authority and power that removes the unbecomingness of the comparison between his displeasure and the future judgment of Christ.

*ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*, not “unto,” as if the words were connected with *βεβαιώσει* (Estius), but “in,” to be connected with *ἀνεκλήτους*. The word “day” continues the notion of a revelation. The present æon is the night (cf. Rom. xiii. 12). But in the words “day of the Lord,” the additional notion of judgment is always included. The two conceptions—light and judgment—blended (cf. iii. 13, iv. 5; Jude 6).

**V. 9.** The ground of the Apostle’s confidence that God will establish them unto the end, is God’s faithfulness to the work which He has already begun in calling them into union with his Son (ver. 4).

*πιστὸς ὁ Θεός*, the *δέ* omitted rhetorically (cf. x. 13). *Πιστός* is explained in 2 Tim. ii. 13.

*ἐκλήθητε*. He ends the introductory portion by reverting to the thought with which he began (ver. 4). Their restoration also will be a new work, rising sheer from the foundation of union with Christ. But the Apostle acknowledges one difference. What was at first God’s grace is now called God’s faithfulness to His own work begun.

*κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.*, not “fellowship in spirit with His Son,” but “participation in Christ’s sonship” (cf. 1 Tim. i. 1). So Theod., *κοινωνίαν γὰρ υἱοῦ τὴν υἰοθεσίαν ἐκάλεσε*. This of itself is the proof that God will establish them to the end. Sonship involves a claim to privileges (cf. Rom. viii. 17; Gal. iii. 7). To establish them is, therefore, a matter of faithfulness on the part of God. The mention of adoption is also, indirectly, a rebuke. Men who have been called to partici-

pate in Christ's sonship at variance with one another! The Apostle is preparing, as his manner is, for what is to come. Meyer and, apparently, Chrysostom, think *κοινωνία* refers to participation in the glory of Christ's kingdom. The view is tenable only on the supposition that St. Paul uses the word *υἱός* in this Epistle, not in an ontological meaning, but simply as an official designation. To a Jew of the time of Christ the name "Son of God" seems certainly to have been synonymous with Messiah and King of Israel, not conveying necessarily the notion that Messiah would be a Divine person<sup>1</sup> (cf. Orig., *c. Cels.* I. 49). So in John i. 49; Matt. xxvi. 63; and the most probable meaning of Acts ix. 20, is that Paul preached immediately after his conversion, that Jesus (*Ἰησοῦν* is the better reading) was the Son of God, meaning the Christ, which is the name used in ver. 22. Admitting, however, all this, it is equally certain that in our Epistle *υἱός* is not a merely official designation. We find in it and in other Epistles of the same group, the doctrine of the Son's pre-existence and ontological relation to the Father. Cf. viii. 6; xv. 47; Rom. viii. 32; 2 Cor. xiii. 14; not to adduce other passages more or less fairly capable of being otherwise explained, as 1 Thess. iii. 11.

<sup>1</sup> Some have held that the designation "Son of God" implied, not indeed in itself, but in reference to Messiah, a higher nature than human.

## FIRST DIVISION.

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### THE FACTIONS IN THE CHURCH.

(i. 10–iv. 21).

CHRYSOSTOM, Theodoret, Theophylact, Ambrosiaster, Calvin, and Alford, maintain that the Apostle does not mean to allege that the Church of Corinth was divided into parties called after the names of Paul, Apollos, Cephas, Christ, but that he borrows these names in order to show, by a kind of hyperbole, the unreasonableness of faction. Chrysostom considers this proved by iv. 6. Certainly we have no ground for supposing with Eichhorn, Milman (*History of Christianity*, bk. ii. chap. 3), Lewin, etc., that four separate communities had sprung up in Corinth. There was no schism in the ecclesiastical meaning of the word. But the course of the Apostle's argument disproves Chrysostom's inference. The Apostle endeavours to put an end to party spirit in the Church by explaining the real nature of the Christian ministry and the relation of all ministers to Christ; which shows that the dissensions in Corinth had direct reference to Christ and the teachers. We have also the testimony of Clement of Rome, whose Epistle to the same Church was written before the end of the first century:—"Ἐπ' ἀληθείας πνευματικῶς ἐπέστειλεν [sc. St. Paul] ὑμῖν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ Κηφᾶ τε καὶ Ἀπολλῶ, διὰ τὸ καὶ τότε προσκλῖσεις ὑμᾶς πεποιῆσθαι . . . προσεκλήθητε γὰρ ἀποστόλοις μεμαρτυρημένοις καὶ ἀνδρὶ δεδοκιμασμένῳ παρ' αὐτοῖς." *Ad Cor.* 47.

Equally unsatisfactory is the view of Hofmann, that the Apostle is speaking of personal predilections for this or that teacher; for Cephas, because he had been intimately connected with the founding of Christianity; for Paul, as founder of

the Corinthian Church ; for Apollos, on the score of learning and eloquence. This theory does not assign to the genitives *Παύλου*, *Ἀπολλώ*, *Κηφᾶ*, their full force. "I belong to Paul," or "I am Paul's man," must mean more than admiration and personal preference. It must mean that the Apostle was represented as the leader of a party, the projector of distinctive ideas. Besides, those who claimed to be Christ's cannot be supposed to have only a predilection for Christ.

We are happily not called upon at present to follow the subtle windings of the Tübingen theory. Whatever opinion we may form of its general correctness, it is enough for our purpose that at least the dissensions in Corinth do not justify the inference that the Church in the Apostolic age was divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps, ranged under the active leadership of Apostles. For, *first*, the Apostle does not in this division of the Epistle address himself to the task of refuting fundamental errors, but censures party spirit as inconsistent with the nature of Christianity. Ingenious attempts have been made to assign to each party its share of error, but with very partial success. It is difficult to believe that the Apostle would have abstained from direct refutation of fundamental errors, if such were at the time making havoc of the Church. In fact, no attentive reader can fail to observe the contrast between the affection that breathes in the first chapters of this Epistle, and the astonished indignation with which the Epistle to the Galatians begins, or the irony of his rebuke of the Corinthian laxity in discipline. *Second*—if an internecine war ravaged the Church in the first century, not to mention that traces of it would be discernible in the Epistle of Barnabas, Hegesippus could not allege, unless he were saying what he knew to be false—and Baur's attempt to discredit him as an honest, however uncritical, witness for facts has completely failed—that the Corinthian Church remained during the Apostolic age "a pure and uncorrupted virgin," and continued orthodox down to the episcopate of Primus. (Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 32; cf. *ibid.* iv. 22). Nor could he, in speaking of a Church founded by St. Paul, mean that the Church was at peace in the sense of being entirely under Judaistic influence. His testimony, moreover, is confirmed by that of Clement of Rome, who says that, when he was writing

(probably before 97 A.D.), their early dissensions had ceased.<sup>1</sup> Besides, if the factions of the Apostle's time had passed away before the end of the first century, more inferences than one follow. Baur's theory that the reconciliation was effected in the second century, vanishes; the factions cannot have divided on vital questions; and their pacification cannot be ascribed to any other cause than St. Paul's two Epistles—in which, however, fatal errors as to Judaism are not formally refuted.

Still it can hardly be doubted that these dissensions represented, in their broad outlines, the difference between Jewish and Gentile views. So far Baur is correct. Indeed the suggestion was long ago made in Lightfoot's *Horæ Hebraicæ*. The extreme views would be, on the side of Judaism, that, though Jesus was Messiah, the laws of Moses were not abrogated, and Gentiles, in order to become Christians, must first become Jews through circumcision; on the side of Hellenism, that Christianity was the best moral theory. An Ebionite would regard the work accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth as a revival of Mosaism and the world-wide expansion of a Divine institution hitherto restricted to one race. A Greek true to the spirit of the age would see in it the revelation of a Divine life. He would accept it because it satisfied the individualism, which had by this time stifled the old Greek idea of the *πόλις* no less in the teaching of the Academy than in that of Zeno or of Epicurus. In fact it is not difficult to trace even in Apostolic times the germs of Gnosticism. We know from Acts xviii. 24 that Apollos was a learned man (*ἀνὴρ λόγιος*) of Alexandria. But an educated man, a Jew, brought up in Alexandria, especially one who fought his way unaided to the threshold of the faith, must, in that age, have been a disciple of Philo; and we may regard it as, to say the very least, extremely probable that Apollos had adopted, before his conversion, that combination of Judaism and Platonism which was designed to harmonize the Hebrew religion with Greek culture and philosophy. Add to this that, as Alexandria witnessed the attempt to fuse Jewish and Greek conceptions in a religious philosophy, a similar tendency, but starting from

<sup>1</sup> Gebhardt (*Prolegg. in Clem. Ad Cor.*, § 6), infers that the controversies in the Apostolic Churches had been allayed when St. Paul was writing to the Philippians, A.D. 63.

an opposite direction, was at work in Greece to transform philosophy into a religion. The tenets of the Paulinists, again, must have borne some resemblance to the Apostle's doctrines of redemption, justification, faith, no doubt more or less ignorantly caricatured. As to the party that called itself after the name of Christ, Chrysostom thinks they were the enemies of all party spirit, the loyal followers of Christ and, as such, commended by the Apostle.<sup>1</sup> To the same effect Augustine (*Serm. ad Pop.* 76), Ambrosiaster, and even Meyer, though he admits that, in proudly standing aloof from party, they had themselves become a party. But it is evident from 2 Cor. x. 7 that some in Corinth claimed to hold a peculiar relation to Christ, and the Apostle maintains that he belongs to Christ as they also do. Neander suggests that they may have had in their possession a collection of Christ's sayings. But all the others would have readily acknowledged the authority of those sayings. Perhaps their factious spirit showed itself, not in their accepting Christ, but in the rejection of Christ's Apostles. That such a thing was possible, we know from the fact that the Nazarene Christians would not read St. Paul's Epistles in their Church assemblies. Men that despise the partial manifestation of Christ which is given through a Paul or an Apollos may be quite as sectarian in spirit as those who fight for a part as if it were the whole.<sup>2</sup> What their peculiar doctrines were, it is useless to conjecture. They may have been mystics; they may have been rationalists. Every man will judge for himself what it is likely those who reject Apostolic teaching will have left.

But are not these differences, it may be asked, fatal to a common Christianity? Decidedly not. The only article of a standing or a falling Church, and the only confessional badge of a Christian, when St. Paul wrote this Epistle, was the answer to the question, "Believest thou that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God?" Baur's error was not so much that he exaggerated the differences of intellectual beliefs in the

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom's view is sometimes incorrectly stated, by Beza for instance, as if he considered the words "I of Christ," to be St. Paul's declaration concerning himself.

<sup>2</sup> The late Dr. Duncan of Edinburgh said that certain good people, "to protest against sects, made another." (*Colloquia Peripatetica.*)

Apostolic age, as that he estimated the meaning and effects of such differences by the narrow standard of a subsequent time.

The Apostle's discussion of questions bearing on the factions extends from i. 10 to iv. 21. After a brief statement of the case, he argues against party spirit on these four general grounds: the relation of Christianity to Christ (i. 13–ii. 5), to the Holy Spirit (ii. 6–iii. 4), to God (iii. 5–20), and to the believer (iii. 21–23). Remarks of a more personal nature conclude this Division of the Epistle (iv. 1–21).

### A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

#### (i. 10–12).

The factions have arisen from undue subservience to human teachers.

V. 10. *παρακαλῶ*, “I exhort,” the only meaning in classic Greek and the usual meaning in the New Testament, where, however, it signifies also, (1) “to beseech,” as in Plutarch and Epictetus; in this sense the older writers use it only of prayer; (2) “to comfort,” which meaning is very rare before the LXX.

*δέ*, transitional. The usage is frequent after a preface, as here. Cf. Thuc., III. 61, § 2, Poppo's note.

*ἀδελφοί*. “Latet in hoc etiam verbo argumentum” (Beza). Cf. Acts vii. 26.

*διά*. The class. word would be *πρός*. But *διά* means “by making mention of.” In the previous verses the Apostle has nine times named Jesus Christ. Similarly in Rom. xii. 1 he exhorts his readers *διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν*, which he has enumerated in xi. 22–36 (cf. Rom. xv. 30; 2 Cor. x. 1). He is preparing for what is to follow by reverting to the fundamental Christian position of union with Christ. If the Corinthians had understood the doctrine of the mystical union, they would not have set a Paul or an Apollos on a level with the Lord Jesus.

*ἵνα*. For this construction with *παρακαλῶ*, cf. Mark v. 10; 1 Cor. xvi. 12; and *ὅπως* in Matt. viii. 34. It marks the transition in the usage of *ἵνα* from the notion of purpose to that of the object of the verb, the clause introduced with *ἵνα* expressing the contents of the exhortation. That *ἵνα* is not

used with παρακαλῶ in class. Greek is enough to disprove Fritzsche and Meyer's doctrine that ἵνα in the New Testament invariably expresses purpose. (Cf. Winer, *Gr.* § xliv., and Moulton's note; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 204; Jelf, *Gr.* § 803. 3.)

τὸ αὐτὸ . . . γνώμη. The exhortation has reference to the two gifts of the Spirit in which these Greek Christians had been eminent, discernment and utterance. The Apostle charges them with abusing these spiritual gifts to the destruction of Christian peace. Their strife of words was an abuse of the gift of utterance. But it sprang from a more inward dissension; for the gift of discernment was degenerating into a barren intellectualism, void of heart. Let them above all, then, seek the deeper union of moral disposition (νοῦς). This will give a new character to their discernment of truth (γνώσις), and from this, again, will result unity in judgment (γνώμη). Νοῦς is related to γνώσις as γνώμη is to λόγος.

σχίσματα, "dissensions," as in John vii. 43, and nearly synonymous with διχοστασίαι, except that the latter term implies that the dissension has given rise to actual division and created "factions." Estius' paraphrase of σχίσματα, "sectæ intra ecclesiam," is too comprehensive. The Apostle purposely refrains from using the strongest term that might have been employed. Much less does σχίσμα in the New Testament denote "schism" in the ecclesiastical sense, or "congregationis separatio" (Aug., *Adv. Crescon.* II. 7), the μερισμός of Ignat. (*Philad.* 2). The Corinthians met in one place (cf. xi. 18; xiv. 23). Neither does σχίσμα denote difference of doctrine. (Cf. Theod. on xi. 18, σχίσματα οὐ δογματικά λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῆς φιλαρχίας.)

ἦτε δέ. The δέ adds somewhat to the idea: "but rather." (Cf. *Thuc.* iv. 86, οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ' ἐλευθέρῳσι δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων.) This furnishes a clue to the meaning of what follows.

κατηρτισμένοι. Καταρτίζειν (from ἄρτιος, "well-fitted;") the κατὰ strengthening the notion, as in κατακόπτω means either (1) "to restore," whether materially, "to repair," e.g. δίκτυα, Matt. iv. 21, or ethically, "to restore into the right way," as in Gal. vi. 1; or (2) "to complete," "make perfect," as in Luke vi. 40. The former meaning is here adopted by Neander, De Wette, etc.: "that ye be reconciled to one another," "that the *status quo ante* be restored." The Vulg.,

on the other hand, has *perfecti*. It is better to combine both meanings. The word carries on the metaphor that lies in *σχίσματα*, and means the repairing of a rent. But their dissensions were beginning to tell injuriously on their spiritual condition. There were not only *σχίσματα* in the Church, but personal *ὑστερήματα*. "Let them, therefore, be fully equipped in grace, that so they may be reconciled to one another." Theophyl. excellently: *τέλειοι ἐν πᾶσι πράγμασιν ὁμονοοῦντες*. Olshausen truly observes "that the Apostle is not speaking about absolute perfection, but perfection in their unity, which can co-exist with a low degree of development, inasmuch as it only requires humble hearts." It is, in fact, the Old Test. idea of perfection, that is, sincerity. The change in point of view after the Apostle's time is well illustrated by Ignatius' explanation—if it be not an interpolation, *ἐν μιᾷ ὑποταγῇ κατηρτισμένοι, ὑποτασσόμενοι τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ*.

*νοῦ*. The class. forms *νοῦ*, *νῶ*, do not occur in the New Test. So *ῥοτ* is late for *ῥῶ*.

*νοῦ* . . . *γνώμη*. The distinction drawn by some of the best expositors between *νοῦς* and *γνώμη* is that between the theoretical and practical reason. So Chrys., Calvin, Estius, etc. The author of the Sixth Book of the Nicomachæan Ethics says, *ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα*, that is, it includes the practical as well as the theoretical reason. It apprehends the object to be desired, the thing to be done. So in Rom. vii. 23 *νοῦς* means, not only the faculty that distinguishes between true and false, but also the moral judgment, which distinguishes what is good and right from what is evil and wrong (cf. Eph. iv. 17; 1 Tim. vi. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 8). Again, *γνώμη* also has a theoretical no less than a practical side. *Γνώμη λαβεῖν τοὺς νόμους* means to understand the laws theoretically; but in vii. 25, 40, *γνώμη* denotes a practical decision. In the Lexicons almost precisely the same significations are given under *νοῦς* and *γνώμη*. But the words differ in point of view. *Νοῦς* regards the thing from the side of the subject; *γνώμη* from the side of the object. Though both are derived from the same root *γνω* (cf. Curtius, *Grundz.* p. 178), yet *νοεῖν* means, on the whole, "to think" and *γινῶναι* "to learn." Hence *νοῦς* is way of thinking, *γνώμη* an opinion,

the result of such operation of mind (cf. Lidd. and Scott). The Apostle wishes the Corinthians to preserve the high spiritual level of thought and feeling, which heathenism had lost and Christianity has restored, to judge questions from the same Christian standpoint, and on the basis of the same principles. This unity in moral attitude would strengthen and purify their discernment (*γνώσις*). But he would have them endeavour to arrive also at a common belief, which they could embody in one form of words, as their manifesto before the world. Such a *γνώμη* would be the best form of utterance.

**V. 11.** *ἐδηλώθη*, "it was made clear;" much stronger than "it was told me" (cf. iii. 13). The word implies that the Apostle was reluctant to believe the reports which had come to his ears. When Chloe's people, among whom was Stephanas, one of the Apostle's best converts in Achaia (cf. xvi. 15), confirmed their truth, the thing was undeniable.

*τῶν Χλόης*. Cf. Rom. xvi. 10, *τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου*. Hence we may suppose they were Chloe's slaves, who had come to Ephesus on her affairs. They may have been Stephanas, Fortunatus and Achaicus (cf. xvi. 17). From vii. 1 we know that the Corinthian Church as such sent to ask the Apostle for directions in certain cases of conscience. We gather from the present verse that no mention was made in that letter of the more grave charges, which had reached his ears from another source (cf. v. 1).

*ἔριδες*. Their dissensions had found a tongue. Cf. Soph., *Æol. Col.* 1234, *στάσεις, ἔρις, μάχαι*. *Ἐρίς* is *ἀντιλογία* (Plat., *Rep.* V. p. 454). From the extreme of gainsaying the Apostle wishes to draw them to the opposite extreme of saying the same thing. Their spiritual union ought to have issued in a common utterance. The form *ἔριδες* is class. and occurs only here in the New Test. The late form *ἔρεις* occurs in Tit. iii. 9, unless we read *ἔριν*.

**V. 12.** *λέγω δὲ τοῦτο*, "what I mean is this" (cf. xiv. 15). This signification of *λέγω* is frequent in class. Greek (cf. Plat., *Rep.* I. p. 338, *σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις*). The *τοῦτο* in such phrases usually refers to what is to follow, unless it is followed by a final clause, as in vii. 35 (cf. Gal. iii. 17).

*ἕκαστος*, emphatic. Party-spirit had infected the whole Church. The form of expression is incorrect for *ὅτι πάντες*

λέγετε, ὁ μὲν, ἐγὼ εἰμι Παύλου, ὁ δὲ, ἐγὼ Ἀπολλώ, ὁ δὲ, ἐγὼ Κηφᾶ, ὁ δὲ, ἐγὼ Χριστοῦ. But the words as they stand really express the Apostle's meaning more accurately. By inserting the δέ in what each party said, he sets forth more vividly the opposition between one and another (cf. Acts ii. 6).

εἰμι Παύλου, "I am Paul's." The rendering in Cranmer's Bible is good: "I hold of Paul." It is unnecessary to supply μέρους, and incorrect to supply, as Kypke, μετά. Cf. Dem., *Phil.* III. p. 125, ἦσαν τινὲς μὲν Φιλίππου καὶ πανθ' ὑπηρετοῦντες ἐκείνῳ, τινὲς δὲ τοῦ βελτίστου, where the participial clause expresses what more is implied in the genit. than in μετά.

Ἀπολλῶς (short for Ἀπολλωνίος) is an instance of a Jew taking a Greek name, a fashion then prevalent in Asia and Egypt among those that wished to shine as learned men. (Cf. Ewald, *History of Israel*, Eng. Tr., V. p. 269. On Apollos, cf. Acts xviii. 24-xix. 1.) He came to Corinth after the Apostle (cf. iii. 6). Both were fast friends (cf. xvi. 12). Apollos was in Ephesus when St. Paul wrote this Epistle. But he does not join the Apostle, as Sosthenes does, in saluting the Church. This may have been intentional and prompted by the same displeasure at their having used his name to rend the Church and disparage Paul, which made him reluctant to visit Corinth notwithstanding the Apostle's generous confidence as to the result. After this Apollos is mentioned only in Tit. iii. 13 (cf. *Introd.*).

Κηφᾶς, Aramaic for Πέτρος (cf. John i. 42). Wordsworth (on Gal. ii. 11) suggests "that the Judaizers fondly cleaved to his Jewish name even [? especially] in a city of Greece." But this is doubtful. (Cf. note on xv. 5.)

Χριστοῦ. Grätz proposes to read Χρήστου, *Chrestus*, as the name of a teacher like Apollos. The passage cited in support of the conjecture are the well-known words in Suetonius (*Claud.* 25): "Judæos, impulsore Chresto, . . . tumultuantes Româ expulit." But it is uncertain that Chrestus is not a mis-spelling for "Christus" in a document of the time of Claudius, which we may suppose Suetonius to be quoting. (Cf. Cruttwell, *History of Roman Literature*, p. 387.)

## B. FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FACTIONS.

(i. 13–ii. 5).

The Gospel is primarily and essentially the proclamation of salvation through Christ. The whole argument is included, in the form of questions, in ver. 13. Christ is the crucified Saviour; it is into the name of Christ we are baptized, and baptism brings us through faith into union with Christ. From ver. 14 to ver. 16 is a personal digression. From ver. 17 to ii. 5 the Apostle proves that the Gospel is primarily the proclamation of salvation through Christ; *first*, from the nature of the message (i. 17–25); *second*, from the character of the Church (i. 26–31); *third*, from the power of the ministry (ii. 1–5).

**V. 13.** *μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός*; Lachm., Stanley, Meyer, Westc. and Hort, consider the clause to be a statement: "Christ has been divided by your dissensions." Theod. mentions this view. But we should then be sacrificing the contrasts which the Apostle's questions bring into prominence. "Has Christ, who is the Head of the whole Church, been divided, so as to become leader only of a faction? Or was Paul, who is but part of the Church, crucified for you so as to become its Head?" They must accept the one or the other alternative. Men who profess to be exclusively Paulinists do so *either* because they choose whatever of Christ is manifested in Paul, and reject what Christ reveals of Himself in Peter, thus dividing Christ, *or* because they take Paul, not for a partial and imperfect manifestation of Christ, but for the Christ Himself, thus ascribing to Paul the redemptive work of the cross. If the clause were a statement, the Apostle would have said, "Christs have been multiplied."

*ὁ Χριστός*. The art. often, not always, turns the proper name into an appellative (cf. Bleek on Heb. v. 5; but not so in Heb. vi. 1). In the same way Aristotle indicates the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues as *ὁ Σ.*, but does not use the art. in speaking of the real Socrates (cf. *Eth. Nic.* VI. xiii. 5). The Apostle is here speaking—to use De Wette's epithet—of "the historico-ideal" Christ. "Has He who is the Christ of God been divided?"

*ἐσταυρώθη*. His crucifixion it was that constituted Christ Head of the Church. The unity of the Church rests on redemption. Consequently believers are baptized into the name of Christ, that is, into union with Christ. What they are through the cross of Christ potentially, that they are actually through baptism. The two are here named together, and these two only, because baptism is to the believer what the cross was to Christ. The one made Christ the Head of the Church; the other makes the believer a member of Christ's mystical body. To baptize, therefore, into the name of Paul would be a confession in act that Paul was the source of our spiritual life through a redemptive death. Expositors detect in the reference to baptism a censure of one or another of the parties in the Corinthian Church. Heinrici, for instance, thinks the Apostle refers to the Apollos-party. But all such conjectures miss the real purpose of the words, which is to show that all party-spirit is disloyalty to Christ as He is represented in the two great corresponding facts, Christ's death and the believer's baptism.

*ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, "for you"; literally, "for your good," the original meaning of *ὑπέρ* being that of bending over a person to protect him. But as we know from other passages that St. Paul believed the death of Christ to be an expiation for sin, *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* must have meant more to the Apostle's mind than merely "for your benefit," though the words do not express more.

*εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, as an acknowledgment of Christ's authority as Head of the Church.

*ἐβαπτίσθητε*, a pass. aor. in a reflexive sense: "ye had yourselves baptized" (cf. note on vi. 11).

**V. 14.** *ὅτι ἐβάπτισα*. The opt. in oblique narration very rarely occurs in the N. Test., except in St. Luke's Gospel and the Book of Acts (cf. Buttmann, N.S. p. 186).

*Κρίσπον*. Crispus was the ruler of the synagogue, who believed in the Lord with all his house, when he heard St. Paul preach during his first visit to Corinth (cf. Acts xviii. 8). He may have been a Jew who adopted a Roman name (cf. Lucius, Rom. xvi. 21). Or he may have been a descendant of the Roman settlers of Julius Cæsar. If so, he was a proselyte of righteousness, of whom there were many among

the Romans (cf. *Dio Cass.* xxxvii. 17, *ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὸ γένος τοῦτο*).

*Γάϊον*, the Greek form of Caius, so that he was probably one of the Roman settlers, like Tertius, with whom he is named in Rom. xvi. 22. He was the Apostle's host during his second visit to Corinth, and the Church met in his house (cf. Rom. xvi. 23). Aquila, with whom St. Paul lodged during his first visit, had now left Corinth and, after a brief sojourn in Ephesus, returned to Rome. Another Gaius, of Derbe, was now with the Apostle in Ephesus (cf. Acts xix. 29; xx. 4).

**V. 15.** *ἵνα* depends on *εὐχαριστῶ*. "My purpose in declaring my thankfulness to God for providentially giving me hardly any occasion to baptize with my own hands is to deprive you of every pretext for alleging that ye were baptized in my name."

*ἐβαπτίσθητε* is the reading of **Σ A B C**. **D** has *ἐβάπτισα*, a reading that appears to have originated in misconception of the Apostle's meaning. But his fear was not that the Corinthians would ascribe to him a wrong motive, but that they would misapprehend the real meaning of baptism. The difficulty is to understand how any member of the Church could have supposed that he had been baptized into the name of Paul. And, if such a supposition were possible, how did the Apostle's omission to baptize with his own hands remove all pretext for it? Christ did not Himself baptize; yet believers are baptized into His name. Rückert thinks the Apostle's argument flimsy. The solution must be sought in the import of baptism. If baptism means no more than the registration of a person in an external society, the Apostle could not attach importance to the boast of some that they had been baptized into his name. He would have treated it with silent contempt. But if baptism is the divinely instituted means whereby a believer is brought into the mystical body of Christ, then to boast of having been baptized into Paul's name would be tantamount to a confession of Paul as Head of the mystical body which is the Church. How would the Apostle have acted, if he had wished to be the founder of a new form of Christianity? Christ's headship rested on an expiatory death. Paul had nothing of this kind on which he might erect his Church. He would have been driven to the universal expe-

dient of all founders of societies. He would have established an external rite of initiation, such as baptism. But he did not do so. He rarely baptized at all. Baptizing was not part of his special commission, which actually differs from the commission given to the other Apostles in not containing any mention of baptizing (compare Acts ix. 15 with Matt. xxviii. 19). The Apostle now thanks God for the omission. He seems to himself to understand at last what the omission meant. He was commissioned by Christ Himself to inaugurate a second epoch in the history of Christianity. In this respect no other Apostle came so near the position occupied by the Divine Founder of the Church. Many would be tempted to regard him as the real founder, and glory in having been baptized into his name. For this reason, he now sees, baptizing was omitted from his apostolical commission. He was at liberty to administer the rite, as Ananias had done and any brother might do. But the circumstances of his life were so arranged that even this was for the most part denied him. No outward initiation of converts entered into the conception of his ministry. Nothing shows more clearly the peculiar greatness of St. Paul's work, or brings out more conspicuously the complete sincerity of his devotedness to Jesus Christ.

V. 16. The *δέ* introduces a limitation or correction of the previous statement (cf. note on ii. 6; Hartung, *Partikell.* i. 168; Jelf, *Gr.* § 767, 3. e).

Στεφανῶ. Stephanas is short for Stephanophorus, as Epaphras for Epaphroditus.

οἶκον, "household," synonymous with οἰκία, xvi. 15. In Acts vii. 10 οἶκος includes even the slaves of the palace.

V. 17. The former part of the verse must be connected with the verses that immediately precede. His reason for not baptizing was that his special work was to evangelize. Οὐ does not here mean "not only;" it means "not" (cf. Winer, *Gr.* § LV. 8; Buttmann, *N.S.*, p. 306).

ἀπέστειλε, "sent as an agent." Erasmus well renders ἀποστέλλω by *lego cum mandatis*.

εὐαγγελίζεσθαι is infin. of purpose, the usual construction after verbs of directing.

The Apostle now proceeds to his arguments.

(1) *That the Gospel is primarily the proclamation of a salvation through Christ is proved from the nature of the message.*

(i. 17-25).

**V. 17.** The latter part of the verse is grammatically connected with the former half, but logically introduces a new thought, that the Gospel is, not primarily a philosophy, but a message. The notion of *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* is carried on in the word *λόγος*. It expresses the distinctive character of the Gospel, as indeed Christ arrogated to Himself the fulfilment of Isaiah's words, *ἔχρισε με εὐαγγελίσασθαι πτωχοῖς* (Luke iv. 18).

*οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου.* The negative particle is *οὐ*, not *μή*, though the infin. *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* is to be supplied, because the words *ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου* are virtually opposed to another clause not expressed, such as *ἀλλ' ἐν μωρίᾳ τοῦ κηρύγματος*. Cf. Thuc. I. 85, where *οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς* is opposed, in a similar way, to a clause to be mentally supplied, such as *ἀλλ' ἔργῳ πρὸς αὐτὰς παρασκευαστέον*. "Wisdom of word" cannot mean merely rhetoric (Theod., Theophyl.), as if it were synonymous with *σοφία τοῦ λέγειν*, for it is opposed to *μωρία* (ver. 18) and *μωρία τοῦ κηρύγματος* (ver. 21). Neither can it denote a heathen system of philosophy; for it is joined with *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*. It must, therefore, mean a Christian philosophy, a system, that is, of theological speculation raised on the basis of a revelation, as opposed to the simple declaration of a fact.

*κενωθῇ*, "emptied" (cf. xv. 14; Rom. iv. 14). The force of *κενὸς* in this connection may be conveyed by the words "empty of content, unreal, not having objective existence, consisting only of opinions, sentiments, speculation." The cross of Christ is a real cause in the moral order of things. To substitute a system of notions, however true and ennobling, for the fact of Christ's death, is like confounding the theory of gravitation with gravitation itself.

**V. 18.** That to regard the Gospel as a mere philosophy deprives it of its cosmical power is proved from the condition of those that perish and of those that are being saved. For the moral state of those that perish effectually prevents them from seeing the greatness and understanding the truth of this

Divine philosophy. It must, therefore, manifest its power to save before it can be recognized as the wisdom of God. Again, those that are saved know in their own experience that the Gospel wields a Divine power and that salvation is, not a theory only, but an operation of God.

ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ, synonymous with εὐαγγέλιον (cf. Eph. i. 13). Σταυροῦ is objective genit. (cf. 2 Cor. v. 19; 1 John i. 1).

ἀπολλυμένοις and σωζόμενοις are not precisely ethical datives ("in the opinion of"), but datives of respect ("in its bearing on them"). They easily pass into the ethical meaning. The Gospel becomes folly in the eyes of those whom it does not save. This explains the fact that some men are even now in a condition that prevents them from seeing the wisdom of the Gospel, while others are now in a condition to acknowledge it. As Chrysostom observes, those that perish are like sick folk to whom healthy food is distasteful, or madmen who abuse their best friends. Meyer thinks the present is here used for the future to express certainty. Winer doubts that it is ever so used; but cf. Bernhardy, IV. S. p. 371. The objection to Meyer's view is that the certainty of perdition or salvation is not relevant to the Apostle's argument. The perdition and the salvation here meant are undoubtedly eternal death and eternal life. (Cf. Phil. iii. 19, ὃν τὸ τέλος ἀπώλεια.)

V. 19. The substitution of a Divine power for human speculation is in accordance with the purpose of God declared through the prophet, that God would at some future time destroy the wisdom of the wise. The time is come.

ἀπολῶ . . . ἀθετήσω. The words are cited from the LXX., Isa. xxix. 14, except that the Apostle has ἀθετήσω for κρύψω. Kautzsch suggests that he wrote ἀθετήσω from a reminiscence of Ps. xxxii. (xxxiii.) 10. The passage in Isaiah has reference to the spiritual blindness and obduracy of Israel, which the prophet traces back to the sovereignty of the Most High. The circumstances differ. But the application of the words to the impotency of human wisdom is justifiable. The principle of God's action is the same in both cases, that spiritual blindness should be punished with spiritual blindness. On the distinction between σοφία and σύνεσις cf. Harless on Eph. i. 8; Ellicott on Col. i. 9. But it must not be here

pressed as the citation is an instance of the parallelism of Hebrew poetry.

V. 20. The prophecy is fulfilled. The world's philosophy is dying. God has through the Gospel turned it into folly. Most expositors, from Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* I. p. 370 Potter) and Chrys. to De Wette and Meyer, see in the Apostle's three questions an allusion to Jewish and Greek philosophy. De Wette and others, after Vitringa on Isa. xxxiii. 18, think the first question includes the other two, of which the former refers to Jewish, the latter to Greek speculations; and Rückert and Hofmann do not succeed in their attempts to throw discredit on the distinction. The name γραμματεὺς was unknown in class. Greek, except as the designation of the clerk of the Ecclesia. But in the New Test. the "scribes" are the Sopherim, the interpreters of the Law and teachers of Rabbinical wisdom; mostly Pharisees and identical probably with the νομοδιδασκαλοί (cf. Luke xxii. 2). But συζητητής would correctly describe a Greek philosopher. Indeed the word is resumed in ver. 22, "Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν. It is not unlikely that the Apostle borrowed the name from the Jewish Cabbalists (cf. Baruch iii. 23; and Vitringa, *De Synag.* p. 670). But the expression is too wide to justify Brucker's supposition that the Apostle is speaking only of the Cabbala or of the germs of Gnosticism (*Hist. Crit. Philos.* II. p. 708). The word expresses precisely the difference between σοφός and φιλοσοφός, the latter the designation said to have been assumed by Pythagoras from a sense of unworthiness (Cic., *Tusc.* V. 3). But all through Greek literature σοφία has a tinge of arrogance from which φιλοσοφία is free (cf. Plat., *Phædr.* p. 278 D; *Sympos.* p. 203 C.; Plut., *De Plac. Philos.* I.). There is perhaps a touch of irony in the Apostle's question, "Where is there a wise man?" Compare Rom. i. 22, φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί, with the common phrase οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι φιλοσοφοί. When the Apostle wrote, Greek speculation was decaying.<sup>1</sup> To find the

<sup>1</sup> I append a few references to modern books: Tenneman, *Manual*, Eng. Trans. p. 149; Archer Butler, *Lectures*, Vol. II. p. 365; Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, Stirling's Trans., p. 143; Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, Eng. Trans., Vol. I. § 62; Caird, *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 21; Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, Th. III. Abth. 2.

teachers of the age, we must turn to the school of Alexandria. But Philo's eclecticism is the best proof possible of the exhaustion of Jewish and of Hellenic thought, inasmuch as it gives expression to the universal yearning for a revelation of God through the Logos.

The Apostle's words are so like Isa. xxxiii. 18 that we must, with Vitringa, suppose them to be borrowed from that passage. If the prophet is asking in triumph, when Ashur has been dashed to pieces, where the men now are that have been appointed by Sennacherib to value the tribute to be raised, to weigh the gold and silver, and to make a recognition of the city to be besieged (so Delitzsch and Cheyne explain the words), then we can have no difficulty in acknowledging that the prophet's language suggested to the Apostle the structure of his threefold question, and gave it a half-concealed tone of triumph.

ποῦ; Cf. xii. 17; Luke viii. 25; Baruch iii. 16; and Soph., *Œd. Tyr.* 390, ποῦ σὺ μάντις εἰ σαφής;

τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, rightly joined to σοφός and γραμματεὺς as well as to συζητητής. The Jews were ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου no less than the heathen (cf. John viii. 23). It is true the Mosaic dispensation is contrasted with the κόσμος (cf. Eph. ii. 12). But that only makes Christ's denunciation of the Jews the more crushing.

αἰῶνος (perhaps from ἄω, "to breathe," though Curtius, *Grundz.* p. 388, reverts to Aristotle's derivation, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι, and compares ἀίδιος, ἐπηετανός, ævum, ætas). The words ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος has sometimes in the New Test. a merely chronological meaning, denoting, in accordance with the notions of the later Judaism, the time up to the (second) coming of Christ, when ὁ αἰὼν μέλλων begins (cf. espec. Tit. ii. 12). To this is sometimes added a moral idea; "this world" being that system of things which is alienated from God, "the world to come" being synonymous with "the kingdom of heaven," that order of things which centres in the revelation of God in Christ (cf. ii. 6; Rom. xii. 2). But the notion of transitoriness is never quite absent from the words; αἰὼν being used of the kingdom of Christ by way of contrast. This distinguishes ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος from κόσμος. In the New Test. the conception of a unity of principle in evil is brought

for the first time into prominence. The unifying power of the personality of Christ confers oneness on all spiritual powers (cf. Martensen, *Dogm.* § 96; Zetzschwitz, *Profangräc.* p. 23).

ἐμώρπαιεν. Not only, to borrow Plato's words (*Apol.* 9), is human wisdom in itself of little worth, but it was also turned into folly by an act of God (cf. Rom. i. 22). When God revealed a way of salvation through what human wisdom despised, human wisdom became foolishness. Celsus seems to allude to this verse when he taunts the Christians with regarding wisdom as an evil, folly as a good (cf. Orig., *c. Cels.* I. 9 and 13).

V. 21. This verse states, not the reason why (Chrys., De Wette, etc.), but the way in which God turned the wisdom of the world into folly. He has accomplished through what the world regarded as folly what the world failed to do through its wisdom. For the end for which all things were made is to know God. Philosophy has not brought Him to light. But God has now made Himself known through a manifestation of mercy and power, that is in men's salvation, and this salvation has been brought to pass through the cross of Christ, which is the κήρυγμα of the Gospel. Origen (*c. Cels.* I. 13) explains the connection in a similar way.

ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Three different explanations have been given of these words:

(1) Macknight, Rückert, Alford render: "as part of the wise arrangement of God." But ἐν cannot mean "as part of," which is a different notion from "in the form of" (ii. 7). Besides, this interpretation introduces an irrelevant notion.

(2) Heydenreich and Maier refer the wisdom of God to the revelation of God given in the Gospel. "God resolved to reveal Himself in Christ as a saviour because the world had failed to know God in Christ as God's wisdom." But the salvation which God has provided for men in Christ is itself the manifestation of God's wisdom.

(3) The great majority of expositors from Chrys. down think the Apostle speaks of the manifestations of God's wisdom in nature and providence, to which Clem. Al. (*Strom.* p. 370 Potter), Meyer and De Wette add the revelation of God given in the Old Test. The objection is the seeming contradiction between the verse and Rom. i. 21, where it is said

that the Gentiles did know God (cf. Gal. iv. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 5). But the contradiction is in the actual history of human thought. The mind of Socrates, for instance, oscillated between an acknowledgment of the popular deities of Greece and a belief in one God, ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάπτων. Plato was a monotheist; yet he considered the myths concerning Zeus, Heré, and other gods a necessary part of education; and by identifying God with the idea of the good he imperilled the notion of the Divine personality.<sup>1</sup> The Stoics were doubtfully pantheists. The prevailing tone of Greek thought is an expression of the utter helplessness of reason to find God—the feeling pensively couched in the doubting question of Æschylus (*Agam.* 155), Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, or ironically in the words of Euripides (*Bacch.* 200), οὐδὲν σοφίζομεθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν. We must add, finally, that there is a great difference between knowing God externally and knowing Him with an inward assent of the soul to God's revelation of Himself.

διὰ τῆς σοφίας, "through its (the world's) wisdom"; not, as Bengel, "through the wisdom of preaching."

εὐδόκησεν, "resolved," denoting not so much the mercy as the free and sovereign will of God (*voluntas liberrima*). Cf. Luke x. 21; Gal. i. 15. The notion is introduced to silence the despisers of the Gospel. Even if the Gospel were in itself ill adapted to reveal God to men, still, as its efficiency is evident in fact, it must be ascribed, if not to God's wisdom, at least to His will and power; and this is enough. Εὐδοκέω does not occur before Polybius. Contrary to most verbs compounded with εὖ, it is formed from a verb, not a substantive (cf. Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 266).

διὰ τῆς μωρίας τοῦ κηρύγματος, "through the folly of what is preached." In 2 Tim. iv. 17 κήρυγμα seems to be used in the sense of κήρυξις, which does not occur in the New Test. In every other passage it means the message. The Greeks did not despise the act of proclaiming truth; they regarded as folly the doctrine preached, which is salvation through the cross.

σῶσαι, that is, from ἀπωλεία, from sin (Matt. i. 21) and

<sup>1</sup> "Die bedeutendsten unter den nachsokratischen Philosophen folgten vielmehr der Richtung, welche schon Sokrates gewählt hatte, um den Polytheismus mit dem Monotheismus zu versöhnen."—Zeller, *Vorträge*, 1.

death, the wages of sin, through faith in Christ (Eph. ii. 8). Though the New Test. writers derived the conception of "salvation" from such passages as Joel ii. 32, which promise deliverance at the coming of Messiah, yet Christ had already given it an ethical application; and the ethical import of salvation is at the core of Pauline teaching. Without this his mission to any other men than the Jews would have been quite beside the mark. A glimmering of this peculiarly Christian conception of the word appears in the closing sentence of Plato's *Republic*: καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀν σώσειεν, ἀν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Αἰθήρης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μινθησόμεθα.

The words "in the wisdom of God" are in antithesis to "the folly of what is preached," and the words "through its wisdom" to the words "them that believe." The cross is the manifestation of God in the Gospel, corresponding to the works of nature and providence; while faith is the eye of the soul that corresponds to human wisdom.

Vv. 22-24. Explanatory of ver. 21. The "world" consists of two very different classes of men, who endeavour to know God in two several manifestations of Him. The Jews find a revelation of God's presence in a physical interruption of the course of nature; the Greeks seek Him in intellectual conceptions. Christianity accomplishes a supernatural work that surpasses all physical miracles, and by so doing proves itself the highest conception ever grasped by the mind of man.

V. 22. Meyer makes ἐπειδὴ . . . ζητοῦσιν the protasis, and ἡμεῖς δὲ . . . ἐσταυρωμένον the apodosis. For δέ introducing an apodosis after ἐπειδὴ, cf. Thuc. I. 11, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν . . . φαίνονται δὲ οὐδ' ἐν ταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι. But we should then expect a particle to connect this with the preceding verse. Hofmann considers the words to be explanatory of πιστεύοντας, as if the Apostle wished to show why men are saved through faith. But the leading thought is the nature of the Gospel, not the way whereby its benefits are received. Olshausen translates ἐπειδὴ by "for," and thinks the Apostle is proving that God has made foolish the wisdom of the world. "He has done so by permitting Jews and Gentiles to seek false objects, such as miracles and wisdom instead of salva-

tion." But this lays the whole emphasis on the first two clauses. Besides, though *ἐπεὶ* sometimes means "for," to translate *ἐπειδὴ* so is contrary to usage. The passages cited by Olshausen do not prove it. Estius, Rückert, De Wette, etc., rightly consider these words to be explanatory of the statement that God has resolved to respond to men's yearnings for a revelation of God by offering them salvation, which is at once the mightiest miracle in the guise of weakness and the highest wisdom in the guise of folly. The word *κηρύσσομεν* looks back to *κήρυγματος*. The Gospel has already been described as an *εὐαγγέλιον* in reference to the benefits it confers. The words *ἐμῶρανεν ὁ Θεός* and *εὐδόκησεν* add the great conception that the Gospel is the outcome of God's sovereign will. It was an act of righteous judgment that proclaimed the foolishness of this world's wisdom. But that judgment was made effectual through another Divine act, the fruit of God's mercy, when He freely resolved to offer men salvation. The Gospel is that divinely authorised proclamation. God's answer to men's demand for miracles and to their search for wisdom is a message, an authoritative proclamation of Christ crucified.

*ἐπειδὴ* . . . *ἡμεῖς δέ*. Rückert says *μέν* must be understood with *ἐπειδὴ*. But the latter clause is not merely antithetical to the former, but introduces an additional thought. "It pleased God to save men through the folly of the Gospel, inasmuch as all men, both Jews and Gentiles, are conscious of spiritual wants, however wayward their efforts to supply them; and, to meet those deep yearnings, we on the other hand, preach Christ crucified." Hence *καὶ* . . . *καί*, not *μὲν* . . . *δέ*. On the alleged omission of *μέν* in apparently antithetical clauses, cf. Fritzsche's exhaustive note on Rom. x. 19; <sup>1</sup> Harless on Eph. v. 8; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 163.

*Ἰουδαῖοι* and *Ἕλληνες* have not the article because many Jews and Greeks were now Christians. He avoids the blunt expression, "*The Jews require a sign,*" etc. Yet the national

<sup>1</sup> He says: "Quotiescunque *μέν* non scriptum est, ne cogitatum quidem est a scriptoribus. Recte autem ibi non ponitur ubi non sequitur membrum oppositum, aut scriptores oppositionem addere nondum constituerant, aut loquentes alterius membri oppositionem quâcunque de causâ lectoribus non indixerunt."

characteristics of both are hit off to perfection in the words *αἰτεῖν* and *ζητεῖν*. To the Jews God has already spoken; and they, from the proud eminence of their divinely sprung religion, "demand" of all upstart religions their proofs and credentials (cf. Matt. xii. 38; xvi. 1; John vi. 30).<sup>1</sup> The Greeks, on the other hand, are seekers; and they seek, as they worship, they know not what. They can only give it the general name of wisdom or truth (cf. Lucret. I. 640, "Gravis inter Graios qui vera requirunt"). The Apostle's statement of a national difference in way of thinking is perhaps one of the latest to be met with in ancient literature. In the second and third centuries a universal syncretism effaced the old national peculiarities of intellectual and moral tendencies under the influence of the natural pantheism of the East. An exception proves the rule. Ælian the sophist was especially honoured in Rome as a survival of the men who, like Cato, had stoutly maintained the national characteristics (cf. Philostr., *De Vitâ Sophist.* ii. 31). Yet Ælian of Præneste wrote in Greek and like a Greek. He professes (*Var. Hist.* xii. 25) to be as deeply interested in Greeks as in Romans. In religion only did nationalism continue to be considered indispensable. Celsus, for example, thought it absurd that Greeks and barbarians should have the same religion. But this only proves how completely a matter of external rites and how entirely separated from the mental and moral life of men it was held to be.

*σημεῖα*. So **Σ** A B C D, Vulg., all the Latin and most of the Greek Fathers. The word means "miracles," as in Rom. xv. 19; 2 Cor. xii. 12. The Apostle alludes to the belief of the Jews that Messiah would do greater miracles than Moses. Every Divine revelation must be replete with miracles and with wisdom. Without miracles no revelation can be proved to be Divine; if it does not offer consummate wisdom, it is proved not to be Divine. But we must advance further. The wisdom and the miracle are both of the very essence of the revelation. The Apostle blames the Jews for demanding miracles on precisely the same grounds as he blames the

<sup>1</sup> A similar allusion to Jewish consciousness of superiority lurks in the word *δογματίζεσθε*, Col. ii. 22, "Why do ye submit to be dictated to by Jewish teachers?"

Greeks for seeking after wisdom. He is combating the theory that the Gospel is to be received because we have already received something else which is not the Gospel. To regard miracles as only external buttresses of our faith, not part of the design, as was done by Paley, is the same kind of error as to rest in the *opus operatum* of a sacrament. It is, in fact, to quote Archdeacon Hare, "the theological parallel to the materialist hypothesis, that all our knowledge is derived through the senses."<sup>1</sup> The only answer to Lessing's question, "If I have nothing historically to urge against the belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, must, I, therefore, believe him to be the Son of God?" is the position which the Apostle takes, that the supernatural facts of Christianity are the essence of Christianity.

V. 23. *κηρύσσομεν*. Instead of seeking we offer; instead of demanding from God we command men in God's name.

*Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον*, not "Christ the crucified one," which would have been *Χ. τὸν ἐστ.*, but "Christ as crucified." Cf. 1 John iv. 3, in *8 C*, *I. X. ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα*, "as having come;" 2 Cor. iv. 5, "Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as servants" (cf. Matt. xxviii. 5).

*σκάνδαλον* (a later form of *σκανδάληθρον*, of the same root as *scando* and our *slander*). It was properly the piece of wood that falls when a creature enters a trap, like *ἵπος* and *ρόπτρον*, on which cf. Hesych. It is synonymous with *πάγιν* in Wisd. xiv. 11. It occurs in the metaphorical sense in LXX. but not in class. writers, who use *προσκοπή* (Polyb.; cf. 2 Cor. vi. 3). Cf. Gal. v. 11; John vi. 60, 61, where the reference is to the doctrine of the cross. Cf. Ignat., *Ephes.* 18; Justin M., *Dial. c. Tryph.* 247. The word appears to have been often on the lips of the Jews. Philo designates any history in the Old Test. that would not fit into his allegories a "scandal."

*μωρία*. Cf. Acts xvii. 18; Justin M., *Apol.* i. 13, *ἐνταῦθα γὰρ μανίαν ἡμῶν καταφαίνονται, δευτέραν χώραν μετὰ τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα θεὸν καὶ γεννήτορα τὸν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπῳ σταυρωθέντι διδόναι ἡμᾶς λέγοντες*. The cross was among the Romans *infelix lignum*, and crucifixion the punish-

<sup>1</sup> *Mission of the Comforter*, Note N. A masterly demonstration of the necessity of miracles will be found in Canon Mozley's *Bampton Lectures*, I. Cf. also Bruce, *Chief End of Revelation*, ch. IV.

ment of slaves and conquered enemies. To preach what was already shame as God's way of salvation was to add insult to folly.

V. 24. αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς κλητοῖς, "but to them, the called;" that is, "those that believe," ver. 21. The other rendering, "but to the called themselves," does not yield any very tangible meaning, though Alford is wrong in saying it would require τοῖς κλητοῖς αὐτοῖς. Cf. John v. 36, αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα, "not only My Father, but the works themselves testify." Cf. Heb. xi. 11, καὶ αὐτὴ Σάρρα, "she also, Sarah;" 1 Thess. iv. 16, αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριος, "He, the Lord."

Χριστόν, accus., not after a supplied κηρύσσομεν, but in appos. to X. ἐσταυρωμένον, and co-ordinate with σκάνδαλον and μωρίαν. Δύναμιν and σοφίαν are explanatory of Χριστόν.

Θεοῦ δύναμιν and Θεοῦ σοφίαν look back to σημεῖον αἰτοῦσι and σοφίαν ζητοῦσι of ver. 22; but they add new elements to the conceptions. God's power is more than a sign; it is also the thing signified. God's wisdom is more than the wisdom of which philosophers were in search. There is an ascent in σκάνδαλον, σημεῖον, and Θεοῦ δύναμις, and a corresponding ascent in μωρία, σοφία, and Θεοῦ σοφία. Ambrose at the Council of Aquileia argued from this verse that Christ is eternal, because the power and the wisdom of God are eternal (cf. Ambros., *De Fide* V. 7). Athanasius uses the same argument frequently. Augustine (*De Trin.* VI. 1) criticises and rejects it. Evidently "power" and "wisdom," when applied to Christ, mean the manifestation of those attributes in the Divine nature. Still a Gospel that consists in the preaching of a cross could not manifest them except for the reason that the crucified One is the power and wisdom of God in the same sense in which He is the Son of God. In effect, therefore, Ambrose is right.

V. 25. Close of the argument. The reason why those that are called see in the crucified One the Christ of God is that the Gospel has proved stronger and wiser than anything human, inasmuch as it saves men, what the world has failed to do.

τὸ μωρόν, "the foolish thing;" that is, the cross, as Chrys., Theod., Theophyl. explain it. A neut. adj. is often used, it is true, for an abstract noun. (Cf. Rom. ii. 4, τὸ χρηστόν for

ἡ χρηστότης, ix. 22, τὸ δυνατόν for ἡ δύναμις; Heb. vi. 17. Cf. Poppo on Thuc. I. 9.) But it is inadmissible here. Besides the unmeaningness and in truth irreverence of such expressions as “God’s foolishness,” “God’s weakness,” the connection of the words tells strongly against this rendering.

(2) *That the Gospel is primarily the proclamation of a salvation through Christ is proved from the character of the Church.*

(i. 26-31).

V. 26 is not, as Meyer and Alford explain, to be joined to what immediately precedes. The Apostle is entering upon his second argument to prove the peculiar nature of Christianity. The cross has not been made void, but is powerful to save; and this is proved from the nature of the Church, the glory of which consists, not in the men that compose it, but in their union with Christ through God’s grace.

βλέπετε, imper., “look at,” etc. (cf. x. 18; Phil. iii. 2). So Chrys., ἐπισκέψασθε. In class. Greek we should have had ἐπί with accus.

κλήσιν, not “condition of life” (Olshaus.), a meaning which κλήσις never has, but “call.” The notion that colours the whole passage, is that the characteristic and in the eyes of the world paradoxical elements in the Church are the result of a Divine act. Κλήσις continues the notion of εὐδόκησεν (ver. 21). Outside the pale of the Church we are in the region of human effort, striving to attain its ends within the limits of law. In the action of Christianity on the world we witness the self-manifestation of the Divine will.

ἀδελφοί. The Apostle is careful to assure his readers of their high Christian brotherhood, now that he directs their attention to the lowliness of their worldly position.

σοφοὶ . . . δυνατοὶ . . . εὐγενεῖς. The “wise” are evidently not only the philosophers, the class. meaning of the word, but educated men in a more general sense, synon. with πεπαιδευμένοι, and opp. to ἰδιώται. Such was Apollos (cf. Orig., c. Cels. III. 73, σοφοὺς κοινότερον λέγων πάντας τοὺς δοκοῦντας προβεβηκέναι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασιν, ἀποπεπτωκότας δὲ εἰς τὴν ἄθεον πολυθεότητα). The δυνατοί are men of rank and political influence, opp. to δῆμος, “the commonalty,” as

in Thuc. II. 65. Such was Sergius Paulus (Acts xiii. 7) and Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts xvii. 34). The *εὐγενεῖς* meant, in the aristocratic ages of Greece, men of high descent, such as the Alcæonidæ at Athens or the Bacchiadæ at Corinth. But when the democracy had been long established, the word degenerated in meaning and came to signify men whose ancestors were virtuous and wealthy, in fact the better sort of freemen, the *honesti* as opposed to the *humiliores* of the Empire (cf. Arist., *Pol.* VIII. i. 7). In the mock funeral oration, which Socrates puts into the mouth of Aspasia, Plato (*Meneæ*. p. 237) sneers at the readiness of the Athenian people to worship birth, and designates all the soldiers that fell in battle *εὐγενεῖς*, because "their ancestors were not strangers, and their children, therefore, were children of the soil." At Athens itself birth never ceased to have a charm (cf. Æschyl., *Agam.* 1009, Paley's note; Ælian, *Var. Hist.* III. 18). There is, consequently, a climax in the Apostle's words: Few intellectual men, few politicians, few of the better class of free citizens, embraced Christianity.<sup>1</sup> The verse breathes the spirit of the Saviour's appeal, as evidence of His divine authority, to the fact that the poor have the Gospel preached unto them.

At first these three classes alike rejected Christianity. Five years before this St. Paul had himself been the laughing-stock of philosophers on Areopagus, the Epicureans deriding his doctrine of Divine providence, and the Stoics being offended at his calling all men to repent. Their scorn was, in most cases, the result rather of ignorance than of aversion. Gallio, the gentle brother of Seneca, thought the dispute between Jews and Christians "a question of words and names"; and Tacitus, himself a Stoic, described Christianity as an "exitiabilis superstitio," because he confounded it with "the atrocious and shameful things that flowed from all parts of the world into Rome" (*Ann.* XV. 44). From the thinkers the politicians and rich men borrowed the principles and prejudices that determined their attitude towards Christianity, at first affecting to despise it, afterwards persecuting its adherents. Eusebius (*Hist. Eccles.* II. 25) says that Nero was the first of the autocrats to proclaim war against the religion of Christ.

<sup>1</sup> In Jer. ix. 23 the same threefold division occurs, but with *πλούσιος* instead of *εὐγενής*. The Apostle probably did not mean much more.

In less than forty years the Apostle's words would no longer represent the condition of things. When Pliny wrote his letter to Trajan about the Christians, A.D. 104—one of the earliest references in a pagan writer to Christianity—many Roman citizens of all ranks were to be found among them (*Ep. ad. Traj.* X. 97). Flavius Clemens and his wife Domitilla, both cousins of Domitian, were charged with atheism, which meant a profession of Christ.<sup>1</sup> Gibbon enumerates the philosophers that had embraced the faith of Christ in the next age after that of the Apostles.

The three classes here mentioned comprehended separate and irreconcilable elements. The thinkers were an aristocracy of intellect, despising public life, and content with the political extinction of Greece. The free citizens, under the Roman regime, gave themselves up to amassing wealth.

*κατὰ σάρκα.* Chrys., *κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον, κατὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν παιδευσιν.* "Flesh" came to have this meaning from the antithesis between the *πνεῦμα*, the supernatural element revealed in Christianity, and the merely human (cf. note on iii. 1). The explanation which derives the meaning of *κατὰ σάρκα* from the notion of kinship is hardly admissible in our passage, but it fits in well in x. 18.

**V. 27.** *τὰ μωρά*, neut. for masc., in speaking of a class, especially to convey some degree of contempt (cf. Gal. iii. 22, *τὰ πάντα*, "all men"). So Thuc. II. 45; VI. 3.

*τοῦ κόσμου*, not "in the opinion of the world" (Theod., Grot.), which would not apply to *ἀγενῆ τοῦ κόσμου*, ver. 28. Meyer understands it of the human race. But this does not account for the emphatic repetition of the word. It means, as in ver. 21, the kingdom of evil, in opposition to the Church; *κόσμου* being genit. of relation. "As appertaining to the world" (cf. James ii. 5).

*ἐξελέξατο*, thrice repeated, because stress is laid, as before, on the fact that the historical development of Christianity has been determined by the free action of God's grace. Here the reference is probably, not to God's eternal election unto salvation (as in Eph. i. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 13), but to the call of the Gospel, synonymous with *κλήσις*, inasmuch as *τὰ μωρά τοῦ*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.* III. 18; Justin M., *Apol.* I. 6, *ἀθεοὶ κεκλήμεθα*.

κόσμου naturally denotes the mass of things in the world. Out of the mass God chooses the Church.

καταισχύνη, that is, because the foolish are chosen the wise "begin with shame to take the lowest place." The aor. subj. is the regular usage for the final clause in Hellenistic Greek. In the New Test. the opt. does not occur in real final clauses.

V. 28. ἐξουθενημένα, "set at nought," "flouted." The word denotes, not mere contempt, but the expression of it (cf. Luke xxiii. 11). The class. equivalent for this Hellenistic word is προπηλακίζω.

τὰ μὴ ὄντα, "things that are no better than if they were not." Τὰ οὐκ ὄντα would mean "things that actually do not exist," which is Tertullian's explanation of this verse (*c. Marc.* V. 5). Cf. Xen., *Anab.* IV. iv. 15: τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ὄντα, and Soph., *Antig.* 1325: τὸν οὐκ ὄντα μάλλον ἢ μηδένα. Even in Rom. iv. 17, though τὰ μὴ ὄντα are non-existing, yet they are represented as being so regarded by the Creator. The distinction is neglected in the Homily that goes under the name of Clement's Second Epistle to the Corinthians, ii. 18, ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὄντας. The slave was τὸ μὴ ὄν. He had no side of his existence distinct from his master's. He was ὅλως ἐκείνου.

V. 29. ὅπως introduces the ultimate end, as ἵνα introduced the subsidiary purposes, vv. 27, 28. Originally ὅπως denoted manner. Hence, as a final particle, it is more objective than ἵνα, and introduces the ultimate aim, which is also the event: "and so it will come to pass" (cf. 2 Thess. i. 11, 12). In Gal. iii. 14 we have ἵνα . . . ἵνα, because both purposes are co-ordinate. Eph. v. 26 is an exception. To put men to shame would, as an ulterior object, be unworthy of God. It is worthy only in so far as it is subsidiary to the design of bringing all His creatures to glory in God.

Πᾶσα σάρξ is a Hebraism for πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, but with a covert allusion to man's weakness and unworthiness to be an object of boasting in the presence of God. The use of πᾶς (or πᾶσα σάρξ) μὴ for μηδείς is another Hebraism. The words are not an exact citation. But they are suggested by Ps. cxliii. 2, and Jer. ix. 23. Man's unworthiness is contrasted with the Christian's special greatness.

*ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ*, “in God’s presence;” that is, in the Church, in which God dwells (cf. xiv. 25). Those that are *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* are *ἄθεοι* (Eph. ii. 12). *Ἐνώπιον* occurs frequently as a prep. in LXX. and New Test., but its class. equivalent would be *παρά* with dat. (cf. Gal. iii. 11).

**V. 30.** In contrast with their former low estate is their present glorious condition of having been placed by God in union with Christ.

*ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Olshaus., Rückert, etc., connect *ἐστε* with *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*: “If you are in Christ, then you are born of God.” This would set in a strong light the contrast between their former and their present conditions. But the connection between being children of God and Christ’s being made their wisdom is too remote, and the phrase *εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ*, as Meyer and De Wette observe, is so characteristic of the New Test., that we must not without very strong reason separate the words. Hofmann, Alford, Webster and Wilkinson, in a similar way disjoin *ἐστε* from *ἐν Χριστῷ*, but explain *ἐξ αὐτοῦ* of God’s free grace. They think an antithesis is intended between *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* (ver. 28) and *ὑμεῖς ἐστε*, between their former nothingness and the being which they now had. But it would not be in the Apostle’s manner not to add something to the notion in the second clause more than the bare opposite of the first clause; and the objection to Chrysostom’s interpretation is equally strong against Hofmann’s, that it destroys the close connection between this verse and the next. We must explain *ἐξ αὐτοῦ* to mean, “it is of God’s grace.” Rückert objects. But we have *ἐξ ὑμῶν* so used, as Neander points out, in Eph. ii. 8, where cf. Harless. We must also join *ἐστε* with *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Yet the emphasis is on *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*. The idea already expressed in *εὐδόκησεν* (ver. 21), *κλητοῖς* (ver. 24), and the thrice repeated *ἐξελέξατο* (vv. 27, 28), is once more stated in another form. “It is of God’s free choice and through God’s power that ye are in Christ Jesus. Boast, therefore, not in yourselves, but in Christ Jesus, your wisdom, and in God, who united you to His Son.”

*ἐγενήθη*, neut., “became,” not pass., “was made” (cf. 1 Thess. i. 5; Acts iv. 4). The form is frequent in LXX. and

New Test., but in class. writers only Ionic and late Attic for ἐγένετο. Ἡμῖν must be placed after σοφία, as in  $\aleph$  A C D, Vulg. So Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort, etc. (B has σοφία ἡμῶν). The words ἀπὸ Θεοῦ must, therefore, be joined, not with σοφία, "wisdom from God," but with ἐγενήθη. We must distinguish also, between ἀπὸ and ὑπό. Though ἀπὸ is sometimes used much like ὑπό, but indicating "a less direct agency" (L. and S.; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 280), it cannot be so understood here; for Christ was the eternal Logos. But He came from God, and, when He had come, He was found to be wisdom for our advantage; *profectus est a Deo tanquam fonte* (cf. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s.v. ἀπό, II. 3). Similarly John vi. 46, παρά. The reference is not to be restricted to Christ's death, but must be extended to the constitution of Christ's person, as God-Man and Mediator.

σοφία . . . δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἁγιασμός καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις. He means more than that Christ was the source of our wisdom, etc. (Fritzsche on Rom. vii. 7). Christ is the manifestation of God's wisdom, etc., in our behalf. As to the relations of these words among themselves, we observe: (1) That τε καὶ joins δικαιοσύνη and ἁγιασμός closely together, as being both on the same plane of thought in relation and contrast to ἀπολύτρωσις. Words joined by τε καὶ are ἐκ παραλλήλου, and words attached afterwards by καὶ are adjuncts. Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 102; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.*, who renders *Antig.* 607 (611), τὸ τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδε, "et in futurum et in quod instat tempus valebit ea lex, atque præterea de præterito." (2) That τε καὶ . . . καὶ would naturally be used to introduce words explanatory of the σοφία. (This against Alford.) Cf. Xen, *Mem.* I. i. 19, Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, where cf. Kühner's note; Thuc. II. 49, τὰ ἐντὸς ἧ τε φάρυγξ καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα. (3) That the position of σοφία, separated from δικαιοσύνη by ἡμῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, suggests the interpretation. (4) That the Apostle's purpose throughout is to represent the Gospel as the power and the wisdom of God. Choosing, calling into the Church the foolish, weak, and worthless, putting to shame the wise and mighty, bringing to nought things that are, uniting believers to His Son, sending His Son

to be righteousness, sanctification and redemption—these are acts of God's power and sovereign will. But in these things we have the most perfect revelation of wisdom. Righteousness, sanctification and redemption are the great spiritual necessities of man; and, from the Apostle's present point of view, they comprehend all the fruits of Christ's death. For these reasons I think *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἁγιασμός* and *ἀπολύτρωσις* are explanatory of *σοφία*. So Neander, Hofmann, Heinrici. The view of Origen, *In Johann.* i. 23, is adopted by most expositors, that righteousness, sanctification, redemption, are additional notions to that of wisdom. If this explanation be preferable, then De Lyra and Bengel's suggestion may seem not to be far-fetched, that wisdom stands in contradistinction to foolish, righteousness to weak, sanctification and redemption to ignoble.

*δικαιοσύνη*, the state of having been justified, the result of *δικαίωσις* (cf. Rom. x. 4). The words *δίκαιον εἶναι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ* (Rom. ii. 13) are explained by *δικαιοῦσθαι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ* (Gal. iii. 11). The conception is borrowed from the Old Test. The laws of God are judgments, *δικαιώματα* (cf. Ps. xviii. 22), and even in those passages in which *δικαιοσύνη* means inherent purity (as Ps. xviii. 20, where it is paralleled by *καθαριότης τῶν χειρῶν*) it regards that moral condition as the ground of an objective justification. In the theocracy ethics necessarily assumed a forensic form. It must do so in all primitive nations, when morality is not yet distinguished from religion, nor religion from politics. Indeed, the development of Greek thought is a gradual unravelling of these threads of human life. In Plato's *Republic*, for instance, the idea of the State occupies the place assigned in the Old Test. to the Invisible King. Consequently the moral condition of the individual is determined, in the one and the other, by his objective relation to the State or King; that is, the central idea of morality is righteousness. So in the teaching of Christ (cf. Matt. vi. 33). The outward theocracy has passed away, and the Greek conception of the *πόλις* gives place to a deeper conception, which represents every man as a *πολίτεια* under the rule of God. This is unquestionably St. Paul's point of view. The Ep. of Barnabas also speaks of *δικαιοσύνη κρίσεως*. Now believers are thus forensically righteous, not

in themselves, but in Christ (cf. 2 Cor. v. 21). Christ is not only their justification, but also the ever-abiding cause of their remaining justified; that is, He is their righteousness.

*ἁγιασμός*. Another conception derived from the Old Test., but assimilated and transformed by Christianity. Jehovah being King of Israel, loyalty was identical with consecration of spirit to God; and as Jehovah was king by indefeasible right, not by his subjects' choice, their consecration must be more than self-devotion; it must be a condition in which they are placed by God. This, applied to the relation of God to believers, means: *first*, that the Christian character is not mere rectitude, but holiness; not only conformity to moral law as the authoritative rule of life, but also assimilation to the moral character of a personal God springing from love; *second*, that this holiness is the result of a Divine act of sanctification—not, like virtue, a human attainment, but the creation of God's Spirit. Hence *ἁγιασμός* here, not *ἁγιωσύνη* (2 Cor. vii. 1). Though there is a tendency in the New Test. to use verbals in *-μός*, from verbs in *-άζω* and *-ίζω*, to denote a condition (cf. Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 511), the forensic meaning assigned to *δικαιοσύνη* necessitates our understanding *ἁγιασμός* of the act of sanctification or moral consecration. Both *ἁγιωσύνη* and *ἁγιασμός* are found only in LXX., New Test. and ecclesiastical writers.

*ἀπολύτρωσις*. *First*, Christ has delivered us from the guilt of sin by the payment of a ransom (*λύτρον*), which is Christ Himself (cf. Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14). *Second*, as a consequence, He will also deliver us from the moral servitude of sin, and this also is brought to pass through the ransom (cf. Eph. i. 14; iv. 30; Rom. viii. 23). In the former, Christ is our redemption by being the formal cause of our justification; in the latter, our redemption means the end and crown of our sanctification. As the former is already included in *δικαιοσύνη*, redemption here must be restricted to final deliverance. So Chrys.

These three conceptions are a summary of the Gospel, from the Apostle's present point of view—God justifies, the Spirit sanctifies, Christ redeems. In these three aspects of the Gospel Christ is come to us from God as wisdom; or, to borrow the more sharply-cut phrases of a later age, Christ

fulfils the office of Prophet by fulfilling the offices of Priest and King.

**V. 31.** Conclusion of the section. "If the Church manifests God's power and wisdom, let the believer boast, not in men, but in Christ, the source of the Church's spiritual privileges of justification, sanctification and final redemption."

*iva.* On the anacoluthon cf. Winer, *Gr.* § LXIV. 7*b*; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 201. The words are a free citation from Jer. ix. 23, 24, with an allusion perhaps to Isa. xlv. 25 (cf. 2 Cor. x. 17; Phil. iii. 3). The Apostle detaches from their connection in LXX. the words that are to his purpose. Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 12, where the prophet's and the Apostle's words are cited together.

*ἐν*, denoting the object of the boast, as in Rom. ii. 17; v. 3, 11 (cf. *χαίρω ἐν*, Phil. i. 18; Col. i. 24). In class. Greek *ἐπὶ* would be used, not *ἐν*.

(3) *That the Gospel is primarily the proclamation of a salvation through Christ is proved from the power of the ministry.*

(ii. 1–5).

The messenger is like the message. As the Gospel is the foolish thing of God, so the Apostle has no wisdom and no utterance of his own (ii. 1, 2). As the Gospel is the weak thing of God, so the Apostle came to Corinth in weakness, fear and trembling (ii. 3). But as Christ is the power and wisdom of the Gospel, so the Spirit is the power and wisdom of the ministry (ii. 4). Finally, as the Gospel is the mystery of God and, therefore, a Divine power, so the ministry is a Divine power and, therefore, the manifestation of Divine wisdom (ver. 5, leading to ver. 6).

**Ch. II. 1.** *καγὼ*, not "I as well as the other Apostles" (De Wette), but "I too in my own person"; that is, "my ministry represents the character of the Gospel: the Gospel is a proclamation, I am a preacher." Cf. Matt. iii. 4, *αὐτὸς δὲ Ἰωάννης*, "John in his own person as distinguished from John as the voice of Christ;" Rom. vii. 25, *αὐτὸς ἐγώ*, "I myself apart from Christ."

*ἐλθὼν* . . . *ἦλθον*, an instance of the pleonastic use of the participle, which occurs even in class. Greek, cf. Hdt. IX.

509, ἔφασαν λέγοντες; Plat., *Phæd.* p. 164, ἀπελθὼν ὄχρετο, espec. in LXX., in imitation of the Heb. idiom, as Ex. iii. 7, and New Test., as Acts vii. 34; Heb. vi. 14. It emphasizes, however, the notion of the verb. The Apostle's having come to Corinth was itself worthy of mention. The Gospel was not a plant of native growth. Christianity is not a mere development of the ancient world, but a new and supernatural beginning.

κατά, not "by way of" (De Wette, Alford, etc.), but "after the model of," "taking as my standard." So even in Phil. ii. 3, κατὰ ἐριθείαν, "in accordance with the dictates of party-spirit" (cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 446 B, κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων βίον). The Apostle's ideal was not pre-eminence as a philosopher or an orator. He wished to "fashion" his ministry "after" the Gospel he preached. The words ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κήρυγμα τοῦ σταυροῦ may be mentally supplied.

The clause οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας is better connected with καταγγέλλων than, as Hofmann, with ἦλθον. In that case the Apostle would probably have written ἀλλὰ κατήγγειλα.

καταγγέλλων. The pres. implies that he began to declare as soon as he came to Corinth. Cf. Thuc. II. 73, ἦλθον ἀπαγγέλλοντες; Xen., *Cyr.* VII. iv. 7, ἦκον ἐρωτῶντες. So Acts xv. 27; xx. 25; 1 Cor. iv. 14; xiv. 6. It is pres. of manner, to be distinguished from fut. of purpose. "Came by way of declaring."

For μαρτύριον (BD Vulg.) ♂ (first hand) A have μυστήριον, which is adopted by Westc. and Hort, Rev. Vers. Though the MS. evidence is pretty evenly balanced, and though elsewhere "the mystery of *Christ*" is the invariable phrase, still μυστήριον is probably the true reading. The notion that the Gospel contains God's wisdom in the garb of folly is pertinent to the Apostle's purpose, and is precisely what "mystery" implies. The Apostle is showing the resemblance between his declaration of the Gospel and the Gospel itself. Both are wisdom; both appear to be folly. Cf. Justin M., *Dial.* 7, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως πεποιήνται τότε τοὺς λόγους, ἅτε ἀνωτέρω πάσης ἀποδείξεως, ὄντες ἀξιόπιστοι μάρτυρες τῆς ἀληθείας.

τοῦ Θεοῦ. De Wette, Meyer, etc., consider it to be object.

genit., as the Gospel declares concerning God that He raised Christ from the dead (cf. xv. 15; 1 John iv. 14). If we read *μυστήριον*, then *Θεοῦ* is necessarily subj. genit.; and it is probably so if we read *μαρτύριον*. For the Apostle's purpose is to state that, not only the Gospel, but also the ministry is from God. So Calvin, Grot., Beng., Osiand., Hofm. (cf. 1 John v. 9, 11; 1 Pet. iv. 17; 2 Tim. i. 8; Rev. i. 9; Acts xiii. 26; 1 Thess. ii. 4). The same idea is at the root of the Old Test. revelation (cf. Isa. viii. 16).

V. 2. He proves that his ideal was not pre-eminence in utterance or wisdom, by avowing his previous determination to have no sort of philosophy—except that philosophy of God which is the opposite of all philosophy of man, Christ crucified.

*οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινα*, not "I did not judge that I knew" (Hofm.), but "I determined not to know." The latter rendering is the only one that confers any moral value on his abstaining from preaching after the manner of a philosopher or a rhetorician (cf. vii. 37; 2 Cor. ii. 1). On the transference of the negative, as in *οὐ φασιν*, cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 745. 2 (cf. *οὐ θέλω*, x. 20).

*τι εἰδέναι* (omitting *τοῦ*) is the reading of *Σ A D*. So Lachm., Tisch., etc (cf. Acts xx. 7; but *τοῦ* in Acts xxvii. 1). Origen and Neander emphasize *ἐν ὑμῖν*, as if the Apostle changed his method when he came to Corinth, having in Athens preached at first natural religion (Acts xvii. 22), but in Corinth begun with the peculiar doctrine of Christ's death. Similarly F. W. Robertson. But such a supposition is really inconsistent with the radical change which the man's entire being had undergone at his conversion. Indeed it makes his preaching in Athens an unwarrantable presumption and his conduct morally faulty.

I. X. *καὶ τούτον ἐσταυρωμένον*, a formal and emphatic expression for the person and death of Christ—the two constituents of His atonement; and it was, not merely the disgrace of the *servile supplicium* of the cross, but the doctrine of the atonement that offended the world. The Apostles' words are perfectly consistent with the supreme place assigned in the Acts and by St. Paul to Christ's resurrection. For he is speaking of the living Jesus, who appeared to him on the

way, not of a theological conception nor of the Logos assuming human nature.

**V. 3.** The consequence of that determination was a union of personal fear and ministerial power. From the resemblance in folly between the message and the preacher, the Apostle passes on to the resemblance between them in point of weakness.

*καὶ ἐγώ*, emphatic; as in ver. 1, contrasting the preacher and the message.

*ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ* κ.τ.λ., not merely persecutions (Chrys.), but denoting that complex state of mind which began in a sense of spiritual prostration, then assumed the special form of fear, and found expression at last in trembling. It is not the fear of external danger, but an absorbing sense of responsibility (cf. 2 Cor. vii. 15; Eph. vi. 5; Phil. ii. 12); the mysterious dread felt by the great preachers of all ages and in all sections of the Church, and more or less constantly accompanying the spiritual power of the ministry. But the Apostle had special causes of discouragement. He came to Corinth from Athens, where he had met with very partial success and not founded a Church. At Corinth he was beset with difficulties through the malevolence of the Jews (cf. Acts xviii. 6). His sadness and gloom find utterance in the First and still more in the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, written at the time from Corinth. The word *συνείχετο* (Acts xviii. 5), whether it means "straitened in spirit" or "hard-pressed by enemies" or "zealously intent on the work of the ministry," implies that he was in a state of unusual dejection. The Lord Jesus vouchsafed to appear to him in a night-vision for his encouragement.

*ἐγενόμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, "came to you and was among you" (cf. xvi. 10; Matt. xiii. 56).

**V. 4.** Having drawn a twofold comparison between himself and his message, the Apostle proceeds to state in what the success of his ministry, which he calls *τὸ κήρυγμά μου*, and the greatness of the Gospel, which he calls *ὁ λόγος μου*, essentially consists. Neither of the two depends on the power of demonstration; both manifest their excellence by the demonstration of power.

Various attempts have been made to distinguish between *λόγος* and *κήρυγμα*, such as "private conversation" and

“public preaching” (De Lyra, Bengel, Neander, Olshausen); or “λόγος the more general term and κήρυγμα the more particular” (Meyer); or “λόγος, speech, a matter of language and dialectic, κήρυγμα, preaching, a matter of conviction and participation” (De Wette). The last explanation comes nearest. A comparison of the verse with ver. 18; Rom. xvi. 25; Tit. i. 3, leads to the inference that λόγος means the Gospel, the revelation of the eternal mystery; κήρυγμα, the announcement of that mystery, the preaching of that Gospel.

μου . . . μου, emphatic; contrasting his message with the dogmas of philosophers, his method with theirs.

πειθοῖς, an anomalous form for πιθανοῖς, but formed, as Heinrici observes, after the manner of φειδός from φείδομαι. It occurs only here. The reading in Euseb., *Præp. Evang.* I. 3, ἐν πειθοῖ ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγων occurs more than once in Origen and partly corresponds to the rendering in D and Ambrosiaster, *in persuasione humane sapientie*. It is adopted by Beza. Grotius conjectures πειστοῖς. The evidence of  $\aleph$  B C D in favour of ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις is decisive. But the meaning is well given by Eusebius, *ib.*, τὰς μὲν ἀπατηλὰς καὶ σοφιστικὰς πιθανολογίας παραιτούμενος, and by Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat.* XIII. 8, οὐ σοφιστικὰ κατὰσκέυαλ κινεῦνται νῦν, ἐπεὶ διαλύονται.<sup>1</sup> The Apostle had not the “persuasive accent, to make the worse appear the better reason.” With a contemptuous touch of irony, that reminds one of Socrates in the *Gorgias* and *Apology*, he disclaims all skill in rhetoric, the spurious art of persuading without instructing, held, nevertheless, in high repute at Corinth. But when the Apostle speaks of “the demonstration of Spirit and of power,” he soars into a region of which Socrates knew nothing. Socrates sets σοφία against πειθώ, the Apostle regards both as being on well-nigh a common level from the higher altitude of the Spirit.

That an antithesis is intended in the clause seems evident. Persuasive means effective, powerful; and wisdom means demonstration. He contrasts these persuasive words of wisdom, that is, the power of human demonstration, with the demonstration of Divine power.

<sup>1</sup> The name of sophist was hateful even to heathen writers. Cf. M. Anton. VI. 30, where it is said in praise of Antoninus Pius that he was no sophist.

ἐν, "in the form of" (cf. xiv. 6; Jelf, *Gr.* § 622, 3). It is more than the instrumental dat.

ἀποδείξει, "demonstration," not "proclamation" (Est.), or "display" (Vulg. *ostensione*, as if it were ἐπιδείξει). For the antithesis of persuasion and demonstration, cf. Plat., *Theæt.* 162 E, εἰ ἀποδείξεσθε πιθανολογία, and Arist., *Eth. Nic.* I. iii. § 4, παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. This ἀποδείξεις is the positive side of the ἐλέγξις mentioned by Christ (John xvi. 8). Refutation of the principles of the world and demonstration of the Gospel are the two sides of the work of the Spirit. Hence there can be no doubt that the Spirit of God is here meant (cf. ver. 14). The Spirit proves the truth by power. His demonstration consists partly in an inward illumination that lends to spiritual objects a self-evidencing clearness (cf. Matt. xi. 25–27; xvi. 17; John xiv. 17, 20, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 13; 2 Cor. iv. 6; Eph. i. 18), partly also in a Divine energy moving, without constraining, the will. It was a taunt of the heathen that Christian teachers, instead of proving their doctrines, demanded faith. On this pretext the Emperor Julian excluded them from educated society (cf. Theod., *Græc. Aff.* p. 12). Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 13, where τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως means the Holy Spirit as the mover of the will and author of faith. (Cf. Phil. ii. 13.)

πνεύματος and δυνάμεως are, like σοφίας, subj. genit (cf. ver. 13; 1 Thess. i. 5). "Spirit and power" is not a hendiadys for powerful Spirit. Neither does "demonstration of power" mean miracles (so Chrys.), which would have been plur., δυνάμεων. The error of such writers as Grotius, South, Stillingfleet, who acknowledge no demonstration of the Spirit save the gift of tongues and the power of doing miracles, is responsible for much of the unspiritual character of Christian evidences. Similarly Lessing (*Essay on Demonstration, etc.*), understands prophecy by Spirit and miracles by power.

**V. 5.** Conclusion of the Third Argument; co-ordinate, therefore, with i. 31. *Ἰνα* denotes, not the Apostle's purpose in the ministry, but God's purpose in rendering the Gospel and its effective preaching a folly and a weakness in the eyes of man.

πίστις. The previous paragraph ended with an exhortation

to *boast* in Christ. The present argument closes with the Divine purpose that men should *trust* in God. When preached, the Gospel becomes not merely an object of boasting—it is that in itself—but also an object of trust. *Ἐν* means, therefore, first of all, the object of faith, as in Mark i. 15. The power of God's Spirit is no less to be believed in than the efficacy of Christ's death. But *ἐν* means also that, not the wisdom of men, but the power of God, is the true originator of faith. It denotes the foundation on which faith in Christ rests (De Lyra), or the earth in which the roots of faith fasten and out of which the tree and the sap of life within it spring. Hence *πίστις* is more than an intellectual conviction of the truth (Baur, *Neut. Theol.* p. 154). It is trust in God; and this saving trust grows out of the all-powerful activity of the Divine Spirit. Cf. Eph. iii. 18, *ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρριζωμένοι*.

### C. SECOND ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FACTIONS.

(ii. 6—iii. 4).

Christianity, then, is primarily a Gospel, not a philosophy; and, as such, it addresses itself to all, out of the evil world forming for itself a Church, and creating the supernatural life of faith. But, when it finds fit audience, Christianity is the truest and divinest philosophy. Regarded from that side too, as a wisdom and a knowledge, it is a protest against factious boasting in men. For, *first*, it is God's wisdom; *second*, it is revealed inwardly by the Spirit; *third*, it is understood only by the spiritual man.

#### (1) *Christianity is God's Wisdom.*

(ii. 6—9).

**V. 6.** *σοφίαν*, not “practical wisdom,” Plato's *ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον σοφία*, but, to borrow Aristotle's happy definition, “the science of the highest objects with its head on” (*Eth. Nic.* VI. vii. 3). The notion of *true* philosophy is implied in *σοφία* here, as always in Scripture, except when it is used ironically. Cf. Eurip., *Bacch.*, 393, *τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία*.

*λαλοῦμεν*. St. Paul and the older Apostles were, therefore, agreed not only in their facts (cf. xv. 11), but also in their interpretation of the facts. He says “we” to censure covertly

the party-spirit in Corinth that set one Apostle against another. If the Tübingen theory were in any vital sense true, the Apostle could not have said *λαλοῦμεν*, either honestly or otherwise. It is not unlikely that he intends a special reference to the Churches of Asia Minor, where he now was (xvi. 8), which seem to have attained greater spiritual maturity than the Churches of Macedonia and Achaia.

*ἐν*, "among," *in consessu*, not "in the opinion of" (Grot.), a meaning which *ἐν* has not except in pronominal phrases, as *ἐν ἐμοί*.

*τελείοις*, not "sincere" (Grot.), nor "endowed with the charismata of prophecy and tongues" (Iren., *Hær.* V. 6), but "full-grown," as is proved by the use of *νήπιος* in iii. 1 (cf. xiv. 20; Eph. iv. 13, 14; Heb. v. 13). So in Philo, *Ieg. Alleg.*, pp. 57, 58, οὐδένο<sup>ς</sup> γὰρ τούτων ὁ τέλειος δεῖται . . . τῷ δὲ νηπίῳ [χρεία] παραιρέσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας. Hence, all Christians are not *τέλειοι*, as Clem. Al. (*Pæd.* I. 6, *υἱοποιούμενοι τελειούμεθα*), and Chrys. (*τελείους τοὺς πεπιστευκότας*) thought. The Gospel is the *power* of God to every believer (cf. i. 24; Rom. i. 16). But with the growth of the Christian character a capacity to discern spiritual things is created and developed. Origen aptly observes that some have come into the Church from the wisdom that is according to the flesh, and of those some have advanced even to the wisdom that is Divine.

In the opinion of the majority of commentators from Castalio to our own day the words imply that the Apostles taught deeper and more mysterious doctrines to mature Christians than to the less advanced; and in early times Origen (*c. Cels.* III. 19) adduces this passage to prove the distinction between the *fideles* or baptized and the catechumens. But on the question what these doctrines were, they are not agreed. Meyer and De Wette think they were all questions connected with the future development of Messiah's kingdom. Osiander explains them of the counsels of grace, the person of Christ, the fall of man, the establishment of the kingdom of God. In addition to the arbitrariness of such conjectures, the view is open to some objections. *First*, the Apostle in effect tells us in the subsequent verses what this wisdom consists of. It includes "the things which God hath prepared for them that

love Him;" which "the princes of this world" did not know; which are "freely given to us of God." But these things the Apostle preached to all alike. Without them Christianity is not a Gospel. In Col. i. 26 the "word of God," that is the Gospel, is itself called "the mystery hidden from the ages." In Eph. vi. 19 τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ εὐαγγελίου means "the mystery which is the Gospel." It is also evident that the wisdom which the rulers of this world did not know is the same as the wisdom which babes in Christ could not understand (iii. 1). *Second*, the distinction of exoteric and esoteric doctrines is not in character with the first age of the Church. That Paul the missionary preacher should withhold from the world the profoundest truths, from which all other truths derived their value and power, is hard to believe. Chrys. virtually admits it when he acknowledges "that there were no catechumens then" (*Hom. in xii.* 3); and the distinction of *fideles* and *catechumeni* was but the fixed and artificial form of the distinction which expositors discover in this verse.<sup>1</sup> It is true that in Heb. v. 11-vi. 3 we perceive the beginning of a tendency to divide theological truth into sets of doctrines. But the στοιχεῖα of that passage consist of the broad outlines in the spiritual history of the believer, repentance and faith, baptism and laying-on of hands, resurrection and judgment, whereas here the doctrines which the Apostle says he preached to the Corinthians, who were babes in Christ, cluster around the person and death of Christ. We infer that the Apostle distinguishes, in our passage, not two classes of truths, but two aspects of the same truths. He is, in fact, stating one of Philo's fundamental distinctions, but with a difference. Christian wisdom does not consist in discovering allegories in the history and ordinances of the Old Testament. Even in the Epistle of Barnabas the distinction between πίστις and γνῶσις is more like Philo's than St. Paul's. It is Clement of Alexandria that first rises to a worthy conception of the Apostle's words. But his account of it is marred by one defect, which is, that he describes πίστις as an intellectual

<sup>1</sup> In the Church of Alexandria alone was there a conscious attempt in the ante-Nicene period to introduce into Christian teaching a distinction resembling, as Origen (*c. Cels.* II. 7) confesses, the distinction of exoteric and esoteric, formerly ascribed to Pythagoras and Aristotle.

apprehension of truth, not as the trust of the heart and an act of the will. It was this error that gave rise to a *disciplina arcani* in Clement and to Origen's principle of exegesis, that Scripture has a natural, a moral, and a mystical meaning. Nevertheless, Clement's distinction is pre-eminently Pauline. For the Apostle here says that Christ as He is the power of God is the object of trust, and that Christ as He is the wisdom of God is the object of knowledge. Cf. espec. Clem. Al., *Strom.* VII. p. 865 Potter, ἡ μὲν πίστις . . . περαιουμένη.

σοφίαν δέ. On δέ introducing a limitation cf. note on i. 6; Rom. iii. 22.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων. Tertullian (*c. Marc.* V. 6) explains the rulers to be the secular power; Origen's view (*de Princ.* III. ii. 1) that evil spirits are meant, as in John xii. 31; 2 Cor. iv. 4, arose from the early patristic doctrine of the atonement, that Christ gave His life a ransom to the evil one. (Cf. Orig., *Comm.* in Matt. xvi. 8; Cyril of Jerus., *Cat.* XII. 15.) Ambrosiaster explained the verse in the same way. So also Cajetan and Estius. But it is inconsistent with ver. 9. The Apostle must mean the wise, the mighty, and the noble of i. 26. But he regards the world under the figure of a kingdom (cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. ii. 2; John xiv. 30). He contemplates the two antagonistic principles in their historical manifestations.

τῶν καταργουμένων, pres.; the Divine purpose of destroying the "world" is already beginning to find its accomplishment. "Far from speaking this world's wisdom, we speak a wisdom that is actually bringing it to nought." The Apostle does not, therefore, refer to the future coming of Christ (Meyer), nor to the evanescent nature of earthly things (Chrys.). Cf. Is. xix. 12.

V. 7. The emphasis in ver. 6 is on σοφίαν, in ver. 7 on λαλοῦμεν. Hence ἐν μυστηρίῳ must be connected with λαλοῦμεν (De Wette, Meyer), not with ἀποκεκρυμμένην (Aquinas, Grotius), which would have been τὴν ἐν μ. ἀποκεκρυμμένην, nor with σοφίαν (Theophyl., Beza, Evans), for σοφία is left purposely anarthrous: "a wisdom of God."

ἐν μυστηρίῳ (from μύειν, to close the mouth; cf. Curtius, *Grundz.* p. 338). The word "mystery" has four meanings, which may be arranged almost in chronological order: (1)

“That which it is forbidden to divulge except to the initiated.” Such were the secrets of the political and religious festivals held in most cities of Greece; cf. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.*, *Eleus.* § 6. We have a trace of this meaning in Matt. xiii. 11. In 2 Pet. i. 16 it is said that the Apostles did not follow the false track (ἐξακολουθήσαντες) of rationalised myths (σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις), but were eye-witnesses by initiation (ἐπόπται) of Christ’s majesty (cf. Col. ii. 3). (2) “That which cannot be known except by revelation” (cf. Rom. xvi. 25; Eph. iii. 3, 4; Col. i. 26. Add Ignat., *Ad Ephes.* 19). (3) “Sacred ceremonies that have a symbolical or spiritual significance;” sometimes restricted to denote the Eucharist. After the time of Tertullian this is the prevailing signification, and its Lat. equivalent is *sacramentum*. (4) “A truth that transcends the human intellect to comprehend,” and this may be either an absolute impossibility or impossible till the Spirit of God gives an inward revelation. In the present passage the word includes somewhat of all these meanings, except the third. The word τέλειος, while it signifies “full-grown,” contains an allusion to initiation into mysteries. The Apostle’s words are apparently parodied by the Gnostic Valentine. Cf. Epiphani., *C. Hær.* I. 31.

ἀποκεκρυμμένην, that is, not only it is passed over in silence (cf. Rom. xvi. 25), but also it is intentionally concealed by God; for it was a mystery of His will (cf. Eph. i. 9; Col. i. 27; Baruch iii. 37).

ἦν, that is, the wisdom of God; not simply the plan of salvation (Est., Billr.), but the Divine wisdom which the mature Christian sees in it.

προώρισεν, “fore-ordained,” before it was revealed. Eph. i. 5 and Ellicott’s note. The word is to be connected with “unto our glory.” This is the proof that it excels the wisdom of the world and our warrant for speaking it. To supply γνωρίσαι after προώρισε destroys the meaning.

εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν. The wisdom of the great men of the world ends in their destruction; God’s wisdom leads, not only to our salvation, but to our glory, which is the Christian conception of happiness. *Εὐδαιμόνια* does not occur in the New Test. Δόξα expresses two notions that are alien to the Greek conception of happiness; that the blessedness of the righteous

is in the highest degree abundant and that it is a reflection of God's blessedness. The world's wisdom stops at a mystery, and this is man's misery; God's wisdom reveals a mystery beyond, and in receiving new revelations of this mystery man's supreme happiness for ever consists.

**V. 8.** This verse is at once a proof of the previous statement that this wisdom was hidden by God and a preparation of the reader for the argument of the following verses, that men cannot know the wisdom of God without the illumination of the Spirit.

ἡν, that is, the wisdom (Chrys. indirectly, De Wette, Meyer), not the glory (Cor. a Lap., Billr., Stanley), which would be irrelevant and superfluous (cf. Rom. viii. 18; 1 John iii. 2).

ἐσταύρωσαν. The contrast between "they crucified" and "the Lord of glory" is intentional (cf. Heb. xii. 2). Christ was put to death by the rulers of the world as the representatives of its highest wisdom, which has proved itself foolishness in not knowing the Son of God. The triumphant antithesis to this verse is Gal. vi. 14. The world that crucified Christ has been crucified by the power of Christ's cross.

Κύριον τῆς δόξης, not "the dispenser of glory" (Aug., *De Trin.* I. xii. 24, quod ipse glorificet sanctos suos), neither is it a Hebraism for "glorious Lord" (Heydenr.), but "the Lord to whom glory belongs as His native right." It is genit. of characteristic quality (cf. Acts vii. 2; Eph. i. 17; 1 Thess. v. 23). Glory is the peculiar attribute of Jehovah among all the gods (cf. Ps. xxix. 1). The expression is theologically important because it implies that Jesus was Lord of glory, that is, Jehovah, and that this Lord of glory died (cf. Acts iii. 15<sup>1</sup>). It is an instance of the *communicatio idiomatum*, in reference to the meaning of which the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches divided; the former maintaining that the attributes of the one of the two natures in the person of Christ, that is to say, the Divine nature, are communicated to the other, that is, the human; the latter teaching that the acts

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Orig., *Comm.* in Rom. i. 6: "Omnia quæ carnis sunt ascribuntur et Verbo, quomodo et quæ Verbi sunt prædicantur in carne. Jesum vero et Christum et Dominum invenimus sæpe ad utramque naturam referri, ut est illud, Unus Dominus noster Jesus Christus, per quem omnia, et iterum, Si enim cognovissent nunquam Dominum majestatis crucifixissent." So Athan., *C. Apollin.* II. 16; Aug., *De Trin.* I. xiii. 28. Cf. Aquinas *in loc.*

of either of the two natures are the acts of the Divine-human Person of the God-Man. The use of *Kύριος* involves a reference in *δόξα* to more than Christ's exaltation.

**V. 9.** Not only was God's wisdom unknown to the princes of this world, but those things in which it manifests itself are in their nature such that their inner meaning cannot be known without a revelation of the Spirit within. The verse is more than a proof (Cor. a Lap., Bengel) that the princes of the world did not know God's wisdom. God's wisdom has manifested itself in things and in facts. But these facts of Christianity have an inner life and meaning, which is hid, not merely from God's enemies, but also from all creatures, and must be inwardly revealed in order to be known. The Apostle does not give that revelation. God's Spirit bestows it on the initiated. We must have the Spirit to know the things of God, though in words they may be spoken to all. The Apostle himself can only tell us what they are not. They are not what eye hath seen, that is, the glories of the visible creation; nor what ear hath heard, that is, doctrines taught by a master to his disciples; nor what springs up in the heart of man, that is, the creations of imagination and desire. The ascent is to be noticed. The works of God in nature have an excellence and beauty that does not invest the great ones of the world; a lily is more gloriously arrayed than Solomon. But there are thoughts in God too great ever to be visibly represented in ocean depths and blazing suns. Yet some at least of even these thoughts are expressed in human language and received into our minds. But the heart desires what it cannot utter in words, and "makes," by the force of imagination, forms of goodness and beauty that have a being only "in the land that is very far off." But beyond nature, beyond ideas, beyond the ken of imagination and the reach of merely natural desire, are the things that God has actually prepared, the completed reality of the Gospel. It may, further, be asked if the Apostle intends this to be an exhaustive division of the things that are not the hidden wisdom of God. If not, why does he mention nature, doctrine, and the ideal? These are the outward garb of the eternal mystery. It manifests itself, first, by taking its place in human history through the fact of the incarnation; second, by a system of Christian truth, a philosophy of the

Divine revelation in Christ; third, by an ideal of perfection. It was necessary that the Divine mystery should manifest itself in these human forms, because Christ is primarily a power; that is, He is a new element in human history, a new force in truths of doctrine, a higher ideal of moral perfection. But no external act or object can of itself, apart from the spiritual insight of the onlooker, be a revelation of anything beyond power, and no manifestation of power can be an adequate revelation of God. The supreme act of Divine love, that God should send His Son and the Son sacrifice Himself for us, can be nothing more to an unspiritual man than a manifestation of infinite power, if it can be that. These things have an inner life known to those who love God.

Many writers, from Irenæus, Clem. Al., Origen, Cyprian, Augustine, to Meyer, suppose the Apostle is speaking of the future blessings of heaven. Several Rabbis so explain Isa. lxiv. 4, as if it meant that the prophets indeed foretold the days of Messiah, but the world to come no eye had seen, except God alone. Cf. Wisd. ix. 16, τὰ δὲ ἐν οὐρανοῖς τις ἐξίχνιασεν; But to exclude present insight into Divine things is to break away from the general purport of the chapter.

καθὼς γέγραπται. The perf. signifies that it still abides as authoritative in Scripture. Origen (*Comm. in Matt.* xxvii. 9) says he never heard of any one that considered this Epistle spurious because the writer cites these words from the apocryphal Book of the prophet Elias. Chrys. thinks the words are taken from a lost book. They resemble too closely Isa. lxiv. 4 to permit a doubt that Jerome (*Ep.* 57, *Ad Pamm.*) is right in saying that the Apostle had in his mind the prophet's words, to which we must add Isa. lxv. 16 (17); and Clement of Rome (*Ad Cor.* 24) alters the Apostle's ἀγαπῶσιν to ὑπομενοῦσιν, as it is in Isaiah. If, with Delitzsch and Cheyne, we render the prophet's words thus: "Yea, from of old men have not heard nor perceived with the ear, (and) eye hath not seen, a God beside thee, who will do gloriously for him that waiteth for Him," then there is no accommodation to an alien purpose in the Apostle's use of the passage. Prophet and Apostle express the same truth, though they do not refer to the same manifestation of it.

ἀ . . . αὐτόν. Osiand., De Wette, etc., think the words

are an anacoluthon. If the words were an exact citation, it might be so. But as the Apostle inserts the relat. pron., he must have intended to place the citation in grammatical construction. Lachm. and Hofmann make ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπεκάλυψεν the apodosis. But in that case the antithesis between eye not having seen and God having prepared, both being in the protasis, is entirely missed. It is preferable, therefore, with Erasm., Est., Meyer (later Edd.), Alford, Heinrici, to connect the words with what precedes as an objective clause after λαλοῦμεν. "We speak the things which," etc.

ἐπὶ καρδίαν . . . ἀνέβη. On this Hebraism cf. Acts vii. 23; Herm., *Past. Mand.* IV. i. 3.

ὅσα ἡτοίμασεν. So A B C, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort. The word ὅσα (*quam pulchra*) implies that these things are different in kind from what eye has seen, etc. The Apostle has altered the prophet's ἐποίησεν into ἡτοίμασεν, which expresses, more than ἐποίησεν, first, that the Gospel is the outcome of Divine thought; second, that it is designed to supply the spiritual wants of men; third, that it is now completed (cf. Matt. xxii. 4, 8).

τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν. Love is the eye that sees, the ear that hears, the heart that realizes the things of God (cf. xiii. 8, 12; Eph. iii. 18). The Apostle has substituted ἀγαπῶσιν for ὑπομενοῦσιν ἔλεον, because the revelation of God, which the saints of the Old Test. waited for as still to come, has now been given. This is another proof that the Apostle is not speaking exclusively or mainly of the future glory of heaven. That glory we still wait for.

(2) *God's wisdom is revealed inwardly by the Spirit.*

(ii. 10–13).

V. 10. ἡμῖν, that is, the τέλειοι. Meyer well observes that the word is spoken in a tone of triumph.

ἀπεκάλυψε. This is scarcely an instance of the aor. being used for the perf. Winer (*Gr.* § XL.) says it is never so used. But cf. Goodwin, *Greek Moods*, etc., p. 25; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 171; and see Xen., *Mem.* I. vi. 4; Thuc., I. 73, παρήλθομεν. Here, however, it is a pure aor. The Apostle is speaking of the revelation given to Christians as an event that began a new epoch in the world's history.

διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος. **Σ** **A B C** omit αὐτοῦ. But it does not change the meaning; for the following verses prove that the Spirit of God, not the human spirit, is meant.

ἐρυννᾶ. So **Σ A B C**. It is the Alexandrian spelling of ἐρευνᾶ. Cf. Rom. xi. 33; 1 Pet. i. 10; Barn. Ep. iv. 1. (Hilgenf.). Here the Spirit, in Rom. viii. 27 God, in Rev. ii. 23 Christ, is said to "search." Hence it does not mean searching in order to discover, but expresses the activity of the Divine knowledge. So Meyer. The LXX. never uses ἐρευνᾶν of God's knowledge, but δοκιμάζειν, which expresses, not so much activity as thoroughness of knowledge. Chrys. makes it refer to the accuracy, others (as Greg. Naz., Or. xliii. 65) to the rich fulness, of the Spirit's knowledge. But all this misses the point. The Fathers justly use the word to prove the Spirit's proper Divinity. But the argument is that the Spirit is ever *active* in fathoming the depths of God.

τὰ βάθη, not "deep things," but "depths," *mysteria interiora* (Aug.). In Rom. xi. 33 the Apostle joins together the ideas of depth and unsearchableness.<sup>1</sup>

**V. 11.** He proves by an analogy that we cannot know the things of God without the revelation of the Spirit of God. No man knows another's thoughts; so none can know God's thoughts until He utters them. Does "Spirit of God" here mean more than the self-consciousness of God? Does not the force of the Apostle's argument lie in the analogy between the self-consciousness of man, knowing what is in man, and the self-consciousness of God as it knows what is in God? Yes, say Osiander, Meyer, Kling, after Baur (*Neutest. Theol.* p. 207). But it would be palpably absurd to say that God reveals anything to men through His own self-consciousness, unless the self-consciousness of God is identical with the Holy Spirit. This, again, would involve that the procession of the Spirit is prior in idea to God's self-consciousness, whereas His self-consciousness as *Deus* must be prior, in order of ideas, to His self-consciousness as *fons deitatis*. We must not, therefore, press the analogy. If we admit that the Holy Spirit knows the things of God, it is not necessary to the validity

<sup>1</sup> Hilgenfeld (*Zeitsch. f. Wiss. Theol.* XV. p. 223) does not hesitate to assert that there is a sarcastic allusion to the Apostle's words in Rev. ii. 24; that is, the Apostle John calls the Apostle Paul's God Satan!

of the Apostle's reasoning that He should know them as man knows the things of man, by self-consciousness. Both are knowledge through introspection, and this is enough. The view of Baur is rejected by De Wette and Delitzsch (*Bibl. Psych.* IV. § 4). If the Spirit is neither the human spirit nor the Divine self-consciousness, a more decisive declaration of His personality cannot be.

τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, man's entire intellectual and moral nature. It includes νοῦς and, as Origen (*Comm. in Rom.* ii. 15) says, conscience also, and is synonymous with Plato's ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος (cf. Matt. xxvi. 41; 2 Cor. vii. 1; 1 Pet. iv. 6). This use of πνεῦμα is to be carefully distinguished from its more special signification of the Divine in man.

οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν. So A B C D, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort. Οἶδα is to know a fact; ἔγνωκα, to know the inner nature of a thing. The distinction is perhaps not to be pressed here (cf. John viii. 55). The perf. means *cognita hibeo*. Ambrose compares Matt. xi. 27; justly. No one knows the Father save the Son; no one knows the depths of God but the Spirit; an inconsistency in appearance only.

To τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ he does not add τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, because the spirit of man is in him as part of him, but the Spirit of God is God and the whole of the Divine essence. The patristic phrase ἐν Θεῷ refers to the αὐτοθεός or Father, and expresses the perichoresis of the Divine persons. But it may be questionable whether the phrase "tres προσώπα in Deo" is correct.

#### V. 12. The Spirit reveals by dwelling within.

τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου. Hofmann explains it of the Spirit of God as the principle of life, physical and intellectual, in all creatures. But ἐλάβομεν would then be inappropriate, and the antithesis that runs through this and the latter part of the first chapter between the kingdom of God and the world, compels us to understand by κόσμος, not the creation (as Theod. Mops.), but the kingdom of evil, the antagonist of the revelation of God in Christ. Meyer and Alford think the personal "god of this world" is meant. In favour of this is the antithesis that would then emerge between the personal Spirit of God and the personal spirit of the world. "To receive the spirit of the world" would then mean to be under

the influence and in the possession of Satan, which is in accordance with the general representation of Scripture that the world is in the power of the evil one (cf. 1 John v. 19). The objection to this interpretation is that St. Paul does not elsewhere use the word *πνεῦμα* as a personal appellation in the sense of an evil spirit. The verse that bears closest resemblance to the present passage is Eph. ii. 2, where the construction of the genit. *πνεύματος* is doubtful, but on the whole it had better be taken in apposition to *ἐξουσίας*. The world is the empire of Satan, and that empire stands together by means of the spirit or principle of evil. Similarly here the spirit of the world will be the principle of evil that binds together the kingdom of darkness and makes it, not a chaos, but a *κόσμος*, an organization contrived to subvert the kingdom of Christ. It is not necessary to the Apostle's purpose that this spirit should be a person, provided it is the central unifying principle. Now such a spirit as this would effectually incapacitate a Christian to comprehend the things of God. The minds of those that believe not are blinded. The aor. *ἐλάβομεν* refers to the time of regeneration, when the believer received the Spirit of adoption (cf. Rom. viii. 15). The revelation of God can be given only through God. "God, who is the object of knowledge and love, must be Himself the principle of knowledge and love" (Martensen, *Christl. Dogm.* § 53). Cf. Aug., *Conf.* XIII. xxxi. 45: "Quidquid in Spiritu Dei vident quia bonum est, non ipsi, sed Deus videt quia bonum est."

ἐκ. Inasmuch as every revelation of God can be received only through God, there must be an actual going forth of the Spirit of God to dwell in man. Hence, though ἐκ does not here express the truth of the Spirit's procession (as Theod. explains), yet it implies it. The Constantinopolitan Creed changed the *παρά* of John xv. 26 into ἐκ, perhaps from a reminiscence of the present passage, the framers of the Creed apparently<sup>1</sup> translating from Tertullian. The purpose of the words in this place is to show that what imparts certainty and depth to the mature believer's knowledge of the things of God is the identity of that which bestows and that which apprehends the revelation. God within teaches the man's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Swete, *History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Spirit*, p. 76.

spirit to understand the revelation of God above; God in us reveals God in our nature.

τὰ χαρισθέντα. The aor. is not (as probably in Phil. i. 29) to be taken in the sense of the perf., but refers to the gift once for all made to man in the facts of Christ's death and resurrection, the contents of the mystery. The argument still advances. For if the thoughts of God must be revealed in order to be known, much more are the free actions of God's heart. Human love never forecast what Divine love would do. God's self-sacrifice was a conception not understood even by God's peculiar people, though taught for ages by priest and prophet.

V. 13. We teach them also through the same inward illumination of the Spirit.

οὐκ ἐν διδακτοῖς . . . Πνεύματος. **N** ABCD omit ἁγίου. So Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort, Rev. Vers. It is better away. "Taught by Spirit"—by a supernatural indwelling light.<sup>1</sup> Hofmann connects these two clauses with κρίνοντες. But λόγοις suggests that they should be connected with λαλοῦμεν. The Apostle has already said that he spoke the things of God; he now adds in what words he spoke them. Δάλω is preferred to λέγω, because they are the utterances of the Spirit (cf. xiv. 2).

σοφίας and πνεύματος are genit., as Erasmus saw, not after λόγοις, but after διδακτοῖς, as in John vi. 45. Διδάκτος is espec. apt to take the genit. (cf. Soph., *El.* 344). But other words not derived from verbs that govern the genit. have the same construction. Cf. γεγυμνασμένην πλεονεξίας (2 Pet. ii. 14); εὐλογημένοι τοῦ πατρός (Matt. xxv. 34). It is rare in class. prose. Cf. Porson on *Eur. Or.* 491, πληγὴς θυγατρὸς. This verse makes no reference to the Apostles' special inspiration as writers of the New Test. (Hodge, etc.). Cf. 1 Thess. iv. 9. The Apostle rests, not indeed his authority, but his ability, to teach on the fact that the Spirit of God enlightened him, as he enlightens other mature Christians.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Harless on Eph. ii. 22, p. 267: "Τὸ πνεῦμα ohne Artikel als inwohnend einem menschlichen Subjecte gedacht wird. Vgl. Röm. viii. 5, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα (ὄντες) τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος (φρονοῦσιν), im ersten Satzglied ist πνεῦμα inneres normgebendes Princip, im zweiten ist τοῦ πνεύματος der objectiv wirkliche, heilige Geist."

πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ συγκρίνοντες. The various interpretations offered of these words differ according to the meaning assigned to συγκρίνω and the gender of πνευματικοῖς. (1) Calvin, Beza, Cor. a Lap., De Wette, Meyer, etc., render συγκρ. by *accommodantes*, *aptantes*, and consider πν. neuter: "adapting spiritual words to spiritual things," and not language incongruous, as we should be doing if we spoke the things of God in words taught by human wisdom. But the Apostle has said this already in effect; and according to this view there is a play on the word "spiritual," which is not in the Apostle's manner; for "spiritual words" can only mean words taught by the Spirit (cf. Eph. v. 19), but "spiritual things" must mean things that reveal God. (2) Estius, Olshausen (doubtingly), render συγκρ. by "adapting," but consider πν. to be masc.: "adapting spiritual things to spiritual men." But this is the direct opposite of what the Apostle declares, that spiritual men understand spiritual things, so that no adaptation of them to their capacity is needed. (3) Bengel, Rückert, Stanley, Alford (latest Edd.), Hofmann, Heinrici render συγκρ. by *interpretantes* and consider πν. to be masc.: "interpreting spiritual things to spiritual men." But it is only in reference to dreams and visions that συγκρίνω means "to interpret," and that, with few exceptions, in LXX. In no passage are the things of God represented as dreams to be interpreted or allegories of which the Apostles have the key. (4) Neander's rendering: "interpreting spiritual things by spiritual words," is open to the same objection. Similar to this is Grotius's rendering, but he restricts the reference to the interpretation of Old Test. prophecies, which would be foreign to the Apostle's purpose. (5) Theod. Mops., Chrys., Theod. thus: "proving the truth of spiritual things (whether Old Test. types, as Chrys. says, or the teaching of the Spirit, as Theod. Mops. says) by the demonstration of the Spirit." But συγκρ. does not elsewhere signify "to prove." (6) The rendering of the Auth. Vers., "comparing spiritual things with spiritual," is satisfactory. Christianity is a Divine wisdom. But this means, from the side of teacher and of learner, that revealed truths are combined so as to form a consistent and well-proportioned system of truths in their correlation. The higher Christian training resembles Plato's

criterion of dialectical power, the faculty to see the relation of the sciences to one another and to true being (cf. *Rep.* VII. p. 517). With *συγκρίνοντες* compare Plato's *συνοπτικός*. The words are a clear statement of the necessity for an objective teaching, and its spirit is opposed to the theory of the Clementine Homilies (xiii. 6) that men require only an inward revelation. It is this objectiveness of the revelation that saves the Apostle's conception of the province of the spiritual man from the Gnostic intellectualism, which deprived Christianity of its foundation in historical fact and reduced it to a philosophical speculation.

(3) *God's Wisdom is Understood Only by the Spiritual Man.*

(ii. 14—iii. 4).

**V. 14.** *ψυχικός*. Two questions claim our attention.

First, Does *ψυχικός* denote the unregenerate man or the weak Christian? Chrys. explains it, *ὁ κατὰ σάρκα ζῶν καὶ μήπω τὸν νοῦν φωτισθείς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ἔμφυτον καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην σύνεσιν ἔχων, ἣν ταῖς ἀπάντων ψυχαῖς ἐμβάλλει ὁ δημιουργός*. Chrysostom's definition is interesting as the source of Luther's rendering, from which Tyndale borrowed the phrase now current in English theology, "the natural man." The Lutherans, in the Augsburg Confession, and the Calvinists, in the Second Helvetic Confession, cite the verse as their *locus classicus* in their polemics against the Pelagianism of the Church of Rome, to prove the impotence of the unregenerate man to attain holiness. On the other hand Catholic expositors, Aquinas, Cor. a Lap., Estius, and the Rheims translators ("sensual"), follow Augustine, who says (*Serm.* lxxi.): "*Hos in ecclesiâ constitutos parvulos dicit [Apostolus] nondum spirituales, sed adhuc carnales. . . . Quomodo essent parvuli in Christo nisi renati ex Spiritu Sancto?*" Similarly Bernard, *De Vitâ Solitariâ*. This view is defended by Usteri (*Entw. d. Paul. Lehrb.* p. 294, 5th Ed.). As the *πνευματικός* is opposed to *σαρκικός* and *νηπίος* in iii. 1, it is at least evident that the spiritual man is also the *τέλειος*. To avoid the inference that the *ψυχικός* is the weak Christian, the Lutheran Calixtus and recently F. C. Baur maintained

that *σαρκικός* as well as *ψυχικός* is a designation for the unregenerate man, which is plainly contrary to iii. 1. But the strong expressions, "the natural man *rejects* the things of the Spirit," and "they are *foolishness* unto him," are hard to reconcile with the supposition that the natural man is the weak Christian, of whom indeed the Apostle has not hitherto spoken. On the other hand, the contrast between the impotence of the merely human faculties to understand the things of God, and the certain knowledge possessed by all who have been endowed with the Divine Spirit is in the channel of the Apostle's argument. Moreover we have the same distinction in James iii. 15, where the wisdom that is not from above is said to be *ἐπιγίαιος*, *ψυχικὴ*, *δαιμονιώδης*—*ἐπιγίαιος* in its sphere of action, *ψυχικὴ* in the mental and moral condition of the persons it addresses, and *δαιμονιώδης* in its origin and principle. So also in Jude 19 the *ψυχικοί* are said to be *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*, that is, they have not the Spirit of God. For these reasons we must accept the view that by *ψυχικός* the unregenerate man is meant.

*Second*, Why is the unregenerate man called *ψυχικός*? If we admit that the word *πνεῦμα* contains a reference to man's relation to God, the difficult question whether the Apostle held that human nature consists of three distinct substances, body, soul and spirit, need not be discussed. Whether the *πνεῦμα* is a distinct substance in man, or a distinct faculty of his soul, or a distinct principle of action, it is, at all events, a power derived immediately from God and directed towards God. It denotes the Divine in man, which the Apostle represents as the result of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. Suggested by the first declaration concerning man's creation, that he became a living soul by the "breath" of God, the conception of the spirit in man as the product of the Spirit of God is distinctly stated by Christ and St. Paul. "To be born of the Spirit" (John iii. 6) is to be born from above; and "the quickening Spirit" (1 Cor. xv. 45, 47) is the second Man from heaven. The use of *πνεῦμα* to designate the Divine Person, who dwells in the believer, is a still more emphatic reason for its application to the kindred God-directed nature which is the result of the Spirit's indwelling. But this supernatural element (to use an indefinite expression) at once creates a contrast between itself and the natural. Now *ψυχή*, in the Old Test. language,

denotes the whole of human nature and nothing more: "Man became a living soul." Whether we accept or reject Beck's notion (*Umriss*, etc., I. § 5) that body and spirit are the two constituents of soul or man, we must admit that Scripture represents man as being, in the totality of his nature, soul. Hence *ψυχικός* will adequately distinguish all that pertains to mere humanity from the Divine nature bestowed or restored by the Spirit of God. While *πνεῦμα* must not be identified with the *νοῦς* of Plato and Philo, the *διανοητικόν* of Aristotle, *ψυχή*, on the other hand, must not be limited to mere *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, which is apparently intended by Chrys. when he introduces into his definition of *ψυχικός* the words *ὁ κατὰ σάρκα ζῶν*. The word *ψυχικός* was coined by Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* III. x. 2), to distinguish the pleasures of the soul, such as ambition and desire of knowledge, from those of the body. In this he is followed by Polybius (VI. v. 7) and Plutarch (*De Plac. Phil.* I. 9). The *ψυχικός* was, therefore, the man who was governed by the higher motives of mind. Neither does the Apostle lower the meaning of the word. It does not mean "intellectum et affectum depressos ad sensibilia" (De Lyra).<sup>1</sup> Contrasted with the *ἀκρατής*, the *ψυχικός* is the noblest of men. But to the *πνευματικός* he is related as the natural to the supernatural.

*οὐ δέχεται*, "rejects" (cf. Heb. xi. 35). It is a litotes like *οὐχ ὑπισχνούμαι*, "I refuse." The words imply that the things of God are offered to all, even the natural, unregenerate man. For *δέχομαι* in the meaning of "accept" cf. 1 Thess. i. 6 et al.

*τὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος*, genit. of possession. The Spirit is not a mere instrument of revelation, but the native home of the truth. But *τοῦ Θεοῦ* also is genit. of possession. The Spirit is not the ultimate source of truth, inasmuch as the Spirit himself is God's.

*καὶ οὐ δύναται γινῶναι*, not equivalent to *οὐ γὰρ δύναται καὶ γινῶναι*, as if the Apostle meant to prove that the natural man does not accept, because he cannot even know, the things of God (Scaliger). To know is not a lesser, but a greater thing than to accept them. The weakest believer accepts; the

<sup>1</sup> Reuss also (*Epîtres Paulin.* I. p. 61) restricts *ψυχή* to the lower faculties of instinct, affections, vitality.

mature Christian alone has a spiritual apprehension of their meaning. The clause expresses, not the reason for, but the consequence of rejecting the things of God. Faith precedes knowledge. "Crede ut intelligas."

πνευματικῶς, after the manner of a πνευματικός, by the insight into the things of the Spirit that results from the Spirit's indwelling. The word is borrowed from the allegorical system of interpretation that prevailed among the Jews of Alexandria, who distinguished between the ψυχικοί and the πνευματικοί, between those that understood the grammatical meaning of Scripture and those that pierced to the spiritual meaning beneath. But the Apostle applies the term, not to the tropical and symbolical (δι' ὑπονοιῶν) interpretation of types and prophecies, but to the judgment of the man who has the mind of Christ.

ἀνακρίνεται, "well sifted," "thoroughly examined." Ἀνα- denotes the resolution of a complex whole. But ἀνακρίνω expresses also, what is not contained in ἀναλύω, a judgment passed upon the truths analysed, an estimate of their comparative value, which leads up to a synthesis (συγκρίνειν) or an estimate of their mutual relation when combined in a system of Christian truth.

V. 15. πνευματικός, the man whose entire moral and intellectual nature has been transformed and made spiritual. The Pauline use of the word implies two distinct but inseparable facts. The one is the indwelling of the Spirit, the other is the Spirit's transforming energy. In relation to the former the πν. is opposite of the ψυχικός, as the supernatural is of the natural; in reference to the latter the πν. is opposite of the σαρκικός, as the holy is of the sinful. For the holy is supernatural, and the one supernatural purpose of the wisdom which God fore-ordained and of the things which God has prepared. The indwelling Spirit is the Holy Spirit; and he in whom that Spirit dwells is at once supernatural and holy. The Apostle cannot speak to the Corinthians as unto spiritual (iii. 1). Though they were no longer ψυχικοί, they were still σαρκικοί. The supernatural element had entered, but not yet done its work of leavening the whole lump (cf. Gal. vi. 1; Barn., Ep. iv. 11, γενώμεθα πνευματικοί, γενώμεθα ναὸς τέλειος τῷ Θεῷ).

μέν is omitted in A C D. So Lachm., Tisch. But De

Wette, Westc. and Hort., etc., retain it. If it is omitted, the antithesis between the clauses is changed into a relation of cause and effect. It is *because* the spiritual man judges all things that he himself cannot be judged.

πάντα or, as in A C D, τὰ πάντα. Its range is not to be limited to the things of the Spirit. For, though the unholy cannot understand goodness, the good can probe the depths of sin. Cf. 1 John ii. 20; Plat., *Rep.*, p. 409: *πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐποτ' ἂν γνῶιη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται.*

ὅπ' οὐδένοσ. The judgment of the spiritual man is at once the widest and the highest. All things are subject to it, from it there is no appeal. It is unhesitating, authoritative, absolute, final. The Apostle answers the question, What is the ultimate authority in matters that admit of being spiritually judged? His answer may be compared with that of Aristotle, who, as Sir A. Grant observes with truth, "escapes being forced into an utterly relative system of morals" by making the σπουδαῖος the κανὼν καὶ μέτρον. But in escaping from a relative morality Aristotle falls into a vicious circle. For he has no standard by which to judge the σπουδαῖος himself except the moral conceptions of which the σπουδαῖος has been constituted judge. St. Paul, while he boldly ascribes to the spiritual man an absolute and final judgment, introduces the new Christian conception of the indwelling Spirit. The mind of the spiritual man is identical with the mind of Christ, whose judgment must be final. In the πνευματικός the two conceptions of the σπουδαῖος and of the universal reason meet. The moral rises into spiritual; the universal reason yields to the Spirit of God; τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα pass into "the things of the Spirit."

V. 16. Proof of the statement that the spiritual man can pass an authoritative judgment on all things. He has the mind of Christ, who has the mind of God.

τίς; From Isa. xl. 13. Hence αὐτόν must refer to Κυρίου, and Κύριος must mean God, not Christ.

ἔγνω, "came to know," that is, at the time when God created all things. Vitringa, Delitzsch, Cheyne render the Heb. by "directed," "gave the measure to." The ἔγνω of

LXX. may be a paraphrastic rendering of the Heb. Anyhow it does not affect the Apostle's purpose (cf. Judith viii. 14).

*συμβιβάσει*, "will instruct." This is not a class. meaning of the causal of *συμβαίνω*. But *προσβιβάζω* is so used in Attic. Hesych., *συμβιβασθέντες διδαχθέντες, διαλεχθέντες*.

*νοῦν*. The Heb. means "the Spirit of Jehovah." The Apostle might have written *πνεῦμα*, though it would not leave the meaning, as Vitringa and Neander say, unchanged. "Isaiah hypostatizes the Spirit" (Cheyne). Similarly in Wisd. i. 7. But the Apostle regards this Spirit as an indwelling mind, which judges all things but is not itself regulated by any extraneous power. "The Spirit of Christ" was in the prophets (1 Pet. i. 11), but not as *νοῦς*. The inspiration that enabled them to foretell the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow is distinguished from their diligent search into the meaning of their own utterances. The exercise of the gift of tongues also, in the Apostolic age, involved the activity of the *πνεῦμα* and the inaction of the *νοῦς* (cf. xiv. 14). On the other hand the search of the spiritual man into the things of God is here represented as the combined act of the sanctified reason of the man himself and the powerful illumination of the indwelling Spirit. Hence *νοῦς* denotes, not the Spirit of God or of Christ, but the mind, the intellect of God and of Christ. This highest form of intellect has for its object the highest form of truth, the mystery now revealed by God, the things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor heart conceived. But *νοῦς* denotes more than intellect. It is the *moral* reason.<sup>1</sup> With it the Apostle served the law of God (cf. Rom. vii. 25). By its renewal the believer comes to know (by testing) the will of God (Rom. xii. 2). In the *πνευματικός* its possession is the result of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is a *ψυχῆς θεῶν ὄμμα* in a sense higher than Aristotle thought of when he so defined *νοῦς*. The Apostle ascribes to the spiritual man, not the thoughts of Christ (Erasm., Grot., and many others), but the moral judgment which Christ Himself had in virtue of the indwelling Spirit which had been given Him without

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Beck, *Umriss d. Bibl. Seelenlehre*, p. 49; Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychol.*, IV. § 5; Cremer, *Lex. s.v. νοῦς*; Kling, *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1839, pp. 431, sqq.; Ackermann, *ib.*, pp. 896, sqq.; Kluge, *Jahrb. d. Deutsch. Theol.*, 1871, p. 325.

measure. "Recipimus in nobis sapientiam Christi ad iudicandum" (Aquinas *in loc.*).

The Apostle's reasoning rests on an unexpressed assumption, that Christ has the mind of God,—the assumption, in fact, which Arius denied in asserting that the Son could not investigate (ἐξιχνιάσαι) the Father's nature. God's judgment is absolutely true and final; Christ has the Divine comprehension; we, again, have the moral judgment of Christ; therefore, the spiritual man judges all things, and from his judgment there can be no appeal. The Apostle seems intentionally to depart from the language of Wisd. ix. 13, τίς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γνώσεται βουλὴν Θεοῦ; ἢ τίς ἐνθυμηθήσεται τί θέλει ὁ Κύριος. The counsel and will of God may be revealed in Scripture, but in vain, unless we have the moral judgment to understand it. Hence also νοῦς is anarthrous, expressing the general notion of mind and will combined (cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 461.7). The passage, finally, does not explicitly identify Christ with Κύριος, as x. 22 and Rom. x. 13 certainly do.

**Ch. III. 1-4.** The Apostle applies the truth that only the spiritual man understands the Gospel as a Divine wisdom to the relation between himself and the Corinthian Church. This paragraph corresponds to ii. 1-5. There he declares that he preached the Gospel to them as a Divine power; here he explains why he could not unfold to them its Divine wisdom. He begins both paragraphs with καὶ ἐγώ, to mark the transition from a general statement to a particular application. He might have begun now with ἀλλ' ὑμῖν. But it would have been harsh. With his usual unerring delicacy, he makes ὑμῖν unemphatic.

**V. 1.** οὐκ ἠδυνήθην, that is, during his stay at Corinth and, perhaps, in a former letter. Rückert and Olshaus. infer that the Apostle had been in Corinth twice, though only one visit is mentioned in Acts, because it would have been unreasonable to expect the Corinthians to be other than νήπιοι when the Gospel was first preached among them. But as the Apostle's stay extended over eighteen months, the inference is groundless (cf. *Introd.*). The words imply that the Apostle endeavoured to speak unto them as spiritual men, but failed (cf. Mark vi. 5). Accordingly Clement of Rome (*Ad. Cor.* 47), says that the Apostle had written to them ἐπ' ἀληθείας

πνευματικῶς, though the Apostle says here that he is still unable to do so.

σαρκίνοις. So **NA B C D**. It is, therefore, rightly adopted by Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., Meyer, Alford, Westc. and Hort; notwithstanding the arguments of Reiche, who with De Wette, Fritzsche (on Rom. vii. 14), Winer (*Gr.* § XVI.), retain σαρκικοῖς. Proparoxytone adjectives in -ινος denote the material of which a thing is made (cf. 2 Cor. iii. 3). Ἀνθρώπινος is an exception, though Epictetus makes a distinction between it and ἀνθρωπικός. Σάρκινος, therefore, means “fleshy;” σαρκικός, “fleshly.” But σάρξ, in its Pauline signification, is not the physical flesh; it has an ethical meaning quite as much as πνεῦμα.<sup>1</sup> It denotes the quality of being merely human, the human being also sinful, as distinguished from being supernatural or spiritual. The Apostle requires an adjective to express this ethical meaning. He may either adopt σάρκινος, which was already used by Aristotle, who is followed by Plutarch, in the sense of “fleshy,” and give it the new meaning of “fleshly,” that is “carnal;” or he may coin a new word, σαρκικός, after the pattern of ψυχικός and πνευματικός. Both things seem to have been done. But the attempt to attach to σάρκινος an ethical meaning was not successful, and in ecclesiastical writers is abandoned.<sup>2</sup> But we may still ask if σάρκινος and σαρκικός express precisely the same ethical conception. Archbishop Trench (*Syn.* p. 262) and Kling maintain that the charge of being σάρκινος is far less grave than that of being σαρκικοί, the former implying only that the Corinthian Christians were tarrying at the threshold of faith, the latter denoting active opposition to the Spirit of God.

<sup>1</sup> The virtually Apollinarian view strenuously advocated of recent years by Baur, Holsten, Pfeiderer, Sabatier, that σάρξ in St. Paul's teaching means the material body or at least the sensuous element in man, I reject on the following grounds: 1. *Basar*, the Hebrew equivalent of σάρξ, has sometimes the extended signification of human in contrast to Divine. 2. The Apostle reckons sins of the mind among deeds of the flesh (cf. Gal. v. 19-25; Col. ii. 18). 3. If σάρκινος means “a person that has material flesh for his substance” (Pfeiderer, *Paulin.* p. 56), how can any man in the present life become πνευματικός? 4. And how would St. Paul be consistent in maintaining the sinlessness of Christ? Pfeiderer admits this inconsistency. A useful summary and criticism of views will be found in Prof. Dickson's *Baird Lecture* for 1883.

<sup>2</sup> Even when they cite the present passage, they sometimes write σάρκινος, sometimes σαρκικός.

The word ἔτι (ver. 3) shows this to be incorrect. Alford and Poor's view that ὡς σαρκίνοις means "as if ye were men of flesh" is untenable; for in Rom. vii. 14, ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκινός εἰμι (the better attested reading), ὡς is omitted. Delitzsch and Hofmann consider σάρκινος to mean the man who has still a sinful tendency, σαρκικός the man whose fundamental character is this sinful impulse. If so, the regenerate man is not σαρκικός (cf. ver. 3). On the whole it is safe to infer that at first both forms were used interchangeably, but that σαρκικός was afterwards alone retained to express the idea of "fleshly," in opposition to πνευματικός. Similarly Bleek on Heb. vii. 16. But we must not with Baur (*Neut. Theol.*) regard them as synonymous with ψυχικός. Man regarded as not supernatural is ψυχικός, man regarded as sinful is σάρκινος or σαρκικός (cf. Gal. v. 17). Adam in his sinless state was ψυχικός. Christ was neither ψυχικός nor σαρκικός. The unregenerate man is ψυχικός and σαρκικός. The believer is not ψυχικός, but for a time continues to be σαρκικός. These two words, therefore, express the antitheses to the two meanings of πνευματικός in chap. ii. The temptation to apply the term ψυχικός to the regenerate man may have arisen from the mistaken notion that σαρκικός refers only to the bodily appetites. It is so applied by Aquinas and De Lyra, and for this reason. But cf. Col. ii. 18; Rom. viii. 6; Gal. v. 20.<sup>1</sup>

νηπίοις (νη-, ἔπος, *in-fans*), the farthest remove from the τέλειος (cf. Heb. v. 13). The Apostle is partial to the metaphor. He uses it here to soften the effect which the epithet "carnal" might have produced. Cf. παιδία, 1 John ii. 13, where allusion is made to their childishness and to the Apostle's fatherly love.

ἐν Χριστῷ, not "in Christian things" (De Wette), but "in union with Christ" (cf. John xv. 1-7. Cf. De Wette on Col. i. 28).

V. 2. γάλα, nourishment for babes. The opp. is βρῶμα or στερεὰ τροφή (Heb. v. 12). Cf. Philo, *De Agric.* p. 188, ἐπεὶ δὲ νηπίοις μὲν ἐστὶ γάλα τροφή, τελείοις δὲ τὰ ἐκ πυρῶν πέμματα, καὶ ψυχῆς γαλακτώδεις μὲν ἂν εἴεν τροφαὶ κατὰ τὴν παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν τὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς προπαιδεύματα.

<sup>1</sup> In Eph. ii. 3 σάρξ has a more limited signification than in the Epistle to the Romans.

Cf. Clem. Al., *Pæd.* I. p. 118 Potter. From this the Fathers coined the word *γαλακτοτροφέω*.

*ἐπότισα*, to be connected with *βρῶμα* by an easy *zeugma*. Greek has no specific word to express "giving solid food;" *τρέφω* is generic (cf. Luke xxiii. 29). In ix. 7 *ἐσθίειν* is used for *πίνειν*.

*ἡδύνασθε*, "were strong." So Cranmer's Bible rightly. An infin. is not to be supplied. This use of *δύναμαι* is not mentioned in Lidd. and Scott. Cf. Thuc. ii. 29, *δυνάμενον μέγα*: Eur., *Io* 565, *ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδὲν ἂν δυναίμεθα*. The more frequent phrase is *δυνατὸς εἰμί*, as in Xen., *Mem.* II. i. 19. The Corinthians were *ἀσθενεῖς* (cf. ix. 22).

V. 3. Proof of the assertion that they were carnal.

*ὅπου*, "whereas," like *quando*. This class. use of *ὅπου* occurs only here in the New Test.

*ζῆλος* (from *ζέω*), "rivalry." In class. Greek the word has for the most part a good meaning (cf. Arist., *Rhet.* ii. 11). So occasionally in LXX. and the New Test. But its usual meaning in the New Test. is the rivalry that is degenerating into envy, *φθόνος* (cf. Plat., *Menex.* p. 242, *ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος*). From *φθόνος*, again, comes *ἔρις*, "strife in words," which, in turn, produces *διχοστασίαι*, "strife in act," "divisions." In Gal. v. 20 *αἵρεσις* is added to *διχοστασίαι* to denote a more chronic state of division. In our verse *διχοστασίαι* is omitted in *8 A B C Vulg.* De Wette suggests that it crept in from Gal. v. 20.

*κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, opp. of *κατὰ πνεῦμα*. So is *κατὰ σάρκα* in Rom. viii. 5. But it does not follow that *σαρκικοί ἐστε* is precisely synonymous with *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε*. The former refers to sinful disposition, the latter to a merely human, unspiritual judgment.

*περιπατεῖν* includes *φρονεῖν* and more. Their whole life did not rise above the human sphere. The use of *περιπ.* for *ζῆν* is a Hebraism. But a similar use of *ὁδός* is not unknown in class. Greek (cf. *ὀρθοποδοῦσι*, Gal. ii. 14).

V. 4. Olshausen and Neander are probably right in thinking that Apollos alone is named because he was an intimate friend of the Apostle, who thus shows his impartiality.

*ἕτερος*, one that belongs to the opposite party. On the misplacement of *μέν* cf. note on i. 12.

οὐκ ἄνθρωποι ἐστε; so  $\aleph$  A B C D Vulg.; adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort. But Reiche defends *σαρκικοί*. He does not satisfactorily account for the insertion by a copyist of the strange expression *ἄνθρωποι*. It is an explanation of *σαρκικός* and means that the Corinthians had not yet risen to the level of the supernatural element that dwelt within them. Though they were not *ψυχικοί*, they played the part of the *ψυχικός*.

#### D. THIRD ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FACTIONS.

(iii. 5-20).

The Apostle has spoken of Christianity as a redemptive scheme and as a Divine wisdom. Regarded from still another side, Christianity is a work which God accomplishes in the course of the world's history. Since God is the worker, factions and boasting in men are excluded. The central thought of the section is ver. 9. The argument may be subdivided thus: Factions are un-Christian, *first*, because Apostles and teachers are, not leaders of men, but servants of God (vv. 5-9); *second*, because what they teach must be in character with the Divine foundation and general plan of the building (vv. 10-15); *third*, because the worldly-wise teaching of party-leaders destroys God's temple and incurs His displeasure (vv. 16-20).

(1) *Apostles and teachers are, not leaders of men, but servants of God.*

(iii. 5-9).

V. 5. As ἀλλ' ἢ must be omitted with A B C D Vulg., *διάκονοι* . . . ἔδωκεν will be the answer to the questions, τί οὖν ἐστὶν Ἀπολλῶς; τί δέ ἐστι Παῦλος;

*διάκονοι* (from *διακ-*, which appears also in *διώκω*, *διάκτωρ*, and the Germ. *jagen*), "servants;" properly "agents," who act for a principal and cannot, for that reason, be themselves heads, without breach of trust (cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 370 sqq.). The Apostle does not, therefore, describe the teachers as servants of the Church (Chrys.; cf. 2 Cor. vi. 4; Col. i. 7, 23). Similarly *δοῦλος*, Rom. i. 1; *ὑπηρέτης*, 1 Cor. iv. 1; *λειτουργός*, Rom. xv. 16.

ἐπιστεύσατε, the Pauline expression for becoming a Christian (cf. Rom. xiii. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 2; Gal. ii. 16, εἰς Χριστόν).

ἐκάστῳ ὡς, a not uncommon trajection for ὡς ἐκάστῳ, as in vii. 17; and not intended to emphasize ἐκάστῳ (cf. Raphael's note on Rom. xii. 3). Καί, "and that," "that is to say" (cf. ix. 5; Mark xvi. 7).

ἔδωκεν, not "gave converts," but "gave to each his own special work." This is proved by ἐφύτευσα, ἐπότισεν, ver. 6.

ὁ Κύριος, that is Christ. So Theophyl. Cf. Eph. iv. 7. Chrys., Meyer, De Wette, etc., understand it to mean God, as in Rom. xii. 3. The gift is Christ's, the Head of the Church; the dispensing of the gift is the work of God's Spirit.

V. 6. The outward acts of planting and watering were done by men, but the life within and growth were from God. It is in the spiritual as in the natural world. Men can only bring the seed into contact with the soil. The life that makes it grow is not only beyond human power to produce, but also beyond human skill to understand or detect. In nature and in the Church life is the direct creation of God.

ἐφύτευσα. Cf. ix. 2; Acts xviii. 1-8.

ἐπότισε. Cf. Acts xviii. 27. It is better to leave these verbs without an expressed accus. He means the Church. We need not suppose, with Ambrosiaster, an allusion to baptism.

ἡύξανε. The imperf. means that when Paul planted and when afterwards Apollos watered, God was simultaneously giving the increase.

V. 7. ὥστε, "so then," *itaque*. The indic. is used with ὥστε when the result is more emphatic than its connection with the antecedent (cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 863). So in vii. 38; Matt. xii. 12.

With ὁ Θεός supply ἐστὶ πᾶν or τὰ πάντα, as in vii. 19, not τι. The *first* inference from the statement that God gave the increase is that he that plants or waters is nothing.

V. 8. The *second* inference from ver. 6 is that he that plants and he that waters are one; there is in their several works a unity of idea and purpose. This unity is in the mind of God. The *third* inference is that, while there is a unity of plan in the work of all the servants, there is also an individuality of service and a distinct responsibility to God. These

are inferences from the presence and activity of God in the historical development of Christianity. Because the life and growth of the Church is from God, the servants are nothing in themselves; all the servants help, nevertheless, to bring to pass the one purpose that runs through the ages; every servant will, therefore, receive his own reward according to his individual service. The δέ after *φυτεύων* and the δέ after *ἕκαστος* are both adversative. Apart the servant is nothing; yet all accomplish together one great work; notwithstanding this oneness in the work, every servant has his own work and reward.

*μισθόν*, "wage;" consisting, not in his salvation, but in something he will receive in addition. Christ calls it participation in His joy (cf. Matt. xxv. 21).

*κόπον*, "toil"; stronger than *ἔργον*, "work," and than *πόνος*, "labour," which does not occur in St. Paul's writings, except in Col. iv. 13, where we must read *πολὺν πόνον*. *Κόπος* expresses, not merely the labour spent in doing a work, but also the weariness and exhaustion that follows. It is the usual word in the New Test. to denote the devotedness of the Christian worker (cf. xv. 58; Col. i. 29; 1 Thess. ii. 9).

V. 9. He repeats for emphasis in another form the ground of the three inferences just drawn. The emphasis is on the thrice-repeated *Θεός*.

*Θεοῦ συνεργοί*, "God's fellow-workers"; genit. of relation, as *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος* (Rom. viii. 29). As the prominent idea is that God works in the Church, we must not render it genit. of the object: "workers with one another for God" (Est., Olshaus., Heinrici). Besides, this is not the construction of *συνεργός* elsewhere in the New Test. Cf. Rom. xvi. 3, 9, 21; 1 Thess. iii. 2, where Lachm. reads *συνεργὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*; Mark xvi. 20. *Γάρ* introduces a proof. It is because he that planteth and he that watereth are fellow-workers with God that they are one. *Συνεργοί* is not synonymous with *διάκονοι*, but expresses alike freedom and service. "The priest was a slave; but the minister is the free associate of God" (Vinet, *Past. Theol.*, Introd. § 1). This new conception of the freedom of the service helps to bring out more clearly the idea contained in *κόπος* and *μισθός*. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 1, where the declaration that the Apostle's work was a service (*διακονία*)

immediately follows a declaration of the liberty which Christ has brought.

Θεοῦ γεώργιον, "God's field," *arvum*, "tilth," "land for tillage" (cf. John xv. 1). God is the husbandman who tills the land (cf. Heb. vi. 7). Chrys., not so well, makes Θεοῦ genit. of possession: God is the owner, we the tillers. Cf. Isa. lx. 21, "the shoots of My plantation, the work of My hands."

Θεοῦ οἰκοδομή, "a house built by God." Cf. 2 Cor. v. 1; Rom. xiv. 20, where the metaphor of building is in the Apostle's mind (Heb. iii. 5). The metaphor of the field describes the raw material on which God works; that of the house describes the result of the work. The field represents the individual Christian in his secret power of life and endless growth; the house represents the Church in its unity of plan, in the beauty and strength of its structure. The metaphor of the building lends itself more easily than that of the farm to the Apostle's purpose in the subsequent verses and leads naturally to the highest conception, that of God's temple in ver. 16. A favourite metaphor (cf. viii. 1; x. 23; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 21). Οἰκοδομή does not occur in Attic before Aristotle.

(2) *What is taught must be in character with the Divine foundation and plan.*

(iii. 10-15).

**V. 10.** The new conception is introduced with a repetition of the three inferences already stated, in the form of a personal application to the Apostle himself. The grace of God has made him what he is; the unity and plan of his work has been decided by the form and position of the foundation; he has had his own special work to do.

χάριν. Meyer, De Wette, Alford, Kling, explain it to mean, not office, but ability. Neander combines both meanings. Elsewhere the words "according to the grace of God given unto me" refer, not indeed to the Apostolic office generally (except in Rom. xii. 3), but to the special commission to preach to the Gentiles (cf. Rom. xv. 15; Gal. ii. 9; Eph. iii. 2, 7; Col. i. 25). He refers here to his mission, partly to

efface the apparent arrogance of the words "as a wise master-builder" (Chrys., Theophyl., Meyer), partly to intimate, through the Apostle's nothingness apart from grace, that God is the doer of the work.

σοφός, "skilled," the original meaning of the word (cf. Xen., *Mem.* I. iv. 7). It was not till Plato's time that δεινός, which hitherto meant "fearful," took its place to denote practical skill, while σοφός began to be applied mostly to theoretical wisdom. But σοφός continued to be used, as it were semi-technically, as the designation of a good craftsman (cf. Exod. xxxvi. 4; Isa. iii. 3).

ἀρχιτέκτων, "master-builder"; defined by Plato, *Polit.* 259, as ἐργατῶν ἄρχων παρεχόμενός γέ που γνώσιν ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν. God is the designer or "architect," in the modern sense of the word. The Apostle is "master of the works."

θεμέλιον. In Rom. xv. 20, the metaphor of a foundation is used of the first introduction of the Gospel into a place; here it denotes the stability of the building, which rests on a foundation, and the plan of the whole structure, which is determined by the form of the foundation.<sup>1</sup>

For τέθεικα A B C have ἔθκα. So Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort.

ἄλλος, a mere ἐργάτης, yet a συνεργὸς Θεοῦ. He means Apollos, who had now left Corinth, and even the other teachers, whom he censures for Judaistic tendencies.

V. 11. Jesus Christ is the foundation. This is still another way of stating two of the previous inferences. If Christ is the foundation, Paul and Apollos are nothing; if Christ is the foundation, the plan of the superstructure has been determined. Variety is possible in the materials; but the idea of the Divine Architect cannot be changed. To lay another foundation would be to alter the whole design, and that would destroy the very idea of the Church (cf. 2 Cor. xi. 4; Gal. i. 7). But the insertion of worthless materials into the superstructure does not necessarily destroy the Church. Hence κείμενον means "laid by the Divine Architect," whose the design is. Κεῖσθαι means that the foundation has been laid

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Athan., *C. Arian.* II. 74: Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν θεμέλιον τοιοῦτον εἶναι εἰα καὶ τὰ ἐποικοδομουμένα ἔστιν, ἵνα καὶ συναρμολογῆσθαι δυνηθῇ.

and now lies in its place fixed and immovable. Cf. Matt. v. 14, 15, where a city is said to be *κειμένη*, but of a lamp it is said *τιθέασιν*. *Κεῖσθαι* combines the neuter and the passive meanings (cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 484, Stallbaum's note).

*παρὰ* after *ἄλλον* (cf. Luke iii. 13; Heb. iii. 3).

*δύναται*, not "has a right" (Grot.), nor "dare" (Billr.), but "can." For if another foundation is laid, the structure raised upon it is not the Church (cf. John x. 7; xiv. 6; Acts iv. 12).

*Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*. ✠ A B C D omit *ὁ* before *Χρ.*; for the Apostle is speaking of the historical person Jesus Christ, the only possible foundation of a historical Church. Cf. Middleton, *Greek Article*, note to Mark ix. 41. The foundation is not the doctrine concerning Christ (Grot., Hodge; similarly Melancthon explains it of the articles of faith). Through the preaching of the doctrine Christ Himself is brought into that relation to men which creates the Church. The expression is intentionally paradoxical. The allusion is perhaps to Isa. xxviii. 16. In Eph. ii. 20 the Apostles and the prophets of apostolic times are described as the foundation.<sup>1</sup> This is the historical growth of the Church. In a similar way the Church itself is said to be historically "the pillar and basement of the truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15), settled on the foundation. Here the Apostle speaks of the idea of the Church. The very design of a historical Church implies that it is erected on a personal Christ as its foundation.

**Vv. 12-15.** On this foundation let every man see that he raises a superstructure that will bear the test of the judgment day. This is the third of the above inferences,—the responsibility of the servant.

**V. 12.** *ἐπὶ τὸν θεμέλιον*. In Eph. ii. 20, *ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ*. The accus. is used when prominence is to be given to the act of laying the stones, the dat., when their position on the foundation is the more prominent notion.

*χρυσίον* . . . *καλάμην*. Asyndeton in enumerations, espec. of opposites (cf. Plat., *Prot.* 319). Maybe the Apostle alludes to the houses of new Corinth, built, no doubt, of various materials; the columns of ancient edifices being raised

<sup>1</sup> I prefer this explanation of Chrys. to that of Calvin, that the words mean the foundation laid by Apostles and prophets.

from the ruins and made to support a thatched roof of reed cut in the marshy plain around. Or he may be thinking also of Solomon's temple, in the construction of which gold, silver, marble, and the better sort of timber were used (cf. 1 Kings vi.). The allusion would then prepare us for the mention of the temple in ver. 16 (cf. Isa. liv. 12). The more perishable materials were used for huts and private houses of even some pretensions; for the walls, the poorer qualities of timber (τὰ τῶν οἰκίων ξύλα, Xen., *Anab.* II. ii. 16) or mud mixed with grass (χόρτος); for the roof, straw-thatch (καλάμη, cf. Verg., *Æn.* VIII. 654, "Romuleoque recens horrebat regia culmo") or the lighter sort of reed (κάλαμος). The Apostle is not thinking of two buildings, the one a hut, the other a palace (Cor. a Lap., Wetst., Stanley). The less valuable materials would be properly used for a hut. The absurdity to which the Apostle refers is that men should use perishable materials in building a temple.

ξύλα, "timber," so Cranmer's Bible. The plur. denotes wood cut into shape.

What do the two kinds of materials represent? Many in the early Church thought the Apostle meant the difference between a godly and an ungodly life, and even Bernard (*Serm. de Ligno*), Bengel, and Hofmann maintain the Apostle is describing the different kinds of persons whom the teachers admitted into the Church. The strongest argument is that of Webst. and Wilkins., "that the entire passage is an expansion of Θεοῦ οἰκοδομή ἐστε, which is repeated in 16, 17." They add "that the foundation is explained to be a person." This suggests the answer to their argument. The Apostle laid the foundation, which was Christ, by preaching the doctrine concerning Christ, and it is through his doctrine that the teacher can exclude corrupt persons from the Church. Excommunication was, in the early Apostolic age, vested in the Church, not in the teachers (cf. v. 4; vi. 1-5; 2 Cor. ii. 8, 10). It could only to a very limited extent be designated the ἔργον of the teacher,—the business of his life, what is distinctly his own. Add, (1) that the analogous metaphor of seed sown is used by Christ of doctrines as well as of persons (cf. Luke viii. 11). (2) All the materials in the building rest on the true foundation, which cannot be said of ungodly persons. (3) Worth-

lessness is not an expression strong enough to designate wicked men; but it precisely sets forth the nature of those doctrines that do not produce an eternally abiding result.<sup>1</sup>

V. 13. *ἐκάστου . . . γενήσεται*. This is grammatically the apodosis to ver. 12. The *ἔργον* consists, not simply of the materials mentioned in ver. 12, but of those materials when built into the house by men's hands. Before the builder placed them in the wall, they were a heap of things, having no character of their own (*ὀποῖον*).

ἡ γὰρ ἡμέρα δηλώσει, undoubtedly the day of Christ's second coming (cf. 2 Tim. iv. 8; 2 Thess. i. 10; Heb. x. 25). That day is always represented as a day of judgment. But τοῦ Κυρίου is here omitted, to lay special emphasis on its being, not only a fixed time for judgment, but also a day as opposed to night (cf. Rom. xiii. 12). The Apostle speaks of life as a night and death as the break of day; while Christ, on the contrary, represents life as the day and death as the night. The contrast is suggestive of the terrible meaning which his own death had to the Saviour's mind, and the Apostle's confidence that that death had taken away the sting of death for all believers.

ἀποκαλύπτεται. Œcum., Neander, and some others consider τὸ ἔργον to be the subject. But this would make the next words tautological. The subject is ἡ ἡμέρα. The day of Christ comes with burning judgment. It is this fiery judgment that reveals it to men (cf. 2 Thess. i. 7, 8, ἐν πυρὶ φλόγος), that is, the flaming fire will be the signal of Christ's coming.

ἐν πυρί, not "by means of fire," but "enwrapped in fire" (cf. Meyer's good note). The Apostle applies to Christ's coming, "the natural description of a theophany in Biblical language" (Cheyne on Isa. xxx. 27). The pres. ἀποκαλύπτ-

<sup>1</sup> The doctrines referred to are clearly not radically false and soul-destroying errors, but frivolous and worthless ones (so Aquinas, De Lyra, etc.). The difference may be exemplified by the incident related of Abp. Leighton. "In a synod he was publicly reprimanded for not 'preaching up the times.' 'Who,' he asked, 'does preach up the times?' It was answered that all the brethren did. 'Then,' he rejoined, 'If all of you preach up the times, you may surely allow one poor brother to preach up Christ Jesus and eternity'" (Pearson, *Life of Leighton*). Luther alluded to this verse when he applied the epithet "letter of straw" to the Epistle of James.

τεται is probably used, not so much to mark its nearness, as to express its nature. It is a day of such a kind that fire is the only fitting revelation of it.

ἐκάστου. The unity of structure makes it impossible for men to distinguish the work of one builder from that of another. God only can say where the work of one man ends and that of another begins. The extent no less than the quality of the work will be judged.

ἔργον. The word has a tinge of the Aristotelian meaning, "function," "the entire activity of a man's life." It is doubtful whether ἔργον is nom. or accus. Neander thinks the former more in St. Paul's style. In that case, it is better, with Hofmann, to consider αὐτό accus. after δοκιμάσει. But this makes ἔργον too emphatic. That αὐτό must not be omitted is certain. It is found in  $\aleph$  A B C. Meyer and Alford explain αὐτό to mean that the fire by its own nature will test the work, which is a truism. Rather αὐτό emphasises πῦρ: "the very fire will try it." Other tests may leave the thing where it was before; though judgment has been passed, power is wanting to execute the sentence. Fire will utterly consume what cannot stand the test.

What is this fiery test? The undoubted reference in the passage to the second coming of Christ disproves all the interpretations that explain it of the events of the present life, such as the destruction of Jerusalem (Hammond), the work of the Spirit (Colet, Calvin), the spiritual development of the Church in knowledge of doctrine (Neander), tribulation (Aug., Aquinas,<sup>1</sup> Bernard, Melanchth.). Neither does the Apostle's notion resemble the Romanist conception of purgatory.<sup>2</sup> For (1) he speaks of a probation, not of a purification; (2) the fire tests, not the man's moral character, but the teacher's work, whether it is worthless; (3) the reference is to the second coming, not to what takes place in the intermediate state between death and the judgment; (4) the work of every man,

<sup>1</sup> They explain it of the "emendatorius ignis" as well.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory the Great (*Dial.* IV. 39), who consolidated the floating notions of earlier writers into a doctrine of purgatory, and the Council or, as Bishop Bull calls it, the Cabal of Florence, A.D. 1439, base the doctrine on this passage. But, among Roman Catholic expositors, Colet, Estius, and Maier reject the interpretation.

even the best, must be tried in the fire, a notion not admitted into the definition of purgatory. Still less can the Apostle mean the fire of Geheenna (Chrys.; Æcum., Theophyl.). The only natural explanation is that it means the judgment which Christ will pass on men at His second coming. So Origen (whose *πῦρ καθάρσιον* must not be confounded with purgatory, his account of which we have in *De Princ.* II. xi. 6; *Hom. in Exod.* vi. § 4), Basil (*De Spir. Sancto*, 15), Græg. Naz. (*Orat.* xxxix. p. 690), Theodoret, and among the Latins Tertullian (*C. Marc.* IV. 2), Lactantius (*Inst.* VII. 21), Ambrose (*Enarr. in Ps.* cxviii.). The word "fire" is used metaphorically, in keeping with the colouring of the whole passage, as in Isa. lxvi. 15; Mal. iii. 2; as the symbolical *πῦρ φλέγον* on Sinai, Exod. xxiv. 17. It is in the very design of the spiritual temple that it should pass unharmed through the most searching trial. The fire is not the punishment, but the test,—*πύρωσις τῆς δοκιμασίας* (*Didache*, c. 16).

**Vv. 14, 15.** The test being that the building should be fire-proof, the owner, who is also represented as the designer, of the house, will reward the builder whose work passes unscathed through the fire, but will inflict a penalty on him whose work is burned; yea, that servant will himself barely escape out of the conflagration that consumes his work.

*μενεῖ.* The future was suggested by Beza, to correspond to *κατακαίσεται*. So Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., etc. The indic. marks the certainty of the fact that some work will abide, some will be burned.

*τινος*, emphatic in both verses. The least will receive his wage, if his work endures; the greatest will pay a penalty, if his work is burned.

*μισθόν*, not his salvation, which is a *χάρισμα* (Rom. vi. 23). Cf. Matt. xx. 8. What it consists of has not been told, except in metaphor. "The eschatology of the Bible is symbolical." (Cheyne on Isa. lxvi. 24.)

**V. 15.** *κατακαίσεται*, Hellenistic for *κατακαυθήσεται* (cf. 2 Pet. iii. 10; Rev. xviii. 8).

*ζημιωθήσεται*, sc. *τὸν μισθόν*,—he will be mulcted of his expected wage. Supply accus. of quantitative object. The emphatic *αὐτός* that follows proves that *ζημιωθήσεται* does not mean "he shall be punished." Neither can *ἔργον* be the object

(Æcum., Scalig., Est.); for the burning of the work is the owner's, not the workman's loss; and it is the fact that he has incurred loss through the servant's unfaithfulness that justifies the owner in withholding his wages and inflicting a fine.

*αὐτός.* The man himself will be saved, though his work will be burned. As a worker he suffers loss; but his salvation is through faith. Yet his salvation even will be through the fire of the conflagration that consumes his work. He deserves for his unfaithfulness to forfeit his salvation and perish with the unbeliever. But he is saved as if through the very flames (cf. 1 Pet. iii. 20). He is a smoking firebrand (Isa. vii. 4). Neither here nor anywhere else can *διά* mean "notwithstanding." Chrys., Æcum., Theophyl. explain *σωθήσεται διὰ πυρός* of the endless duration of the pains of Gehenna. But *σώζειν* nowhere has the meaning of *τηρεῖν* (Jude 6). Many expositors consider *ὡς διὰ πυρός* to be a proverb, signifying difficulty. So Scalig., Grot., Wordsworth. But the reference to *πῦρ* in ver. 13 is evident. The metaphor requires us to suppose the fire is kindled at once. It is not that a fire happens to break out afterwards (Rück.). The fire is purposely lit to try the building, and that before the workmen are gone. He whose work feeds the fire escapes only through the flames. Either the Apostle represents the second coming of Christ as close at hand (Stanley, Hofmann), or he considers that every man's work continues through the ages till the Son of Man appears.

(3) *The worldly-wise teaching of party-leaders destroys God's temple and incurs His displeasure.*

(iii. 16-20).

Chrys. and others join these verses closely with what immediately precedes. De Wette, Meyer, Osiander, Stanley, etc., consider them to be a new argument against party-spirit. The previous metaphor of a house naturally leads up to that of a temple, and indeed implies it. The materials intended by the designer to be used in the construction of the house were the proper materials for building a temple. Notwithstanding this, the thought moves onward. The Apostle has

spoken of men who would be saved, though their work would perish. He refers now to those whom God will destroy with their work. From transitory work built on the true foundation, he passes to the crafty wisdom of the world, which is in direct antagonism to Christ. The new argument seems to be that party-spirit is sometimes the introduction into the Church of the wisdom of the world, which would craftily subvert the kingdom of God. Teachers that bring into the Church the principles of the enemy of Christ, God will destroy, because destruction of the Church is sacrilege. Indeed, to say that the Church is a temple is but another form of the general conception of these chapters,—the inconsistency of dissension with the mystical union between Christ and the believer. When Clement of Rome (*Ad Cor.* 2) congratulates the Corinthians on the cessation of schism among them, the word he uses to express their repugnance of dissension conveys just the notion of the Apostle that the Church is a sanctuary. “All sedition and all schism was in your eyes an *abomination* (βδελυκτόν),” —an allusion to Christ’s words (Matt. xxiv. 15), “the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place.” We may infer from this remark of Clement that the Corinthians understood the point of the Apostle’s argument and felt its force.

**V. 16.** οὐκ οἶδατε; This searching question is much more than a reference to the common-place of Philo and others that man is a dwelling of God. It is more also than an expression of surprise. Their want of spirituality had left them in ignorance of the indwelling of the Spirit. He dwells in every believer, but the carnal Christian does not know it.

ναός, “sanctuary”; not merely οἶκος ἐνθα Θεὸς προσκυνεῖται (Hesych.), but “the house in which God dwells.” The *ἱερόν* is the sacred enclosure, τέμενος (cf. Hdt. VI. 19; Joseph., *Antiq.* VIII. iii. 9, ναοῦ δ’ ἔξωθεν ἱερόν ὠκοδόμησεν). In no instance, not even in Matt. xxvii. 5, is ναός used for the whole sacred building (cf. 2 Cor. vi. 16; vi. 14–16). Though ναός is here anarthrous, it must be rendered “the temple” (cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XIX. 1 a). Neander is wrong in saying that the art. is omitted because the Apostle speaks only of a single Church. But Estius is equally mistaken in arguing from the use of the sing. that the reference is only to the universal Church. As in οἰκοδομή, so in ναός, the Church as a whole

is meant.<sup>1</sup> Every believer is God's temple; yet the whole Church is but one temple. This is so, not only because the allusion in the word to the substitution of the spiritual order of things for the Temple at Jerusalem implies that there is but one temple, but also because the very nature of the Church involves the idea of unity. Similarly in the Epistle of Barnabas *ναός* sometimes denotes the Church, sometimes the heart. We have a beautiful analogy to the Apostle's use of the word *ναός* in the appellation given by Polycarp, *Ad Phil.* 4, to the poor widows that received the alms of the Church—*θυσιαστήρια Θεοῦ*.

*τὸ Πνεῦμα . . . ὑμῖν*. This is the proof that they were the temple of God (cf. 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 22). The words have often been used to prove the divinity of the Spirit. So Ambrosiaster. Cf. Basil, *Contra Eunom.* III. p. 276; Athan., *De Incarn.* p. 704; Ambrose, *De Spir. Sancto*, III. xii.; Aug., *De Trin.* VII. 3; *Contra Maxim.* II. 21. Similarly Pearson, *On the Creed*, Art. VIII.: "If the Spirit were any other Person not Divine, or anything but a Person though Divine, we could not by any means be assured that He did properly inhabit in us; or if He did, that by His inhabitation He could make a temple of us."

**V. 17.** If the Church be God's temple, he who destroys it is guilty of sacrilege, and will himself be destroyed.

*φθείρει*. Tert., *De Pudic.* xvi., has *vitiat*; Aug., *De Lib. Arbit.* III. xiv., *corruptit*; but in *Contra Ep. Manich.* xxxix. he adds that many Latin interpreters feared to use the word "corrupt," and said "destroy." Vulg. and Beza have *violat* for *φθείρει*, and *perdet* for *φθερεῖ*. Wycliffe: "If ony defoulith the temple of God, God schal leese him." Erasmus defends the use of two words on the ground that a play was intended on the Greek word, which cannot be rendered by one word in Latin. But I cannot find that *φθέρω* ever means to "pollute a holy place." The destruction of a temple is, of course, a sacrilege and a defilement. But this is an inference which the Apostle draws in the next words. Deyling (*Obs. Sacre*, II. p. 505, cited by Grimm, *Lex.*) says the Jews considered the pollution of the Temple to be its destruction. But this

<sup>1</sup> "Simul omnes," says Hervæus on xii. 4, "unum templum et singula templa sumus, quia non est Deus in omnibus quam in singulis major."

notion of pollution is alluded to in ἅγιος, not expressed in φθείρω.

φθереῖ. The retribution corresponds to the sin. The next ver. introduces the idea of sacrilege, and φθереῖ is an allusion to the punishment inflicted for sacrilege under the Old Test. But the law of Moses, like the Roman law, punished sacrilege with death (cf. Lev. xvi. 2; 2 Sam. vi. 6, 7). Whether the Apostle, however, means temporal or eternal death is a question that cannot be answered. He has left it purposely unanswered. God's rule of action has not been revealed, and may vary in different cases.

ὁ γάρ . . . ὑμεῖς. The majority of expositors consider ναός to be the antecedent of οἵτινες. De Wette, Meyer, Alford, Hofmann make ἅγιος the antecedent. Their reasons are: (1) the meaning of ὅστις as distinguished from ὅς, to denote one of a class; but this is not decisive, for ὅστις may be used when the relative clause is explicatory of the principal clause (cf. Ellicott on Gal. iv. 24). (2) The number of οἵτινες; but this, again, is not decisive; for the attraction of the relative subject into the number of the predicate of the relative clause occurs, though not frequently (cf. Hdt. V. 108, τὴν ἄκρην αἱ καλεῦνται κληῖδες τῆς Κύπρου; Plat., *Crat.* 405, τὸν οὐρανόν, οὗς δὲ πόλους καλοῦσιν, and Winer, *Gr.* § XXIV. 3; Poppo, *Proleg.* in Thuc., i. p. 105). (3) The tautology that results from making οἵτινες refer to ναός; but we do not get rid of the tautology by referring οἵτινες to ἅγιοι; for, in that case, "ye are the temple of God" must be understood as the minor premise of the syllogism; and the relative clause, "who are holy," will be the conclusion. It is not likely that the Apostle would express the conclusion in the form of a relative clause. (Acts v. 16 is not an instance; for οἵτινες ἐθεραπεύοντο is not an inference but an additional statement.) It is better, for these reasons, to understand the relative clause as the minor premise, the conclusion being left unexpressed: "The temple of God is holy; ye are the temple of God; [therefore ye are holy]."

V. 18. μηδεὶς ἐαυτὸν ἐξαπατάτω. Theophyl., Est., Meyer join this warning to "him will God destroy," as meaning either "let no man deceive himself by thinking he will not suffer punishment," or "let no man deceive himself by think-

ing that party leaders are not destroying God's temple." Most expositors join it to what follows: "Let no man deceive himself by thinking he is wise when God judges him to be a fool." The connection is, I think, double. Let no man deceive himself by thinking God will not destroy the destroyer of His temple. But this form of self-deception is the result of another, which consists in a mistaken conception of what is true wisdom. He who is governed by the principles of the world deceives himself by thinking that to be wisdom which in the eyes of God is folly. His mental attitude unfits him to understand that goodness is wisdom. He is blind to the idea of holiness, and cannot discern in the Church the sanctuary of God.

δοκεῖ, not "seems to others" (Vulg., Erasm., Neand.), but "thinks" (Beza and most expositors). Cf. viii. 2; Phil. iii. 4. This is evident from ἐξαπατάτω. It is a warning to false teachers, whose danger arises from an erroneous estimate of their own wisdom, based on the principles of the world, the antagonist of Christ and His Church (cf. Gal. vi. 3; Isa. v. 21).

ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ (cf. note on i. 20). Origen (*Contra Cels.* I. 13), Chrys., Luther, Hofmann join the words to μῶρος γενέσθω: "If any man thinks himself wise in relation to the Church (ἐμῇ), let him become a fool in relation to this world." But if this implies that the words "in this world" are not to be understood in the conditional clause and, therefore, that the wisdom on which the man prides himself is not the wisdom of this world, it is certainly not the true explanation. It is not mere self-conceit or an undue estimate of one's own attainments in Christian wisdom that the Apostle rebukes. Self-conceit does not destroy God's temple. The Apostle is showing the danger of introducing into the Church the principles of the world. The consequent clause is indefinite: "Let him become a fool, not only in the wisdom of this world, but in all, even in Christian wisdom."

ἐν ὑμῖν, in emphatic contrast to ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, and so denoting the attempt to bring the wisdom of the world into the Church, the very opposite of the world. It is to be observed also that the Apostle does not say εἴ τις ὑμῶν. The false teacher was among them, not of them (cf. 1 John ii. 19).

V. 19. Proof of the statement that self-deception as to the folly, vanity, and weakness of the principles, of the world is at bottom the reason why men endeavour to destroy God's temple.

παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, "before God" as judge (cf. Rom. ii. 13; Hdt. III. 160, παρὰ τῷ Δαρείῳ κριτῇ). The words allude to ver. 17, and mean that God has passed a judgment of condemnation on the wisdom of this world. Its wisdom is "before" God as He is present in the Church, in the same sense in which false gods are said in Exod. xx. 3 to be "before" Him, as if desirous of obscuring His glory, veritably "affronting" Him, but soon brought into the position of a criminal standing "before" God to receive sentence. The Divine judgment is not that of the future exclusively, but declares itself in the judgment of the Church (cf. xiv. 24, 25).

ὁ δρασσόμενος is not in grammatical construction simple because the words are a citation (cf. Heb. i. 7). The LXX. in Job v. 13 has ὁ καταλαμβάνων σοφούς ἐν τῇ φρονήσει. But πανουργία is nearer the Hebrew, as in Josh. ix. 4 and Prov. i. 4. The two words πανουργία and δρασσόμενος bring into prominence the contrast between the weakness and cunning of men and the strong grasp of God. The verse is, therefore, favourable to the opinion, maintained by Bleek and others, that the Apostle sometimes corrected the LXX.; and this renders superfluous the conjecture of Kautzsch that the Alexandrian translation of the Book of Job was not yet in use among the Jews of Palestine when the Apostle wrote. Δράσσεσθαι (akin to Eng. *grip*, *grasp*) occurs nowhere else in the New Test.

ἐν, as in a net. The world has been caught in its own net and "worsted with its own weapons" (Chrys.). Its wisdom has been convicted of folly because it judged to be folly God's mystery of salvation. Aristotle defines πανουργία as "δεινότης with a bad aim," and Plato hardly ever uses the word except as the opposite of σοφία (cf. *Menex.* p. 247). His description of the ideal judge (*Rep.* p. 409 C.) should be read in the light of what the Apostle says concerning the false wisdom and the spiritual man. As he that forms a healthy judgment often passes for a simpleton, because he has no evil in his own soul, so does the spiritual man in the eyes of the world. Again, as

the cunning wise man, with his ill-timed suspicions, turns out to be a fool in the company of good men, because he has no sample of goodness in his own soul to enable him to recognise goodness in others, so the wise are caught in their own craftiness by that manifestation of God's wisdom which is given to the spiritually minded in the Church. Occasionally in class. authors also we meet with an ambiguous use of σοφός for "over-subtle" and "wise" (cf. Verrall's note on Eur., *Med.* 600).

V. 20. The previous citation has told us that God in and through the Church actually turns the schemes of the world into folly. Another citation refers to the judgment passed in the mind of God on the principles and counsels that give birth to the world's futile efforts to destroy God's temple. The Apostle has mentioned three distinct stages in the Divine retribution: first, the destruction of the men who endeavour to destroy the Church; second, the subverting of their schemes; third, the condemnation of their principles. The present citation is from Ps. xciv. 11. The Apostle follows the LXX. but substitutes σοφῶν for ἀνθρώπων, an accommodation to his purpose which is justified by the object of the psalm. For it describes the haughtiness of God's enemies and their folly in thinking God did not see them. The foolish arrogance of Israel's oppressors was to the Church under the Old Test. what the senseless pride of a worldly philosophy is to the Church of Christ under a more spiritual dispensation.

γινώσκει, "knows" the inmost nature. It is the exact equivalent of רָץ, which denotes "the knowledge that goes to the root of the thing" (Delitzsch).

διαλογισμούς (cf. Wisd. ix. 14, λογισμοὶ γὰρ θνητῶν δειλοί). The word has usually an unfavourable meaning in the Book of Wisdom and the New Test. (cf. Wisd. i. 3, σκολιοὶ διαλογισμοί).

V. 21. Conclusion of the section, but to be also closely connected with what immediately precedes. This verse is co-ordinate with i. 31.

ὥστε, "therefore." The imper. is really not construed with ὥστε, but arises from a sudden and emphatic change from the *oratio obliqua* to the *oratio recta* (cf. x. 12). See Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s. v.: "Quando cum imperativo dicitur, item rem faciendam certo documento firmat."

## E. FOURTH ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FACTIONS.

(iii. 22, 23).

This short, but pregnant, section is co-ordinate, logically, with the previous three Arguments against dissensions in the Church. The first was based on the relation of the Church to Christ as its Saviour, the second on its relation to the Holy Spirit as revealer, the third on its relation to God who giveth the increase. An additional argument is now drawn from the prerogative of the Church itself as possessor of all things. Far from having lordship over the Church, the teachers are servants of the Church, and that because they are its possession. They are ὅλως ἐκείνης. They have no side of their being of which the Church is not absolute owner.<sup>1</sup> This is not an exceptional privilege. The Apostle recognises in it a truth of universal application. The Church possesses the teachers in precisely the same way in which it possesses all things. Outside the Church there is no real possession. The power that most truly subjugates and uses for its own ends all things is faith; for to this omnipotence of the weak Christ has put all things in subjection. But faith means the subjection of the spiritual man himself to Christ; and it is in virtue of the subjection of the Church to Christ that all things, with the sole exception of Christ, are subjected to the Church. With his wonted eagerness to trace all facts back to God, the Apostle adds, that the subjection of all to the Church is not arbitrary, but rests on the same principle as the subjection of the Church to Christ. For Christ's lordship is based on His subjection to God, and springs from His self-effacing obedience. The Church, in like manner, has lordship over all things in so far as it yields absolute obedience to Christ; and the power and effectiveness of every teacher's life will also depend on his subjection to the Church.

V. 22. The emphatic word is πάντα, "not the teachers only, but all things." Yet the argument is not, "Do not say that Paul or Apollos is yours; for all things are yours." The Corinthians did not say, "Paul is mine; Apollos is mine."

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult not to see in this the Greek conception of the free πόλις, the κοινωμία τῶν ἐλευθέρων, which exists for the good of the governed.

They said, "I am Paul's; I am the possession of Apollos." The Apostle retorts, "On the contrary, they are your possession; for all things are yours."

εἴτε. . . . μέλλοντα. This enumeration of the things that constitute the πάντα is quite in the Apostle's manner (cf. Rom. viii. 38). It is a representative, not a detailed, list of the kinds of things contained in the πάντα, and divides itself into three pairs of opposites: the Apostles and the world; life and death; things present and things to come.

*First.* Paul, Apollos, Cephas were set in opposition to one another by the Corinthians. But their real opposition to "the world" destroys every threatening tendency to mutual hostility, and renders the contrast between them a harmony. Hence κόσμος does not here denote the entire human race, as if the Apostle were making a sudden leap from Peter to all men (Est., Cor. a Lap., Bengel, Osiand., Kling), nor the ordered entirety of creation (Meyer, Hodge, Cremer). These conceptions are included in ἐνεστῶτα. Rübiger (*Krit. Untersuch.* p. 54) and Hofmann rightly consider κόσμος to mean, as in ver. 19, the kingdom of evil which stands over against the kingdom of Christ. This kingdom of evil is now subjected to the Church, and believers wrestle against its κοσμοκράτορες (cf. Eph. vi. 12; Col. ii. 15; John xvi. 33). Of men, the subjugated slaves of this kingdom, Christ forms His Church. "All things are conquered by wisdom," was a maxim among Greeks and Romans. The world's wisdom, says St. Paul, is conquered by the Church. No man, therefore, can be sovereign over conscience. We may add, as a legitimate corollary, that the Apostle's argument is fatal to the theory that the Church consists, in so far as it has authority in controversies of faith, not of "a congregation of faithful men" or "all who profess and call themselves Christians," but only of a select number of the teachers (cf. 2 Cor. i. 24).

*Second.* Chrys., Theophyl. and Grotius think ζωή and θάνατος refer to the teachers, who are willing to live or die for the Church. Chrys. offers an alternative explanation, adopted by Theodoret: ὁ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ θάνατος δι' ἡμᾶς, ἵνα σωφρονισθῶμεν, καὶ ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα σωθῶμεν, which leaves ζωή unexplained. Neither can the former be the correct view; for the notion is already contained in εἴτε Παῦλος κ.τ.λ., and

the abstract terms, *ζωή* and *θάνατος*, would hardly be used (cf. Phil. i. 21). Most expositors understand *ζωή* to mean vital existence, which is included in *ἐνεστῶτα* (cf. 1 Tim. iv. 8). We should rather say that "life" and "death," in keeping with the spirit of the passage, are half-personified and denote the two great powers of the spiritual world, the one comprehending all that human nature fears and abhors, the other all it loves and hopes for (cf. 2 Tim. i. 10; Heb. ii. 14). So also in Rom. viii. 38 *ζωή* and *θάνατος* are in a way personified and enumerated with angels, dominions and powers.

*Third.* *Ἐνεστῶτα* will, therefore, denote the present state of existence,—its possibilities, its work and the results, while *μέλλοντα* will include all the future in its eternal development, ever increasing revelations, and consummation of glory (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 19).

*κόσμος* usually has the article, but not here, partly because it is in an enumeration, partly because it expresses a quality (cf. note on *πνεῦμα*, ii. 13).

*πάντα ὑμῶν* is repeated in order to close with a formal and complete enumeration of the series of subordinations. "All things yours; you Christ's; Christ God's." For the same reason *ἐστιν* is omitted, as in A B C D. The word *πάντα* sums up the three pairs of opposites, which comprehend the three spheres in which men's entire existence moves,—the sphere of nature, the sphere of the supernatural or unseen universe, and the sphere of the Church or Christianity.

**V. 23.** *ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ*. On its Divine side the Church is a *δεσποτεία*. The argument is twofold: "Do not subject yourselves to men; first, because ye are subject to Christ; second, because men are subject to you in virtue of your subjection to Christ." The Apostle even here rises above the partial view that Christianity is merely a revelation of a Divine plan for the salvation of the individual. If that were all, Christ would exist for the sake of the Church, not the Church for the sake of Christ (cf. Eph. i. 22).

*Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ*. He connects the subordination of all things to the Church, through the subordination of the Church to Christ, with the subordination of Christ to God. This is stated because it implies, on the one hand, that the authority of the Church is formed after the pattern of Christ's authority,

that is, it is based on subordination; on the other hand, that the supremacy of the Church has in it a Divine element, inasmuch as it springs ultimately from God's authority. Meyer and others think these words are intended as a saving clause, lest any might think the Apostle in the previous words favoured the claim of the Christ party. But the words "Christ is God's" would, in that case, denote, not subordination, but exaltation, and mean that Christ is too high to be the head of a party. The genitive Θεοῦ could hardly admit of this meaning, which, besides, would be a different meaning from that of the genitives ὑμῶν and Χριστοῦ.

In ante-Nicene times the reference in these words was understood of Christ's mediatorial office and His assumption of humanity. Clement of Rome, for instance, seems to have this passage in his eye when he says, ὁ Χριστὸς οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ οἱ Ἀπόστολοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (*Ad Cor.* 42); and Ignatius speaks of a series of subordinations analogous to this: ὑποτάγητε τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ὁ Χριστὸς τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ σάρκα καὶ οἱ Ἀπόστολοι τῷ Χριστῷ καὶ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι (*Ad Magnes.* 13). So Calvin, Cajetan, Estius, Cor. a Lap., Olshaus., De Wette, all of whom refer the words to the humiliation of the God-Man. On the other hand, the Greek Fathers of the dogmatic period refer them to the Son's eternal generation. Thus Theodoret says, Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ ὡς υἱὸς γνήσιος, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννημένος κατὰ τὴν θεότητα. So Hervæus, Meyer, Kling, etc. The Apostle is evidently speaking of a subordination in the sense of subjection to God's authority. Now the Greek dogmatists connected this subordination with Christ's eternal sonship. They assigned to the Son not only γέννησις, but also, as its necessary consequence, ὑπηρεσία. So apparently Tertullian also (*C. Præx.* 16). But Ambrose and Augustine disconnected this notion of inferiority (τὸ ὑποδεέστερον εἶναι) and ministry from that of sonship and connected it with the Son's incarnation. If this is not done, the incarnation is nothing more than a continuation of the eternal sonship under the altered conditions imposed by the assumption of humanity. Another passage explained by Chrys. to be a reference to the eternal fatherhood and sonship is xi. 3. He strives to rebut the inference, which the heretics were not slow to draw, that a certain inferiority

(ἐλάττωσίς τις) belonged to the Son. In commenting on the same verse Ambrose (*De Fide* IV. iii.) says that God is the head of Christ *secundum incarnationem*. Again, the words of Christ, "The Father is greater than I," are cited by Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom in proof of the doctrine of the Son's subordination κατὰ θεότητα. But Augustine explains them of His incarnation (*Contra Maxim. Arian.* I. 5 et al). If, in order not to imperil the doctrine of the Son's equality with the Father (Phil. ii. 6), we must distinguish between generation and subjection,<sup>1</sup> and as the Apostle here speaks of subjection, we must accept the reference of the words to the Mediator, the God-Man.

But, what is of no less importance, the Apostle speaks, not of Christ's obedience unto death, but of His present state of exaltation, which continues the obedience and service in a heavenly form. The exaltation of Christ is the glory of unending service. As the θεάνθρωπος he is still subject to God, and the Apostle elsewhere intimates (xv. 28) that a further subjection awaits Him, that God may be all in all; and this will also be the Son's final and supreme exaltation. His present life in heaven is a life of consecration to God on behalf of the Church (cf. Rom. v. 10; vi. 10; Heb. vii. 25). If it were not so, He would not have been through the ages subduing the wills and hearts and consciences of men, nor have made myriads willing to die for Him.

## F. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

(iv. 1-21).

(1) *A personal appeal from the judgment of men to that of Christ.*

(iv. 1-5).

The Apostle, having exposed the errors of the Corinthians respecting their teachers and their office, adds an earnest declaration of its true nature, and ends with a lofty appeal to the judgment of Christ, whose servant he is—an appeal that reminds us of Aristotle's description of high-mindedness; only that the Apostle's greatness of soul is rooted in a pro-

<sup>1</sup> Bp. Bull (*Def. Fid. Nic.* IV. 2. 1) identifies "auctoritas" and "origo."

found sense of duty and a vivid realization of God's judgment, resulting in dignity without pride, humility without meanness.

V. 1. Most expositors join οὕτως with ὥς, which makes the transition abrupt and emphatic, but sacrifices the reference in the verse to the close of the previous chapter. The Apostles are servants and possession of the Church because the Church is the possession of Christ. "As such, therefore, and from this point of view, let us be judged."

λογιζέσθω. The notion is taken up by the word κρίνω. "So far you may judge us and no further; so far, that is, as to account us servants of God and, therefore, exempt from your judgments."

ἄνθρωπος, for τις, a rare usage in class. Greek, not mentioned by Lidd. and Scott. But cf. Ast, *Lex. Plat., Prot.* 355 A. The Apostle, however, borrowed it from the use of ὦν in this sense. It passed to the sub-apostolic writers, e.g., *Ep. ad Diogn.* 7. It is an over-refinement to suppose, with Beng. and Osiand., that the Apostle uses the word to distinguish between the judgment of man and that of God (cf. xi. 28; but ἕκαστος in Gal. vi. 4).

ὑπηρέτας, lit., "under-rowers." But we are not to suppose any allusion to the literal meaning; in a war-galley all that performed any service, except the soldiers, were called ὑπηρέται. Διάκονος implies "trust;" and, in allusion to Christ's departure and continued absence, this became the name of a class of officers in the Church. But ὑπηρέτης implies subordination<sup>1</sup> and long afterwards became the name of the ὑποδιάκονοι (cf. Suic. s. v.). From the Apostle St. Luke borrowed it (Luke i. 2).

οἰκονόμους, "house-stewards," in allusion to Θεοῦ οἰκοδομή (iii. 9; cf. 1 Tim. iii. 15). The steward, though himself a δούλος, stood in the master's place (cf. Plat., *Polit.* 259, οἰκονόμος καὶ δεσπότης ταυτόν). In relation to the δεσπότης the οἰκονόμος was a δούλος, but an ἐπιτρόπος in relation to the ἐργάται (cf. Matt. xx. 8; Luke xvi. 1, 13; and Epictet. III. 24, τοῦ Θεοῦ διάκονοι).

μυστηρίων (cf. note on ii. 7). The metaphor of the house-

<sup>1</sup> Trench (*Syn.* p. 32) says, on the contrary, that the ὑπηρέτης had more official character and functions than the διάκονος.

steward is not dropped. The wisdom which had been hidden but is now revealed is the treasure which the stewards disburse on behalf of the οἰκοδεσπότης to the household (cf. Matt. xxiv. 45). The notion of distributing contained in οἰκονόμος accounts for the use of the plur. μυστηρίων. Aquinas, Olshausen and others explain it of the sacraments. Cf. Philo, *De Præm.* p. 929, μύστην γεγονότα τῶν θείων τελετῶν. Properly speaking, the sacraments are not mysteries in the New Test. meaning of the word, that is, a thing revealed. They are instruments of revelation, not the revelation itself (cf. Arnold, *Fragment on the Church*, p. 29). That the sacraments are included is probable. But if they alone were meant, the Apostle would not have said in i. 17 that Christ had not sent him to baptize.

**V. 2.** ὧδε. The phrase ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν (text. rec.) occurs nowhere else. The reading of  $\aleph$  A B C D and Vulg. (*hic*) and several of the Fathers is ὧδε, which is adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort, while ὁ δέ is retained by De Wette, Olshausen, Hofmann. The weight of evidence is in favour of ὧδε, but it is difficult to fix the meaning. (1) Kling, Stanley, etc.: "in this matter." But ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις would then be redundant. (2) Alford: "here on earth;" as if a contrast were indicated between the stewards into whose faithfulness an enquiry is made on earth, and God's stewards, who refuse to submit to any earthly judgment. Shore considers we have here, not a contrast, but an analogy: "As in the case of an earthly steward, inquiry is made, so will it be in the case of God's stewards." But the notion of responsibility first appears in ver. 5. In Heb. xiii. 14 ὧδε means "on earth;" but all danger of ambiguity is there obviated by the word μέλλουσιν. (3) Lachm. joins ὧδε to ver. 1: "stewards of the mysteries of God in this matter." The position of ὧδε is harsh, and μυστηρίων makes it redundant. (4) Meyer's rendering yields an excellent meaning: "such being the case;" that is, such being the nature of our condition as servants of Christ and stewards of God's mysteries; ὧδε being equivalent to εἵπερ ὧδε ἔχει (cf. Soph., *Philoct.* 624, πεισθήσομαι γὰρ ὧδε). Christ's servants and the stewards of the mysteries of God should, because they are such, take no heed of men's judgment, but be faithful to their Lord.

λοιπόν, "for the rest," *ceterum*. If the Apostles are servants of Christ, nothing else remains for them except to be faithful. Their whole duty is comprised in being faithful. Auth. and Revised Versions incorrectly: "moreover."

ἵνα, denoting the object of ζητεῖται. Meyer's opinion that ἵνα is always telic cannot be sustained (cf. i. 10; xiv. 12; John xv. 8). The phrase ζητεῖν λόγον is class., but with παρά, not ἐν. Ἀπαιτεῖν ἐν would be used.

εὔρεθῇ. The word looks back to ζητεῖται. The master seeks and expects to find faithfulness, when the steward renders his account (cf. Luke xii. 43; 2 Cor. v. 3). It is incorrect, therefore, to suppose εὔρεῖν is here an Aramaism for εἶναι (Cureton, *Corp. Ignat.* p. 271).<sup>1</sup> Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 50, ἵνα εὔρεθῶμεν ἁμῶμοι.

V. 3. ἐμοὶ δέ. We might have expected οὖν. "Since faithfulness to his Lord is required in a steward, *therefore* I, being God's steward, will pay no heed to your judgment." But the sing. ἐμοί introduces, not a general statement, but an earnest and emphatic personal expression of the Apostle's determination, the more emphatic because all reference to others is suppressed.

εἰς ἐλάχιστόν ἐστιν, "it amounts to very little," when compared with God's judgment. This use of εἰς to express the point to which something rises or is reduced is class., and must be distinguished from the Hebraistic use of εἰς as a secondary predicate.

ἀνακριθῶ, not "to be judged whether I am faithful or not" (Aquín., Beng.), but "to be examined, sifted, so that all my faults shall be made manifest" (cf. Luke xxiii. 14; Acts iv. 9; xii. 19). The Apostle knew that on the score of faithfulness nothing could be laid to his charge. But ἀνακρίνειν implies that even if men were to bring to light the hidden things of darkness (ver. 5), it would be a matter of little moment to him, because they had no jurisdiction. The judgment of God at once confers worth on the judgment of men, when the latter is an echo of the former, and prevents our over-estimating it when it is not (cf. 2 Cor. i. 12; iv. 2; Gal. i. 10).

<sup>1</sup> In Isa. liii. 9, the LXX. has, in the Alex. MS., εὑρέθη, though the notion of finding is not in the Hebrew.

ἡ ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμέρας. This is added to explain why he made light of their judgment. It was not from personal contempt, but because man is not his judge. The phrase is not equivalent to ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων. The latter denotes the judgment of public opinion; but ὑπὸ ἀνθρ. ἡμέρας denotes the judgment of the constituted authorities as representing the principles of the world. No doubt the phrase was suggested by the use of ἡμέρα Κυρίου in Isa. xiii. 6; Joel i. 15; Zeph. i. 14. It implies indirectly a contrast between men's day and Christ's, a contrast necessarily springing from the fundamental difference between the κόσμος and the Church, the kingdom of evil and that of Christ, the present and the future, the natural sphere and the spiritual. It is unnecessary to suppose, with Jerome (*Ep.* cxxi. Ad. Algas.), that the phrase is a Cilician provincialism, or, with Theod., that it is an allusion to the shortness of life.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐμavτὸν ἀνακρίνω, "but I do not bring even myself to trial and I pass no judgment upon myself." The judgment of his own conscience even is not absolute and final (cf. 1 John iii. 19, 20). The reference is not to "morbid spiritual analysis" (Webst. and Wilkins.). He appeals, not only from an unhealthy subjectivism, but also from the healthy, but imperfect and erring, judgment of conscience to the judgment of God. We cannot fail to mark the suggestive contrast between this avowal of inability to judge oneself and the emphatic claim made by the Apostle in chap. ii. on behalf of the spiritual man, who judges all things. Self-knowledge is more difficult than knowledge of revealed truth.

V. 4. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμavτῷ σύνοιδα, "for I am not conscious of any unfaithfulness as steward of God's mysteries." Cf. Plat., *Apol.* p. 21, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμavτῷ σοφὸς ὢν, and Job xxvii. 6. The clause is not simply concessive, as if the next clause alone contained the reason why the Apostle did not judge himself. This would have required μέν. Both clauses depend on γάρ: "I do not judge myself; for I am not conscious of fault, so as to condemn myself: I do not judge myself; for I am not absolved by being free from the condemnation of my own conscience." He ascribes to conscience authority to condemn, and denies to conscience the power to absolve. Cf. Rom. ii. 15, where κατηγορεῖν

implies the condemnation of conscience, but ἀπολογεῖσθαι means, not acquittal, but merely a defence. Similarly the Apostle John says that when conscience condemns, God condemns, but the silence of conscience does not involve that God absolves. He adds, what is only suggested in the language of St. Paul, that if our heart condemn us not, we have confidence before God. This is hinted at in δεδικαίωμαi: the silence of conscience is a ground of hope that he has been justified (cf. Heb. xiii. 18; 2 Cor. i. 12; v. 9, 10).

δεδικαίωμαi. Cor. a Lap. and Estius understand this of the dogmatic justification, as in Rom. i. 17, in accordance with their definition of justification as *renovatio interioris hominis*. Melancthon (*Postilla*, vol. xxiv. p. 687, edit. 1856), Rückert, Meyer also explain it of dogmatic justification, but in a forensic sense. Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Calvin, De Wette, etc., refer it to the approval bestowed on the faithful servant when he gives an account of his stewardship. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Rom.* 5; Barn., *Ep.* iv. 10, μὴ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐνδύοντες μονάζετε ὡς ἤδη δεδικαιωμένοι, and xv. 7, and it is the only sense in which Barn. uses the word "justification." As this is an appeal on the part of the steward of God's mysteries to the judgment of God, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and burn the worthless materials which the servant may have placed in the walls of the temple, the notion of justification through faith is foreign to the general purport of the passage. Of course the denial of present justification includes that he has not been justified by the law. By the use of the perf. the Apostle intimates that the case is still pending. In the next clause this judgment is ascribed to the Lord Jesus, to whom the act of forensic justification is never assigned. That Κύριος means Christ is proved by ver. 5. "Ad tribunal tuum, Jesus Christe, appello," said Pascal, in the spirit of St. Paul.

V. 5. ὥστε. Cf. note on iii. 21.

πρὸ καιροῦ, "before the appointed time," when the saints will judge as the Lord's assessors (cf. vi. 2).

τι is accus. of respect, not of the object, which would have been τινας.

ἕως ἄν. In class. prose the instances in which ἄν is omitted with ἕως before a subjunctive are rare, at least till the time of

Plutarch. Cf. Bernhardt, *W. S.* p. 400. In the New Test. it is much the more frequent usage. Cf. Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 198; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 291. Hermann (*De Partic. ãv*, II. 9) and Klotz (*Devar.* II. p. 568) think *ẽws* with the subjunctive takes *ãv* when either the event itself or the time of its occurrence is uncertain. A comparison of our passage with xi. 26 seems to prove that in the New Test. there is no real difference in meaning between *ãχρις οũ* or *ẽws* and *ãχρις οũ ãv* or *ẽws ãv* with subjunctive. Compare xv. 25, *ãχρις οũ θῆ*, where *Ⲛ B D* omit *ãv*, with Matt. xxii. 44, *ẽws ãv θῶ*.

*τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους*, genit. of possession, in order to express more emphatically the power of Christ, who will bring into light the things which the darkness holds in its grasp. Cf. *καρδίας*, xiv. 25; Rom. ii. 16; espec. Philo, *Quod a Deo mittantur somnia*, p. 578, *ὃ πάντα προῦπτα καὶ ὅσα ἐν μύχοις τῆς διανοίας ἀοράτως ἐπιτελείται*, and Col. i. 13.

*ὃς καί*, "who also," besides judging, will make manifest, etc.

*φωτίσει*, i.e. *εἰς φῶς ἄγειν* (Suid., cf. 2 Tim. i. 10). But in John i. 9; Eph. iii. 9, it means "to enlighten." The word is comparatively late Greek.

*βουλάς*. It is not enough, in order to pass judgment on men, that the hidden things should be brought to light. The motive must also be known.

*τότε*, emphatic: "then, not before; but then at once."

*ὁ ἔπαινος*, "the praise due to each." Cf. *ὁ μισθός*, Rom. iv. 4. *Ἐπαινος* is not a *vox media*, including the censure of one and the praise of another. The Apostle refers to the servant, who has built on the true foundation, and will receive his due praise, neither more nor less.

*ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Christ brings secret things to light; God passes judgment. It is the Divine element in Christ's judgment that makes it absolute and final. This finality is well expressed by *ἀπὸ* (cf. Rom. ii. 29, *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*). *Ἐκ* means that the act of judging passes in God's mind and the judgment formed is by Him pronounced; it is, therefore, an *independent* judgment. *Ἀπὸ* denotes that the judgment proceeds ultimately from God and cannot be traced to any higher authority; it is, therefore a *final* judgment.

(2) *A Sharp Rebuke.*

(iv. 6-13).

**V. 6.** No better proof of the substantial harmony between the Apostle's teaching and that of Apollos could be had than what he now says. They at least cannot have been heads of contending factions. For what has been said from iii. 5 to iv. 5, the Apostle now tells us, is a kind of parable, in which the Corinthians could read their own condition and dangers. There were teachers among them who built wood, hay, and stubble into the walls of God's temple, or strove even to destroy it. The Apostle—if indeed he knows—will not name them. To do so would only establish them the more firmly in their position of party-leaders; and on the other hand, the Apostle's reticence does much to dissolve their influence.

*μετεσχημάτισα.* *Μετασχ.* means properly "to change the figure or shape." It thus approaches to the signification of *μεταμορφοῦσθαι*, as in Phil. iii. 21 (cf. Rom. xii. 2). But, in accordance with the difference between *σχῆμα*, the changeable fashion, and *μορφή*, the distinctive and abiding form, *μετασχ.* came to signify "to use a figure of speech in which one thing is named and another is meant." Here, therefore, a lesson is conveyed to the Church concerning certain teachers, whom the Apostle leaves unnamed, under the "guise" of a statement respecting the Apostle himself and Apollos (cf. Plato, *Laws*, X. p. 906). The word cannot mean "to teach a general truth by means of an example" (De Wette, Neander; so Cranmer's Bible: "I have for an ensample descrybed"). As Meyer remarks, this would not be to change the *σχῆμα* of the truth at all.

*ἐν ἡμῖν*, "in our case," to be joined to *μάθητε*, but not quite synon. with *ἐξ ἡμῶν μάθητε*. *Ἐν* combines the two notions of instrument and sphere. So *κρίνειν ἐν ἀνδρί* (Acts xvii. 31) means, not merely "to judge by means of," but "to judge in the person of a man." Cf. John xiii. 35, "They will know by your mutual love that ye are My disciples and will see My teaching exemplified in your love."

*φρονεῖν*, omitted in **8 A B D Vulg.** and the Latin Fathers, but inserted in most Greek Fathers. It is rejected by Lachm.,

Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort, but retained by Reiche. It may have crept in to complete the expression from Rom. xii. 3 and is not wanted. Hartung (*Partikell.* II. p. 153) gives a number of examples of the omission of a verb after *μή*. The omission of *φροεῖν* turns the words into a maxim and at the same time widens their application (cf. *μηδὲν ἄγαν*). For a similar ellipse cf. v. 1; xi. 24.

*ὑπὲρ ἃ γέγραπται*. So  $\aleph$  A B C. But D has  $\delta$ , which Meyer and De Wette retain, because it may have been altered into  $\tilde{\alpha}$  to correspond to *ταῦτα*, with which, however, it has nothing to do. Cranmer's: "beyond that whyche is above wrytten." So also Mosheim, Neander. In that case we should probably have had *ἐγράφη* or *προέγραψα*, as in Eph. iii. 3. Hofmann: "above what has been assigned to each by God." We should then have to read  $\delta$ , and the rendering unduly strains the meaning of *γέγραπται*, which very rarely occurs in the sense of *μεμέρισται* or *τέτακται*, as in Pind., *Nem.* 6, 13 (7). Eur., *Ion.* 446, cited by Hofm., is not an instance. Surely the Apostle means the Scriptures of the Old Test.; not that he refers to any particular passage, but to the general spirit and point of view of the Divine revelation. So Bengel, Olshaus., Meyer, etc. The facts which he has delivered to the Corinthians are "according to the Scriptures" (xv. 3). He claims the same allegiance to the Old Test. on behalf of Apollos, who was "strong in the Scriptures" (Acts xviii. 24). The words are another undesigned vindication of himself and Apollos from the charge of being party-leaders. Both kept close to the teaching of Scripture. The faithfulness of the steward (iv. 2) turns out to be loyalty to the word of God; and, as the faithful servant fears not the judgment of men, so also the pride of his self-conceit is quelled by the subjection of his spirit to God's revelation. Both qualities are the opposite of the tortuous intellectual cleverness of the Corinthians. Both are the surest safeguard of transparent, direct, honest simplicity of character, which, in turn, is the best preservative of church order and the only remedy against factions.

*ἴνα . . . ἴνα*. Both depend on *μετεσχημάτισα* (cf. i. 27; Rom. vii. 13; Gal. iii. 14). But the former clause has special reference to party-leaders; the latter to the Church.

εἰς . . . ἐτέρου, "that ye be not puffed up one on behalf of one, and another on behalf of another, against an opponent" (cf. 1 Thess. v. 11). It is not necessary to consider it an Aramaism (Winer, *Gr.* § XXVI. 2 *b*). Cf. Plat., *Laws*, I. p. 626, εἰς πρὸς ἕνα, "individual against individual." It is more individualising than ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων. There was at Corinth, not only the common action of one party against another, but the strife of one individual for another individual against a third. The attachment of a partisan to one person was the result of his antagonism to another (cf. note on i. 12). Winer (*Gr.* § XLVII.) and Olshausen render ὑπὲρ by "over" and consider τοῦ ἐνός to mean the opponent of εἰς, "that one may not be puffed up over the other," so as to imagine himself raised above him. But, in this sense, ὑπὲρ would require the accus. in the New Test. (cf. Matt. x. 24). Besides, it would make the words κατὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου redundant.

φυσιοῦσθε. Gal. iv. 17, ζηλοῦτε, is the only other passage in which the use of ἵνα with the pres. indic. is certain. To avoid the anomaly Grotius conjectured φυσιοῖσθε and ζηλοῖτε. Bengel supposed the Apostle formed the subjunctive of these verbs by an erroneous contraction into -ου instead of -ω. But the pres. indic. occurs as a various reading in other verbs; e.g. A reads ἵνα ποιῆσθε, 2 Pet. i. 10; A C have ἵνα διώκονται, Gal. vi. 12; A, σωφρονίζουσιν, Tit. ii 4; B, γινώσκομεν, 1 John v. 20. Others regard φυσιοῦσθε and ζηλοῦτε as Attic futures, and cite Thuc. II. 8; III. 58; where, however, ἐλευθεροῦσιν and ἐρημοῦτε are presents, though joined to futures. Meyer accepts Fritzsche's explanation, that ἵνα, when it takes the pres. indic. is the local adverb ("where," "under which circumstances"). But Fritzsche himself abandoned the theory as regards our passage, and suggested an alteration of the text into ἕνα μὴ . . . φυσιοῦσθαι, the reading of Theod. and, apparently, of Origen (*Cat.*). Against Meyer's view it may be urged; *first*, that we should then expect οὐ, not μὴ. Meyer replies that μὴ is used because the clause is subjective. But it is subjective only if the Apostle is expressing his purpose. *Second*, ἵνα does not once occur in the New Test. as an adv. of place. It is probable, therefore, that we have here an early instance of ἵνα with the pres. indic., parallel with the undoubted examples of εἰάν and ὅταν with

the pres. indic., and of *ἵνα* with the fut. indic. in the Ep. of Barnabas (v. 6). Cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 806. 2. Obs. 2; Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 202.

. *φυσιώω*. The class. form is *φυσάω* (cf. *χολάω*, John vii. 23, for the class. *χολοῦμαι*). The source of party-spirit is pride. Cf. Phil. ii. 2, where *κενοδοξία* is the cause of *ἐρίθεια*, and its remedy is *ταπεινοφροσύνη*. The Apostle is probing the moral disposition that gave rise to the factions, as he has already tested their intellectual reasonableness.

V. 7. The parable is justified. For the case of the Corinthians does not differ from that of a Paul or an Apollos. The point of the three searching questions with which the Apostle rebukes the self-conceit of the Corinthians is that what any man has is not his own, but God's.

*τίς γάρ σε διακρίνει*; Of the various interpretations that have been offered of this question the following alone seem deserving of consideration: (1) Chrys., Theophyl., Œcum., Olshaus., De Wette, Meyer, Neander, Alford, etc., with slight differences among themselves: "Who adjudges thee to be superior to thy brethren? No one. For God's judgment is not yet, and man's judgment is not to be accepted." If this means that others do not acknowledge a man's superiority, that of itself is not a reason for humility. He may be justly conscious of the possession of superior gifts. If the meaning is that one man is not superior to another, that is not true in fact and is inconsistent with the next question. If it be replied that the Apostle means not superiority of gifts, but authority to tyrannize over the brethren, then the meaning of *διακρίνειν* is too much strained. (2) Origen, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, Hofmann: "Who makes thee to differ from thy brethren, so that one has superior gifts to another? Not thyself nor any man, but God only." (Similarly Augustine, *C. duas Ep. Pelag.* II. 7, *et al.*, only that he refers the preference to the act of God's electing grace drawing a man *à massâ perditionis*, a notion foreign to the drift of the passage.) The objection is that this interpretation approaches too nearly the meaning of the second question. On the whole, then, we must seek another explanation. The Apostle has compared the condition of the Corinthians to that of Apollos and himself. In this verse he justifies the comparison by

asking who hath made any of them differ from the Apostles, so that, while the latter dare not relax in their preparations for the judgment of Christ, the former can afford to indulge in self-satisfied pride and create factions in the Church. "Or shall we say," he proceeds, "that any one among you has anything of his own, while the Apostles have only what the Lord has given to each; and that you need not, as they need, fear to be called to give an account of a stewardship? If you dare not allege this, then why do you boast?"

εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλαβες. The usual distinction between εἰ καὶ and καὶ εἰ creates a difficulty here and in 2 Cor. iv. 3.<sup>1</sup> The meaning here assigned by expositors to εἰ καὶ is, not "although," but "even if." "Even if I concede that thou hast, yet thou receivedst it from God." The extremely rare use of καὶ εἰ in the New Test. tends to show that the Apostle does not observe the distinction between καὶ εἰ and εἰ καὶ. It is true there are many instances in which εἰ καὶ means neither *etsi*, "although," nor "*etiamsi*," "even if," but *si etiam*, "if even," when the καὶ emphasizes one only of the words that follow (cf. vii. 21, and Kühner's note on Xen., *Mem.* I. vi. 12, εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν). But whether we render εἰ καὶ in our passage by "even if" or by "if even," we are met by the same difficulty, that ἔλαβες is made to be synonymous with εἶχες, whereas the Apostle has just before distinguished between ἔχειν and λαβεῖν, and immediately after uses λαβὼν in its usual meaning of "receiving." To avoid this we must render εἰ καὶ by "although." "Why, though thou receivedst from God all thou hast, boastest thou as if thou hadst not received it?"

κανχᾶσαι, the original, uncontracted form, which appears in class. prose in δύνασαι. Cf. Rom. ii. 17; Luke xvi. 25, ὀδυνᾶσαι, and the futures φάγεσαι and πίεσαι, Luke xvii. 8.

ὥς μή, subjective: "as if thinking thou hadst not received."

**Vv. 8, 9.** Searching questions give place to ironical derision. But both are intended to show the folly and sinfulness of pride.

<sup>1</sup> The distinction was pointed out by Hermann, *Adnotationes ad Viger.* p. 664: "Καὶ εἰ est etiam si, et καὶ refertur ad ipsam conditionem, eamque indicat non certam esse: etiam tum, si . . . Contra εἰ καὶ est etsi, et καὶ conditioni postpositum, non ad εἰ refertur, neque conditionem ipsam indicat incertam esse."

Not only they had forgotten that all they had was from God, but they were also satisfied with their present attainments in spiritual gifts, as if they were already in possession of Messiah's kingdom, and that to the exclusion of the apostles, through whom they had been brought into the Church. As ver. 7 looks back to iii. 5-10, so ver. 8 is an allusion to iii. 13-15 and iv. 4, 5. While Paul and Apollos were still building God's temple and awaiting the trial of the day of Christ, the Corinthians behaved as if the trial were past and the reward gained. Yea, more than this, supposing the Corinthians to be right in acting as if God's judgment upon men were declared, then the outward condition of the Apostles was proof of their having been already condemned. The Divine Judge himself (*ὁ Θεός*, ver. 9) has to all appearance thrust them upon death. If judgment is already come, those men who fondly expected to be Christ's assessors in judging men and angels, have themselves been made a spectacle to the world of angels and men. But the Apostle mingles his irony with expressions of the deep longing of his heart for the appearing of Christ. With tenderness and in self-forgetfulness, he avows his wish that they might in truth reign with Christ, so he and his fellow-Apostles might but share in their glory.

**V. 8.** *ἤδη κεκορεσμένοι*, "already filled to satiety." *Ἦδη* (that is, *οὕτω ταχέως*, Chrys.) prepares for the statement of the contrast between their condition and that of the Apostles, and contains an allusion to the time when Christ will have come, no one knew how soon. "When we are hungry, ye are full; while we are waiting for the Lord's coming, ye are satiated and expect nothing." The irony of the words is the more keen for the contrast between this false conceit of fulness, which finds its satisfaction in the present and forgets the promise of the Lord's coming, and the true Christian fulness of grace, which is always accompanied by an earnest expectation of Christ. Their fulness is not the joy that springs from a believing expectation of Christ's coming, but that which renders such an expectation impossible. The words are not inconsistent with i. 7, which has reference to their former, not their present condition. *Κεκορεσμένοι* is a metaphor borrowed from satiety in eating: "ye have had your fill" (cf. Acts xxvii. 38).

ἐπλούτήσατε, “ye grew rich.” Cf. Rev. iii. 17, where πεπλούτηκα means “I have enriched myself,” and so differs from πλούσιός εἰμι. The allusion is to the proverbial self-conceit of men who have made their own wealth. This prepares for χωρὶς ἡμῶν.

χωρὶς ἡμῶν, “apart from us.” The Apostles, through whom the Corinthians had been brought into possession of Christian privileges, were flouted by those Corinthians as unworthy to partake of their privileges and to associate with them in hope of obtaining them.

ἐβασιλεύσατε, “ye got the kingdom,” *regnum adepti estis* (Erasm.). The view of Estius and Billroth that the Apostle means lordship over a party in the Church makes χωρὶς ἡμῶν meaningless. Still it was by being satiated with influence in the Church that they had attained to a false appearance of the kingly power which will be bestowed on all Christians at the coming of Christ. The correct interpretation, that the Apostle refers to the second coming, was suggested by Origen, and in modern times resuscitated by Cor. a Lap., Meyer, De Wette, Neander, Hofmann, etc.

καὶ ὀφελόν γε, “and would that certainly,” etc. In the New Test. and late Greek ὀφελον is simply an adverb. Cf. Exod. xvi. 3, with pres. tense; 2 Cor. xi. 1, with imperf.; Gal. v. 12, with fut. With a past tense of indic., as here, it expresses a wish which is, at the same time, impossible of attainment (cf. Rev. iii. 15). In exclamations and expressions of a wish γέ often occurs. Cf. Eur., *Iph. in Aul.* 70, ὥς γε μήποτ’ ὄφελεν λαβεῖν. Sometimes καὶ . . . γέ, “and certainly,” introducing with force an unexpected addition (cf. Xen., *Mem.* III. viii. 6). After ironically taunting the Corinthians with the pretence of kingship, the Apostle gives utterance to his desire for the coming of Christ. His disappointment at the spiritual degeneracy of the Corinthians and, perhaps, his own sufferings at Ephesus make him long for rest. Theod. observes that in other passages συμβασιλεύειν denotes the Christian’s reigning with Christ (cf. 2 Tim. ii. 12); and elsewhere (Col. i. 28) St. Paul describes believers as presented perfect in Christ Jesus before God’s throne by himself and other teachers. Here he expresses a wish to reign with these Corinthians, to be presented, that is, by them.

In Col. i. 24 he strikes a higher note and rejoices in his sufferings for the Church.

**Vv. 9-13.** He enumerates his sufferings and contrasts them with the self-satisfaction of the Corinthians. He does this, not to account for his wish to see the kingdom of God come, but to explain why it was that, while the Corinthian Church was racked with contentions, the Apostles presented a united front to the world. Satiety left the former a prey to factions; sore trials made any considerable disunion within the apostolic college impossible.

**V. 9.** δοκῶ, "methinks;" not implying doubt, nor ironical (Grot.), nor a strong asseveration (Æcum., Wordsw.), but the expression of his own feeling and corresponding, therefore, to κεκοροσμένοι. Theirs was a feeling of self-satisfaction; his, of self-surrender to God's will. Hence ὁ Θεός is emphatic. "Ye are become kings, but your greatness is of your own making; we suffer, but our sufferings are appointed by God." Yet this must not be thought to destroy the irony of the passage as a whole.

τοὺς ἀποστόλους. Babes in Christ imagining themselves in possession of the kingdom, while Christ's ambassadors, through whom they believed, are exhibited before the world as men condemned to death!

ἑσχάτους, not "the last Apostles" (Wycliffe, Erasm., Calvin, Beza, Cor. a Lap., Heinrici), as if Paul and his brethren were last compared with the Apostles of the Old Test., that is, the prophets, or as if Paul were last of all the Apostles. This would be τοὺς ἑσχ. ἀπ. Heinrici defends the omission of τοὺς before the adj. by reference to x. 3, τὸ αὐτὸ βρῶμα πνευματικόν, and Gal. i. 4, τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος αἰῶνος πονηροῦ, and Matt. xxiv. 45, ὁ πιστὸς δούλος καὶ φρόνιμος. But φρόνιμος is virtually a predicate, and in the other two examples the occurrence of another attributive (τὸ αὐτό and ἐνεστῶτος) having the article dispenses with the article before the second attributive, even in class. Greek (cf. Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 79). Chrys., Estius, and most modern expositors make ἑσχάτους predicate after ἀπέδειξεν. Tynd. and Cranm.: "hath set forth us which are Apostles for the lowest of all." Selden (*De Dis Syris*, Præf.) understands the word to denote the ἐφέδρος or third combatant, who sits by to fight the conqueror. It is difficult to see the

propriety of the metaphor. Chrys.: πάντων ἀτιμότεροι. For ἔσχατος in this sense cf. Mark ix. 35. *Extremus* is used in the same way, and Cicero (*Pro Sext. Rosc.* 137) uses *postremus* for *pessimus*. The reference is probably to the custom of carrying into effect the sentence on men condemned to death as a fitting close to the day's sport, when less sanguinary exhibitions had palled on the spectators' appetite. The Apostle's mind is still full of the thought that Christ's kingdom is at hand. It is the evening of the world's day of power. Already the scene changes; and the last act is played out in the worst display of cruelty.

ἀπέδειξε. Not equivalent to ἐποίησε (Chrys.), which is a class. meaning of ἀποδείκνυμι. The allusion to the θέατρον requires the meaning of "exhibiting." Beza correctly: *spectandos proposuit* (cf. 2 Thess. ii. 4). The ἀπο- has the force of "away from oneself," so that ἀποδείκνυμι is really synonymous with ἐπιδείκνυμι, "to show forth" (cf. Matt. xxii. 19).

ὥς ἐπιθανάτιους, "as men condemned to death;" to be distinguished from ἐπιθάνατος, "hard at death's door;" though Hesych. seems to use both words in the latter meaning. But here at least ἐπιθανάτιος must mean more than ἐν θανάτοις πολλάκις (2 Cor. xi. 23); for ὥς introduces a metaphor. Indeed θανατώω properly means, not "to kill" (as Auth. Vers. in Rom. viii. 36), but "to put to death by process of law" (cf. *Æschyl., Prom. V.* 1074, Paley's note). It was Tertullian, apparently, that suggested an allusion to the *bestiarii*. So Colet, Calvin, Estius, Cor. a Lap., Stanley; but not De Wette and Meyer. The words ἀπέδειξεν and ἐσχάτους strongly favour the allusion, and the causal ὅτι shows that the words θέατρον ἐγενήθημεν explain more fully the covert allusion in ἐπιθανάτιους. Cf. xv. 32, ἐθριομάχησα; Phil. i. 27, στήκετε ("stand your ground in the encounter"); and *Martyr. Ignat.* 9, θηρίοις αὐτὸν εἰς τέρψιν τοῦ θεάτρον κοινὴν ἐκδοθῆναι.

θέατρον, that is, θέαμα ἐν θεάτρῳ, "a theatrical spectacle." Cf. Heb. x. 33, θεατριζόμενοι. Cf. Greg. Naz., *Ep.* 29, δρᾶμα γεγόναμεν, οἳ ποτε νομισθέντες εὐδαίμονες.

τῇ κόσμῳ, "to a world." It is not often St. Paul uses κόσμος in the sense of "the universe," as here and viii. 4. That a world has been summoned to the spectacle enhances

at once their suffering and its dignity. The Corinthians were kings because they centred in themselves and were satisfied with very small attainments. The Apostles were, indeed, covered with obloquy, but it was cast upon them when they were doing a work in which men and angels and God Himself were interested. The absence of *καί* before *κόσμῳ* makes it probable, but not certain, that "angels" and "men" are explanatory of "the world." Cf. Gen. i. 24, *τετράποδα καὶ ἔρπεντα καὶ θηρία*, where the three are co-ordinate. But the omission of the article before *ἄγγέλοις* and *ἰσχυράτοις* is also favourable to this view. So Tertullian (*C. Marc.* v. 7) and most expositors; but Origen apparently otherwise (*Ad Mart.* 18). This comprehensive use of the word *κόσμος* is remarkable because, on the one hand, it is an advance on the Old Test. conception of two separate spheres of existence, Heaven and Earth, not comprehended under any wider designation; and, on the other, because it differs from the meaning attached to the word among the Greeks, inasmuch as the Apostle uses it of the spiritual as well as the physical totality of existence. The spiritual oneness of the universe is a conception eminently characteristic of St. Paul. But it is foreshadowed by Plato (*Gorg.* p. 508), *φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί . . . καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἰσχυράτους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν*. On ἄγγελοι cf. 1 Pet. i. 12. "The angels of God," observes Origen (*Cat.*), "hasten to this novel spectacle, to see a man compassed with flesh wrestling against principalities and powers." In *Ad Mart.* 18 he rightly includes bad as well as good angels. Cf. Rom. viii. 38.

**V. 10.** Asyndeton, because this verse is epexegetical of the preceding verses. With combined irony and earnestness he says in what way the Apostles are the laughing-stock of the world, and in what way the Corinthians are kings in the Church. The threefold antithesis of fools and wise men, of weaklings and strong men, of outlaws and men in honour, is an allusion to i. 23-28, which makes the irony of the words the more biting. "God chose the foolish, the weak, the despised things of the world, and you were at one time willing to be fools, weaklings and outcasts for Christ's sake. But you have

succeeded in becoming wise, strong, and honourable in consequence actually of your being Christians. You have turned your Christianity itself into an effective means to restore to you the worldly greatness, in another form, which you once surrendered in order to become Christians."

*διὰ Χριστόν* . . . *ἐν Χριστῷ*, "fools *on account* of Christ;" not *in* Christ, because he is speaking of the inward motive: but "*wise in* Christ;" not *on account* of Christ, because they made their objective condition as Christians the occasion of pride. They not only succeeded in reconciling these two opposites, Christianity and worldly prudence (Neander, *De Wette*), but actually put the latter to rest upon the former. Their worldly wisdom was an attainment which they had achieved in virtue of their union with Christ. Cf. Jude 4. Hence *φρόνιμοι* is to be closely joined to *ἐν Χριστῷ*, which, therefore, means, not *ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χριστὸν πράγμασιν* (Chrys.), nor "*in ejus ecclesiâ*" (Grot.), but "*as Christians.*"

*ἐνδοξος* carries with it the notion of glitter and show, ostentation with a suggestion of pretence. Cf. *Ælian., Var. Hist.* ii. 20, where Antigonos calls kingship *ἐνδοξον δουλείαν*.

*ἄτιμοι*, "outlaws," "outcasts." The contrast is between kings and persons stigmatised with social *ἀτιμία*.

**Vv. 11-13.** "Our condition proves that we are fools, weaklings, outcasts in the eyes of the world." He mentions three things, every one of which proves all he has said in ver. 10, while each has also a special reference to one or another of the three points mentioned. *First*, the Apostles endured hardship for the sake of Christ (ver. 11); and this the world would account folly and fanaticism. *Second*, they abstained from retaliating, and even blessed their persecutors (ver. 12); and this the world accounts weakness and "a noble simplicity." *Third*, they were outcasts for their religion and the honour of Christ; and this treatment of them the world accounted a religious rite that might be expected to appease the anger of their gods (ver. 13).

**V. 11.** *ἄχρι τῆς ἄρτι ὥρας*, with special reference to his own sufferings at the time in Ephesus. *Ἄρτι*, from *ἄρω*, "up to this very hour," when you imagine the kingdom of Christ to have come.

*γυμνητεύομεν*, "we go without sufficient clothing," the opp.

of θερμαίνεσθαι (James ii. 16). Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 27. The form γυμνιτεύομεν is read in  $\aleph$  A B C D, and is adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The difficulty is that γυμνίτης does not occur, but γυμνήτης, from which we should expect γυμνητεύω. But γυμνός would correctly yield γυμνίτης and γυμνιτεύω. Though, therefore, we cannot, with Alford, assume a form γυμνίτης, we need not, with Meyer, suppose a clerical error in γυμνιτεύω.

κολαφιζόμεθα, "we are buffeted;" literally so (cf. 2 Cor. xi. 23).

ἄστατοῦμεν, "we have no home." Cf. *Ep. ad Diogn.* 5, excellently: πατρίδας οἰκοῦσιν ἰδίας, ἀλλ' ὥς πάροιχοι. . . . πᾶσα πατρὶς ξένη. So Heb. xi. 13, 37, 38. The Vulg. has *instabiles sumus*, whence Wycliffe: "we ben unstable." Beza corrects it into *incertis sedibus erramus*.

**V. 12.** κοπιῶμεν ἐργαζόμενοι, "we toil in working." The latter word denotes the Apostle's self-denial, the former his physical weariness. Barnabas and Paul differed from the other Apostles in voluntarily refraining from accepting maintenance at the hands of the Churches (ix. 6). Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 9; 2 Thess. iii. 8; Acts xx. 34. He mentions it here as folly in the eyes of the world,—that he, a learned teacher, should assume the contemptible condition of a mechanic (βάνανσος τεχνίτης). On the participle cf. 2 Cor. xi. 7, ταπεινῶν.

λοιδορούμενοι. . . παρακαλοῦμεν. He passes to what the world considers weakness, the humility around which all the Christian graces cluster. That humility shines in every grace he shows by three contrasts,—blessing revilers, being patient in persecutions, being gentle towards slanderers.

λοιδορεῖσθαι differs slightly from βλασφημεῖσθαι or its equivalent δυσφημεῖσθαι, because it implies "reviling to one's face," and so refers to the *sting* of the word, while βλασφ. (for βλαψιφημεῖν, says Pott, *Etym. Forsch.* I. 47) is "to defame," and refers to the *injury* inflicted.

ἀνεχόμεθα, "we bear up under it;" scarcely so strong a word as ὑπομένειν. The former is "to bear patiently," the latter "to bear bravely."

**V. 13.** δυσφημούμενοι. So  $\aleph$  A C; adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort. παρακαλοῦμεν, probably not "we pray for them" (Tynd., Cranm., etc.). So Calvin. The

accus. τὸν Θεόν would have been inserted. Theophyl. paraphrases, *πρᾶτοτέροις λόγοις καὶ μαλακοῖς ἀμειβόμεθα*. But "to give a soft answer" is a rare meaning of *παρακαλεῖν*. Basil (*Reg. Brev. Tract.* ccxxvi.) explains it of Christian instruction: *συμβιβάζειν τὴν καρδίαν εἰς πληροφορίαν τῆς ἀληθείας*. To the same effect Orig., *C. Cels.* V. 63. The persuasiveness of the Christian preacher is here opposed to unchristian reviling. It is on this its positive side that it surpasses the abstention from retaliation urged by Plato, *Crit.* p. 49.

*περικάθαρμα* and *περίψημα* have almost precisely the same meaning: "what is scoured or scraped off in cleansing a vessel." Neither word occurs elsewhere in the New Test. For the metaphorical sense cf. Dem., *In Mid.* p. 578, *καθάρματα καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ οὐδὲ ἄνθρωποι*. Many expositors see in the words an allusion to an ancient custom in Athens of throwing men into the sea as a sin-offering for the people, with the words *περίψημα ἡμῶν γενοῦ*. Hence Luther has "Fegopfer." Our authority for the existence of such a custom is the Schol. to Aristoph., *Ran.* 731, *Plut.* 454. De Wette sums up the objections to this view: (1) The custom had long ceased before the Apostle's time; (2) *κάθαρμα*, not *περικάθαρμα*, was the usual word; (3) the plur. would have been used. Similarly Meyer, Hofmann, etc. But (1) even if the custom had ceased the allusion would be understood by the reader; the Schol. says it prevailed among the Romans; and, if the custom were unknown to the early Christians, it is difficult to account for their using the expression, *ἐγὼ περίψημα σου*, to betoken great affection (cf. Eus., *H. E.*, Heinrich's Ed., Excurs. xii. 2). (2) Though *κάθαρμα* is the class. word, *περικάθαρμα* occurs in the same sense in LXX. (cf. Prov. xxi. 18). (3) The sing. is used because all the offerings would make one atonement. Erasmus mentioned another objection, that the Apostle would be arrogating to himself what belongs only to Christ. But he states what the world thinks, not what he claims. A stronger objection is the probability that the Apostle's words are a citation from Lam. iii. 44 (45 according to the Heb.). On the other hand (1) The two words *περικάθ.* and *περίψ.* point equally to a propitiatory sacrifice (cf. Hesych.). If only one of the words

did so, the probability that even that word was so used here would be much weaker. (2) The genitives κόσμου and πάντων are vague and rhetorical, if there is no allusion to the ancient custom; while, on the other hand, the notion of a sacrifice that would propitiate the gods for the guilt "of all men," because of the aggravated crimes of the men so sacrificed, is a thought distinctly conceived and boldly expressed. (3) The allusion is a natural and appropriate description of utter disgrace and obloquy. Cf. Schol. ad Aristoph., *Equit.* 1136: ἔτρεφον γάρ τινες Ἀθηναῖοι λίαν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀχρήστους καὶ ἐν καιρῷ συμφορᾶς τινος ἐπελθούσης τῇ πόλει ἔθιον τούτους ἔνεκα τοῦ καθαρθῆναι τοῦ μιάσματος, οὓς καὶ ἐπωϊόμαζον καθάρματα. The subsequent use of περίψημα as an expression of Christian love (as in Ignat., *Ad Ephes.* 8; Barn., *Ep.* iv. 9; vi. 5, ἐγὼ περίψημα τῆς ἀγάπης ὑμῶν) does not seem to have been occasioned solely by this verse; for Dionysius of Alexandria (Eus., *H. E.* vii. 22) cites it as a popular and often unmeaning saying (δημῶδες ῥῆμα). The Latin Fathers sometimes retain *peripsema* (Tert., *De Pudic.* 14), sometimes render it by *purgamentum* (Vulg.), sometimes by *lustramentum* (Ambrose, *Serm. in Ps.* cxviii.). This variety and these words imply that the writers had in their minds a special reference. The name "Stercorius" is said to occur frequently on early Christian tombs, perhaps in allusion to our passage.

(3) *What has been said is a Father's Admonition.*

(iv. 14—21).

**V. 14.** οὐκ ἐντρέπων, "not by way of making you ashamed." The metaphorical use of the act. ἐντρέπω is late Greek. On the pres. part. cf. note on ii. 1. In vi. 5 and xv. 34 he does speak πρὸς ἐντροπὴν.

ταῦτα, considered by most expositors to refer to what immediately precedes, but equally pertinent to all the Apostle has said of the factions in the Corinthian Church. The section contains supplementary remarks of a personal nature which occurred to him on a review of the whole discussion.

νουθετῶ. Admonition is the duty of a father (cf. Eph. vi. 4). The finite verb is used instead of the part. for the sake of

emphasis, as in ix. 27, where ὑπωπιάζω corresponds to δερών (cf. vii. 37). Such a transition from part. to finite verb is not class. (cf. Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 327).

V. 15. μυρίους, a hint that they had already too many (cf. 2 Tim. iv. 3). Other teachers they might themselves heap up; but they owed their existence as a Church to Paul.

παιδαγωγούς, whence our "page," properly the slaves who took the children to school (cf. Plat., *Lys.*, p. 208, παιδαγωγὸς δούλος ὢν, ἄγων δῆπου εἰς διδασκάλου). But the word had also the more general signification of "tutor," "guardian." It seems, however, to have always had a slightly disparaging meaning. Hence it is not likely the Apostle uses it here simply for teacher. Origen well remarks that the word contains a covert allusion to the childish state of the Corinthian Christians, and would not have been used in reference to the Ephesians.

ἀλλ' οὐ, *at certe non*; an emphatic contrast (cf. viii. 7; strengthened into ἀλλάγε in ix. 2). It frequently occurs after a hypothetical clause.

ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, meaning more than the previous ἐν Χριστῷ, as ἐγέννησα signifies more than παιδαγωγούς ἔχειν. All Church teaching is to be "in Christ," who is the quickening spirit of all words and sacraments. But he also quickens souls into spiritual life. The name "Jesus" brings into prominence the realization in the Apostle's mind of Christ's personal activity in the Church. He identifies once and again the exalted Christ, the source of life, with Jesus, whom he has persecuted (cf. ix. 1).

διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, as the instrument of their conversion. Cf. Eph. i. 13; v. 26; 1 Pet. i. 23; James i. 18.

ἐγέννησα. Cf. Philem. 10; Gal. iv. 19; 1 John ii. 1; Philo, *De Virtut.* p. 1000, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἦττον τῶν γονέων γεγέννηκα.

V. 16. μιμηταί, implying more than μιμεῖσθε. It ought to be their general character. Hence he does not specify particulars. Children are imitators of their father and disciples, as Socrates says (*Xen., Mem.* I. vi. 3), of their teacher in all things. The Apostle's self-denial would not be theirs, if they did not elevate their life generally to the level of his. Cf. xi. 1; 1 Thess. i. 6; 2 Thess. iii. 7-9.

V. 17. *διὰ τοῦτο*, not, as Chrys. and Theophyl., because the Apostle was their father, for then ver. 16 would be without connection, but because he wished them to be imitators of him, the wish being implied in *παρακαλῶ*. Even here *διὰ* with accus. denotes, not the purpose (Alford), but the ground or reason of the act. Cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XLIX. c.

*ἐπεμψα* may be epistolary aor., which would imply that Timotheus was the bearer of this very Epistle. So Bleek, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 625. This would scarcely be consistent with *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ*, xvi. 10. Timotheus had, probably, been already sent, perhaps in consequence of the tidings brought by Chloe's servants. Hofmann thinks he had even come to Corinth. The Apostle at least evidently supposed him to be still on his journey (xvi. 10), probably in Macedonia (cf. Acts xix. 22). It is a natural conjecture that, as Timotheus had been the Apostle's companion when he first visited Corinth (Acts xviii. 5), he sent him to exhort the Church before he decided to write this Epistle, and that, after Timotheus had started on his journey through Macedonia, the Apostle resolved to anticipate his arrival by sending a letter across the *Ægean*.

Paley (*Hor. Paul.*) has noticed undesigned coincidences between this passage and the narrative in Acts. Another coincidence is the following. It is not stated in the Book of Acts that the Apostle sent Timotheus to Corinth. All we know from the narrative is that he went to Macedonia. But it is said that Erastus accompanied him. Now this Erastus was most probably the treasurer of Corinth (cf. Rom. xvi. 23). The natural inference is that Erastus was returning home from Asia and that Timotheus' destination was Corinth. But whether he remained in Macedonia or came to Corinth at this time is not known.

*τέκνον μου*. The father sends a son to sons; but a faithful son, which some of them were not. It is nowhere expressly said that Timotheus was converted by Paul. At the time of the Apostle's second visit to Lystra, he was already a disciple (cf. Acts xvi. 1). We infer that he became a Christian during the Apostle's first visit (cf. Acts xiv. 6, 7; 1 Tim. i. 2, 18; 2 Tim. i. 2).

*ἀναμνήσει*, milder than *διδάξει*, yet containing a sting; for

it implies that they had forgotten the ways of their father. Timotheus was very young. Ten years after this St. Paul bids him so conduct himself that no one would find occasion to despise his youth.

ὁδοῦ;. A youth could bring to their remembrance the Apostle's "ways in Christ," and nothing else would be more effective to silence his detractors. A vague expression is preferred, because a more definite reference to his self-denial would have the air of arrogance, and would not include his doctrine and manner of teaching. Cf. James i. 8; Acts xiii. 10.

τὰς ἐν Χριστῷ, as opposed to the Apostle's ways in himself. Cf. Gal. ii. 20; Phil. i. 21.

καθώς. Cf. note on i. 6. It never has the meaning, which ὥς sometimes has, of a relative pron., "*what* I teach." He is comparing his way of teaching with his life generally, and declares the perfect consistency of the one with the other.

V. 18. ὥς μὴ ἐρχομένου, "as if you thought I was not coming." They had concluded from his sending Timotheus that he dared not come himself. The position of δέ suggests that the words ὥς μὴ ἐρχομένου form one notion, "keeping away." Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 190; Kühner on Xen., *Mem.* IV. i. 3. This accounts also for the pres. part., which is not for the fut.

τινες, some, either "whom I cannot name," or "whom I could name" (cf. xv. 12; Gal. i. 7). So in Soph., *Aj.* 1138, *τινι* is ironical for *σοι*.

V. 19. ταχέως. Cf. xiv. 6; xvi. 7, 8. He intends staying in Ephesus till Pentecost. He previously purposed crossing direct to Corinth and then proceed to Macedonia. In order to give the Corinthians time to repent and rectify abuses, he alters his plan and decides to visit Macedonia first (cf. Acts xix. 21; 2 Cor. i. 23). The word ταχέως, compared with xvi. 8, proves that the Epistle was written shortly before Pentecost.

Κύριος, that is, Christ (cf. 1 Thess. iii. 11). In Rom. i. 10 he says Θεός, but in Rom. xv. 32 Lachm. reads διὰ θελήματος Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ.

γνώσονται, not "I will know" (Rev. Vers.), denoting his purpose in trying them, but "I shall know," expressing the certain result of the trial.

δύναμιν, not "the power of doing miracles" (Chrys., Theophyl.). Cf. note on ii. 4. Their lack of the Spirit's power to transform men's character was the test by which the Apostle intended to try the pretensions of the party-leaders (cf. 1 Thess. i. 5).

V. 20. ἐν, not "consists in" (Alford), which would be expressed by the predicate, as in Rom. xiv. 17, but "is established on." It denotes the foundation on which the kingdom rests. Cf. note on ii. 5; Heb. ix. 10, ἐπὶ.

ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, in allusion to ver. 8. He will test the spiritual power of these men, who boast as if they had already attained possession of the kingdom; for that kingdom rests on power. This clearly refers to the future kingdom. At the same time the power he speaks of is the spiritual power of the Gospel (cf. ii. 4). Thus the two conceptions, of a future kingdom to be established at the second coming of Christ and of a present kingdom consisting in the spiritual condition of a believer, run into one. The ethical character of the future triumph is identified with the ethical character of the present time of warfare. A kingdom erected on words or on any other foundation than sovereign authority is not a kingdom. If, then, the Corinthian boasters have entered into the kingdom of Christ, let them show that they possess its peculiar attribute, which is spiritual power.

V. 21. It is more natural to join this ver. to what immediately precedes than with what follows (as Œcum., Calvin, Hofmann); for, *first*, the threat to come with a rod is connected with the assertion of his fatherly authority; *second*, the next ver. has no connecting particle and must be the sudden bursting of the storm. The Apostle claims that he possesses the power of the kingdom. He can wield the rod; and that spiritual power is, after all, the power of words.

ἐν ῥάβδῳ. Though ἐν denotes sometimes the instrument even in class. Greek, it is here used because of the antithesis between ἐν ῥάβδῳ and ἐν ἀγάπῃ—in anger and in love. Tert. (*De Pudic.* 14) paraphrases: *virgâ armatum* (cf. Luke xiv. 31; 2 Cor. ii. 1).

ἔλθω, "am I to come; it is for you to decide." The deliberative subjunctive depends on θέλετε. Cf. Luke ix. 54.

πνεύματι. Chrys., Theophyl., Meyer understand the Holy

Spirit. But the co-ordination of ἀγάπη and πνεύματι implies that πνεῦμα is a disposition of meekness; only it should be borne in mind that a good disposition is designated a πνεῦμα, because it is the product of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost (cf. Exod. xxxi. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 13; Eph. i. 17; and Harless's note to Eph. iv. 23). In Rom. viii. 15, πνεῦμα δουλείας is in antithesis to πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας (cf. 2 Tim. i. 7). Again, in Gal. v. 22, "love" and "gentleness" are named among the fruits of the Spirit. If, therefore, he had meant here the Holy Spirit, he would probably have written ἐν πνεύματι ἀγάπης τε καὶ πραότητος. But we may still ask, Why did not the Apostle say "the spirit of love" as well as "the spirit of meekness"? The answer is, that ἀγάπη is not natural affection, but a Christian grace, which is always and necessarily the work of the Spirit of God, whereas πραότης is a natural virtue raised by the Spirit into a Christian grace. Hence in 2 Tim. i. 7 πνεῦμα ἀγάπης means the Holy Spirit as the source of love.

πραύτητος, the later form, is the reading of A B C. So Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort.

## SECOND DIVISION.

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### CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

(v. 1.-vi. 20).

THOUGH we cannot suppose, with Chrysostom and Ambrosiaster, a direct reference in the previous discussion to the case of the incestuous person, what the Apostle has already said prepares generally for this severe rebuke. The Second Division opens with a sudden, indignant charge. Irony, which was befitting in dealing with factious self-conceit, is almost entirely laid aside. The style even becomes more formal; the march is slower and less jerky. Of no portion of the Epistle are Jerome's words more true, "As often as I read the Apostle Paul, I seem to hear, not words, but thunders" (*Ep.* XLVIII. *Ad Pamm.* 13).

The Apostle brings against the Corinthians two specific charges, which indeed seem, at first, to be mutually inconsistent. He accuses them of tolerating gross sins of impurity and of not tolerating injuries. Actions that would be a shame in the eyes of the heathen these Christians unblushingly avow. Losses such as a Christian ought to suffer with equanimity for the sake of peace, they carry before the judges. But these opposite tendencies are but the development of one error. The Corinthians denied or ignored the conception of the Church as the body of Christ. Christianity must create for itself an organic body, which is a society complete within its own limits. Hence, while it can nourish itself by assimilating elements which it draws from the world, it must, on the other hand, have the power of governing itself, which involves the right and duty of excommunication. This power

dwells in the Church in virtue of the spiritual presence of the Lord Jesus. In his name and Spirit the Church is ever in process of formation through the washing of regeneration (vi. 11); in his name and Spirit evil-doers are chastised (v. 4). His presence gives birth also to the following leading elements of Church life: holiness and joy (v. 8), silent rebuke of sin on the part of the individual Christian (v. 11), collective censure and excommunication (v. 13), awe (vi. 1), practical wisdom in judging and awe-inspiring boldness in pronouncing judgment (vi. 3-5), magnanimity and love that brooks injuries and is not exacting (vi. 8). Having shown the relation in which the fundamental conception of union with Christ stands to Church discipline, the Apostle applies it to explain the attitude of Christianity towards those sins of impurity their tolerance of which has called forth his rebuke.

This Division of the Epistle falls, therefore, into two sections:

A. Union of the Church with Christ determining the nature of Church discipline (v. 1-vi. 11), with special reference (1) to the case of the incestuous person; (2) to the practice of accusing brethren before heathen judges.

B. Union with Christ inconsistent with a life of sensuality (vi. 12-20).

#### A.—UNION WITH CHRIST DETERMINING THE NATURE OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

(v. 1-vi. 11).

##### 1. *The Case of Incest.*

(v. 1-13).

**Ch. V. 1.** ὅλως . . . πορνεία. Various interpretations have been offered of this difficult clause. (1) "A common saying." So Wordsworth: "It is commonly reported, as a notorious fact." But ὅλως will not admit of this meaning. (2) "The character of πόρνος is actually borne among you." (Alford). This would be ἀκούει. (3) "Even fornication is reported among you." But ὅλως does not mean "even." (4) "Absolutely, without any qualification or doubt, it is reported," etc. For ὅλως in this sense (*prorsus*) cf. Plat.,

*Phileb.* 36, ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως. (5) "To speak generally (*ut in universum dicam*) it is reported that there is fornication among you, and, to mention a particular instance of such," etc. This is much the more usual meaning of ὅλως. But this rendering results in a balancing of clauses which is too formal, too much in the manner of Isocrates, to be in the Apostle's incisive style. I prefer (4). It would be a natural thing to say that this report, which he had not received from the Corinthians with the cases of conscience submitted to him, had nevertheless come to his ears without qualification or uncertain sound. But ἐν ὑμῖν must be joined with ἀκούεται not with πορνεία, so that the verb has virtually two meanings, closely allied, "to be reported" and "to be avowed."

πορνεία, in class. Greek "prostitution," as in vi. 13. Here it includes "fornication," as in Lev. xviii; Matt. v. 32. The Apostle refers first to all the sins of impurity allowed in the Corinthian Church, afterwards he speaks of one kind, the case of incest.

ἥτις. Cf. note on iii. 17.

ὀνομάζεται, omitted in **X** A B C D Vulg. and nearly all the Latin Fathers, while the Greek Fathers insert it. Reiche thinks it was omitted by a copyist who considered it an exaggeration. But it may have crept in from Eph. v. 3. It is rightly omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg. Westc. and Hort. understand ἀκούεται. Cf. Cic., *In Cluent.*, "scelus incredibile et præter hanc unam in hac vitâ inauditum," in reference to the same crime. The Hippolytus of Euripides turns on a similar case. Cf. Seneca, *Hippol.* 165. It was the sin of Reuben (Gen. xxxv. 22) and Absalom (2 Sam. xvi. 22). The story of Antiochus Soter, to whom his father Seleucus Nicator relinquished his wife Stratonice, is told by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 38, 39). Winer (*RWB.*, s. v. Ehe) suggests that the man referred to by the Apostle was a proselyte, it being held by the Jews that, when a man became a proselyte, his natural relations ceased. The word οὐδέ is inconsistent with this supposition.

γυναῖκα τοῦ πατρός, instead of μητρειάν, to indicate that the father was still living (cf. 2 Cor. vii. 12). Ἐχειν may mean either marriage (Origen) or concubinage, as in John iv. 18. The word ἔργον is not enough to prove that it was a marriage. It rather suggests that it was not.

ὥστε, as well as ἥτις, follows τοιαύτη.

V. 2. A side-glance at what he previously said of their being puffed up (iv. 18). Pride was at the root of their sensuality as well as of their dissensions. The word ὑμεῖς is emphatic: "Whoever may indulge in pride, you, of all men, should be abashed." It is better to understand the ver. as a question, which is often introduced with καί, if it expresses what is inconsistent with a previous statement. When the καί stands at the beginning of the clause, the question is often either ironical (cf. Xen., *Hiero* § 1 and § 15) or, as here, sad. Cf. Eur., *Hecub.* 883, καὶ πῶς γυναιξὶν ἀρσένων ἔσται κράτος; So Luke x. 29; xvii. 26.

ἐπενθήσατε, "mourned," as for the dead. Theod., ἐθρηνήσατε (cf. 2 Cor. xii. 21). So Origen, *C. Cels.* III. p. 141, observes, ἀπολωλότας καὶ τεθνηκότας τῷ Θεῷ τοὺς ἐτ' ἀσελγείας ἢ τινος ἀτόπου νενικημένους ὡς νεκροὺς πένθουσιν. Clement of Rome, in evident allusion to this verse, commends the Corinthians that they did mourn for the sins of their neighbours (*Ad Cor.* 2).

ἵνα κ. τ. λ. Hofmann makes the clause depend on ὁρᾶτε or βούλομαι understood, as in Mark v. 23. It is unnecessary. "Ἰνα is partly telic, partly ecbatic. Their sorrow would have for its aim and result the guilty man's excommunication.

For ἐξαρθῇ **Σ** A B C D read ἀρθῇ. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. But all read ἐξάρατε in ver. 13, where see note.

V. 3. ἐγὼ μὲν. The emphasis on ἐγὼ is enhanced by the μὲν *solitarium*, which is almost equivalent to γέ, "at least," *certe*. Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 18; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 413; Winer, *Gr.* § LXIII. e.

ὥς before ἀπών is omitted in **Σ** A B C D Vulg. and some of the Fathers, but De Wette, Maier, Hofmann retain it. Meyer thinks it crept in from ὡς παρών, which is improbable. Its insertion certainly seems to strengthen the expression: "as being (that is, in the character of one who is) at once absent in body and present in spirit." The δέ would then be a copula. That the Apostle has passed judgment on the case resulted from his being absent in one way and present in another. But the MS. evidence against ὥς is too strong, and it is omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The

clause will then be an example of the omission of *μέν*, occasioned perhaps by the previous *μέν*, in the former of two antithetical clauses: "absent indeed in body, but present in spirit."

*τῷ πνεύματι*. When *πν.* is contrasted, as here, with *σῶμα*, it is usually equivalent to *ψυχή* (cf. James ii. 26). But the Christian *πν.* is the *ψυχή*, not in the unity merely of self-consciousness, but as the dwelling-place of God's Spirit (cf. Rom. viii. 10; Col. ii. 5). It is in virtue of the indwelling of the Spirit of God that the Apostle could assert his apostolical authority at any time or place. As with Christ, so with the Christian, there is a real presence other than that of the body. Church authority and the apostolic office are, not a garb put on or an external condition assumed, but a mode of the spirit's inner life in so far as it is the abode of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Greg. Naz., *Ep.* 31, *παρειμὶ πνευματικῶς*. Hence *πν.* here does not mean "solicitude" (Beza, *Est.*, Cor. a Lap.); nor the Holy Ghost (Ambrosiast.), which is disproved by *ἐμοῦ*, ver. 4; nor the merely human *ψυχή* (Pfleiderer, *Paulin.* p. 65). On *πνεῦμα* generally cf. Usteri, *Lehrb.*, Anhang I.

*ὡς παρών*, "as though I were present in body." Such was the power of the Spirit that the Apostle judged the case with as much certitude and authority as he would have done if he had been present in body. Distance neither blunted his sense of the heinousness of the sin nor weakened the force of his condemnation. On *ὡς*, "as though," cf. 2 Cor. x. 14.

*τὸν . . . κατεργασάμενον* is accus. after *κέκρικα*, and *τὸν τοιοῦτον* is resumptive of *τὸν κατεργασάμενον*. To govern *παραδοῦναι* by *κέκρικα* weakens the meaning of *κέκρικα*: "I have decided to," etc.—*Οὕτω τοῦτο* is not synonymous with *τὸ τοιοῦτον*, "a deed of this kind"; *οὕτω* conveys the notion of his being a member of the Church. It is unnecessary to suppose it refers to aggravating circumstances known to the Corinthians, but unknown to us.

V. 4. But this judgment of an individual, though an Apostle, was not authoritative, as an ecclesiastical act, without the sanction of the assembled Church.

*ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι . . . Ἰησοῦ*, "in the name of our Lord Jesus." *Χριστοῦ* is omitted in A B D. C deficit. It was probably inserted by copyists to assimilate the clause to the

more usual formula. Origen (*De Or.* 31), Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Beza, Grot., Olshaus., etc., join ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι . . . Ἰησοῦ to συναχθέντας, as in Matt. xviii. 20, where συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ὄνομα justifies σύναγειν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι. But, as παραδοῦναι is the leading idea of the verse, it is more probable that the Apostle is stating the authority on which this act rested (cf. 2 Thess. iii. 6).

σὺν τῇ δυνάμει . . . Ἰησοῦ. **ABD** Vulg. omit Χριστοῦ. The clause is better joined to συναχθέντων, because, *first*, as the words ἐν . . . Ἰησοῦ have been joined to παραδοῦναι, the participial clause would otherwise be left without an adjunct and the verb would have two adjuncts almost equivalent in meaning; *second*, if the words are joined to παραδοῦναι, σὺν must mean “armed with the power of,” but it is very doubtful that σὺν has this meaning in the New Test.; cf. Grimm, *Lex.* s. v. The words will rather express the reason why the Apostle refers the question for settlement to the Church. The power of Christ resides, not in any individual, but in the assembly of believers. De Wette well observes that the Apostle writes “in the republican spirit of early Christianity.” So also when the transgressor is pardoned, the Apostle declares his readiness to concur in the pardon granted by the Church. The punishment had been inflicted “by the greater number” (cf. 2 Cor. ii. 6, 10). In Acts xv. 22, 23, “the whole Church” and “the brethren” are associated with the Apostles and elders in deliberation. Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 44, συνευδοκίας τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης, and 54, ποιῶ τὰ προστασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους. The nervous suspense of the whole passage arises from the Apostle’s reluctance to have recourse to the extreme act of Church discipline, and his anxiety to fortify himself in his present attitude with the authority of the Church and of Christ Himself.

τῇ δυνάμει, not merely “with authority,” equivalent to τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ (Meyer), nor “the power of doing miracles” (Osiand.), but, as in iv. 20, the spiritual force that makes all the acts of the Church effective and compels obedience. It is the power of the kingdom.

**V. 5.** Hofmann joins παραδοῦναι with εἰς ὅλεθρον, Satan being the agent through whom God accomplishes the destruc-

tion. This makes τῷ Σ. dat. of the instrument, which the position of the words renders unnatural; and παραδοῦναι τῷ Σατανᾷ occurs without εἰς in 1 Tim. i. 20 (cf. Matt. v. 25).

Tertullian (*De Pudic.* 20), Calvin, Beza, Cor. a Lap., Maier, etc., explain the words to mean simply excommunication. The world, outside the Church, is described as the power of the darkness and of Satan (Acts xxvi. 18; Col. i. 13). But the phrase "delivering to Satan" was not among the Jews an expression for the higher degree of excommunication. Origen (*Hom.* 14 in Lev.), Chrys. (on 1 Tim. i. 20), Theod., Theophyl., Ambrose (*De Pœnit.* I. 13), Augustine (*De Serm. in Monte*), Aquinas, Grotius, De Wette, Meyer, Alford, Heinrichi, etc., maintain that the words mean bodily affliction. In favour of this view are the following considerations: (1) Satan was the cause of physical disease (cf. Luke viii. 2; xiii. 16; Heb. ii. 14; 2 Cor. xii. 7). (2) Disease and even death were forms of punishment inflicted in the Apostle's time on members of the Church (cf. xi. 30; Acts v. 5; Rev. ii. 22). (3) There was an element in the incestuous man's punishment that made it impossible for the Church alone, without the presence of the Apostle's spirit, to inflict it, whereas the Church could have excommunicated him. (4) If the words mean only excommunication, they are a rhetorical exaggeration. For it cannot be supposed that the offender's expulsion involved his being abandoned to the spiritual domination of sin, inasmuch as the purpose of his chastisement was "the salvation of his spirit." Tertullian and Ambrose err unquestionably in saying that he was delivered unto Satan "non in emendationem, sed in perditionem."<sup>1</sup> (5) The moral influence of physical and mental suffering is acknowledged and experienced by the holiest men (cf. Ps. cxix. 67); and even of Christ it is said (Heb. v. 8) that He learnt obedience through suffering. By bad men it is not seldom the only salutary influence profoundly felt. When its influence is the reverse of salutary, the soul is lost.

Σατανᾷς. Whether the Iranian ideas with which the Jews came in contact during the exile first gave them the conception of Satan may fairly be doubted, though it must be admitted demonology plays a more conspicuous part in their

<sup>1</sup> Renan (*Apotres* p. 87) says that excommunication was regarded as equivalent to a sentence of death!

religious history after the return from Babylon. The correct view seems to be that Christ and His Apostles combined the Zoroastrian doctrine of an antagonist of God with the early Hebrew doctrine of Satan's inferiority to God (cf. Isa. xlv. 18). Our passage contains no reference to the belief that the Pagan world, as distinguished from the Church, was under the dominion of demons. The *δαιμονία*, that is, the heathen gods, are not identified with Satan, the Sammael of the Hebrews.

*σαρκός*. The distinction between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is not precisely the same as that between *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*. The *σάρξ* is the principle of sin as it actuates itself through the *σῶμα*, the members of the body being *μέλη τῆς σαρκός*. Hence the destruction of the *σάρξ* involves the salvation of the *πνεῦμα*, which the death of the body does not. As *σάρξ* has here an ethical meaning, so also has *πνεῦμα*. It is not "the psychological opposite of *σῶμα*" (Pfleiderer, *Paulin.* p. 65). We must add the notion of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, on which the salvation of the *πνεῦμα* depends. Similarly in Rom. viii. 10, 11 the life of the human spirit is connected with the indwelling of the Divine Spirit. The action of Satan is only destructive; but it is overruled by God to destroy the principle of sin. Salvation is the work of God. Finally, it is worthy of note that Satan is represented as acting from without, by the infliction of bodily suffering; but the Spirit of God from within, by dwelling in the human spirit.

*ἡμέρα*. Cf. note on i. 8; iii. 13; iv. 5.

V. 6. *καύχημα*, "an object of boasting;" not the incontinent person (Chrys., Hammond), but "this is the sort of thing you boast in." In Phil. i. 26 *καύχημα* has passed over into the meaning of *καύχησις*. Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 34.

*ζύμη* (from *ζέω*, cf. *ζῶμος*; Lat. *jus*; Eng. *juice*), "leaven." Ambrosiast., Herv., Meyer, Hofm., Alford understand it to mean that toleration of sin robs the Church of its Christian character and implicates all in the sin of one. This is not the meaning of the proverb elsewhere. Cf. Gal. v. 9; and Wetstein's note for the Rabbinical use of it, and Lightfoot (*Hor. Heb.*) on Matt. xvi. 6. Chrys. correctly explains it here of the moral influence of a corrupt example.

V. 7. The mention of leaven suggests to the Apostle a

beautiful allegorical application of incidents connected with the paschal feast, a suggestion helped perhaps by the fact of his writing about Easter.

ἐκκαθάρατε, "purge out thoroughly" (cf. ἀφανιεῖτε, Exod. xii. 15). The omission of οὖν (so A D Vulg.) makes the command more urgent. The next verse shows that the leaven means wickedness. The Apostle is not, therefore, here speaking of the excommunication of the incestuous person, but passes to a more general statement. The epithet "old" is not itself part of the allegory, but introduces into it the Pauline distinction of the "old" and the "new" (cf. Rom. vii. 6; Eph. iv. 22, 24). Now that the Gospel has brought in "the power of an indestructible life," wickedness ought to be purged out, because it is in its very nature corruption. Yet, though it ever "decayeth and waxeth old," it is a leaven. The spirit, on the other hand, is not only καίνον, but also νεόν; not only a life, in opposition to death, but also recent, entering into the place hitherto occupied by corruption and death. The classical opposites are ἀρχαῖος and καινός (cf. 2 Cor. v. 17), παλαιός and νέος. But it does not appear that the distinction is always observed in the New Test. (cf. Matt. xiii. 52; Rom. vii. 6). The sing. φύραμα is significant, denoting the oneness of the Church and the consequent danger of contamination from evil-doers.

καθώς ἐστε ἄζυμοι. It is better not to understand ἄρτοι. Theod., Grot. explain it, "abstaining from leavened bread," as if it referred to their observing at the time the feast of pass-over. But (1) though ἄσιτος and ἄοινος are active, ἄζυμος is not. (2) There is no trace at this early period of a Christian feast at Easter, other than the weekly Eucharist. (3) To the Apostle the observance of a Jewish rite could be no reason for spiritual purity; indeed it would be contradicted by the argument that we ought to be pure because Christ is the true paschal lamb. Chrys., Theophyl., Est., Cor. a Lap., etc., think Christians are here designated "unleavened," because it *became* them to be pure, or because they would at last be pure. The Protestant Reformers and Neander understand it of forensic righteousness. (Melanchthon adds the beginnings of sanctification.) Wordsworth explains it of baptismal regeneration. It is one of those words, our interpretation of

which will inevitably be coloured by our preconceived doctrines. Laying aside every dogmatic expression, we may at least say that it refers to what the Christian is in *idea*, as distinguished from what he is *actually*.

*καὶ γὰρ . . . Χριστός* "for our passover has been slain, even Christ." Cf. Eur., *Io* 161, ἄλλος ἐρέσσει κύκνος, "another bird comes, and that a swan." So Heb. ii. 9, "and that one no other than Jesus;" Heb. iii. 1, "I mean Jesus." The words ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν are omitted in **8 A B C D** Vulg.; and are rejected by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., De Wette, Meyer, Reiche, Westc. and Hort. They are unnecessary. The notion is really included in ἡμῶν, and we must not, with Meyer and Reiche, say that it would be here inappropriate. In the fact that the paschal sacrifice has been offered *for us* lies the reason for our keeping the feast. Two grounds for purging out the old leaven of wickedness have been mentioned. The one is that it would leaven the whole lump. The other is that the whole time of the Church is a paschal feast. Hence *καί* is "also," not "truly;" and *καὶ γὰρ* is equivalent to the more usual *καὶ γὰρ καί*, as in 2 Cor. ii. 10 (cf. Fritzsche on Rom. xi. 1). So Plat., *Rep.* p. 468, *καὶ γὰρ* "Ομηρος.

*πάσχα*, "the paschal lamb," as in Mark xiv. 12; Luke xxii. 7. The word is emphatic. That Christ is our atonement is the foundation of holiness, a sufficient refutation of Holsten's assertion (*Zum Evang. d. Paulus*, p. 43), that knowledge is the only fruit of his conversion acknowledged by St. Paul. The Lamb that taketh away the sins of the world has been slain, and the condition of the Christian Church is, therefore, that of men keeping the paschal feast. The notion of atonement lies not so clearly in the word *ἐτύθη* as in the idea of the paschal lamb and the sprinkling of its blood, which things constituted the passover a real sacrifice (cf. 2 Chron. xxx. 16; Exod. xii. 27; xxiii. 18). The view of Calov, Reuss and Hofmann (*Schriřtb.* II. p. 270, 2nd ed.) that it was only a sacrament would render the Apostle's use of it here an unjustifiable accommodation. Not the first passover only, but the annual commemorative celebration also was a sacrificial feast (cf. Exod. xxxiv. 25). To infer that the Apostle accepted the tradition that the crucifixion took place on the day before that on which the Jews kept the passover is to introduce into

the Apostle's allegory a detail which is as unimportant as it is uncertain.

V. 8. ὥστε ἐορτάζωμεν, "so then let us keep the feast," that is of the spiritual passover. The Apostle is surely not urging the Corinthians to observe the Jewish passover (Lechler, *Apost. Zeit.* p. 350, ed. 1857; Hilgenfeld). Cf. Gal. iv. 9-11; Col. ii. 16. Ἀπας δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ [the true Gnostic] πανήγυρις ἁγία, says Clem. Al. (*Strom.* VIII. p. 860, Potter). Cf. Origen, *C. Cels.* VIII. 22. But, while the reference is to the Christian's life, the Apostle alludes especially to the Lord's Supper—thus preparing his readers for what is to follow,—which commemorated at once the death and the resurrection of Christ. The transition from the command to purge out the old leaven to the thought of joy and thanksgiving for redemption occasions the pleasant change from the imperat. to the subjunctive and the Apostle's gladsome associating of himself with his readers.

μή . . . ἀληθείας. Μηδέ introduces not an additional thought, but the explanation of the allegorical expression, "old leaven." The view that by "old leaven," the Apostle meant Judaism is absurd; for he has already described the Jewish passover as eaten with unleavened bread. Κακίας, etc., are genitives in apposition, "the leaven which consists in," etc.

κακία and ποιηρία are found together also in Rom. i. 29. The former means that which is in itself evil, the latter what is injurious to others. But either word may be used in the general sense of "evil" (cf. Acts iii. 26; viii. 22). The case of the incestuous man exemplified the twofold character of sin.

εἰλικρινεία is derived in the Et. Magn. from πρὸς εἴλην κρίνεται, "what is tested by being held up to the sun;" by Alberti (notes to Hesych.) and Stallbaum from εἰλεῖν, "what is tested by shaking;" by Bishop Lightfoot (on Phil. i. 10) from εἴλη, εἰληδόν, *gregatim*. It is distinguished from ἀλήθεια as "sincerity" from "truth." The former is the harmony of our words and actions with our convictions, the latter the harmony of all these with reality. Similarly in 2 Cor. ii. 17, ἐξ εἰλικρινείας denotes the inner, ἐκ Θεοῦ the external source (cf. 1 John iii. 21). Ἀλήθεια sometimes means "sincerity," as in Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 19, ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ. But not so here. In Corinth there was a marked absence of

intellectual honesty and moral sincerity. "Truth" does not here mean "true doctrine." It is a moral quality, inasmuch as the harmony of our convictions with objective truth depends on the moral state of the soul. The converse of truth is self-deception.

**Vv. 9-13.** He justifies the sharpness of his language. He has warned them before not to associate with wicked men, so that they cannot now plead the excuse of ignorance. But he explains more fully from the nature of the Church what that warning implies. It does not mean that Christians should withdraw from all secular dealings with bad men. That would be tantamount to the withdrawal from the world of the power of Christianity to leaven society and ever to create the Church out of the world. It means that the exercise of discipline should assume the form, first, of personal alienation; and, second, of the transgressor's excommunication from Church fellowship. Expositors suppose the Corinthians misunderstood the Apostle's former letter, and that this passage is a digression intended to remove that erroneous impression. But it is not likely anybody could have imagined St. Paul of all men urging Christians to live in seclusion from the world. It is more natural to think that he wishes to explain his former words in order to apply to a particular instance his conception of the nature of Church discipline.

**V. 9.** ἔγραψα. Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Cor. a Lap., Hammond, Wolf, Whitby, Middleton (*Greek Article*, p. 326 Rose), Stanley, etc., understand this to be the epistolary aor., referring to the present Epistle, more especially verses 2, 6 and 7, or (as Lardner thinks) what the Apostle subsequently writes. But the words ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ seem as if they were added expressly to guard against this interpretation. The examples cited by Middleton of ἐπιστολή referring to the letter written at the time are not to the point; for in Rom. xvi. 22; Col. iv. 16; 1 Thess. v. 27; 2 Thess. iii. 14, the word is required to complete the sense (cf. Hilgenfeld, *Einleit.* p. 260). Similarly St. John refers to an Epistle of his not now extant (3 John 9), not to mention Chrysostom's supposition of an Epistle written by St. Paul to the Corinthians between our First and our Second Epistles, and the "Epistle from Laodicea" (Col. iv. 16).

V. 10. The *καί* before *οὐ* is omitted in A B C D Vulg. If we join the *οὐ* to *πάντως* the words will mean, "by no means did I intend that you should not associate," etc. This makes *οὐ πάντως* equivalent to *πάντως οὐ*, which is very rarely the case (cf. Grimm, *Lex.*). It also emphasizes the negation much too strongly for the Apostle's purpose. We must, therefore, connect *πάντως* with *μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι* understood; thus: "not that I intended you should abstain altogether from all dealings with," etc.

ἡ . . . εἰδωλολάτραις. He adds two other classes of wicked men, one class, however, falling into two divisions; for we must read *καί* (as in A B C D) between *πλεονέκταις* and *ἄρπαξιν*. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Hence the omission of the art. before *ἄρπαξιν*. Estius remarks that the Apostle mentions those sins under which all sins can be comprehended. The fornicator sins against himself; the covetous man against his neighbour; the idolater against the majesty of God. But they are mentioned probably because they were the cardinal vices of the heathen world, especially Corinth, where religion itself combined sins of impurity, avarice, and idolatry. This is better than to suppose all these words denote impurity. Thus Stanley, Conyb. and Howson, etc., render *πλεον.* by "lascivious persons," for which there is no foundation; Hammond renders *ἄρπ.* by "ravishers;" and Stanley renders *εἰδωλ.* by "sensual men." *Πλεον.* is the man who takes by fraud; *ἄρπ.* the man who takes by violence.

*εἰδωλολάτραι*, the earliest instance of the occurrence of the word. Cf. Trench, *Study of Words*, p. 180, 15th Ed.

*ὀφείλετε*. So *ⲛ* A B C D, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. But Meyer, De Wette, Alford prefer *ὀφείλετε*, as if *ὠφ.* were the attempt of a copyist to correct the Greek.

*ἄρα* differs from *οὖν* in marking the unexpected character of the inference. Cf. note on vii. 14; Gal. v. 11; Xen., *Hell.* VII. i. 32; Plat., *Rep.* p. 382, where a series of startling inferences respecting the gods are each introduced with *ἄρα*.

*κόσμος* is explained by Calvin in an ethical sense: "I did not write to you to abstain from associating with the fornicators of this present, evil world, because you ought surely of your own accord to come out from among them." Cf. Tert., *Idol.*

24. But ἐπεὶ ἄρα means, not “for surely,” but “for in that case.” Besides, ὠφείλετε would then mean that it was their *duty* to withdraw from the intercourse and business of society, not that it was practically *impossible* in such a place as Corinth, this πόλις ἐπαφροδιότητι. The Apostle deprecates any intention to advise Christians, as a duty, to become recluses and anchorites. Chrysostom’s paraphrase (ἐπεὶ ἐτέραν οἰκουμένην ἔδει ζητῆσαι), though adopted by Aquinas and modern expositors, does not give ὠφ. its proper force. Ἄν is omitted almost always when the apodosis contains such words as ἔδει, ὠφείλου, καλὸν ἦν, ἐβουλόμην, ἡδυνάμην, espec. in the later prose and New Test. (cf. Matt. xxv. 27).

V. 11. νυνὶ δέ, not the temporal, but the logical “now,” as in vii. 14; xiii. 13; Rom. iii. 21; Heb. xi. 16. This word and repetition of ἔγραψα conveys a sharp censure, and tends to prove that the Corinthians had not misunderstood the Apostle’s former letter.

ἐὰν . . . πόρνος, “if any one having the name of a brother be a fornicator.” Messmer and Kling point out the antithesis between what he is called and what he really is.

μηδὲ συνεσθίειν, not a reference to the Agapé or to the Lord’s Supper merely (Hausrath), but to social intercourse. So Tert., *De An.* 35 (cf. Luke xv. 2; Gal. ii. 12). Eating together is a sign of friendliness; business transactions are not. If the reference is restricted to Church fellowship, the emphatic “not even” is out of place. It is true that μηδέ has also an adversative meaning, (“and not,” “instead of,” “on the contrary;” cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 210). This cannot be the meaning here; for the emphatic position of τῷ τοιούτῳ shows that συνεσθίειν prolongs the notion of συναναμίγνυσθαι. Cf. Matt. xviii. 17; Rom. xvi. 17; 2 Thess. iii. 6; Tit. iii. 10.

That an idolater should be in the Church seems strange. The reference cannot be to the weak brother, who still believed that a divine power is hid behind the idol; for the same Apostle bids the Romans receive such a one into friendship (Rom. xiv. 1). Neither does he mean the strong brother who despised the scruples of the weak and took part in idolatrous feasts; for he did not believe in any divinity attaching to the idols and, consequently, did not worship them. The passage intimates that a hard and fast line was not always drawn

between the heathen of religious feelings and the Christians. Men that still worshipped idols came into the Church assemblies, though unbaptized, in the same way as misers and revilers, if baptized, are to be found there still. The persecutions of later times widened the gulf between heathen piety and profession of Christianity. When the Church mounted the imperial throne, Constantine found it possible to preside unbaptized over an œcumenical council.

**V. 12.** τί γάρ μοι κ.τ.λ., "for what have I to do with judging those who are without?" Cf. Dem., *In Aphob.* III. p. 855, τί τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ βασάνῳ; So Mark i. 24; John ii. 4. The καί before τοὺς ἔξω is omitted in  $\aleph$  A B C. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Its omission renders it impossible to accept Rückert's view that the Apostle is denying that he judged at all: "Those who are within you, not I, judge; those who are without God judges, not I." We should also, in that case, expect μέν before ἔσω, the force of the οὐχί running on to κρίνει. Rather the Apostle introduces the question that refers to himself in order to show, by his own example, that it is not a Christian's duty to withdraw from the world. St. Paul was an apostle, no more a Pharisee; an evangelist, not a censor. Cf. John v. 45.

**V. 13.** In vi. 2 he says the time will come when the saints will judge not only those who are within, and not only individuals among those who are without, but the world as a system of evil, and even angels. At present they judge only brethren. Why this difference? Their judgment of those who are within is disciplinary; their judgment of the world will be punitive. In the latter case, therefore, exact justice must be meted out; in the former the purpose of the chastisement is to produce a salutary effect. For this reason it is that in God's providential government discipline is delegated to fathers, but not the power of finally condemning or absolving, which God has kept in his own hands. In like manner the judgment of the Church is at present disciplinary, and moral influence is more to be sought in it than exact distributive justice. Again, the judgment of the Church is now formed in great measure through the religious feeling, on the ground of maxims that embody men's best instincts, such as the rule to do unto others as we would have others do unto us. But the final award

will be arrived at from a profound knowledge of the spiritual principles that guide the moral government of the Most High. In proportion as the Church becomes more holy, its judgment of men and of principles partakes more of the character of final awards.

οὐχὶ . . . κρίνετε; "Is it not the fact that you also, like myself, judge only those who are within?" He appeals to their own consciousness of power to exercise discipline within the Church, and of feebleness, as yet, to judge the world. He has referred to himself as an example of a Christian who did not associate with the world. He now asks them if, as a fact, they did not know they had sufficient spiritual power to judge those who are within. The phrases οἱ ἔσω, οἱ ἔξω, transfer to the language of the Church the Jewish idea of separation from the world,—an idea appropriated by Christ Himself. Cf. Mark iv. 11; Col. iv. 5; 1 Thess. iv. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 7; Rev. xxii. 15, where, however, the metaphor is, not that of a household, but that of a city, into which some men cannot enter through the gates.

κρίνει, better here than κρίνῃ, which is adopted by Lachm., Tisch. So Vulg., *judicabit*. The future judgment of God at the last day is not thus contrasted with the judgment of the Church (cf. vi. 2).

ἐξάρατε. So  $\aleph$  A B C D, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Meyer, De Wette, Westc. and Hort. The reading καὶ ἐξαπεῖτε is probably an attempt to assimilate the Apostle's expression to the words in Deut. xxiv. 7, καὶ ἐξαπεῖς, which he is undoubtedly citing. But the aor. and the omission of καί make this final command more abrupt and urgent: "I wrote to this effect before; I have now explained how and why it should be done: Do it." Theod. excellently observes that the Apostle adds force to his command by using the very language of God's law given through Moses.

τὸν πονηρὸν, not Satan (so Calvin), but the incestuous person. In most passages the Heb. has the neut. But in Deut. xvii. 7, where the reference is to stoning the idolater, the LXX. has τὸν πονηρόν. Ἐξάρατε looks back to ἀρθῇ, ver. 2. But it contains an allusion also to the contagion of the man's evil example. For the compound ἐξαίρειν does not mean "to remove," except in the applied signification of removing a

disease (cf. Hippocr., *Tract.* 765). Chrys. rightly understands it so here: ὡς ἐπὶ νόσου τινος καὶ λοιμοῦ.

ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, "from among yourselves." The αὐτῶν is emphatic. If they spared him, they would be participating in his sin.

## 2. *Litigation before Heathen Judges.*

(vi. 1-11).

The Apostle next applies his conception of the nature of the Church to censure the practice of instituting legal proceedings against Christian brethren before heathen tribunals. The point of his censure lies in three things: *first*, that the Church permitted its members to go to law before heathen tribunals, and did not decide by arbitration within the Church all disputes among brethren touching secular matters (vi. 1-6); *second*, that Christians should have such disputes and insist on their rights, instead of suffering wrong (vi. 7, 8); *third*, that the real cause of both these faults was their ignorance of the nature of Christ's kingdom and Church (vi. 9-11). The reader will perhaps be reminded of Plato's description (*Rep.* p. 405) of a diseased State, in which the art of the lawyer gives itself airs and a man that actually prides himself on his liberal education has to go abroad for his justice because he has none at home.

**Ch. VI. 1.** *τολμᾷ*, "dare." Bengel admirably: "Grandi verbo notatur læsa majestas Christianorum." It contains the gist of the Apostle's argument, which is not, at present, that brotherly love and pity ought to restrain them. He has already set forth the greatness and power of the Church, and now asks if any of them dare affront the majesty of Christ who dwells therein. Hence *audet* (Vulg.) is better than the *sustinet* of Erasmus and Beza.

*πράγμα*, "a matter of dispute" (cf. Xen., *Mem.* II. ix. 1). *Τον ἕτερον*, "the other party," "his opponent." *Κρίνεσθαι*, reflex. mid., "to go to law" (cf. Matt. v. 40; Eccles. vi. 10). *Ἐπὶ*, "before the tribunal of," *coram*, arising from the notion of local nearness (cf. Acts xxv. 9, 10). It is a class. usage, though not freq. in the best writers.

*τῶν ἀδίκων*. It is doubtful that he purposely chooses an

ethical designation, as if he wished to show the folly of seeking justice at the hands of the unjust. The Apostle had met with a notable exception in the gentle Gallio in Corinth itself. *Οἱ ἄδικοι* was equivalent to *οἱ ἁμαρτωλοί*, the Jewish designation of the Gentiles, while the Jews applied to themselves the epithet *οἱ δίκαιοι* (cf. *Wisd. xviii. 20*). On the other hand, the Apostle calls Christians “holy,” to remind them of the sanctity and awe that pertains to those who have the mind of Christ, and therefore judge all things (cf. *ii. 15*). It is most probable that the Greek portion of the Corinthian Church were guilty of the practice, not the Jewish. The Greeks were proverbially litigious (*φιλοδικοί*). The Jews were in the habit of appointing arbiters from among themselves to settle disputes, if both parties were Jews, and their Roman conquerors connived at the system. Cf. *Joseph., De Bello Jud. IV. 34*; *Origen, Ep. ad Afric. 14*. Perhaps *Acts xviii. 15* is an allusion to it. From the Jewish synedrion it passed into the Christian Church. Cf. the so called Epistle of Clement to James, 10, *οἱ πράγμα ἔχοντες, ἀδελφοί, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξουσίῳν μὴ κρινέσθωσαν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας πρεσβυτέρων συμβιβαζέσθωσαν*. To this small beginning we must trace the authority acquired by the bishops, especially in the Latin Church, to settle disputes in ecclesiastical and even civil cases, which was in part recognized by a law of Valens, A.D. 376. An interesting account of the “tumultuous perplexities” of an episcopal magistrate is given by Augustine (*De Op. Monach. 29*). We may infer that the Apostle does not mean to say that civil disputes should be brought before the assembled Church, but that both parties should choose Christians as arbitrators and submit to their decisions.

**V. 2.** ἦ (inserted from **Σ A B C D**) *οὐκ οἴδατε*, an interrogative phrase introducing a statement that could not have been known except by revelation (cf. *vv. 16, 19*).

*κρινούσι*. Chrys., Ambrosiast., Theod., Theophyl., Phot., Erasm., Musculus understand the judgment of the world by the saints to mean that their faith will condemn the unbelief of the world, as the Ninevites will rise in judgment against the generation that rejected Christ. But this would not prove that Christians are fit to judge matters in dispute in the Church. Lightfoot (*Hor. Heb.*) and Vitringa (on *Isa. xxxii. 18*)

consider the words to be a prediction of the worldly power of the Church, when the magistracies of the world would be in the hands of Christians, a prophecy that began to be fulfilled in the time of Constantine. What, then, is meant by judging angels? Neander justly objects that the Apostolic age did not expect a time when the Church would wield the power of the State, but anticipated a continuous struggle to be ended only by the second coming of Christ (cf. Justin M., *Diab. c. Tryph.* 39). Tertullian (*Apol.* 21) evidently believed that the Cæsars, as the personification of the evil principle in the world, would never become Christians. Surely the meaning is that the saints will be associated with Christ in the act of judging the world at the last day (cf. iv. 5). This doctrine glimmered faintly to a prophet's eye and came as a message of consolation and hope in a time of national suffering and shame (cf. Dan. vii. 18, 22; Wisd. iii. 8). It is stated, within narrow limits, by Christ (Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30), and emerges in the Apocalyptic visions (Rev. xx. 4). In the belief of the post-apostolic Church, the prerogative of being τοῦ Χριστοῦ πάρεδροι . . . καὶ μέτοχοι τῆς κρίσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδικάζοντες αὐτῷ (Eus., *H. E.* VI. 42) was confined to martyrs. Tertullian (*Apol.* 39) has caught the spirit of the Apostle's words.

καί, introducing a question. Cf. note on v. 2. Ἐν, implying a judicial college, *in consessu vestro*. It will not be the irresponsible opinion of individuals, but the solemn sentence of assembled judges. Cf. Dem., *Ol.* III. § 10, νομοθέτας καθίστατε ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς νομοθέταις μὴ θῆσθε νόμον μηδένα. Ἑμῖν differs from οἱ ἅγιοι as the actual from the ideal.

ὁ κόσμος, not here the kingdom of sin, but the created universe. The contrast between κόσμ. and κριτ. ἐλάχιστα is that between the vastest and the smallest.

ἀνάξιοι . . . ἐλαχίστων. The usual meaning of κριτήριον is "a court of justice," and Chrys., Theophyl., Valcken., Olshaus. so understand it here: "Ye are too noble to appear before these very small tribunals." But, notwithstanding the occasional use of ἀνάξιος in class. Greek in the sense of *nimis dignus* (e.g. Soph., *Æd. in Col.* 1546, ἀνάξια δυστυχεῖν), the Apostle would probably have written ἀνάξια ὑμῶν ἐστι κριτήρια ἐλάχιστα. It is more natural to suppose that κριτήρια means, by an easy metonymy, the judgment of disputes:

“Are ye unworthy of sitting in judgment on the smallest matters?”

**V. 3.** From the contrast between great matters and small he passes to the difference between the present life and the supernatural order of things: “If we judge angels, whose nature touches ours only in its higher part, and the conditions of whose moral status are in some respects essentially different from those under which we are placed, are we incompetent to judge those matters that touch us on the lower side of our nature, and often involve the consideration of no complex moral conditions.” Aquinas, Meyer, Alford, Hodge think the reference is to good angels. But, as there is no hint in Scripture that they will come to judgment, *οὐκ οἶδατε* would be out of place (cf. Jude 6). The thought that the saints will pass sentence of condemnation on fallen angels is but the complement of the doctrine taught by St. Paul that they here wrestle against principalities, powers, and spiritual wickedness in high places (Eph. vi. 12). The contest will end in the defeat of the evil spirits (cf. Luke x. 19, 20). The reference to bad angels is maintained by Tert. (*De Cult. Fem.* 11), Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Calvin, Est., Bengel, etc.

*μήτι γε*, “not to mention,” *quanto magis* (Vulg.).

*βιωτικά*, that is, *αἱ βίου πραγματεῖαι* (2 Tim. ii. 4) or *ὁ βίος* (Luke xv. 12), synon. with the class. *βίου τροφή*. *Βιωτικός* first occurs in Aristotle, but in an active sense: “capable of obtaining the means of living.” Polybius and Philo use it in the sense of “secular,” as here. But it has a depreciatory meaning.

**V. 4.** *καθίζετε*. The view that this is an assertion cannot be correct, because *ἐάν* cannot be synon. with *ὅτε* or *εἰ* with indic. (“on those occasions on which”). Valla suggested that it is an interrogative and, therefore, that *ἐξουθενημένους* means the heathen. So Luther, Wolf, Olshaus., De Wette, Meyer, Maier, Neander, Heinrici, etc. The strongest argument in favour of this interpretation is that the Apostle in ver. 5 seems to imply that the wise ought to be judges. But, (1) if *καθίζετε* is interrog., would *ἐάν* with subjunct. be used, and not *εἰ* with indic.? (2) *Καθίζειν* means not “to appear before a tribunal,” but “to appoint as judges,” as in Dem., *In. Mid.* p. 585, *ὅπόσους ἂν ἡ πόλις καθίσῃ*. (3) *Τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους*

cannot mean merely "those who have no authority" (Olshaus., Maier), but means "those who are despised," as in i. 28. Was contempt of the heathen a fact in the Corinthian Church? On the whole, it yields a more natural and certainly a more forcible meaning to consider *καθίζετε* imperat.: "In case you may at any future time have disputes pertaining to this life, appoint the despised ones of the Church to be your judges." He is not justifying their contempt of brethren, but stating it, and, in stating it, really rebuking their pride. Meyer objects that the Apostle would then have written, *τοὺς ἐξουθενημένους τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*. But their being despised by the Church was more to the Apostle's purpose than their being members; and Cajetan rightly altered the *contemptibiles* of the Vulg. into *contemptos*. Whatever view we accept of the words, they imply that a standing presbytery had no place as yet in the Corinthian Church. In the Clementines (see note on ver. 1) the enactment reads differently.

**V. 5.** The Apostle has written ironically in ver. 4. He justifies himself by saying that he did it to make them ashamed. For surely they will not admit that they have no brother fit to arbitrate.

*οὕτως*, not to be joined to *λέγω* (Hofm.); nor having a climacteric meaning (Chrys.), for we should then expect an adj., as in Gal. iii. 3; but inferential: "So, it seems, I am to infer." Cf. Matt. xxvi. 40.

*Ἐν*. So **N B C**, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. On *ἐν* cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XIV. 3 c.; Lightfoot and Ellicott on Gal. iii. 28. At least, it is more emphatic than *ἐστιν*: "So, then, there is no room among you for one wise man."

*σοφός*, "spiritually wise." Vitranga (*De Syn.* p. 570) erroneously supposes the Apostle means an official teacher, such as the president of a Jewish synagogue was.

*διακρίναι* . . . *αὐτοῦ*, "to arbitrate between his brother and an opponent." It is not a Hebraism for *τῶν ἀδελφῶν* (Maier) because of *αὐτοῦ*. Though incorrect, it occurs in LXX., Exod. xi. 7, et al. *Αὐτοῦ* is emphatic.

**V. 6.** *ἀλλά* introduces a sharp contrast. Hence the clause had better be regarded as an assertion, not a question. The contrast is threefold: instead of displaying the moderation

of wisdom, you wrangle brother against brother; instead of accepting arbitration, you go to law; instead of referring matters to brethren for decision, you bring complaints against brethren before heathen tribunals.

*καὶ τοῦτο, et quidem.* The class. phrase is *καὶ ταῦτα*. Cf. Heb. xi. 12.

*ἀπίστων.* As *ἄδικοι* is the designation of the heathen among the Jews, so *ἄπιστοι* is their name from a Christian point of view. The distinctive characteristic of a Jew is legal righteousness, that of a Christian faith.

V. 7. *ἤδη*, “at once,” not here, however, temporal, but logical. “If it is a shame to go to law before unbelievers, then that at once implies that a litigious spirit generally is itself unchristian.” Hence *ὅλως* is “generally,” that is, apart from contingent circumstances, such as that the appeal is to heathen judges.

*ἧττημα*, first in LXX., Isa. xxxi. 7, “subjugation.” The Att. form is *ἦττα*. In the New Test. *ἧττημα* occurs only here, and in Rom. xi. 12, where it is the opp. of *πληρῶμα* and must mean either “diminution in number” or “rejection.” But both these meanings are two aspects of the same notion and do not involve the idea of moral depravity. In our passage Chrys. (apparently), Theod., Theophyl., Œcum., Calvin, Bengel, Neander, Olshausen, etc., explain it to mean sin; Vulg., *delectum*. But Maier, Meyer, De Wette, Osiand., Kling, Hofm., etc., think it means “loss,” though some of them refer it to present disadvantages, others to loss of participation in Messiah’s kingdom. (1) It must have a pass. meaning; and, if it has any moral reference, it must be to moral loss, not to moral depravity. Cf. Rom. xi. 12, where *παράπτωμα* denotes “lapse,” and *ἧττημα* “rejection,” the loss of what was once possessed. (2) The notion of loss naturally prepares for ver. 9; a litigious spirit is an unjust spirit, and the unjust forfeit the kingdom. (3) There may be also, as Messmer and Wordsworth surmise, a contrast intended between the fancied gain of going to law and the real loss involved in it; their *πλεονέκτημα* was a *ἧττημα*. (4) *Ⲡ ABC* omit *ἐν*, and therefore *ὑμῖν* will be a dat. incommodi, which is a natural construction only if *ἧττημα* means “loss.” But we ought not to restrict the reference to loss of participation in the future

Messianic kingdom. Loss of spirituality also results from an exacting and litigious spirit.

*κρίματα*, more general than *κριτήρια*, and including private arbitration.

*ἀδικεῖσθε* . . . *ἀποστερεῖσθε*, "why do ye not suffer yourselves to be unjustly treated and defrauded?" For this use of the middle cf. Thuc. I. 120, *μήτε τῷ ἡσυχίῳ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι*, "to brook injury,"—a passage, by the way, the sentiment of which is in direct contrast to that of the Apostle's words. Plato comes nearer, *Crito* 10, *οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν*.

*ἀποστερεῖν* is a specific form of *ἀδικία*, having reference mostly to property (cf. James v. 4). In Mark x. 19 *μὴ ἀποστερήσης* seems to be the form in which the Jews of our Lord's time stated the tenth commandment, substituting the outward act of fraud for the inward coveting. In the commercial centre of Greece injustice would assume the form of fraud.

V. 8. Not a continuation of the questions (Meyer). The emphatic *ὑμεῖς* shows that he starts anew with an assertion; and *ἀλλά* will then have its usual meaning after a question, "nay but," as in ver. 6. "You of all men doing injustice!"

V. 9-11. *Ἄδικοι* connects these verses with *ἀδικεῖτε* in ver. 8. But they have a wider range of meaning than as a reason why Christians should be just. They are an argument for Church discipline, and an additional statement respecting the nature of the Church. The Apostle, as we have seen, does not recognize a sharp boundary line between the present spiritual condition of the Church and that of the Messianic kingdom. The ethics of the kingdom yet to come determine the morals of the kingdom that now is. If wicked men will be excluded from the former, they cannot be left unchastised in the latter. For the presence and power of Christ is as real in the one as in the other. It is true that the present is a state of trial and education, and that, consequently, Church discipline does not now involve the exclusion of all wrong-doers. But the presence of Christ endows the Church with an authority not less real nor less absolute in itself than that of the future kingdom. The ethical resemblance between the two is what the Apostle insists upon.

V. 9. *ἄδικοι*, primarily to be understood in the special

sense of "unjust," inasmuch as the word is suggested by ἀδικεῖτε, ver. 8. But the word has also a generic meaning here, which appears from the use of the subordinate negatives οὔτε . . . οὔτε. "Unrighteousness" is the fundamental idea of sin (cf. 1 John iii. 4). By omission of the art. before ἄδικοι, attention is drawn to the attribute of unrighteousness.

Θεοῦ βασιλείαν. So **N A B C D**. This reading brings into juxta-position the contrasted notions, ἄδικοι and Θεός.

κληρονομήσουσι, a theocratic word, in allusion to the promise given to Abraham (cf. Gal. iii. 29). All believers are heirs; but the heirs will be disinherited if they live in sin, and that because of the very nature of the inheritance (cf. Col. i. 12, 13). It was a widespread belief among the Jews that belief in One God secured a man from future punishment, however evil his life might be.

πόρνοι, generic; μοιχοί, specific, expressing the opp. of the κοίτη ἀμίαντος (Heb. xiii. 4). Cf. Theophyl. on Rom. i. 29, πᾶσαν ἀπλῶς τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν τῷ τῆς πορνείας ὀνόματι περιέλαβεν.

εἰδωλολάτραι. The mention of idolaters is suggested by the intimate connection existing at Corinth between the rites of the worshippers of Aphrodité and fornication. In Rom. i. 25 the Apostle speaks of idolatry as constituting the punishment of sins of the flesh.

μαλακοί, probably not "persons living in self-indulgence" (Meyer), but specifically synon. with παιδικά, *qui muliebria patiuntur*. ἀρσενικοῦται, synon. with παιδερασταί. Cf. Dion. Hal., *Antiq.* VII. 2.

V. 10. Comparing this with the enumeration of the works of the flesh in Gal. v. 19-21, we see that both series begin with sins of impurity. The transition is easy, in both passages, to the mention of idolatry. These and drunkenness were the universal sins of the pagan world, in polite Corinth no less than in half-civilized Galatia. In our passage "calumny" represents the many manifestations of hatred mentioned in the Epistle to the Galatians. For witchcraft, which would prevail in Galatia, covetousness is here substituted.

V. 11. The ethical aspect of the Church is exemplified in the actual change of moral character which the Corinthians themselves have undergone.

ταῦτα is not equivalent to τοιοῦτοι (Billr.); nor can *τινες* be joined to ταῦτα as part of the predicate ("and something of this kind ye were") to soften the harshness of the expression (Valcken.), which would have been ταῦτά τινα. *Τινες* limits the subject: "and these things ye were, some of you." The neut. is often thus used to express contempt, especially after *καί* (cf. Rev. iii. 2; Thuc. VI. 307, ὀλίγον ἦν τὸ πιστεῦον Ἑρμοκράτει).

ἀλλ ἀπελούσασθε κ.τ.λ. For this use of ἀλλά in a succession of statements to emphasize a contrast between each and another that precedes them all cf. 2 Cor. vii. 11. Hence ἡγιασθητε and ἐδικαιώθητε may be explanatory of ἀπελούσασθε. That they are so is probable: for (1) Ἀπελ. is a figurative term, the others are not. (2) It is reflexive middle, implying that, while this washing was not their own act, it did not take place without an act of their own. It is therefore a reference to baptism (cf. Acts xxii. 16). But baptism in the New Testament represents two distinct blessings, forgiveness (Acts ii. 38) and renewal (Eph. v. 26). Cf. note on i. 14. But what is called forgiveness in reference to sins is called justification in reference to the person of the believer; and sanctification is another name for renewal (cf. Heb. x. 10, 14; xiii. 12). In other words ἡγιασθητε and ἐδικαιώθητε are explanatory of ἀπελούσασθε. Cf. Turretin, *Instit. Theol.*, De Baptismo xiii.; De Justificatione, Q. II. xx. We must, therefore, reject the view of Aquinas, Grotius, Lipsius (*Die Paulin. Rechtf.* pp. 49, sqq.), Osiander, etc., that justification is here to be understood subjectively as synonymous with "sanctification."<sup>1</sup> The objection that the Apostle ought to have named justification first is not of much weight. As he is contrasting the present moral condition of the Corinthians with their former life, he gives special prominence to sanctification. In fact he adds the reference to justification to show that their change of moral character was not a mere individual gift, but the result of that Divine economy of redemption which had given birth to the Church and will develop it into the Messianic kingdom. This is the reason why he speaks of those blessings as coming "in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God."

<sup>1</sup> Roman Catholic expositors explain δικαίωσις of sanctification also in Rom. iv. 25.

The name of Christ is the source of Church authority. The Spirit is the power that renders the exercise of that authority effective. The Corinthians are now summoned to wield that authority in Church discipline which has been effectually directed towards them in their own justification and sanctification.

B. UNION WITH CHRIST INCONSISTENT WITH A LIFE OF  
SENSUALITY.

(vi. 12-20).

It was a prevalent belief among the heathen at this time that fornication was no sin. At the Council of Jerusalem the Apostles thought it necessary to forbid fornication as a thing not indifferent (cf. Acts xv. 20). The Epistle to the Romans contains a distinct refutation of Antinomian teaching. The Apostle sets himself to show, from the new Christian standpoint, that there is an essential contrast between things in themselves indifferent and things in their very nature evil. The believer's mystical union with Christ is consistent with the former, inconsistent with the latter.

V. 12. He begins with a broad, unqualified statement of Christian liberty: "All actions are lawful to me." It is put in the form of a maxim, as appears from the *asyndeton* and, as Bengel has observed, from the use of *μοι*. Whether they are the words of the objector (Theod., Calvin) or not, the Apostle appropriates them to express his own doctrine. Some have thought he is speaking of objects, not of actions. But such a distinction is fanciful. Objects do not come into moral relation to us except through our action upon them. Besides *συμφέρει* must refer to actions. After stating the principle broadly, he limits its application on two sides: *first*, it must not be applied to the injury of ourselves or others; *second*, it must not be applied to its own destruction; and both these are but two aspects of Christian utility. The Apostle does not formally state the other distinction, that of right and wrong. Not that he denied it. But we cannot well conceive his thinking it necessary to prevent a misunderstanding of his words on the subject, as a modern writer on ethics might.

ἐξουσιασθήσομαι. Chrys. has not failed to remark the play

on the words *ἔξεστι* and *ἐξουσιασθήσομαι*. "All things are in my power, but I shall not be overpowered by anything." If Meyer's acute observation on *οὐκ ἐγώ* is too fanciful: "The subjection will not be on my side; the things will be subjected to me," we may suppose the contrast to be between the Apostle and his readers: "Whatever you may do, I will not," etc.

**Vv. 13-20.** He explains what he means by these two aspects of Christian utility. And, *first*, in vv. 13-17 he explains "expediency." It consists not in the possession of external goods, but in the development of all the creature's capacities and the realization of all possibilities. This, again, is secured by a Divine adaptation of one thing to another. What is contrary to that fitness is destructive of Christian expediency. This adaptation runs through all creation. For instance, food is adapted to the organs of digestion, and they in turn are adapted to receive and assimilate the food. Here we find adaptation in the lower sphere of perishable things. A higher example of it is to be seen in the relation between Christ and the body, an adaptation that leads up to the eternal life and development of the body through the power of God. Now fornication is destructive of the adaptation of the body for Christ, and fatal to the entrance of the body into the sphere of the spiritual. *Second*, in vv. 18-20 he explains the other aspect of Christian freedom. It must not be freedom to destroy freedom. The Christian must not be brought into subjection by anything. When he cannot resist, he must flee; and such is the nature of fleshly lust that victory is obtained only by flight. If he is subjugated by this sin, he has enslaved his body. Let the Christian remember, rather than permit himself to be brought into subjection by lust, that he is already in subjection to Christ, who bought him and consecrated his body to be a holy dwelling place of His Spirit, thus making His service the most perfect freedom and subjugation of the body the body's most glorious exaltation.

**V. 13.** Cf. 1 Thess. v. 22; Rom. vi. 19. This relation between Christ and the body does not exist between Christ and mere matter as such, nor even between him and the body itself as a material substance. It exists between Christ and the body so far as it is part of the believer's personality.

Hence the Apostle does not say "meats for the *body*," because he is speaking here of the fitness established between meats and the *σάρξ*, the material substance and the physical organs, which cannot inherit the kingdom of God (xv. 50). But he does say, "the body for the Lord," because he now speaks of what is part of a human personality, to the full consciousness of which personality a man most of all rises when he is brought into union with Christ.

**V. 14.** Chrys. erroneously makes gluttony and intemperance the object of *καταργήσει*, in accordance with the patristic doctrine of a material resurrection. The Apostle asserts that the material universe as such will be destroyed. Food and the physical organs will both perish for ever. But the body, the instrument of the soul and, equally with the soul, part of the man, is capable of undergoing a change from material to spiritual, from mortal to immortal. The body of our Lord underwent this change by His resurrection, which is here mentioned to show that Christ has been raised to lordship over the body, and is become the quickening Spirit that can change our bodies from material to spiritual. Cf. Rom. viii. 11, xiv. 9; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Col. i. 18.

For *ἐξεγερεῖ*, the reading of **Ⲱ A C D**, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., B reads *ἐξήγειρε*. The fut. seems to be required by the opposition of the word to *κατάργησει*.

*ἡμᾶς*, "us," Christians. He says nothing in this Epistle of the general resurrection of all men.

*αὐτοῦ*, that is God. Cf. Matt. xxii. 29.

**V. 15.** The body is not only adapted for the Lord, but also united to the Lord. In the previous verses the Apostle represents the personality of the man as the link between Christ and the body. He now speaks of Christ Himself as being the unifying personality; so that the believer's body becomes "members of Christ."

*μέλη*. Neander and Meyer suppose the figure to be that of the head and the members, as in Eph. iv. 16. This is inadmissible here, because it destroys the analogy between *μέλη Χριστοῦ* and *μέλη πόρνης*. Rather, Christ is represented as the new, supernatural personality with which the believer is endowed. Cf. Gal. ii. 20.

*ἄρας*, not "take," as if expressing intention (Cor. a Lap.,

Est., Messmer, Webst. and Wilkins.), which would be λαβών, but "take away," so that they cease to be members of Christ (cf. John xvii. 15). The point of the Apostle's question lies in the impossibility of the body being member of Christ, if it is made the member of a harlot (cf. Aug., *De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 25). Αἶρω expresses also the voluntariness and determined character of the act (cf. Soph., *Æol. Tyr.* 1270, ἄρας ἔπαισεν ἄρθρα τῶν αὐτοῦ κύκλων). He does it in spite of his higher nature, like Leontius, διελεύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς (Plat., *Rep.* IV. p. 440). The same notion lurks also in ποιήσω: "Shall I *make* them by my own deliberate act?"

ποιήσω may be deliber. subjunct. ("am I to," etc), or, what is more probable, fut. indic. ("will it ever come to pass that," etc.). Cf. Luke xi. 5, the fut. implying that such importunity is not likely to happen.

πόρνῃς μέλη. He means that the union of man and woman confers upon both, in accordance with the original decree of God at man's creation, a double personality. The roots of the union, whether in or out of wedlock, live and grow necessarily in the personality of each. Fornication is the forming of this union in an immoral way; that is, in contravention of the Creator's decree of monogamy. Because it is a sin that affects the man's own personality, it destroys the holy, supernatural union between him and Christ.

Baur (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1852, pp. 18 sqq.) endeavours to show that the Apostle's reasoning involves a *petitio principii*, because he proves the sinfulness of fornication by assuming that it is immoral to make the members of Christ the members of a harlot. The Apostle does not seek to prove the sinfulness of fornication. He assumes it. Has he not already said (vi. 9) that it excludes men from the kingdom of God? His purpose is to introduce a new reason, applicable to Christians only, for purity. Indeed it is only on the assumption of the sinfulness of fornication that the argument escapes being a *non sequitur*. Marriage, being a holy union, does not involve the taking away the members of Christ. Fornication, being an unholy union that does involve it, ought, for that reason also, to be shunned by Christians.

V. 16. κολλᾶσθαι, akin to Eng. *glue*, and denoting a most intimate union (cf. Luke x. 11). τῇ πόρνῃ, "his harlot."

*σῶμα* denotes not merely a physical organism, but a complex personality on its lower plane. In this citation *σάρξ* must have the same meaning, by synecdoche, and not signify the mere material substance of the body. So *basar* in the Old Test. is used for “body” as well as for “flesh.” Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11. Melancthon explains the words in Genesis to refer to the union between Christ and the believer, because of the apparent difficulty to apply to fornication words that originally referred to marriage. The *γάρ* and the *δέ* render this view inadmissible.

*φησίν*, sc. *ὁ Θεός*, as in Rom. ix. 15. Cf. Matt. xix. 4, 5, where *ὁ ποιήσας* supplies a nom. to *εἶπεν*. Similarly in Philo and Barnabas *φησί* introduces citations from Scripture.

*οἱ δύο*. He cites from LXX., Gen. ii. 24. So Matt. xix. 5; Eph. v. 31. The words *οἱ δύο* are wanting in the Hebrew. Their omission does not affect the argument.

V. 17. Here again *κολλ.* is mid., “he who cleaveth to the Lord,” expressing the believer’s act of self-consecration and faith, resulting in union with Christ. He is really exhorting them to unite themselves to Christ. Cf. Deut. x. 20; 2 Kings xviii. 6; Herm. *Past.*, Sim. viii. 8, *μὴ κολλώμενοι τοῖς ἀγίοις*. The *κόλλησις* is what grammarians call *σχετική*, that is, it here expresses consent of will.

*πνεῦμα*, denoting a complex personality on the higher plane. This union is not in the sphere of the natural, but in that of the supernatural and spiritual. It is observable that the words “of his flesh and of his bones” are to be omitted in Eph. v. 31.

V. 18. Other vices are overcome by resistance (cf. Eph. vi. 13; James iv. 7). The imagination detracts from the fascination of other sins, but adds fuel to the flame of fleshly lusts. The opposite of *φεύγειν* is *κολλᾶσθαι*. Cf. Ambrose on this ver. (*De Fugâ Sæc.* IV.), whose words sound like a reminiscence of Plat., *Rep.* p. 329, “I have fled from lust, as if I were fleeing from a savage and fierce master.” Perhaps the close connection in Corinth between impurity and idolatry caused the Apostle to give the same warning in reference to idolatry also (cf. x. 14).

*ἀμάρτημα*, “a sinful act”; *ἀμαρτία* may be either the principle or the act.

*ὅ ἐάν*, “whatsoever.” On the use of *ἐάν* for *ἄν* cf. Winer,

Gr. § XLII. 6; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 63. It is put for *ἀν* only in relative clauses with the subjunctive, and that not in class. authors (cf. Matt. xvi. 19).

*εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα.* *Εἰς* may mean "against," as in Luke xv. 18, or "towards," denoting the object affected, as in *πλουτεῖν εἰς Θεόν*. Cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 396, *ἁμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτούς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους*. The meaning is that fornication institutes a relation which affects the sinner's personality. *Σῶμα* has the same meaning as in ver. 16. Some explain it of the harlot's body; De Wetze thinks it is the language of exaggeration; Calvin, that it is spoken relatively; Meyer and Osiander suppose the meaning to be that the bodily frame is the immediate organ and object of the sin. But why, if two sins, drunkenness and fornication, equally affect the body, is the latter the more heinous because no external agent is employed?

**V. 19.** The connection is that, while they ought not to permit themselves to be brought under the power of anything, they should remember, on the other hand, that they have been brought into subjection to Christ through purchase, and that, consequently, their bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit.

*σῶμα.* So **8 A B C D**. Vulg. has *membra vestra*. The use of the sing. *σῶμα* for the plur. ("your bodies") occurs in class. prose, once at least, in Plat., *Menez.* p. 249.

*ναός.* The indwelling of the Spirit confers a sacredness on the body. Fornication is sacrilege, and defiles the shrine of God. *Ἀγίου* is emphatic. The Apostle alludes indirectly to the contrast between the dwelling-place of a holy God and the temples of heathen deities, in some of which fornication itself became a sacred rite. No wonder he refuses them the name of temple (cf. note on viii. 10). The difference is noteworthy between the Apostle's declaration that the body is the shrine of the Holy Spirit and the philosopher's description of it as a prison and a tomb. Cf. Plat., *Phæd.* 63 (referred to by Tert., *De An.* 53); *Gorg.* 493, *τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα*.

*ἔχετε.* The indwelling of the Spirit was a fact, then true of them (cf. Gal. iv. 6). Jovinian adduced the words to prove that marriage is not necessarily sinful. Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* II. 29) replies that there are many chambers in a temple, all of which are not equally the abode of Deity. The word *ναός*

("shrine," not *ἱερόν*) refutes the reply. It refutes also the view of Baur, Holsten, and Pfeiderer, that the Apostle taught that the body is essentially sinful (cf. 2 Cor. vii. 1).

*ἔστε*, depending on *ὅτι*. They were Christ's. But the Apostle does not say so. He leaves it to the witness of the Spirit to declare whose they were. Cf. vii. 21, 22; Gal. iii. 13; iv. 5; Tit. ii. 14; 2 Pet. ii. 1, where *δεσπότης* expresses the property Christ had in them by purchase. In Acts xx. 28 the purchaser is God, unless we read *Κυρίου*, with Lachm. and Tisch.

V. 20. *ἡγοράσθητε*, aor., referring to Christ's death (cf. Tert., *Ad Uxor.* II. 3).

*τιμῆς*. The price or ransom (*λύτρον*) which Christ, their purchaser, paid for their redemption from slavery was His own soul (Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45), or His own blood (cf. Eph. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 19; Rev. v. 9). Now to the mind of a man whose religious life has been that of a pious Israelite, the conception of deliverance through blood must mean that the idea of redemption passes over into that of propitiation. The blood is necessarily the blood of a sacrifice. It is this new conception of an atonement that connects the redemption from slavery with the indwelling of the Spirit. The great dogmatic passage in Gal. iv. 4-7 teaches that the purpose of redemption, which consists in deliverance, is to bestow the positive blessing of adoption, which is the highest form of reconciliation, and that the result of adoption is "that God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." The Vulg. has *pretio magno*. It is a correct paraphrase. The point, however, is that the transaction was not a nominal but a genuine purchase. Cf. Tert., *De Cor.* 13, "et quidem magno."

*δοξάσατε δὴ*. The urgency of a command is often expressed by *δὴ* (cf. Luke ii. 15). The aor. also helps: "Do it, I say, at once." The positive idea of glorifying God takes the place of the negative warning to flee from sin; because, whereas union with Christ is the source of the body's sacredness, it is the indwelling of the Spirit that imparts to the believer all actual grace for well-doing. Nearly all the Latin fathers and the Vulg. have "*clarificate et portate* (or *tollite*) *Deum*," as if *ἄρατε* or *βασιτάζετε* were in the text. Chrys. (*Hom.* 4 in 1 Tim.) has *δοξάσωμεν τοίνυν τὸν Θεόν, ἄρωμεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ*

σώματι ἡμῶν. With this exception the reading seems to be unknown to the Greek Fathers.

ἐν, "in" the temple of your body, in allusion to ver. 19. The body of the believer, as it circumscribes his personality, is the sphere within which he glorifies God.

The words καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ὑμῶν, ἅτινά ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ, are omitted in **8** A B C D, Vulg., in some of the Greek and all the Latin Fathers, but read by the two Syriac translators, by Chrys., Theod., etc. Most editors now follow Mill in rejecting them. They enfeeble the sententious strength of the concluding exhortation. For σῶμα means, throughout, not a mere physical organism, but the man's personality in its lower and more external aspects (cf. Rom. xii. 1). In both passages the Apostle means that, in order to glorify God, religion must pass out of the sphere of thought and emotion into action.

#### *Additional Note on Vv. 16, 17.*

The "decay in verbal significance" (Rutherford's *Babrius*, p. lx.), that is, the tendency to use vivid words in a less intense and incisive meaning than former usage warranted, observable in debased Greek, had not set in when the Apostle wrote. In later writers κολλᾶσθαι signifies no more than "to be attached" to a person. In our passage it expresses the formation of a mystical union.

### THIRD DIVISION.

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#### MARRIAGE AND CELIBACY.

(vii. 1-40).

THE Apostle passes from the complaints that reached him from other quarters to answer various questions contained in the letter of the Corinthian Church. He begins with the subject of marriage, perhaps because it is closely connected with the previous warning against fornication.

The doctrine that Christians ought to abstain from marriage has been ascribed by one or another expositor to three out of the four parties that divided the Church. Olshausen, Hausrath (*Der Ap. Paulus*, p. 389), etc., find an ascetic tendency in the Christ-party; Olshausen because he thinks they were idealists, Hausrath because he supposes they imitated Christ's abstention; and certainly Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* III. p. 533 Potter) refers to certain persons who boasted that, in abstaining from marriage, they followed the Lord's example. Schwegler (*Nachap. Zeit.* I. p. 163) detects asceticism in the Petrine party and traces it to the influence of Ebionitism, which indeed was, not improbably, another name for Jewish Christianity (cf. Origen, *C. Cels.* II. 1). But the opinion that the Ebionites advocated celibacy rests on the sole testimony of Epiphanius, *Hær.* XXX. ii. 5.<sup>1</sup> At least, if they abjured marriage, it is unlikely they would profess themselves followers of Cephas. Neander, Rübiger, Meyer, Osiander, Maier, Stanley, etc., think the question respecting marriage originated with the Pauline party, who are supposed to have drawn an unwarrantable conclusion from the Apostle's celibacy. But all these conjectures (for they are little more) rest on too con-

<sup>1</sup> Neander (*Church History*, I. Sect. iv.) discerns in Ebionitism a reaction even of the original Hebraism in favour of marriage.

tracted a view of the influence of the ascetic spirit in the Apostolic age. Asceticism was one of the undefined impulses of the time, which Christianity had to take into account, but did not create. Christ assumes its existence among the men whom He warns not to be as the hypocrites are. Cf. Matt. vi. 16; and xix. 12 implies that already men were waiting for the kingdom and bringing the body into subjection for its sake. The tendency of the ancient Jewish religion had been to extol marriage. But after the return from Babylon the ascetic spirit manifests itself, and gathers strength with the breaking up of the national independence and exclusiveness. Perhaps the vigorous language of the 127th Psalm, written after the exile, conveys the remonstrance of the old religion against the growing asceticism of the age. In course of time ascetic pietism degenerated into a hypocritical Pharisaism or assumed an increasingly vigorous form in Essenism (cf. Joseph., *Hist. Jud.* II. viii. 2, et al.; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* V. 17).<sup>1</sup> In early Christian writers the morality of marriage appears to be well nigh the only casuistical question which all discuss. Certainly they were not led to assign so important a place to it in their thoughts and exhortations from any special prominence it assumes in the New Testament. On the contrary, they are continually adjusting the statements of Scripture in accordance with their own preconceived notions. It is a curious fact also that asceticism appears in a more pronounced form among the heretical sects (cf. Tert., *C. Marc.* I. 29). For instance, Tatian the Syrian and the Gnostics repudiated marriage; and the Montanists considered it an evil, though necessary. But even the orthodox betray an admiration for celibacy. Clement of Alexandria, though he combats the ascetic spirit, speaks of virginity as the more excellent way. Athenagoras (*Apol.* 33) praises those Christians who had grown old in the unmarried state, hoping to attain thereby closer communion with God. Methodius wrote

<sup>1</sup> Reference to the so-called Therapeutæ of Egypt in this connection must now be omitted, since Lucius of Strasburg (in his *Die Therapeuten*, etc., 1879) has convinced such competent critics as E. Schürer, Hilgenfeld, and Künen that the treatise *De Vita Contemplativa*, previously ascribed to Philo, in which alone we have an account of the Therapeutæ, is a Christian forgery of the fourth century.

a dialogue in praise of virginity. The early Fathers generally condemned marriage if entered into for any other purpose than the procreation of children; and in this they were more ascetic than the dogmatic writers of the fourth and fifth centuries, when asceticism had struck its roots deep in the moral sentiment of the Church.

We infer that the Apostle in this chapter discusses, not an isolated question, but a wide-spread and prominent tendency of the age, not originating always in a definite theory, much less occasioned by separate instances of celibacy, but presenting to Christianity a great moral force which it must either subdue or assimilate, and undoubtedly to be connected with the doctrine that all contact with matter was essentially evil.

The Chapter may be divided thus: (1) A general statement (vv. 1-7). (2) The case of a Christian who has not been married or is in a state of widowhood (vv. 8, 9). (3) The case of a Christian married to a Christian (vv. 10, 11). (4) The case of a Christian married to an unbeliever that is willing to cohabit with the believer (vv. 12-14). (5) The case of a Christian married to an unbeliever that refuses to cohabit with the believer (vv. 15, 16). (6) A digression in reference to circumcision and slavery (vv. 17-24). (7) The case of virgins (vv. 25-33). (8) The case of widows (vv. 39, 40).

### (1) *A general Statement.*

(vii. 1-7).

**Ch. VII. 1.** δέ, not only transitional but also slightly adversative; what the Apostle says concerning marriage standing in a relation of contrast to what he has said respecting fornication.

περὶ ὧν, i.e. περὶ ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν.

ἐγράψατε. No trace of their letter occurs except in the Apostle's reply. But we may infer from the plur. here that it was written in the name of the whole Church. It is also evident that the Apostle's deliverances on casuistical questions were incidental, as circumstances brought them to the surface, and that they formed no part of the Gospel which he preached as the divine power and wisdom.

ἄπτεσθαι, a euphemism; not synonymous with γαμεῖν. Cf.

Gen. xx. 4, 6; Plat., *Laws*, p. 840 A; espec. Clem. Al., *Pædag.* p. 224 Potter. The expression is used because the question was prompted by an ascetic sentiment that marriage was defiling (ἀκάθαρτον). Cf. Lev. xi. 8; Col. ii. 21. But Jerome's explanation that the word is used to show the danger of the slightest approach would require μηδέ. The omission of μέν renders it probable that the clause καλὸν κ.τ.λ. is explanatory of ἃ ἐγράψατε (Musculus, Rübiger). The clause is not the enunciation of an independent axiom (Meyer), inasmuch as the Apostle is replying to a question. His answer necessarily assumes the form of an admission, on the one hand, and a limitation of that admission, on the other.

καλόν. Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 7), who is followed by Estius and Cor. a Lap., considers the meaning to be that celibacy is a moral and spiritual good, marriage an evil, not indeed sinful in itself, but inevitably accompanied by sin in this state of corruption, and permitted "ne malo quid deterius fiat." That καλόν sometimes approximates to the meaning of ἀγαθόν must be admitted (cf. Rom. vii. 18, 19). But how, then, can the Apostle call marriage in ver. 7 a divine χάρισμα, or describe it in Eph. v. 31, 32 as acquiring a mystical meaning, or the Hebrew Christians be exhorted to hold their marriage in honour and not be led by Essenians to disparage it? On the other hand, many Protestant expositors assign to the word the meaning of "expedient under present circumstances," as in ver. 26. Cf. Matt. xvii. 4; xviii. 8, where καλόν is synonymous with συμφέρει of Matt. v. 29. We must bear in mind that the Apostle is discussing a great ascetic principle. Is it likely he would begin with advising his readers to abstain from marriage from prudential motives in hard times? And if, in saying that a widow is more blessed by remaining a widow, he means only that she is more prudent, why should he close his argument with declaring that he was guided by the Spirit of God? Καλόν differs from συμφέρει in containing the notion of mental satisfaction, —such gratification, for instance, as that which is felt in contemplating a beautiful scene or an act of self-sacrifice. Considered in its idea, marriage has an honour conferred upon it which is denied to celibacy. For it is a type of the union between Christ and the Church and from that union derives

its own holy character. But, considered in its several acts and accompaniments, marriage is inferior to celibacy. The unmarried are, like the angels of God, freed from the earthly side of what, in its higher aspects, bears an analogy to the life of the Son of God, in whose union with the Church the conception of marriage is realized without the dross of earth. We must add, therefore, the notion of the morally beautiful to the notion of expediency before our interpretation will satisfy the Apostle's words. He is exhorting his readers to win for themselves the comeliness of undistracted and entire service. Abstinence from marriage and, by mutual consent for a time, in marriage will give leisure for special seasons of prayer, deepen the Christian's solicitude for the things of the Lord, and create a more complete consecration in body as well as spirit. Whatever furthers this is *καλόν*.

V. 2. Limitation (*δέ*, cf. note on ii. 6) of the general statement that celibacy is good.

*διά* with accus. denotes cause ("owing to"). Whether it can also express purpose ("for the sake of") is doubtful. Krüger (*Gr.* II. p. 294) and Winer (*Gr.* § XLIX. c and Moulton's note) deny it. The few examples given by Shilleto (*Dem.*, *De Falsâ Leg.* § 291) and Jelf (*Gr.* § 627. 3 a) are from Thucydides or in pronominal phrases, such as *διὰ τί*; Here, at least, the art. points out the meaning. The fornications then abounding in Corinth were a reason why Christians should marry, if they were in danger of contamination.

*πορνείας*. The use of the plur. of abstract nouns to denote the various acts in which an abstract quality manifests itself is a frequent Hebraism in LXX. (cf. Isa. lxiii. 15). But it is also a classical usage. Cf. Heinichen's exhaustive note to Eus., *H. E.* VIII. 6; Fritzsche on Rom. xii. 4; Bernhardt, *W. S.* pp. 62-64. So Matt. xv. 19. Paraphrase: "But owing to the prevailing fornication of all kinds."

*ἐχέτω*. The imperat. is sometimes permissive in the New Test., though not so often as grammarians say. But here Calvin and Meyer rightly consider it to be jussive. The absence of a connecting particle makes *ἀποδιδότω* and *μὴ ἀποστερεῖτε* (vv. 3, 5) explanatory of *ἐχέτω*. As they are jussive, so must it also be. Besides, the prevalence of fornication in Corinth is a reason, not merely for permitting marriage, but also for

making it incumbent on all that have not the gift of continence. The Apostle does not, therefore, prohibit all continent persons to marry. Origen (*Cat.*), Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 4), Rückert, Kling think the Apostle is speaking of those who are already married. But ἔχειν does not mean "to retain" (so Semler), as if synonymous with κατέχειν, not even in 1 Tim. i. 19; 2 Tim. i. 13. It means "to have a wife," as in Thuc. II. 29, οὗ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφήν, and Mark vi. 18.

ἴδιον, implying that the wife is to have a husband who is to be her own and no other woman's husband. He does not say also τὴν ἴδιαν γυναῖκα because a warning against polyandry was not present to his mind. In Greece the only approach to it was in Sparta. When Theodoret (*Græc. Aff. Cur.* p. 133) contrasts the Apostle's doctrine on this point with Plato's community of wives, which involved polyandry as well as polygamy, he uses ἴδιος of husband and wife. Ἰδιος is not redundant, not even in Wisd. x. 1.

**V. 3.** For ὀφειλομένην εὐνοίαν **Σ** A B C D Vulg., Clem. Al. (*Strom.* III. p. 555, Potter), Orig. (*Cat.*; *De Or.* 17), Tert. (*De Pudic.* 16), etc., read ὀφειλήν, which Erasm. actually conjectured from the *debitum* of the Vulg. The longer reading may have been a euphemistic gloss or had an ascetic origin (so Neander), thus making the Apostle's words mean that, though cohabitation may cease from ascetic motives, kindness is still due to the wife. But "the debt" strictly means cohabitation. The ascetic feeling that prompted to celibacy would also lead to abstention from cohabitation on the part of those who were married.

**V. 4.** He proves that cohabitation is the due of husband and wife. Each is the other's possession. The fundamental ground of the Apostle's conception of marriage is to be found in the union that forms of husband and wife one complex personality. The revelation of the union between Christ and the Church has restored the conception of marriage which God sanctioned before man's fall, that husband and wife are one flesh (cf. Matt. xix. 5). It is the realization of this primeval conception that distinguishes the Christian theory of marriage. From this arises the "elegans paradoxon," to adopt Bengel's happy phrase, that husband and wife have no right to their own bodies, but have a right to one another's

bodies. This is the reason why their right to one another's goods and chattels must be decided on altogether different grounds. To this radical distinction also we must trace the wide divergence of the Apostle's theory of marriage from that of Judaism and Paganism. By the law of Moses polygamy was allowed under certain limitations. In Greece concubinage prevailed as widely as marriage. In Roman law the woman passed in *manum viri* and was included in his *patria potestas*; and in the later days of the Republic, when this ancient conception of marriage had become practically obsolete, far from being followed by such a theory as that of the Apostle, which gives the *potestas* (ἐξουσία) to both husband and wife, the authority of the husband ceased and made room for "the laxest marital tie the Western world has seen." Cf. Maine, *Ancient Law*, Ch. V. It must, however, be acknowledged that Greek and Roman sentiment was slowly rising towards the distinction, as we may infer from the ever widening difference between the *patria potestas* and the *dominica potestas*, which were at first identical. Cf. Justinian, *Institutes*, Sander's Ed. I. ix. Gradually the notion of ownership was modified in reference to wife and children as distinguished from slaves. Cf. Chrys., *Hom. de Virginit.* 75.

V. 5. Not only is cohabitation the due of husband and wife, but the Apostle advises that neither of them should lay it aside, except under certain restrictions; viz. first, that it be by mutual consent; second, for a time only; third, in order to have leisure for special prayer; and, fourth, with a view to the resumption of cohabitation in a manner worthy of Christians.

ἀποστερεῖτε. The object is left unexpressed from motives of delicacy. But the word "rob" alludes to the word "due."

εἰ μή τι ἄν. Sometimes ἄν is used without a mood, if the verb can be supplied from a preceding clause. Cf. Hermann, *De Part.* ἄν, p. 187; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 330. Buttmann (*N. S.* p. 189) suggests that ἄν stands for ἐάν, sc. ἀποστερήτε ἀλλήλους, "except perhaps in case you may," etc. But as the use of ἄν for ἐάν is very doubtful in the New Test., it is more natural to render εἰ μητί by "except perhaps," and to consider that ἄν makes the εἰ μητί more indefinite: "except, perhaps, should it so happen" (cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 430. 2. Obs. 1).

πρὸς καιρόν, "for a time," the πρὸς expressing that it is with a view to its lasting only a short time. The notion of duration is in καιρόν, not in πρὸς. Cf. πρὸς ἑσπέραν "towards evening"; and Heb. xii. 10.

σχολάσητε, so **Σ** A B C D. The aor. refers to extraordinary seasons for prayer. Clem. Al. (*Strom.* III. p. 547 Potter), by pointing this out, refutes Tatian the Syrian's attempt to prove from this verse that marriage is in itself sinful.

The words τῇ νηστείᾳ καὶ occur in Chrys. (*De Virginit.* 29, et al.) Theod., etc. But they are omitted in **Σ** A B C D, Ignat. (*Ad Pol.* I. 3), Origen (*Hom. in Num.* xxiii.), Cyprian (*Ad Quir.* iii. 22), Vulg. Fasting cannot be the purpose of abstinence from cohabitation, but is itself a form of abstinence. The words had, we may suppose, an ascetic, but early origin (? 2nd cent.) both here and, though more doubtfully spurious, in Mark ix. 29. In Matt. xvii. 21 and Acts x. 30 they must be omitted.

τῇ προσευχῇ need not be restricted to stated seasons of public worship, which would rather be in the plur., as in Col. iv. 12 (cf. Col. iv. 2).

ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, "to the same place," as in Acts ii. 1, and implying that there has been for a time a local separation. So Erasm., Meyer. Jerome thinks the phrase a euphemism.

ἦτε, so **Σ** A B C D. It seems to have been altered first to συνέρχησθε, and, in the time of Chrys. (*De Virginit.* 29, et al.) to συνέρχεσθε. But Gratama correctly considers ἦτε to depend on ἵνα, though he is incorrect in saying that the Apostle writes inaccurately. Abstention from cohabitation ought to have for its purpose, not only special prayer, but also a return to cohabitation with all the permanent benefits derived from that time of prayer. It is, therefore, unnecessary to suppose ἦτε is an anacoluthon for an imperat., occasioned by the attraction of the foregoing conjunctions (Osiand).

διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ὑμῶν. He began with a reference to the prevailing immorality of Greek society; in the end he charges the Corinthians themselves with incontinence. Ἀκρασία is the later form of ἀκρατεία. Rückert derives it from κεράννυμι with *ā*, and renders: "on account of your abstaining from matrimonial intercourse"; and Cranmer's Bible has "for your continencye." But κεράννυμι has not the euphemistic mean-

ing which *μίγνυμι* has, and *ἀκρασία* would signify, not “absence of mixing,” but “bad mixture.”

V. 6. *τοῦτο* refers to all the Apostle has said on the subject of marriage. So Chrys. (*De Virg.* 34), Bengel, De Wette. The general advice to abstain from marriage (ver. 1), the advice to the incontinent to marry (ver. 2), the advice to the married to cohabit (ver. 3), and the advice to abstain for a time (ver. 5)—all this variety of exhortation is given by way of allowance for the weakness of human nature. Hence the necessity for a declaration of the distinction between casuistical decisions and moral principles.

*συγγνώμη*, which occurs only here in the New Test., does not mean “pardon” in this ver.; that would yield a very unnatural antithesis to “command.” There is, consequently, not the slightest ground for the inference of Augustine (*De Bono Conj.* 6, et al.) that the Apostle considered even marriage, if entered into from any other motive than the perpetuation of the race, a sin, though a venial one. Neither does *συγγνώμη* ever mean “advice,” “opinion,” (Valck., Hammond, Neander); so that the antithesis between *συγγν.* and *ἐπιταγή* cannot be the same as that between *γνώμη* and *ἐπιταγή* in ver. 25. Here it can only mean “forbearance,” “concession to weakness,” or, to borrow from Aristotle’s definition (*Eth. Nic.* VI. xi. 1), “the discriminating considerateness of equity.” So Iren. IV. 15 (29), 2, Origen (*Cat.*) and Chrys. (*Hom. in Gal.* ii.). If so, he is speaking, not of the permission given him by the Holy Ghost (Webst. and Wilkins.), but of the allowance made for their weakness and incontinence by the Apostle. He has spoken, not as a legislator imposing general and unqualified commands, but as an equitable man, who takes into consideration their moral weakness.

V. 7. *θέλω*. It is usually said that, while *βούλομαι* implies a positive wish, *ἐθέλω* expresses only the negative idea of willingness, having no objection. Cf. Shilleto, Dem., *De Falsâ Leg.* § 26. This does not hold good in the New Test. at least. Indeed Buttmann (*Lexil.*) and Stallbaum (on Plat., *Rep.* p. 437 B) say that *ἐθέλω* adds to the notion of wishing that of intending (“voluntatem deliberatione et consilio nitemur significat”). Cf. 1 Tim. v. 14. He wishes them to marry, but he has no intention of urging his wishes upon

them. On the other hand, in our passage the Apostle declares his wish that all men should be as he himself was, possessed of the gift of continence, and his intention to do what he can to bring about this result. The Gospel has for its practical aim to discipline men to deny fleshly lusts. *Ἐθέλω* is the prevailing form in Attic prose, except in certain phrases; *θέλω* is the only form in the New Test. *Βούλομαι* is a much rarer word both in the classics and in the New Test.

*δέ* is the reading of A C D, and is adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort, etc. It gives to *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* its full and natural force; for these words covertly express the Apostle's exulting joy at the moral victory of the Gospel over the world.

*ὥς καὶ ἑμavτόν*, that is, continent. So Chrys. But he mentions himself rather than say *ἐν ἐγκρατείᾳ* to show that continence is not a utopian dream. Pierius, the Alexandrian commentator in the third century (Jerome, *Ep.* 49, Ad Pamm.), is not the last to maintain that the Apostle in this verse preaches celibacy.

*ὥς καί*. In correlative clauses *καί* sometimes occurs in both members of the comparison, sometimes only in the demonstrative clause, sometimes only in the relative. But it is not the *καί* of comparison, as it is in *ὁμοίως καί*, but preserves its force, "also." The pivot of comparison is in *ὥς*, not in *καί*. But when the *καί* occurs only in the second member of the comparison, the writer, in penning the first clause, either had not the second clause in his mind, or purposely left the reader unprepared for it. Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 126. So here. The Apostle starts with *θέλω πάντας ἀνθρώπους*, as if he were about to finish with *ἐγκρατεῦσθαι*. But he suddenly changes the expression into a more concrete and personal form. Cf. Mark xiv. 31. *Ἐμavτόν* is an example of the somewhat rare attraction of the nom. into the accus. after *ὥς*, *ὥσπερ*, *ὥστε*. Cf. Thuc. VI. 68, *ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς*, and Poppo on Thuc. V. 44.

*ἴδιον χάρισμα*. Continence is the common material out of which a special class of *χαρίσματα* are formed, which, however, have each of them its own distinguishing characteristic (cf. xii. 11). De Wette and Alford consider the words to be a milder expression for "all have not the gift of continence."

But this would imply that incontinence also is a gift. What he means is that marriage and celibacy are equally gifts of God, wherein purity of soul may manifest itself and be developed. Πνέει χαρίσματος ὁ γάμος, says Origen even. Similarly Theod. and Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 8). But we must not say that χάρισμα expresses nothing more than "moral and intellectual gifts" (Stanley; so also Origen, *Cat. in Rom.* i. 11: ἔστι γάρ τινα χαρίσματα οὐ πνευματικά, ὡς καὶ ὁ γάμος· τὸ γὰρ πνευματικὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐμποδίσαι προσευχῇ). Though all attainments are God's gifts, it is only when they are sanctified by the Spirit to Christ's service that they become χαρίσματα. St. Paul himself defines χάρισμα as δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι (*Rom.* v. 15). Ἐκ, as in xi. 12; *John* x. 32. The use of ἐκ to denote the agent is rare in Attic prose.

ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ. So **Σ A B C D**. The reading δς μὲν . . . δς δέ arose from the frequent use of the relative. Cf. *Dem., De Cor.* p. 243, ἄς μὲν ἀναιρῶν, εἰς ἃς δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας κατάγων. Cf. *Rom.* xiv. 5.

(2) *The Case of a Christian who has not been married or is in a state of widowhood.*

(Vv. 8, 9).

**V. 8.** λέγω δέ, "now what I mean is this." Cf. note on i. 12. Though λέγω grammatically belongs to this clause only, logically it introduces all the particular decisions that follow to the end of the Chapter, and in ver. 40 the notion that the Apostle's decisions are authoritative is repeated in a stronger form.

By τοῖς ἀγάμοις *Erasm., Musculus, Grotius* understand "widowers," corresponding to ταῖς χήραις. But it must here include all unmarried persons, in contrast to τοῖς γεγαμηκόσι, ver. 10. Hence καί is, not "and also," but "and especially," *et quidem*. Cf. *Mark* xvi. 7; *Hartung, Partikell.* I. p. 145. Meyer thinks the Apostle wished the widows to remain unmarried in the interests of the Church. The special position assigned to widows in the early Church had probably some connection with the ascetic tendency of the age. In the second and third centuries the deaconesses were chosen from

the widows. Cf. Tert., *De Veland. Virg.* 19; *Ad Uxor.* I. 7. The reading in Ignat., *Ad Smyrn.* xiii. 1, is doubtful, but Voss thinks the word τὰς παρθένους τὰς λεγόμενας χήρας is an allusion to deaconesses. The Pastor of Hermas says that a widow or a widower who remains unmarried gains greater honour with the Lord (cf. *Mand.* IV. iv. 2). Athenagoras (*Leg.* p. 37) probably meant marriage after the death of a first husband when he said ὁ δεύτερος γάμος εὐπρεπὴς ἐστι μοιχεία. Cf. also Clem. Al., *Strom.* III. p. 428. We may with some confidence infer that in the Apostle's advice to widows not to contract a second marriage we have a reference to those widows for whose support the Church had already made provision (Acts vi. 1), and who afterwards acquired a more official position as deaconesses, or, in a later age, as members of the χήρικον, the viduate. The present passage marks an intermediate stage in the growth of that office.

ὥς καὶ γώ. Those who understand widowers by ἀγάμοις argue from these words that the Apostle was a widower. So Erasm., Grot. If we set aside as corrupt or not genuine the Epistle of Ignatius to the Philadelphians, the belief that the Apostle had been married rests solely on a statement of Clem. Al. (*Strom.* III. p. 535 Potter), cited by Eus. (*H.E.* III. 24), Παῦλος οὐκ ὀκνεῖ ἐν τινι ἐπιστολῇ τὴν αὐτοῦ προσαγορεύειν σύζυγον. But this is evidently not a tradition, but an inference from a mistaken interpretation of Phil. iv. 3. Tert. (*De Monog.* 8) says Peter was the only one married among the Apostles. Cf. Jerome, *Ep.* 22, *Ad Eustoch.* § 20. Certainly we may infer from this ver. that Paul was never married.

V. 9. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται, "but if they are incontinent"; equivalent to εἰ δὲ ἀκρατεύονται (Arist., *Eth. Nic.* VII. 6. Cf. x. 1; Matt. xxvi. 42; Xen, *Mem.* II. vi. 3 and Kühner's note). This is not the only force of οὐ in a conditional clause; for it sometimes expresses an antithesis between the conditional and some other clause, as in ix. 2. Canon Evans so explains it here. Ἐγκρατεύομαι is not a class. word. The aor. ἐγάμησα is a later form of ἔγημα, which occurs in Luke xiv. 20.

πυροῦσθαι, pres., "to burn on" (so Canon Evans excellently). Tert. (*De Pudic.* 16), Cyprian (*Ep.* 4, Ed. Fell) and Pelagius understand it of the fire of hell. They would

not have fallen into this error, if the Lat. expressed the force of the Greek present. Clem. Al. gives the correct explanation. It is synonymous with the ἐξεκαύθησαν of Rom. i. 27.

(3) *The Case of a Christian married to a Christian.*

(Vv. 10, 11).

V. 10. παραγγέλλω denotes the command of a superior. But παρακαλέω, with which it is sometimes joined (2 Thess. iii. 12), expresses urgency more than authority.

οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὁ Κύριος. Cf. note on ver. 12.

χωρισθῆναι. A D read χωρίζεσθαι, adopted by Lachm. The aor. is more usual after verbs of commanding. The Apostle omits an important modification of the doctrine that marriage is indissoluble, which in Matthew's Gospel is found in the teaching of Christ, viz. "except for the cause of adultery." But its omission in the other Gospels proves that its absence in our passage is not necessarily occasioned by a difference between Christ's doctrine and the Apostle's. The Apostle is stating Christ's doctrine as authoritative; and his omitting all reference to the one lawful reason for divorce shows that he is speaking of a voluntary separation, which does not affect the *vinculum* of the marriage. Χωρισθῆναι has a mid. sense, as the 1 aor. pass. often has in the New Test. (cf. Rom. vi. 17, παρεδόθη, Matt. ix. 36, ἐσπλαγχνίσθη, James iv. 7, ὑποτάγητε). Χωρίζω is said of the man (Matt. xix. 6), χωρίζομαι of the woman (Polyb. XXXII. 12).

V. 11. εἰν δὲ καὶ χωρισθῇ. Osiand., Hofm., Alford translate: "if such a separation have really taken place"; but incorrectly. Cf. Goodwin, *Greek Moods* § 20, Note 1. The supposition is that a case of the kind may occur in the future; the wife, that is to say, separating from the husband in contravention of the law that divorce is not permitted, except, as we may presume is implied, on account of adultery. The καὶ emphasizes, not the condition, but the word χωρισθῇ: "if she go so far as actually to separate from her husband notwithstanding the command" (cf. iv. 7; Matt. xviii. 17). Augustine wrote one of the books *De Conjugiis Adulterinis* to prove that the Apostle here supposes the case of a woman that

separates from her husband because of his adultery. Romanist expositors, adopting this interpretation, infer that in no case can the *vinculum* of marriage be dissolved, except by death, and, therefore, that, when one of the parties is guilty of adultery, the other party may not contract a second marriage. Augustine's argument is that, if the Apostle were referring to any other case than that of the wife's separation because of the husband's adultery, he would not give her the option of remaining unmarried, but would command her to be reconciled to her husband. Protestant expositors endeavour to rebut this argument by saying that there are circumstances which justify a woman in leaving her husband, but do not justify divorce. This, however, contradicts ver. 5. Besides, χωρισθῆναι refers to the same kind of separation as χωρισθῆναι, which undoubtedly means divorce; for the Apostle is citing the words in which Christ prohibits divorce. We need not suppose, with Hodge and others, that the Apostle justifies the woman's conduct. It is the case of a woman that persists in divorcing herself from her husband for an insufficient reason. She transgresses the law of Christ. She ought to be reconciled to her husband. If she refuses to be reconciled, at least let her remain unmarried. No one will say that such a case was not likely to occur in the Corinthian Church, who bears in mind the ease with which a divorce was obtainable in Greece or Rome. Cf. Plut., *Cat. Min.* 25; Juvenal, *Sat.* VI. 224, *flammea conterit*. Among the Jews the school of Hillel permitted divorce κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, Matt. xix. 3. Very different from Augustine's is Chrysostom's interpretation. He supposes that the woman lives apart from religious motives. De Wette also thinks it is the case of an ascetic. But it would not be necessary to bid such a person remain unmarried; and καταλλαγῆτω implies that the woman separates from her husband on account of dissension.

ἀφίεναι, depending on παραγγέλλω. Ἀφίεναι is said to be a milder word than ἀποπέμπειν, and both than ἐκβάλλω. But the three words denote the act of dismissal, while ἀπολύω (Matt. v. 32) denotes more directly the dissolution of the marriage, and χωρίζω simply the actual separation.

- (4) *The Case of a Christian married to an Unbeliever that is willing to cohabit with the Believer.*

(V. 12–14).

V. 12. τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, co-ordinate with τοῖς γεγαμηκόσι and τοῖς ἀγάμοις, introducing, therefore, two supposed cases of mixed marriages, the one of an unbeliever willing, the other of an unbeliever refusing, to cohabit with the Christian. Estius and Cor. a Lap. understand the reference to be to the married. But we should then expect μέν with γεγαμηκόσι and a connecting particle after εἰ. On the other hand, Augustine (*De Conj. Adult.* I. xiii.), who correctly says the Apostle is speaking of mixed marriages, thinks λέγω differs from παραγγέλλω as exhortation differs from command; and from this interpretation of Augustine's Aquinas and Hervæus argue that it is allowable, though not always expedient, for the believer to divorce the unbeliever. The distinction between λέγω and παραγγέλλω being baseless, their inference falls to the ground.

ἐγώ, οὐχ ὁ Κύριος. The distinction is not between uninspired and inspired commands of the Apostle, as Tertullian (*De Exhort. Cast.* 3 and 4) understood it, though he was afraid of being considered irreligious for daring to say so. Origen (*In Joh.* i. 5) explains it in the same way; and Milton (*Tetrach.*) says, "If the Lord spake not, then man spake it, and man hath no lordship to command over conscience." But this interpretation affords no logical resting-place. If we say that the Apostle is usually writing under the infallible guidance of a Divine inspiration, but that when he speaks on the question of celibacy his inspiration fails him, to return suddenly when he enters on the question of divorce, again to desert him when he writes on the case of mixed marriages, inspiration becomes at once arbitrary and mechanical; arbitrary, because there is nothing in the nature of the subjects discussed to account for the difference, and mechanical, because it comes and goes independently of the writer's mental activity. Chrys. (*De Virgin.* 12) offers a more satisfactory explanation. On the question of divorce Christ Himself had legislated for His Church when He was on earth. We have His decision in Matt. v. 32;

xix. 9. But touching other questions discussed by the Apostle we have no direct decision of the Lord. The question of divorce touches the inmost nature of marriage, as it was instituted by God at the beginning and afterwards connected by Christianity with the union between Christ and the Church. For this reason Christ, as the Divine lawgiver of His Church, rescinded ("But *I* say unto you") the Mosaic permission to a man to divorce his wife for other causes than adultery and restored the original idea of marriage. St. Paul never dared rescind a law of Moses. Cf. Chrys., *De Christi Precibus* 3. Yet the Apostle draws various inferences from the words of Christ. One distinction between the teaching of Christ and that of His Apostles must necessarily be that Christ always commands. We have no instance of His arriving at a conclusion through a process of reasoning, much less of His discussing a question and leaving it undecided. John Baptist is said παρακάλειν τὸν λαόν, Christ never. This absolute certitude is essential in the revelation of central principles. But it would be destructive of all that is valuable in human effort, if it extended to the minute details of practical life; if it decided beforehand every possible case of conscience and reduced our moral activity to a mechanical conformity with unswerving and merely authoritative regulations. The danger attaches to all books of casuistry; but in a book accepted by the doubting conscience as containing divinely inspired casuistry, the effect is fatal. The writings of the Apostles abound, on the other hand, in argument and inference, which sometimes end in practical decisions, sometimes result only in the expression of an opinion. The decision is often left to the enlightened conscience of the spiritual man (cf. ver. 25). But apart from the teaching of Christ, which is the *fons et origo* of revelation, the inspiration of the Apostles would have been an altogether different thing from what it actually is. Baur (*Theol. Jahrb.*) thinks the Apostle is speaking of the higher and lower degrees of certitude with which a Christian truth presented itself to his consciousness. What he received as truth without doubt or misgiving was to him the voice of Christ; but whatever was accepted with more or less doubt he himself spoke, not Christ. Practically this view amounts to the same thing as the view of Chrysostom, and in its point of

difference it is less satisfactory. For the certitude with which truths present themselves to the mind varies by imperceptible degrees and at different times. The pres. παραγγέλλει is no difficulty. It means that the command of Christ was still in force. We need not suppose, with Bengel, that Christ gave the Apostle an immediate revelation on the question of divorce. The general tradition of the early Church and the narrative in the Book of Acts points to an intimate connection between St. Paul and the Evangelist Luke. Indeed our Lord's doctrine on the subject was in that age singular, and cannot fail to have been known among Christians throughout the world.

ἐχει. The supposed case is that of a man who was already married before he became a Christian. The case of a Christian marrying a heathen is not put. On οἰκεῖν meaning "cohabitation" cf. Soph., *Œd. Tyr.* 990, ἥς οἰκεῖ μετὰ, that is, as his wife.

V. 13. ἥτις, implying that the Apostle is speaking of a class. Cf. note on iii. 17. **8** D read εἴ τις.

οὗτος. So **8** A B C D, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Both αὐτός and οὗτος are used in the New Test. and LXX. in the sense of "he." Cf. Buttmann, *N.S.* pp. 95 and 328. The use of καί and the demonstrative where we should expect the relative or participle is of frequent occurrence in class. Greek. The repetition of the relative was avoided from preference for direct narration. Cf. Bernhardt, *IV. S.* p. 304; Stallbaum's note to *Rep.* III. p. 395. So in viii. 6; Tit. i. 2, 3; 2 Pet. ii. 3.

μὴ ἀφιέντω αὐτόν. Ἀφιέναι is properly used of the husband, ἀπολείπω of the wife. Bengel and Meyer suggest that ἀφιέναι is here used of the wife because the Christian is the superior party. Rather, ἀφιέναι is the expression used by Christ for "renouncing" all things for his sake. A touching story is told by Justin Martyr (*Apol.* II. 2) of a Christian woman who for a length of time continued to live with her unbelieving and unchaste husband in hope she might reform him. After long and fruitless efforts she at last gave him a bill of divorce and separated from him; whereupon he informed on her that she was a Christian. Here a believer cohabits with an unbeliever; and when at last she leaves him, it is

not because he is a heathen, but for unnatural cruelty and unchastity.

V. 14. ἀδελφῶ is the reading of  $\aleph$  A B C D. Ἄρα: cf. note on v. 10. Ἔστι: on the pres. after ἐπει cf. v. 10, ὀφείλετε. Having stated as a fact the consequence of a mixed marriage, he states, also as a fact, the alternative, which necessarily follows if that consequence does not follow.

Three explanations have been offered of the Apostle's statement that the children of believers are holy:

First, that the children of even a mixed marriage are legitimate, *sanctitate quâdam civili*. So Cajet., Muscul., Cor. a Lap., Melanchth., Wolf (hesitatingly), Heydenr., and certain antipædobaptists who think to evade, with the help of this interpretation, the inference which other divines have drawn from the words in favour of infant baptism. Against this view are the following considerations: (1) Ἄγιος means more than the negation of νόθος. (2) This view makes all heathen marriages illegitimate. (3) It supposes that τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν denotes the children of mixed marriages only, whereas the word ὑμῶν shows that the reference is to the children of any Christian parents. Those who feared that cohabitation with an unbelieving husband or wife would defile a Christian would, by parity of reason, believe that the children of a mixed marriage are ἀκάθαρτα. (4) To prove that the children of a mixed marriage are legitimate would not of itself be enough to prove that the Christian ought not to separate from the unbeliever.

Second, Theod., Cyril Al. (σαγηνεύσομεν εἰς εὐσέβειαν), Photius, Estius, Hammond (*Pract. Cat.* VI. iii.), De Wette, Osiand., Olshaus., Neand., Maier think the Apostle is speaking of the moral influence which the believer's holy life will have upon the children and, consequently, it may be hoped, on the unbelieving wife or husband. Such was Nonna, who made her husband a Christian by her life, not by arguments (*Greg. Naz., Carm.* 68). This view is mentioned by Tertullian (*De Animâ*, 39, "ex institutionis disciplinâ") and Augustine (*De Serm. in Monte* III. 45; in *De Peccat. Merit.* III. 12 he speaks more doubtfully). The perf. ἡγιάσται would then refer to actual instances of the conversions brought about already in Corinth by the holy life of the Christian; and certainly

*ἀγιάζομαι* may signify the conversion of the unbeliever (cf. i. 2). But, besides that this view makes τὰ τέκνα denote more naturally the children of mixed marriages, it does not follow that, if the unbelieving husband is not converted, the children also will remain unconverted. Moreover, the reply would not really touch the difficulty felt by the Apostle's questioners, who feared moral defilement from the perpetuation of a marriage union with an unbeliever. Further, the correct understanding of ver. 16 will lead to the inference that the Apostle considered the contingency of the unbeliever's conversion by the believer's example too remote to be used as an argument for perpetuating the marriage union between them.

*Third*, many Protestant divines explain it to mean *sanctitas fœderalis*. The children of believers are in God's covenant. From this the Second Helvetic Confession argues that they have a right to baptism, the sign of the covenant. But when we enquire into the meaning of "federal holiness," Lutherans and most Calvinists<sup>1</sup> part company. For the former understand by it a right to the external privileges of the Church or, to borrow Bramhall's words (whose view is similar), "an exterior or ecclesiastical sanctity." Cf. Gerhard, *Loci*. XXI. viii. § 217. On the other hand Calvin, followed by Beza and Peter Martyr, argues from this verse that the children of a Christian parent are already from their birth "*supernaturali gratiâ sancti*" (*Inst.* IV. xvi. 31). Beza, however, modified this doctrine of the internal sanctification of believers' children and their "latent possession of the seed of faith" (as Calvin said), by making their federal holiness consist, not in their actual sanctification at their birth, but in the certainty that elect children of believers will hereafter receive the grace of regeneration *ex auditu*. He therefore justified their baptism in infancy by the faith of their parent.<sup>2</sup> Against the Lutheran

<sup>1</sup> Not all. Turretin (*Inst.* XV, Q. xiv. § 14) differs from Calvin in explaining it of "Christianismus" and "*sanctitas externa*."

<sup>2</sup> Hooker's remarks on the subject are noteworthy, because of the allusions he makes to these various theories: "We are plainly taught by God that the seed of faithful parentage is holy from the very birth. Which albeit we may not so understand, as if the children of believing parents were without sin [the Romanist doctrine], or grace from baptized parents derived from propagation [Calvin's doctrine], or God by covenant and promise tied to save any in mere

doctrine the Dutch Calvinists especially argued that an external sanctity has no place under the new covenant, and no one can be called holy unless he is truly holy within, because all the promises and precepts of the new covenant are internal. Cf. Vitringa, *Doct. Christ. Relig.* XXIV. pp. 116, 117. It is objected to the Lutherans that they make the baptism of a believer's children altogether meaningless; but they reply that the sanctification ascribed to them is bestowed upon them at their baptism. But this is certainly not the Apostle's meaning. If he intended to ascribe their children's holiness to their baptism, it would not follow that, if the husband were not sanctified in the wife, the children could not be sanctified in baptism. Again, Calvin's interpretation cannot be what the Apostle here intends; for the holiness ascribed to the children must be of the same kind as the holiness resulting from it to the unbelieving husband or wife. But no one will say that the unbeliever is a child of God in virtue of his marriage with a Christian.

*Fourth*, Bengel, Grotius, Hofmann, etc., think the sanctification of the unbelieving husband of a believing wife denotes the character of the marriage-union, not the personal character of the husband. Tertullian mentions this as an alternative explanation ("ex seminis prærogativâ"). The Christian character of the marriage is proved from the sanctity of the children of a Christian parent. The Apostle argues that, if parentage is a Christian relation, so also is marriage. It implies that, if the children partake of the consecration of a believing parent, much more will the husband partake of the consecration of the believing wife. The union between husband and wife constitutes a complex personality; that between parent and child does not. The *solidarité* of men in their various relations is a pre-eminently Pauline conception. The race is one; the Church is one; and the family is one. It is not true that the privileges of the new covenant are internal and individual only. Yet the Apostle does not

regard of their parents' belief [Beza's doctrine]: yet seeing that to all professors of the name of Christ this pre-eminence above infidels is freely given, the fruit of their bodies bringeth forth into the world with it a present interest and right to those means [Luther's doctrine], wherewith the ordinance of Christ is that His Church shall be sanctified" (*Eccl. Pol.* V. ix. 6).

sacrifice the individual to the community any more than the community to the individual. Indeed, it is the individual faith of one member of the family that confers sanctity upon the family and, as touching their relation to the family, on all its other members. For this reason also the sanctity of the family is not a figment nor a mere idea, but a practical power. For the believing member may be trusted to bring into a family that is Christian in idea the Christian influence also of prayer, example, and teaching. These, however, do not create its sanctity; they flow from it. This view yields an excellent meaning, and it disposes at once of Baur's theory (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 18) that St. Paul recognizes no moral element in marriage, nor even the divinely-appointed means to perpetuate the race,—nothing, in fact, but a remedy for incontinence.

As to the bearing of this ver. on infant baptism, it neither proves nor disproves that infants were baptized in the Apostolic Church. It does not prove it; for the sanctification here spoken of is the children's inheritance in virtue, not of their baptism, but of their relation to a Christian parent. It does not disprove it, as De Wette and Neander (*Hist. of Dogmas*, Eng. Trans., I. p. 230) allege, at least if we accept the ob-signatory theory of baptism. Indeed, *supposing* this to be the Apostle's theory, the principle on which infant baptism rests is contained in this verse. For if infants are either children of God or in the covenant, why not give them the symbol and seal of their privilege?

(5) *The Case of a Christian married to an Unbeliever that refuses to cohabit with the Believer.*

#### Vv. 15, 16.

In this case the Christian is free to regard the unbelievers' departure as a separation and a dissolution of the marriage; for three reasons: (1) the believer has not been made a slave by becoming a Christian; (2) the Christian's call has given him or her a right to the enjoyment of peace; (3) these Christian privileges of liberty and peace are not to be sacrificed from an uncertain and probably fallacious hope of saving the

unbeliever, by continuing in the bondage of wedlock when the unbeliever has severed the actual union.

V. 15. *χωρίζεται*, pres. marking intention: "if he is bent on departing." *Χωριζέσθω*, concess. imperat., but even here conveying something of decision and authority, if not also of contempt: "let him begone."

*οὐ δεδούλωται*. The rendering of the Auth. Vers. ("is not under bondage") arose probably from the notion that the Apostle is contrasting the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free (Gal. v. 1) with the bondage of the law. But he is speaking of a particular application of the doctrine of Christian liberty. Christianity has not made slaves of believers as touching marriage. It has revived the original conception of marriage, but has not imposed a new obligation. The words imply what is subsequently more directly stated, that the Apostle would reject the doctrine of counsels of perfection. But the real question is whether the Apostle means to say that a Christian, if finally deserted by an unbelieving husband or wife, is at liberty to marry another. Bengel, Olshausen and others deny it. If he permits a second marriage after desertion, how are his words consistent with Christ's prohibition of a divorce except only for adultery? But it is one thing to divorce husband or wife, another to be repudiated. In ver. 12 he is careful to say, as if he anticipated the objection, that he is now proceeding to the consideration of cases to which, as not having arisen, Christ made no reference. One of them is the case of a Christian repudiated by the unbeliever. Bengel objects also that the Apostle himself in ver. 11 commands the believing wife, who has insisted on separating from her husband, to remain unmarried. But in ver. 15 he is dealing with the case of a wife finally deserted, not of one who separates herself. Another objection has been based on an incorrect interpretation of the words, "God has called us in peace," which are really a reason for a second marriage, not for abstention. In favour of the view that the Apostle permits the deserted Christian to contract a second marriage are the following considerations: (1) No other explanation does justice to the words "is not enslaved." It has been argued (e.g. by Tholuck, *Beryp.* pp. 233, sqq. 3rd Ed., otherwise 1st Ed.) that the Apostle is not speaking of a final and absolute desertion. If

so, the condition of the deserted believer is the worst form of slavery. Cf. Gerhard, *Loci*, De Conjugiis, § 627; Nitzsch, *Syst. d. Christl. Lehre*, p. 338, 6th Ed. (2) Equity seems to require that at least a person that has not the power of continence should not be precluded from marrying in a case of final desertion. "Nequaquam," says Melancthon (*Loci*, App. I.), "laquei injiciendi sunt innocentibus personæ propter aliena delicta:" a principle of general application and decisive of the question. Fabiola, in the time of Jerome, is a case in point. She even deserted her husband for his vileness and married another, because she had not the gift of continence. Jerome (Ep. 77, *Ad Ocean.*) excuses her conduct. But she did penance after her second husband's death. (3) If the desertion is absolute and final, the marriage is *de facto* dissolved. But why is it permitted to a widower to contract a second marriage, if not because death annuls a marriage *de facto*? By parity of reason may we not argue that final desertion, as it brings the union to an end actually, leaves the deserted believer free to marry another? This view was held in the early Church by Ambrosiaster. But the Council of Arles (A.D. 314) advised abstinence.

ἐν εἰρήνῃ . . . Θεός. Winer (*Gr.* § L.), Maier and De Wette think ἐν is for εἰς, "called into peace." But καλεῖν can hardly be considered a verb of motion. Cf. Harless' and Ellicott's notes on Eph. iv. 4. The latter well observes: "We are called ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ and εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, but ἐν εἰρήνῃ, ἐν ἁγιασμῷ and ἐν μίᾳ ἐλπίδι." The reason of the difference may be that liberty and life are our condition, but that peace, sanctification, hope are the attitude of the soul when it reflects on its condition. Hence "peace" in our passage is much more than a state of permanent truce between two parties. It is their tendency to lose sight of the deeper conception of peace that marks the comparative shallowness and different stand-point of sub-apostolic writers. To them peace is the cessation of hostilities. Consequently the question of Church order assumes an importance in their eyes, as the final aim of Christian endeavour, not assigned to it in St. Paul's writings. He also, it is true, represents peace as the ultimate goal, but not in this negative and external sense. It includes the deep tranquillity of the spirit, the peace which

Christ gave His disciples. To endure affliction is consistent with the profoundest spiritual peace; but to cling tenaciously to an unbeliever that spurns the Christian from him is the unrest of weakness, the perturbation of a soul that seeks its happiness in the creature, not in God. But there is special reference in the words to a person that has not the gift of continence. The divinely-ordained means to secure his "peace" is marriage. Many expositors explain the clause as a limitation of the statement that the believer has not been enslaved in such cases: "Though the believer is free, still it is his duty to live in peace as far as possible." But if the unbeliever has finally deserted the Christian, it is inconsistent to add that the believer must live in peace with the unbeliever. Chrys., Pelag., Theophyl., Cajet., Est., De Wette, Meyer, Harless, Osiand., etc., rightly understand the words as a reason for separation. The word "call" may be intended to allude, in a secondary sense, to runners in a race. Perhaps Clement of Rome (*Ad Cor.* 19) has the passage in his thoughts when he urges the Corinthians to run towards the goal of peace delivered to them from the beginning.

**V. 16.** τί; not "how?" but "how far?" The τί expresses, not the manner in which the knowledge is to be obtained, but the extent of it. Cf. Matt. xvi. 26; xxvi. 65. *Οἶδας* is Ionic, rare in Attic. Like many other Ionic forms, it reappears in the *κοινή* and supersedes *οἶσθα* in the New Test., certainly not from "lettered affectation."

What is this verse a reason for? Tert. (*Ad Uxor.* II. 2), Chrys. (*Cat.*), Theod., Augustine (*De Conj. Adult.* I. xiii), Photius, Hervæus, Cajet., Hodge, etc., connect it with vv. 13, 14, as a reason why the believer should continue to live with the unbelieving husband or wife, if the unbeliever consents. It is improbable that ver. 15 is parenthetical. Besides, this view implies the Christian's right to depart, if there is no hope of the unbeliever's conversion though the unbeliever be content to remain. We must, therefore, accept the interpretation proposed by De Lyra, and regard these two questions as the third reason for letting the unbelieving husband or wife depart, if he or she refuses to remain unless the believer renounces Christianity. The privilege of spiritual peace, especially if continence is imperilled, must not be

sacrificed to so remote a contingency as the conversion of an unbeliever that demands the renunciation of Christianity as the first condition of cohabitation. St. Peter also intimates, by his use of *καὶ εἰ*, that he considered the conversion of such as had been hitherto disobedient to the word difficult and improbable; yet he is speaking of husbands willing to cohabit with their Christian wives. This view is adopted by Est., De Wette, Meyer, Alford, Stanley, Neander, Osiander, Maier, etc. But some of them incorrectly allege that *εἰ* would be bad Greek in the sense of "*whether thou mayest not.*" De Wette says it is "*allem Sprachgebrauche widerstreitend,*" and Osiander supposes it crept into the Greek of the Fathers from the Lat. *haud scio an!* But cf. Xen., *Mem.* I. i. 8, οὔτε τῷ καλὴν γήμαντι ἔν' εὐφραίνηται δῆλον εἰ δία ταύτην ἀνιάσεται, "it is not certain that he will not suffer"; Thuc. II. 52, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ διαφθαρήσεται, where see Poppo's note; Eur., *Heracle.* 791, φόβος γὰρ εἰ μοι ζῶσιν οὐς ἐγὼ θέλω, "I am afraid that they are not alive." The objection to Chrysostom's interpretation is not the grammar, but the connection. Cf Immer, *Hermeneut.* p. 145.

(6) *A Digression in reference to Circumcision and Slavery.*

(Vv. 17-24.)

The connection of these verses with what precedes depends on the meaning we assign to *εἰ μή*. (1) Chrys. (*Cat.*; otherwise *Hom.*), Theod. (*Cat.*; otherwise *in loc.*), Œcum., who ascribes the view to Severian, read ἢ μή, as a disjunctive member of the preceding question: τί οἶδας εἰ τὴν γυναῖκα σώσεις ἢ μή (σώσεις;). MS. authority is decisive against the reading. (2) Others read εἰ μή, but join the words in the same way to what precedes. But *εἰ* cannot be used for ἢ. In 2 Cor. iii. 1 *εἰ* has been so rendered; but the true reading is ἢ. (3) Others render it by "if not," that is, "if thou canst not save the unbeliever, let every one walk," etc. This would be εἰ δὲ μή or εἰ δὲ καὶ μή. (4) Chrys. (*Hom.*), Theod. (*in loc.*), Hervæus join it to what precedes, and put a full stop after Κύριος: "how knowest thou that thou wilt save thy wife unless thou behavest to her according to the grace given thee?" But this would destroy the force of the argument in ver. 16, which rests on the

improbability of the unbeliever's conversion, even though the Christian's behaviour be worthy of his holy calling. (5) Beza, Grotius, Wolf, Meyer (earlier Edd.) make *εἰ μὴ* synon. with *ἀλλά* (cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 860, 5 b). But in the New Test. *εἰ μὴ* has always an exceptive force, as may be seen from its always following a negative clause. Cf. Fritzsche on Rom. xiv. 14 *ad fin.* (6) There cannot be much doubt that De Wette's rendering, adopted by Olshaus., Osiand., Harless, Meyer (latest Edd.), Maier, Alford, Evans, etc., is the correct one. The Apostle has stated his doctrine of Christian liberty and applied it to the case of a believer married, before his conversion, to an unbeliever, who refuses to live with the Christian unless she renounces her new religion. With his usual balance of thought and care to shun a one-sided and therefore misleading statement, St. Paul, who was not one of those men "who license mean when they cry liberty," proceeds to state the opposite truth, that Christian liberty does not dissolve or disturb worldly relations, but, on the contrary, confers upon them a new character, that of constituting the various forms assumed by obedience to the "call" of the Gospel. He introduces the principle of order as limiting in actual life the principle of liberty. Christianity has not made slaves of us; but neither has it brought in anarchy. It is not despotic; it is not revolutionary. The Christian is free from the bondage of wedlock with the unbeliever that insists on his denying Christ, "saving that" every one should abide in the position in which his Christian calling has placed him. Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 5, *εἰ μὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις*.

V. 17. *ἐκάστῳ ὡς*. Cf. note on iii. 5. The word is repeated for emphasis. Cf. Phil. ii. 4.

*ὁ Κύριος . . . ὁ Θεός*. So *NA B C D*, Vulg.; adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. De Wette and Meyer think that by *Κύριος* is meant God, which makes the change to *ὁ Θεός* in the next clause meaningless. The Christian's lot and work in life is the dispensation (*μεμέρικεν*) of Christ, and a man's call (*κέκληκεν*) by God to be a Christian turns that lot and work into an expression of his religion, which consists henceforth in obedience (cf. Harless, *Die Ehescheid.* p. 93). As far as human action is concerned the Apostle does not acknowledge the distinction between sacred

and secular. One act differs from another in degree of religious effectiveness, but not in kind. The Apostle's sentiment is the reverse of the Stoical doctrine that slavery erases from the soul all holy principles. Cf. M. Anton. X. 9.

*διατάσσομαι κ.τ.λ.* He says this to intimate that he has been stating a broad principle, not laying down an arbitrary regulation; not building an imaginary republic, but representing Christianity as the leaven of society. The word *διατάσσομαι* marks how largely the historical development of the Church was determined by St. Paul (cf. 2 Cor. xi. 28). The mid. of *διατάσσω* does not differ in meaning from the active. Cf. xvi. 1.

**Vv. 18-24.** What he has to say is not only commanded to all the Churches, but also applicable to various cases. Two applications, other than marriage, of the general principle that every man's condition of life is the outward form of his Christian calling, are now discussed, viz. circumcision (vv. 18-20) and slavery (vv. 21-24).

**V. 18.** *περιτετμημένος τις ἐκλήθη*; So Lachm., Rev. V., Westc. and Hort punctuate. It is better to regard it as a hypothetical assertion; "one who has been circumcised was called,—suppose the case." Cf. Hermann, *Opusc.* I., De Ellipsi, p. 205; Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 385; Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 194; Winer, *Gr.* § XXV. 1 b. So Dem., *Ol.* III. p. 33; *De Cor.* p. 317, *ἀδικεῖ τις ἐκὼν . . . ἐξήμαρτέ τις ἄκων* (and *κατώρθωσε* in next clause is also hypoth. indic., and should not have a mark of interrog. any more than the other two clauses). Cf. James v. 13.

*ἐπισπάσθω*, sc. *τὴν ἀκροβυστίαν*. Hesych., *μὴ ἐλκνέτω τὸ δέγμα* The word occurs only here in this sense. Many Jews after the time of the Maccabees wished to be thought uncircumcised, in order either to avoid the scorn of the Greeks or the persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes. Cf. 1 Macc. i. 15; Joseph., *Antiq.* XII. v. 1; Ewald, *History of Israel*, Eng. Trans., Vol. V. p. 271. The Apostle's word seems to convey the notion that Jewish Christians had adopted the practice of epispasmus. There is no hint elsewhere of such a thing, except as an inference from this passage. Hence Origen (*Unt.*) and Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 6 and 14, et al.) think the Apostle, in speaking of circumcision and slavery, is referring allegoric-

ally to marriage. But we may naturally conclude that there were Judaisers among the Gentile Christians and contemners of Judaism among Jewish Christians. We are told by Dion Cassius that many heathens had in this age become proselytes to Judaism, and they appear to have preferred it in its more rigorous forms. Some Gentile Christians too became Ebionites. Why may we not suppose there were Jews in the Church who practised episcopasmos, not indeed as a condition of their Christian status, but from fear of scorn and shame of their nationality? Contact with Greek thought was to them the sudden revelation of a new world. In their new contempt of their former narrowness and exclusiveness we recognize some of the beginnings of Gnosticism, as it appears, for instance, in Philo's theory that the historical religion of the Jews was a mere husk around the kernel of ideas. To such men circumcision was nothing; but for that very reason uncircumcision would acquire factitious importance, and a false liberalism would be thought to be the only worthy position to assume. The Apostle applies to the badge of nationality his doctrine that all things are, not only pure, but to a Christian sacred and religious. He condemns false shame no less than false righteousness. Faithfulness to one's own nation and age is as real an expression of Christian sentiment as charity and cosmopolitanism.

**V. 19.** οὐδέν ἐστι, that is, οὐκ ὠφέλει (Rom. ii. 25), or οὐκ ἰσχύει (Gal. v. 6). So also in class. Greek. Chrysostom's paraphrase, "contributes nothing to faith," limits the reference too much.

τήρησις ἐντολῶν Θεοῦ, sc. πάντα ἐστιν, which is expressed in Col. iii. 11. Cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 366 D, Stallbaum's note. In such instances ἀλλά means "much rather." Cf. Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 458. The art. is omitted with τήρησις to make the notion as general as possible. It is obedience as such that has moral value. In this sense τηρεῖν is not a class. word, but often occurs in Scripture. Lipsius (*Paul. Recht.* p. 194) remarks that it is almost a technical word for fulfilling the Mosaic Law. Cf. Sir. xxxv. (xxxii.) 22; Wisd. vi. 19. To the mind of a true Israelite obedience involved the notion of keeping intact the Divine deposit entrusted to the Jews (cf. Rom. iii. 2). In Gal. v. 6 circumcision is contrasted with faith working

through love; in Gal. vi. 15 with the new creature; and here with obedience. It does not follow that faith, the new creature, and obedience are identical. The Apostle is here speaking of practical duties. Circumcision was at one time a Divine injunction, but when the Jews did what had been commanded, not in the spirit of obedience, but in the spirit of self-righteousness, their circumcision became uncircumcision. It is important to observe, that, though circumcision and uncircumcision are in themselves indifferent, abstention from the one or the other may become a duty when others declare that either is not indifferent. The Apostle himself acted on this principle when he refused to circumcise Titus (cf. Gal. ii. 5).

V. 20. The case of circumcision is summed up (cf. ver. 24).

ἐν τῇ κλήσει ἢ ἐκλήθῃ cannot mean "let every one abide in the condition of life to which he was called," a rendering as early as the time of Tertullian (*De Idol.* 5), and used then by certain manufacturers of idols to justify their continuing in their craft. The relat. ἢ may be governed by ἐν to be supplied from ἐν τῇ κλήσει. Cf. xi. 23; Matt. xxiv. 50; and freq. in class. Greek, e.g. Thuc. I. 28, παρὰ πόλεσιν αἰς. The meaning would then be, "Let every one abide in that occupation in which Christianity found him" (cf. Clem. Al., *Strom.* III. 12, ἕκαστος οὖν ἐν ᾧ ἐκλήθη ἔργῳ τὴν διακονίαν ἐκτελείτω). But κλήσις never means "occupation," "business." It is not improbable that this signification was attached to the corresponding words in other languages in consequence of this interpretation of the present passage (cf. Du Cange, s.v. *vocatio*). Κλήσις must mean "the call of the Gospel," as always in the New Test. (cf. Rom. xi. 29; Eph. iv. 1; Heb. iii. 1; 2 Peter i. 10). That being so, ἢ will be either instrumental or by attraction for ἦν, cognate accus. with ἐκλήθη. Cf. Ellicott on Eph. iv. 1. In either case the meaning of the clause is the same: "Let every man abide in the call of the Gospel." But it is evident such an expression has no relevant meaning, unless the Apostle is referring also to conditions of life. In fact he describes circumcision and uncircumcision, slavery and freedom, as modes of the Divine call into the sphere of the spiritual life. The idea is not that the various occupations of life are the Divinely-appointed lot of every man, but that there

are certain conditions of life that impart to the Christian call a special form. Such are the great distinctions—natural, national, social—on the maintenance of which, in any particular age or country, the preservation of the principles of liberty and order and their legitimate development in human history mainly depend. Cf. Gal. iii. 28, where the Apostle enumerates the three fundamental conceptions that at once divide and unite the race, that of Jew and Greek or the national distinction, that of slave and free or the social distinction, and that of male and female or the physical distinction.

V. 21. He passes to the second case that illustrates the bearing of Christianity on human relations. This example, again, is not arbitrarily chosen. For, *first*, slavery was a very conspicuous institution in the ancient world and sprang from the other fundamental distinctions,—the physical superiority of the man over the woman, the religious pre-eminence of Jew over Gentile, or else the Greek consciousness of creative political genius; so that, in discussing the question of slavery, the Apostle not only arbitrates between master and slave, but addresses himself to the antagonisms most deeply seated in the religious, political, and social condition of his time. *Second*, slavery is one of the institutions which Christianity transforms. At times the Apostle appears to sanction it, sometimes to proclaim its entire abolition. In Christ there is neither bond nor free, and in the history of his religion the distinction between master and slave ceases at the door of the Church. But Christianity abolishes slavery by assimilating and sanctifying the relation of master and servant in its inmost nature. While it refuses to wield the sword and destroy civil institutions by violence, it so transforms their ruling ideas that those institutions become what they never were before. For instance, Christ bestows on the most degraded and despised slave who is a believer, spiritual endowments that cannot fail to inspire him with a consciousness of freedom. He ceases to be a slave by the very fact of knowing that in the sight of God he is free, and his service ceases to be a bondage because it is now a willing obedience to Christ.<sup>1</sup> “Deo servire,” observes Augustine, “vera libertas est.”

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Origen, *C. Cels.* III. 54: 'Ὁμολογοῦμεν δὲ πάντας ἐθέλειν παιδεῦσθαι τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, ὥστε . . . οἰκότεριψιν ὑποδεικνύναι πῶς ἐλευθέρων ἀναλαβόντες φρονήματα ἐξευγενίσθηεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου.

ἐκλήθης. Cf. note on ver. 18.

μὴ σοὶ μελέτω, "let not the fact that thou wert called to manifest thy spiritual life by servitude weigh upon thy mind, as if the liberty with which thou wert then endowed made thy external condition of slavery unworthy of thee."

ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ . . . χρῆσαι. Does this mean, "if thou canst become free, accept thy freedom," or "though thou canst be free, remain a slave and serve so much the more faithfully because thou art a Christian?" The latter is the view of Chrys. (μᾶλλον δούλευε, similarly *Serm.* 5 in Genes.), Theod., Pelag., Theophyl., Aquinas, Œcum., Phot., Hervæus, Muscul., Est., Bengel, Wolf, De Wette, Meyer, Maier, Alford, Stanley, Osiand., Baur (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 26), Heinrichi; the former that of certain persons referred to by Chrys., of Calvin, Grot., Neand., Hofmann, etc. *Εἰ καί* has two meanings. *First*, it is often opposed to καὶ εἰ. The latter (when the καί is more than a connecting particle, which it seldom is in the New Test.) emphasizes the condition, that is, represents the occurrence of the condition as doubtful; the former emphasizes, not the condition, the occurrence of which is supposed to be not doubtful, but the opposition between the conditional and the consequent clauses. Cf. p. 105, foot-note. If this is the meaning of εἰ καί in our passage and we render it by "although," the consequent will mean "still remain a slave." *Second*, εἰ καί is also used to emphasize some words only in the clause. Cf. Luke xi. 18, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ Σατανᾶς διεμερίσθη, "if Satan even, so strong a potentate;" Phil. ii. 17, εἰ καὶ σπένδομαι, "if I am offered even." In this case also the meaning will be, "if thou canst be even free, still remain a slave." If the Apostle had intended the consequent clause not to be contrasted with the conditional clause, but to be homogeneous with it ("if thou canst be free, accept thy freedom"), he would have omitted καί, as in vv. 9 and 15. A contrast is, besides, more in keeping with the whole tenour of the passage. His advice to every man to remain in the call of the Gospel, whatever condition of life obedience to that call may assume, amounts to very little if it is to be applied only when the man is compelled to abide in his present condition. The Apostle's words imply that the Christian slave is more likely than the free man to realize vividly his freedom in the

Lord, and, therefore, that, of the two conditions, his is the preferable.

*μᾶλλον χρῆσαι* may mean "accept it in preference to freedom," or "apply thyself to the service so much the more because thy master has offered thee freedom." Cf. 1 Tim. vi. 2, *ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δουλεύετωσαν*, "let them serve the more faithfully." This accounts the better also for the introduction of the clause, and the other view seems to do some violence to the meaning of *χράομαι* (cf. 1 Pet. ii. 18, 19). *Χρῆσθαι* is a *vox media*, being used with *συντυχία* and *εὐτυχία*. The words *ἐκὼν γὰρ οὐδεὶς δουλίῳ χρήται ζυγῷ* (*Æschyl., Agam.* 922) express a sentiment the reverse of what the Apostle teaches; but they justify the use of *χρῆσθαι* with "slavery" as well as with "liberty."

V. 22. A reason, not merely for not caring (*Est.*, etc.), but also for the advice to a Christian slave to remain a slave in preference to accepting his freedom.

*ἐν Κυρίῳ*, not synonymous with *ὑπὸ Κυρίου* (*Osiand.*), nor used by a brachylogy for *εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐν Κυρίῳ* (most expositors), nor equivalent to *κλητοὶ Χριστοῦ* (*Rom.* i. 6, that is, that Christ has called and, therefore, possesses them), but marking "the distinctive element in which the calling has its specific character" (*Meyer*). The words express the constant element in the Christian call, in contrast to the varying elements "circumcised," "in uncircumcision," "bond," "free." They imply redemption (*ver.* 23) and consequent possession by the Redeemer (*ver.* 22).

*ὁ ἐν Κυρίῳ κληθεὶς δοῦλος*, not here "the slave called in the Lord" (*Meyer, Alford*), but "he who was called in the Lord as a slave" (*De Wette*). The former would, of course, be grammatically correct, like *ὁ πολλὰ δὴ τὰς Ἡρακλῆς*. But when the participle is accompanied by an adjectival phrase, such as *ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ*, the substantive, even when it is a secondary predicate, often follows the participle. This avoids the danger of connecting the adjectival phrase with the substantive, not with the participle. In the next clause the secondary predicate (*ἐλεύθερος*) precedes the participle, because no adjectival phrase occurs.

*ἀπελεύθερος Κυρίου* must mean more than *ἐλευθερωθεὶς ὑπὸ Κυρίου*. The slave has been freed by Christ and is in

consequence Christ's. *Κυρίου* and *Χριστοῦ* are genitives of possession. Cf. Rom. vi. 18. Ignatius (*Ad Rom.* 4) evidently considered that the notion of possession is contained in the words, when he applied them to himself: *ἐὰν πάθω, ἀπελεύθερος γενήσομαι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἀναστήσομαι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐλεύθερος*.

*ὁ ἐλεύθερος κληθείς*, "he who was called as a free man."

Putting together the two clauses of the verse we arrive at the following results: the Christian slave is, as to outward condition, still a slave, but really, as he stands before God, a freedman, delivered from spiritual bondage by Christ and transferred into the service of Christ, which is perfect liberty; the Christian freeman is in outward condition still free, but, in his inmost being, the slave of Christ, who acquired the rights of owner and master by purchasing for him moral and spiritual liberty from sin and death; both bond and free are, therefore, freemen and bondsmen; all external conditions are of less importance now, inasmuch as Christ has fully revealed the ethical relations in which men stand before God; Christ has not only brought men's moral position into stronger light, but also changed their moral state by His redemptive death from a condition of spiritual bondage into spiritual liberty; lastly, the ultimate effect of redemption is to destroy slavery as an external condition in proportion as men learn to realize the nature and greatness of the redemption wrought for all men by Christ. To the Apostle's mind bondage and freedom are but opposite facets of the same conception. The Christian slave not only is free in spite of his bondage, but manifests his freedom by willing service and resignation. His bondage is the sphere within which his liberty moves in due order. In like manner, not only is the Christian freeman a bondsman of Christ notwithstanding his freedom, but his liberty is the field in which his Christian obedience expatiates at large. It is, however, to be observed that the Apostle nowhere says the lot of the slave is a just one.<sup>1</sup> A Christian will never regard himself as an *ἐμψυχον ὄργανον* (Arist., *Eth. Nic.* IX.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.* V. xi: "Ὅτι μὲν τῶντων εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δούλοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεῦν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν. But even in Aristotle's time there were some who held that slavery was unjust because it is *παρὰ φύσιν*. Cf. *ib.* I. iii.

xiii.), which is the essential idea of slavery.<sup>1</sup> A slave was incapable of moral virtue. Christianity annihilates as a fact the natural inequality which justified slavery in the eyes of the Greek philosophers, and endows the slave with a capacity not only for morality but for the highest form of religion, a spirituality of life.

It is interesting to watch the slowly but constantly growing influence of these principles in the early ages of the Church. We recognise it in the practice of manumitting slaves at Easter, on the Lord's day, and at last daily; in the law of Constantine forbidding the owner of slaves to break up their families; in the sentiment that led rich men to consider the education and the manumission of slaves an act of piety, and in the election of slaves to offices in the Church. Calixtus, bishop of Rome in the third century, was originally an οἰκέτης; and one of the charges brought against him by Hippolytus was that he sanctioned as a Christian marriage, not as a mere *contubernium*, the union of a woman of rank with a manumitted slave.<sup>2</sup> We must not, however, forget that a spirit akin to that of Christianity was all this time at work independently in Roman society. The noble efforts of the Antonines to relieve the condition of the slaves and facilitate their enfranchisement prepared men for a readier acceptance of Christian teaching.

V. 23. The change to the 2nd pers. plur. shows that the Apostle now addresses, not the slaves nor the freemen only, but the whole Church. That they have been bought with a price is the proof that they are both the bondsmen and the freedmen of Christ. Liberty and service are but opposite sides of the same fact; for both begin in redemption.

<sup>1</sup> But the meaning of *δουλον* must be modified by that of *ἐμψυχον*. Cf. Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 165: "That the inferiority of the slave was not such as to place him outside the family, or such as to degrade him to the footing of inanimate property, is clearly proved, I think, by the many traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inheritance in the last resort." The later Stoics made an approach to the Christian doctrine when they said that moral evil alone was a slavery (cf. Epictet., *Fragm.* VIII.). But in Roman law a slave is not a person: *nullum caput habuit* (Justin., *Inst.* i. 16. 4); and not before the reign of Hadrian did the practice excel the law, when masters were deprived of the power to put slaves to death without trial.

<sup>2</sup> The whole subject of the attitude of Christianity towards slavery is treated with marked ability and fairness in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, Vol. II.

τιμῆς ἡγοράσθητε. Cf. note on vi. 20. If the expression occurred only here, we might fairly consider it to be simply a metaphor not to be pressed into the service of any doctrinal scheme,—a metaphor most apt in the discussion of the question of slavery. But as the notion of redemption meets us in other passages, the subject of which is remote from the present question, the Apostle must have recognised a real analogy between the notion of slavery and liberty and that of the spiritual condition of men in their relation to Christ's death. The forensic aspect of salvation is real, not figurative.

μὴ γίνεσθε δοῦλοι ἀνθρώπων, "do not become by your own will what in Christ you are not, slaves of men." Bengel and Mosheim understand the words literally as an exhortation to Christian freemen not to sell their civil liberty: "If you are slaves, remain so; but do not become slaves." But this would imply that ἡγοράσθητε refers to freemen only. It is much more probable that the Apostle is speaking of the inward realization of spiritual liberty. "Though you may be slaves in external condition, be not slaves in spirit." So Chrys., *De Virgin.* 41. The word "become" intimates to them that a slavish spirit in a Christian is the selling of a prerogative, which cannot be alienated but by their own deliberate act. Indirectly the words prove also that the Apostle, the slave of Jesus Christ, believed him to be more than man.

¶ 24. Summary of the exhortation to freemen and slaves.

παρὰ Θεῶ. The thought is really implied in ver. 19. The Apostle has spoken of the call of the Gospel as imparting to circumcision and uncircumcision, civil liberty and bondage, their moral element. But the vigour of all moral character is to be found only in a realization of God. Without an abiding sense of His presence, Christianity itself soon sinks into an external round of observances or an unreal sentiment. The meaning is, not merely that spiritual communion with God will aid the Christian slave to live contented with his lot, but that the conviction of having obeyed a call from God in becoming a Christian and of living the spiritual and supernatural life of faith and prayer, teaches him to realize the sacred character of his lot in life. Paula looked up to heaven for strength to tear herself away from her little son as he

stretched out his hands to her from the shore (Jerome, *Ep.* 108, *Ad Eustoch.*). The Apostle would have taught her that prayer will sanctify the family no less than the hermitage.

(7) *The Case of Virgins.*

(Vv. 25–38).

V. 25. *περὶ δὲ τῶν παρθένων.* Theod. Mops., Bengel, Olshausen, etc., think the Apostle is now passing to the case of the unmarried. *Παρθένος* often means “an unmarried man” in ecclesiastical writers; whence *οἱ παρθελεύοντες* (*Fragm. de Resurr.* 3). But this usage probably arose from a false interpretation of Rev. xiv. 4, where the word is obviously metaphorical. Besides, the Apostle has already given his advice to the unmarried generally. It is much more probable that he means unmarried women, as in vv. 28, 29, 36, 37, and especially such as wished to consecrate themselves to the service of God. So Theophyl., *ἀφιερωθεῖσαν Θεῷ*. They may have been the precursors of the “ecclesiastical virgins,” as distinguished from the monastic virgins of still later times. Cf. Bingham, *Antiq.* VII. iv. Even in the eyes of the heathen special honour belonged *ταῖς ἐκ ναοῦ γυναιξὶ καὶ ταῖς παρθένοις*.

*γνώμη*, “opinion.” But in practical matters opinion is equivalent to advice. Cf. 2 Cor. viii. 10. Theologians have inferred that Christians have power, not only to give adequate obedience to the moral law, but also to do works of supererogation (cf. Petavius, *Diss. Eccles.* II. vi.). The distinction between *præcepta* and *consilia* is foreshadowed by Origen and Cyprian. It is explicitly stated by Ambrose, *Ep.* lxiii. 35, “non enim præcipitur quod supra legem est, sed magis dato suadetur consilio,” et al. Cf. also Augustine, *De Adult. Conj.* I. 14. It is already implied in Herm. Past., *Mand.* IV. 4; *Sim.* V. 3, where he speaks of “some good things beyond (*ἐκτός*) the commandment of God,” by doing which a man gains more abundant honour and is more acceptable to God. Philo even suggests the distinction in *Leg. Alleg.* pp. 57, 58. The doctrine of supererogation rests on two assumptions: *first*, that God requires in His creatures, not perfect conformity with moral law, but only sincerity of endeavour; *second*, that the

actions supposed to be counselled, but not commanded, are moral, and not merely indifferent. But both assumptions destroy the essential nature of moral law, which must, in its very idea, be obligatory; and whatever is not obligatory is no part of morality, but belongs to the class of indifferent things. It follows that, if the Apostle imposes no command but simply gives advice in reference to abstention from marriage, such abstention is not to be reckoned among the things “*quæ nec sunt præcepta nec indifferentia, sed Deo grata et ab illo commendata.*”

This distinction, however, between obligatory and supererogatory moral obedience must not be confounded, as is done by the Romanists and sometimes by their opponents also, with the distinction between precepts and counsels of perfection, *præcepta legis et consilia evangelica*, the latter so called from the Vulg. rendering of *γνώμη* in this verse. Melancthon acknowledges the difference, though he rejects counsels of perfection no less than works of supererogation. Cf. *Apol. Conf. Aug.* XIII. §§ 25 sqq. Hooker rejects the latter and accepts the former. Cf. *Eccles. Pol.* II. viii. 5; similarly Davenant, *Prælectiones* XLIV. Counsels of perfection differ from works of supererogation in two points: *first*, they have always reference, not to actions in themselves moral, but to actions in themselves indifferent; *second*, they are to be sought, not in the words of Christ, but in the words of His Apostles. Whatever Christ says in reference to practice is a command, which men disobey at their peril. But the Apostles, though they may often have authority to command, may also be unable on occasion to arrive at a decision and, therefore, rest content with the expression of an opinion, which Christians may, if they so judge, lay aside. The present passage is an instance of this. The Spirit's enlightenment does not lead the Apostle to a decision. He gives his advice, therefore, and imposes no command. We need not discard the name “counsels of perfection.” There are undoubtedly cases in which celibacy is helpful to spiritual progress, and other cases in which marriage is essential to it.

ὡς ἡλεημένος . . . εἶναι. Olshaus., Meyer, De Wette, Osiand., Maier assign to πιστός a purely passive meaning:

“as one that has received the grace of deserving your confidence.” Cf. 2 Tim. ii. 2. *Ἐλεος* is much more probably the grace of salvation and ministry. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 1; 1 Tim. i. 13. The infin. will then express, not the content of the “grace,” but its consequence, *εἰς τὸ εἶναι πιστός* (Ecum.). Cf. Col. iv. 6, *εἰδέναι*, “so as to know”; Heb. vi. 10, *ἐπιλαθέσθαι*. The meaning is: “I give my advice, not frivolously nor as a man wise in this world, but with all the faithfulness and sincerity of one that has had the grace of salvation and apostleship” (cf. 2 Cor. i. 18, 19). The advice is given with manifest reluctance. He is careful to prepare their minds for it by telling them that it is simply his own opinion, not the Lord’s command, and that, on the other hand, he has formed his judgment under a sense of the responsibility attaching to his office. In Attic the passive of *ἐλέω* would hardly be used, but *ἐλέου τυγχάνειν*.

V. 26. His reluctance renders his language redundant and incorrect. *Τοῦτο* refers to no substantive expressed, but to a thought which he intended to express in the next clause, but does not; for *οὕτως* also refers to no antecedent. There is also an anacoluthic repetition of *τοῦτο καλόν* in the form *ὅτι καλόν*. That *ὅτι* is not “because” (Est., De Wette), introducing the reason for virginity (“because it is good to abstain from marriage generally”) is evident; for this would be inconsistent with the statement that the present distress had led the Apostle to the opinion which he is about to give.

*ἀνάγκη* has been explained to mean (1) the troubles inseparable from marriage (Ecum., Aquin., Herv., Calvin); (2) our life in the body (Orig.) or the afflictions of life (Grot.); (3) the approaching end of the world (Ambrosiast.) or, more particularly, the distress that would precede the second coming of Christ (Meyer, Maier, Osiand., etc.). The third view is rendered probable, *first*, by the word *συνεσταλμένος*, ver. 29; *second*, by *ἀνάγκη*, which sounds like a reminiscence of what the Apostle may have heard from Luke of the discourses in which Christ foretells the great distress of the latter days (cf. Luke xxi. 23–28). Hence *ἐνεστῶσαν* will mean “impending” (as in 2 Thess. ii. 2), not “present” (as in iii. 22). In class. Greek *ἀνάγκη* rarely means “distress, calamity.” Cf. Æschyl., *Prom.* III. 108, et al.; Xen., *Mem.* III. xiii. 2;

*Anab.* IV. v. 15. But it is common in Hellenistic Greek. Cf. *Ps.* cxix. 143; *Luke* xxi. 23, et al.

V. 27. *δέδεσαι*. Cf. note on ver. 18. *Γυναικί* is dat. of community. Cf. *Rom.* vii. 2; *2 Cor.* vi. 15; *Jelf, Gr.* § 590.

*λέλυσαι*. Tert. (*Ad Uxor.* I. 7) and others explain it of release from a previous marriage by the death or desertion of the wife. If so, the Apostle dissuades from a second marriage. But it is more probable that Origen is right in considering *λελυμένος* to be equivalent to *μὴ δεδεμένος*. So Phot., Est., De Wette, Meyer. *Δύω* may have been used to intimate a deliverance from the strongest of human impulses.

V. 28. For *γήμης* A<sup>1</sup> B read *γαμήσης*, adopted by Lachm., Treg., Westc. and Hort; so that we have in this ver. the class. aor. *γήμεναι* and the later form. *Γαμέω* is not used of the woman in class. Greek. The passages in which it occurs, as *Eur., Med.* 262, are probably spurious. Whether the aor. subjunctive is a fut. or a fut. perf. depends on the context. Cf. Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 382; Goodwin, *Greek Moods*, etc. p. 26. As the Apostle has already disposed of the case of persons previously married and does not after this give his opinion of such as would in future marry, it is better to regard the aor. here as a fut., not a fut. perf. The case of virgins is associated with that of others, in order to show that really there is no difference between them. If virgins sin in marrying, so does a man; if it is because of the impending distress that it is well for all to abstain from marriage, it is well for virgins to do so for the same reason. "*Ἡμαρτες* and *ἡμαρτε* are gnomic aorists. Cf. *John* xv. 6; *Rom.* viii. 29; *James* i. 10, 23; *1 Pet.* i. 24.

Origen, Chrys., Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 7), *Cecum.*, and Romanist expositors deny that the Apostle is speaking of virgins dedicated to the Lord's service. But, *first*, he has already discussed the case of unmarried persons generally (ver. 8), and there is no apparent reason why he should revert to the subject; *second*, in ver. 34 it is said that "the unmarried woman careth for the things of the Lord;" *third*, there are allusions in other Epistles to vows of abstinence from marriage, as in *1 Tim.* v. 12, where "the first faith" seems to refer to the vow to abstain from a second marriage. In his advice to Timothy the Apostle dissuades the younger widows from taking

<sup>1</sup> A has *γαμήση*, evidently by an oversight.

such vows ; and as in our passage he intentionally places all on the same footing, we may infer that he would have equally discouraged vows of virginity. His mentioning the impending distress as a reason for abstinence proves that he cannot have advised virgins to abstain because the married life was morally a superior condition. Origen's remark that the Apostle does not say, "If thou marry, thou doest well," is inconsistent with ver. 38.

θλίψιν, another of Christ's words in reference to the circumstances that would presage His appearance (cf. Matt. xxiv. 9, 21, 29). The Apostle undoubtedly applies it to the same events. Peace, holy joy, serene awe are the befitting preparations for the coming of Christ. Θλίψις is not a class-word ; but θλίβω (akin to τρίβω) occurs.

σαρκί may be dat. of instrument, and σάρξ will then mean the lower appetites, their indulgence of which occasioned the tribulation. But it is more natural to consider it dat. of sphere or reference. Σάρξ will then denote the earthly aspect of human nature and life, in an unethical sense, with an implied contrast between it and πνεῦμα, which is the spiritual side of the regenerate man. So of Christ, Heb. v. 7. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 11 ; Gal. ii. 20 ; iv. 13 ; Phil. i. 22 ; Col. i. 24 ; ii. 1, 5. They have not sinned by marrying, and their mind and conscience have not been defiled (cf. Tit. i. 15). Still they have not "watched" ; their hearts have been overcharged with the cares of this life, and the day of the Lord comes upon them unawares. For the dat. of reference cf. xiv. 20 ; Matt. xi. 29 ; 2 Cor. ii. 12. It limits the action to the flesh and so gives a delicate turn to the import of the verb : "they will find afflictions for their flesh."

οἱ τοιοῦτοι, not only the virgins that marry, but all that do not watch for the coming of the Son of Man, who consequently involve themselves in unbecoming cares.

ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμῶν φείδομαι, that is, "if you follow my advice, you will be spared afflictions to the flesh." Augustine (*De Virgin.* 16) explains the words to mean "I will spare you the enumeration of the cares of married life." The emphatic ἐγὼ is decisive against this, as well as against the interpretation of Cajetan and others : "I grant you indulgence and do not altogether forbid you to marry."

V. 29. The reading of D, ὅτι before καιρός, is not supported by  $\aleph$  A B Vulg., though it has the authority of Origen and Tertullian. If we omit ὅτι, τοῦτο must refer to what follows, to emphasize it, as in xv. 50. "Whether you marry or abstain is a question of less importance; but *this* I do say, Watch." The words that follow are, therefore, not intended to urge celibacy or virginity (Meyer). The objection that, if his purpose was to exhort Christians to watch, the words "but this I say" would have followed immediately after the words "he has not sinned," is not of much force, inasmuch as the Apostle is now stating a fact, and that a fact which he could not have stated without revelation. Hence he uses φημί, which is stronger than λέγω, having the force "affirmandi cum suasionem."

For the Rec. τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστὶ we must read, with  $\aleph$  A B, ἐστὶ τὸ λοιπόν. But the punctuation is more doubtful. On the whole it is better to connect τὸ λοιπόν with what precedes, not with ἵνα κ.τ.λ.; for this will account for the participle συνεσταλμένος. "In itself the time is not short; but henceforth it is to be short, because God has shortened it." The distinction sometimes made between λοιπόν, "finally," and τὸ λοιπόν, "henceforth," is not correct. Cf. Phil. iii. 1; Eph. vi. 10. It is also doubtful that late writers observe the distinction between τὸ λοιπόν, "for the future," and τοῦ λοιποῦ, "any time in the future."

συνεσταλμένος is explained by Valck., Rück., Olshaus., Neand. as meaning that the time is full of tribulation. But, though συστέλλειν has the metaphorical meaning of "oppressing," "filling with consternation" (cf. Schweigh., *Lex. Polyb.* s.v.), this notion is inapplicable to a period of time. Tert., Chrys., Ambrosiast. give it its usual meaning, "shortened." Vulg., *breve*. But the participle expresses more than βραχύτης (Æcum.). The time has been shortened by a Divine act (cf. Dan. ix. 24; Mark xiii. 20). That is, the length of the time is determined on ethical grounds. Cf. 2 Pet. iii. 12, "hastening the coming of the day of God;" Barn., *Ep.* IV. 3: "For this purpose the Lord has shortened the times and the days, that His beloved may hasten and come to His inheritance." Hence καιρός will mean, primarily, the time that must elapse before Christ comes. So Chrys., *De Virgin.* 73. Cf.

Rom. xiii. 11; and, possibly, Rom. xii. 11 (*καιρῶ* for *Κυρίῳ*). But to refer it also to the individual life (so Calvin, Cajet., Estius) is not only a pious application, but also a justifiable explanation. Christ and St. Paul regard the life of the individual and the life of the Church as two aspects of the same conception. Christianity has brought into men's lives an element of responsibility and a sense of individuality and solitariness. It has made life more intense than it was among the Greeks, whose greatest writers are lacking in moral depth. A Christian has never enough of time. His life on earth is shortened by being linked to the life beyond. The distinction between *χρόνος* and *καιρός* is not to be neglected. For it is not shortness of duration, but certainty of consequences when the Judge appears, and the uncertainty of His approach though He is near, that make the Christian sentiment of watchfulness a stronger incentive to well-doing than the heathen contempt and despair of life.

Vv. 29, 30. *ἵνα* depends on *φημί* (Beza, Hofmann), not on *συνεσταλμένος* (Meyer). For, though God's purpose in shortening the time is to bring Christians into an attitude of watching, the Apostle mentions those particular forms of watchfulness which might be realized in his own or his readers' experience. He begins with marriage, because the letter of the Corinthians referred to it. From this he passes to the mutually opposite and universal emotions of sorrow and joy, the deep springs of human character; to these he purposely links external aspects of life, buying and using. If we can imagine St. Paul putting together an ethical theory after the manner of a Greek philosopher, we have the pith of it in this verse. Marriage is ranked in the same category with sorrow and joy, while all three are classed with the more external side of man's life on earth. They are in themselves neither morally good nor morally bad, but indifferent; yet forming the raw material out of which men produce their moral goodness or their moral evil. The Stoics would not have joined together the soul's emotions and external conditions. The latter would have been described as a thing indifferent, the former as a defect: *πάν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἀμαρτία* (Plut., *Virt. Mor.* 10); and, though Cleanthes distinguished between *χαρά* and *ἡδονή*, the only joy he permitted was made to consist in

apathy. The Apostle, on the other hand, taught that emotion was not to be eradicated or weakened, but that it ought to be regulated and harmonized. The nearness and uncertainty of the time of Christ's coming is the regulative element in the Christian life. It checks excessive joy, tempers the anguish of sorrow, and determines the right mean in the use of earthly goods. But it also deepens joy and sorrow, and unites both in one joy of sadness, sadness of joy. Pagan life was shallow in the great emotions of the human spirit. No man rejoices, no man sorrows, as the Christian who lives in expectation of Christ. Excess is prevented, not by the diminution of joy or sorrow, but by the harmony of both.

V. 31. *κατέχοντες*, "possessing," as in 2 Cor. vi. 10. *Καταχρόμενοι* may mean either (1) "using wrongly," as in Plat., *Menex.* 247 A, or (2) "using fully," "to the uttermost," as in Clem. Al., *Pæd.* I. p. 142 Potter, *πάσῃ καταχρόμενος σοφίας μηχανῇ*. But here the former signification would destroy the symmetry of this series of antitheses, in which he is contrasting what is right, not with what is in itself wrong, but with what is wrong because the time has been shortened. Cf. Theophyl., *περίττως χρῆσθαι*. When Christ comes they will neither marry nor give in marriage; therefore let those who are now married assimilate their present condition as closely as may be to that future state, by caring for the things of the Lord, how they may please the Lord, and being as holy (that is, as consecrated) in soul and spirit as the unmarried Christian is. Again, as to the emotions of sorrow and joy, a philosopher may condemn every the least degree of either, or discover that their danger lies in excess and their goodness in a mean. But the Apostle, judging both in the light of Christ's speedy return, teaches that Christians may weep much and greatly rejoice. But let them regard their sorrows as being also joys, and their joys as being also sorrows. Spiritual greatness of character demands the union of surpassing joy and profoundest sorrow. Watching for the coming of Christ is more than anything else calculated to unite and deepen both. Finally, the sum total of the actions that constitute the business of human society and are designated "the world" consists in buying (or selling), on the one hand, using and accumulating, on the other. But it is the desire of accumulating

and the need of using that confer on all the transactions of the world their reality and worth. Now this sense of reality in worldliness is just what the Apostle wishes to remove. He finds its solvent in the expectation of Christ's speedy return. Christians that watch for their Lord's coming will buy to use, not to possess. But from this arises an opposite danger, that of over-using the world. Watching for Christ's return will deliver them from this temptation also, by making all eager pursuits of the world unreal as the acting of a play, when the curtain falls.

*κόσμον*. So **NA B D**, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. *Κόσμῳ* must have been a copyist's attempt to improve the grammar. Several examples of accus. after *χρῆσθαι* are given by Palm and Rost. But most of them, even in late Greek, are doubtful or explicable on other grounds. The use of the adverbial accus. with *χρῆσθαι* in class. writers (e.g. Thuc. II. 15, *ἄξια ἔχρωντο*) prepared the way for it and for the objective accus. after compounds of *χρῆσθαι* in Plutarch, Lucian and other late writers. In Hellenistic Greek the examples are few and more or less doubtful; e.g. in Wisd. vii. 14 Tisch. retains *ὃν οἱ χρησάμενοι*, which some change into *κτησάμενοι*. In Acts xxvii. 17 C reads *βοηθείας ἔχρωντο*. Buttmann's suggestion (*N. S.* p. 157), therefore, that the object of *χρώμενοι* is attracted into the accus. by *καταχρώμενοι*, which in ix. 18 itself governs the dat., is scarcely necessary.

*παράγει . . . τούτου*. Recent expositors consider *παράγει* to be used for the fut., to denote the nearness of the end. Cf. Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 177. The older expositors think the reference is to the transitoriness of the world. This seems to me correct. The danger of worldliness lies in its fascination. It has the power of making men believe that the present is the only reality and that spiritual things are a dream. In the previous clause the Apostle has taught Christians to regard it as unreal, and now compares the world to the acted scenes of a play. Its fascination is that of the theatre; but its unreal nature betrays itself in the shifting of the scenes. He appeals to their own observation: "For behold how the scene changes!" Every change proves that the end will come. This is a legitimate application of the transitoriness of earthly things. It is abused only if we descend to details and infer from particular

changes the approach of the end, as is done by Cyprian, *Ad Demetr.*: “scire debes senuisse jam mundum, non illis viribus stare quibus prius steterat.” The Apostle’s argument goes only so far as to deny the theory of an eternal series of changes or that “all is mutable save mutability.” In the moral as in the natural world movement implies a future crisis. When the Apostle wrote, the state of society was one of intense strain. But the tension, which led heathen moralists to despair of humanity, made the ear of the Christian quick to catch the sound of his coming Lord. The view that *παράγει* is synonymous with *συνεσταλμένος* leaves *γάρ* altogether purposeless. *Παράγειν* is not used in the sense of “passing away” in classical Greek. But to render it by “deceives” (Cajetan, etc.) introduces a notion foreign to the purport of the passage. “The world” is understood by most expositors in a physical sense, the sum total of the material universe. But it is better to explain it in both clauses of human life on earth, as in 1 John ii. 17. Düsterdieck is not justified in saying that St. John alone speaks of the world in an ethical sense.

*σχῆμα*, “fashion,” always denotes an external semblance and, consequently, of itself involves some change. Cf. Theod. on 2 Cor. iii. 18, *τὸ δὲ σχῆμα εὐδιάλυτον χρῆμα*. “He shows that every human thing exists in fashion only and glides by us as a shadow and a dream” (Chrys., *Hom.* 35 in Genes.). The allusion to theatrical spectacles is certain. The word implies their unreal nature.

**Vv. 32-34.** A second reason for abstention from marriage. The first was the near approach of Christ’s kingdom; the second is the need of devotedness to Christ’s work; and the former lends urgency to the latter.

**V. 32.** He has said that he wishes them to be free from care on the eve of the great distress. But this freedom from care consists in caring for the work of the Lord. A happy paradox. Care has two sides. The one is devotedness; the other is distraction. He who cares for the things of Christ concentrates his thoughts on one purpose; he who cares for the things of the world is distracted between the world and Christ.

**V. 33.** Those things by doing which a man pleases the Lord are the Lord’s, but those things by doing which a man pleases

his wife are said to be, not the wife's, but the world's. Acts belong to the heavenly or to the earthly order of things, and that according to the motive of the doer. But two things characterize motives,—sincerity and depth. Of two equally sincere actions, the one may be a fuller and more adequate exponent of a man's spiritual nature than the other. On this distinction a great part of Christian self-denial rests.

**V. 34.** The reading is very doubtful. But *καί* must be inserted before *μεμέρισται* from **NA B D**, and *καί* must be inserted before *ἡ γυνή* from **NA B**. Probably, but not certainly, *ἡ ἄγαμος* ought to be inserted after *γυνή* from **NA B**. So Vulg., *innupta*. Jerome (*Adv. Jovin.* I. 13) says that, though the Lat. MSS. omit it, other authorities prove it to be *apostolicæ veritatis*. But Tert. (*De Virg. Vel.* 4), Chrys., Basil (*De Virg.* 17) omit it. After *παρθένος* **NA** insert *ἄγαμος*. B omits it; so Vulg. and all the early Greek and Latin Fathers. The weight of evidence is against it. The meaning of the passage will depend on the question whether *καὶ μεμέρισται* is to be connected with what precedes or with what follows. This, again, depends on the insertion or omission of *ἡ ἄγαμος* after *γυνή*. For, if they are omitted, *γυνή* means a married woman, and cannot, therefore, be the subject of *μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ Κυρίου*. In that case *ἡ γυνή* and *ἡ παρθένος* will be subjects of *μεμέρισται*: "And the wife and the virgin differ." So De Wette, Meyer, Osiander, Baur (*Theol. Jahrb.*, 1852, p. 18), Maier, Alford. The next verse will then explain how they differ. But the sing. *μεμέρισται* is an objection to this rendering. Meyer defends it on the ground that the verb precedes the two subjects and that *γυνή* and *παρθένος* together include the female sex as a whole. But the Apostle's purpose is not to regard them as a complex whole, but the reverse. He wishes to state in what they differ, and this makes the rule as to the use of the sing. inapplicable to the passage. Cf. Bernhardt, *W. S.* p. 416. If, on the other hand, we read *ἡ γυνή ἡ ἄγαμος* we must join *καὶ μεμέρισται* with what precedes. I accept, therefore, Lachmann and Tregelles' punctuation: *ὁ δὲ γαμήσας μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου, πῶς ἀρέσῃ τῇ γυναικί, καὶ μεμέρισται καὶ ἡ γυνή ἡ ἄγαμος καὶ ἡ παρθένος μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ Κυρίου*. "But he who has married careth for the things of the world, how he may please his wife,

and he is distracted; and the unmarried woman and the virgin cares for the things of the Lord.” So Estius, Neander, Hofmann, Westc. and Hort. *Μεμέρισται* will then mean, “is divided in his interests,” “is distracted.” Cf. Matt. xii. 25, *βασιλεία μερισθεῖσα καθ’ ἑαυτῆς*. “The unmarried woman” will mean the virgin, the widow, and the wife whose husband has deserted her. The sing. *μεριμνᾷ* is used because the two subjects form one complex notion, *καί* meaning “and to particularise.”

*ἵνα ᾗ ἁγία*. He does not mean that the unmarried woman is morally purer than the married woman. For, *first*, he has already said that marriage is not a sin (ver. 28; cf. 1 Pet. iii. 5); *second*, the words are evidently an expansion of “how she may please the Lord,” and denote, therefore, consecration to the Lord’s service; *third*, the indwelling Spirit of God makes the body of every believer a holy temple (cf. iii. 17; 1 Thess. v. 23). Augustine (*De Bono Conj.* xi. and xii.) gives the correct explanation, that the virgin has greater singleness of purpose in the Lord’s service. On the dichotomy of *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα* cf. note on v. 3. On the dat. of reference, *σώματι, πνεύματι*, cf. note on ver. 28.

**V. 35.** This question of marriage is, however, to be decided according to its bearing on the spiritual advancement of each. As touching other matters the Apostle lays strict injunctions on the Churches (ver. 10), but this is not one of them. Devotedness to the Lord and spiritual growth coincide.

*βρόχον*, “noose,” a metaphor taken from the chase, not from war. Philo (*De Vitâ Mos.* III. p. 691) alludes to the custom of throwing the lasso to catch the enemy. But the Apostle’s purpose is to assure the Corinthians that he has no wish to deprive them of liberty to marry. Some expositors think the word means “a snare” (*παγίς*), as if the Apostle meant to say that he has no wish to give them occasion to fall into the sin of incontinence by abstaining from marriage. This is not likely, though the word does sometimes mean “snare” in late Greek.

*εὐπάρεδρον*. So **Σ A B D**. *Εὐπρόσεδρον* crept into the text because *εὐπάρεδρον* occurs nowhere else. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Pol.* 6, *ὡς Θεοῦ οἰκόνομοι καὶ πάρεδροι καὶ ὑπηρέται*. The meaning is that they also serve who only stand and “wait.”

ἀπερισπάστως, “without distraction,” a frequent expression among the later Stoics, as the opposite of παρέργως. Cf. Epictet. III. 22, “he ought to be without distraction wholly given to the service of God.” Theodoret incorrectly explains it by διηγεκῶς, “continually,” in accordance with the monastic tendency of his time. Hesych., ἀμερίμνος, ἀφροντίστως. The remarkable similarity between the passage and Luke’s account of Mary and Martha (Luke x. 38–42) has not escaped the notice of expositors. Εὐπάρεδρον reminds us of παρακαθισάσα, ἀπερισπάστως of περισπᾶτο, μεριμνᾶ of μεριμνᾶς καὶ τυρβάζῃ.

Vv. 36–38. He has urged abstinence from marriage with a view to what is seemly. But cases may arise in which such abstention appears to the persons concerned to be unseemly and sometimes really is so. In such cases let them marry.

V. 36. αὐτοῦ, the father of the virgin, as is evident from ver. 38, though ἡ παρθένος αὐτοῦ in the sense of “maiden daughter” is not a very usual expression. In Soph., *Œd. Tyr.* 1462, Œlipus speaks of his daughters as παρθένουν ἐμαῖν.

ἀσχημονεῖν may be passive, “that he incurs shame,” as in Deut. xxv. 3. So Chrys. (*De Virgin.* 78), Grot., Kupke, Neander, Hofmann. The active meaning (“to put to shame”) is apparently not classical. But it is the better meaning here; for ἐπί with accus. will express the direction of the verbal notion. It is a more difficult question in what the unseemliness of the father’s action consists. Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Beza, Estius think the reference is to the disgrace supposed by Jews and Gentiles to attach to the unmarried state; Meyer, De Wette, Hodge, Kling, to the danger of the maiden being tempted into sin. The words ἐὰν ᾗ ὑπέρακμος favour the former view. For they mean, not “if she be of full age” (Alford), but “if she have passed her bloom.” The class. synon. of ὑπέρακμος is παρακμάζω. Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* III. 10, ὑπερήμεροι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι. It is the age which follows the μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς, which, according to Plato, *Rep.* p. 460, begins at twenty in the case of females. In Sir. xlii. 9 the father is described as losing his sleep with anxiety lest his daughter pass the flower of her age unmarried. On the other hand, ὀφείλει is too strong an expression, unless we can combine both views. The Apostle probably has in his mind the

father's sentiment and the daughter's danger, arising, perhaps, from its being an enforced abstinence. These will correspond to the two opposite suppositions stated in the next verse, that the father is steadfast and unmoved by the general opinion of the age respecting the unseemliness of being unmarried, and that there is no real necessity for the daughter's marriage arising from peculiar circumstances in the case.

*ποιείτω*, permissive imperat. Cf. note on ver. 2. *Γαμείτωσαν*, the virgin and her wooer. Wolf and Neander think the subject is virgins. This is grammatically admissible. Cf. 1 Tim. v. 4, where Chrys. supplies *χῆραι* as subject of *μανθανέτωσαν* from *τις χήρα*.

**V. 37.** The opposite case is that of a father refusing to give his daughter in marriage. He earns the praise of well-doing, provided, *first*, he is steadfast in his resolve; *second*, he is free from constraint; *third*, he has authority to give effect to his wish; *fourth*, he obeys the spontaneous promptings of his own heart. *First*, by "firmness" we are to understand freedom from vacillation. The three words, "stands," "heart," "stable," express the same notion of firmness. For *ἑστηκέναι* is "to stand fast," as in xv. 1; *καρδιά* is the inmost spring of purpose, as in Acts xi. 23; and *ἑδραῖος* contains the metaphor of a house and combines in its signification the special meanings of *τεθεμελιωμένος* and *ἀμετακίνητος* (cf. Col. i. 23). This steadfastness of purpose is in contrast to fear of shame. It is the firmness that does not bend to the opinions of the day nor yield to national sentiment at the cost of sacrificing a higher good. *Second*, freedom from external restraints is in contrast to the words "ought so to be." The Apostle is supposing that there are no circumstances, such as his daughter's incontinence would be, that make it incumbent on the father to give his daughter in marriage. For *ἀνάγκη* of external compulsion cf. Luke xiv. 18. *Third*, the words *ἐξουσίαν* . . . *θελήματος* suppose the father to be a freeman, *ἐξούσιαν* denoting civil rights. The change of construction from *ἔχων* to *ἔχει* and the anacoluthon that arises from the omission of *εἰ* occur frequently in the New Test., sometimes in class. Greek. Cf. Xen., *Cyr.* VIII. ii. 24. In reference to a father's authority over his children at this time we must not forget that Corinth was politically a Roman city. Though there was ample time

during the hundred years that had elapsed since Julius Cæsar had founded the Colonia Julia Corinthus for Greek thought to leaven Corinthian society, the political institutions of the place would still be essentially Roman, even apart from the diffusion of the old Patria Potestas at this time "into every corner of the Empire" (Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 114). On the other hand, it would be in such a place as Corinth that the stringency of the Roman law of persons would be relaxed. The veterans and the freedmen, who composed the colony, would be the men whom we should expect to find losing their entire authority over the persons of their children or retaining it in a very mitigated form. The military class had been themselves practically free from the action of the Patria Potestas when they served as legionaries, and a libertinus, who had not become a Roman citizen, had the same political status as a Latinus, that is, he had no Patria Potestas whatever over his children. Cf. Justinian, *Institutes*, Sander's Ed. I. v. We may safely infer that there were some besides slaves in the Corinthian Church, that had not the ἐξουσία presupposed by the Apostle. *Fourth*, it must be the resolve of his own (ἰδίᾳ) heart, free from that undue influence which would mar its moral worth.

The whole description belongs to times far different from our own, and, in its present form, is not applicable to men whose life is moulded by freer social sentiments and more complex political ideas. Yet *mutatis mutandis* the words are true and practically important in every age. If a person wishes to abstain from marriage that he may wholly devote himself to the work of the Lord, he must have these qualifications: steadfastness of purpose, freedom from any moral obligations to marry, freedom from civil restraints, a genuine desire in his inmost heart as opposed to the promptings of another. Whoever abstains from domestic joys and sorrows in order to serve the Lord without distraction, and does not infringe any of these conditions, not only does not sin, but even does well. Cf. ver. 36.

τοῦτο is the object of κέκρικεν, and τηρεῖν is explanatory of τοῦτο. Meyer defends τοῦ τηρεῖν, and it certainly is the more difficult reading. But as **Σ** A B omit τοῦ, Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort do right in rejecting it, though κρίνω may

take infin. genit., as in Acts xxvii. 1. For the infin. without the art. to explain τοῦτο, cf. Barn., *Ep.* i. 4, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκάζομαι, ἀγαπᾶν ὑμᾶς. So Plat., *Rep.* p. 351, τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν.

τηρεῖν means, not merely “to keep her from marrying” (Alford), nor “to keep her at home in her father’s service,” but “to keep intact in what he believes to be the best state.” Cf. 1 Pet. i. 4; Rev. xvi. 15. She is consecrated by her father to the Lord’s service.

**V. 38.** After ὁ γαμίζων **Σ** A read τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρθένον, B D τὴν παρθένον ἑαυτοῦ. **Σ** A B D Vulg. read καὶ ὁ μὴ. But we are not justified in inferring (De Wette, Meyer, Winer, *Gr.* § LIII. 4) that the Apostle had intended writing καλῶς, not κρεῖσσον, in the second clause. For he has already ascribed some superiority to the father who does not give his daughter in marriage, by saying that he did well, while of the father who allowed his daughter to marry he says only that he did not sin.

**Vv. 39, 40.** He has mentioned the case of virgins and that of widows in ver. 34. In vv. 36–38 he states his opinion respecting the former; he now states his opinion respecting the latter.

**V. 39.** **Σ** A B D Vulg. omit νόμῳ. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Reiche defends it. The word probably crept in from Rom. vii. 2 and is as much out of place here as it is appropriate there. In our passage the Apostle is stating the Christian doctrine, not the Mosaic law. The object of the verse is to check any desire on the part of married women to leave their husbands in order to devote themselves to the work of the Lord, the doctrine afterwards taught by Montanus, ὁ διδάξας λύσεις γάμων. Cf. Eus., *H. E.* V. 18. The Apostle does not here touch upon the right of the wife to seek divorce for the cause of fornication.

κοιμηθῆναι, at first simply an easy euphemism for death (cf. Hom., *Il.* ii. 241; Soph., *El.* 499). It is used in the Old Test. of Rehoboam as well as of Moses and David (cf. Deut. xxxi. 16; 1 Kings xi. 21; 2 Chron. xii. 16, LXX ἀπέθανε). Christ appropriated it to a higher use (John xi. 11), and it conveys to the Christian mind the doctrine of the resurrection. Cf. Chrys., *Hom.* 29 in *Genes.*; Aug., *Tract. in Johan.* xi. 11. In

Rom. vii. 2, where he discusses the general question, the Apostle uses the more direct expression, "if her husband die;" here his words will have a practical bearing on some of his readers and he uses the more tender and Christian expression.

*γαμηθῆναι*, late Greek (Plutarch, etc.) for *γαμεθῆναι*. The Apostle permits second marriages. He adopts and sanctions the established law. Tertullian (*Ad Uxor.* I. 7), in defending the Montanists, who forbade second marriages, not only to bishops, but to all Christians, parries the natural inference to be drawn from the Apostle's words in two ways: *First*, our life dates from our second birth—a notion borrowed from Tertullian by the author of the treatise "*De Vitâ Contemplativâ*," who says the Therapeutæ reckoned seniority according to the time of admission into the Society—and the Apostle speaks of a woman whose husband was dead when she became a Christian. *Second*, even if the Apostle permits second marriages, he tolerates them because of the weakness of the flesh; and as Christ abrogated what Moses had, by reason of men's hardness of heart, permitted, similarly the Paraclete may abrogate what St. Paul has allowed. Cf. *De Monog.* xi. and xiv. There is an evident allusion to this ver. in Herm. Past., *Mand.* IV. 4, where, however, the disapproval of second marriages is more pronounced (as it certainly is in ecclesiastical writers generally) than in our passage or in 1 Tim. v. 14.

*ἐν Κυρίῳ*. Tert. (*C. Marc.* V. 7), Cyprian (*Test.* iii. 62), Jerome (*Ep.* cxxiii. *Ad Ageruch.* 5), Cor. a Lap., Est., Grot., Bengel, Olshaus., De Wette, Meyer, etc., explain the words to mean that she is not permitted to marry an unbeliever. Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Calvin, Neand., Osiand., etc., think they mean that she must marry in the spirit and with the motives of a Christian. Augustine (*De Conj. Adult.* 25) says he does not remember a passage in the New Test. forbidding, in unambiguous terms, Christians to marry unbelievers. His mother Monica had married a heathen. The words *ὃ ἐθέλει* are favourable to the former view, but the latter is more to the point. If a widow marries, let her do so with the same motives with which another remains unmarried. Let their lives be within the sphere of the Lord's work. In Rom. xvi. 2, the phrase "in the Lord" is explained by "worthy of saints."

Cf. Ignat., *Ad Pol.* 5, ἵνα ὁ γάμος ᾗ κατὰ Κύριον, καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

V. 40. *Μακάριος* sometimes means "fortunate" (Acts xxvi. 2), but usually has the higher meaning of "blessed." Here it cannot refer to external prosperity (Erasm., Grot.), for the statement is too general and unqualified; and it must not be restricted to the future blessedness of heaven (Tert., *De Cast.* 4: "erit"). It denotes the blessedness of entire consecration to the work of the Lord. In 1 Tim. v. 14 very different advice is given the younger widows. But after the Apostolic age the Church regarded second marriages with displeasure. Athenagoras calls them *εὐπρεπὴς μοιχεία*, and Origen asserts, somewhat hesitatingly, that they exclude from the kingdom of God (*Hom.* 17 in *Luc.*). In A.D. 314 the Synod of Neo-Cæsarea forbade a priest to sit at table at a second marriage. Cf. also Apost. Const. VI. 17.

*δοκῶ*. Some infer from Gal. ii. 9 that *δοκῶ ἔχειν* here means "I certainly have." So Lee, *Inspiration*, Lect. VI. But *οἱ δοκοῦντες* means "those who have the repute of being pillars." *Δοκῶ* always implies an opinion, either true or false, either one's own or another's; and, as we cannot suppose the Apostle means that he had the reputation of having the Spirit, we must render *δοκῶ* "I think." This use of *δοκῶ* is common in Ionic prose and reappears in later Greek, but the usual phrase in Attic would have been *δοκῶ μοι*. But it may still be explained in one of two ways. Chrys., Est., Alford, etc., consider it to be a modest way of asserting a claim to Divine inspiration and authority. It is difficult to see that an ambassador gives any proofs of modesty by saying, "*I think* I have my sovereign's authority." Augustine (*Tract. in Johan.* XXXVII.), Meyer, De Wette, etc., consider the word to be ironical,—a strong asseveration being couched in terms expressing a doubt, as *οἶμαι* is often used by Plato "asseverandi vi" (Ast, *Lex.*). But this is unnatural. The word is quite appropriate. The Apostle has given his opinion. But an opinion is the result of thought. The guidance of the Spirit in the formation of the opinion does not destroy the man's consciousness of mental effort; otherwise the judgment is only a revelation. But this implies that his knowledge also of his own inspiration is, not a revelation, but the result of thought.

His conviction that he has the guidance of the Spirit may be equal in degree in both cases, but it is different in kind. But the words seem to have a further reference than to the Apostle's inspiration as a writer. He presents himself to their notice as an example of a Christian that has been guided aright through the besetting difficulties of life. Since his conversion he has hearkened to the voice of God within. To this secret of prayer and trust he ascribes his victory. On a retrospect of his own history he *infers* that he has been guided by the Spirit of God.

καὶ γὰρ, "I also" no less than other teachers, no less than all Christians who hear the voice of God and obey it. Hilgenfeld's suggestion that the others were inspired prophets who cried *λύσατε τοὺς γάμους, ἡγγικε γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*, is, therefore, unnecessary.

πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἔχειν is not synon. with νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχειν (ii. 16). In ii. 12 possession of the Spirit is set forth as the cause of the believer's having the mind of Christ, and in Rom. viii. 9 the indwelling of the Spirit in every believer is explained to mean that every believer has the Spirit of Christ. Hence, in the present passage also, the words do not necessarily convey the notion of a special revelation or mean that the Apostle, in declaring his judgment as to second marriages, was "borne along by the Holy Spirit" (2 Pet. i. 21) and impelled to the utterance of what he did not understand (cf. 1 Pet. i. 10, 11).

## FOURTH DIVISION.

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### EATING MEAT OFFERED TO IDOLS.

(viii. 1—xi. 1).

The public and private life of ancient Greece and Rome was bound up with religion. The hearth-stone was an altar at which worship was paid to departed ancestors, and the city was in idea the family on a large scale, with its own presiding divinity. House and garden would be studded with statues of the gods. Most banquets would be, like Agathon's, sacrificial feasts. Cf. Philo, *De Plant. Noë*, p. 354 Vol. I. Ed. Mang.; Tert., *De Idol.* 9 sqq. From the earliest times, as we know from Homer (*Il.* I. 457 sqq., et al.), it was usual to burn in sacrifice the legs of the animal, enclosed in fat, and the intestines. The remainder, being thus sanctified, was given back to the worshipper and either eaten by him and his family or sold in the public shambles. The antipathy of Jews and Christians to idolatry would naturally attach itself to all its surroundings, especially to the festive meals at which meat offered to an idol was eaten. It required a very broad and profound conception of the nature of morality to discover or even admit that "not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man" (Matt. xv. 11). The Apostles even had not understood this truth, though Christ had revealed it, until facts taught it them at the Council of Jerusalem and before. St. Paul was the first of the Apostles to recognise the difference between principle and rule, between moral and ceremonial defilement, between the abiding nature of holiness and the transitoriness of ritual cleansing. But it is not a just representation of what took place at the Council to describe the Apostles as decreeing abstention from meat offered to idols because they still believed that eating such food was forbidden

in the Mosaic law; for they permit freedom in other matters equally forbidden by Moses. Besides, as Paul assented to the decree, it would be nothing less than a breach of faith on his part afterwards to ignore it. Indeed, it is only in so far as it becomes an occasion to the weak to fall into the sin of fornication that the risen Christ forbids in his letters to the Churches of Pergamus and Thyatira (Rev. ii. 14, 20) the eating of sacrificial meats.<sup>1</sup>

The views of subsequent times may be briefly indicated. In the age immediately succeeding that of the Apostles the orthodox were strict abstainers from sacrificial meats, and eating them was one mark of a heretic. The "Didache" says: ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδωλοθύτου λίαν πρόσεχε· λατρεία γάρ ἐστι Θεῶν νεκρῶν. Justin Martyr abstained, while the Gnostics took part even in the idol feasts. Cf. Just. M., *Dial. c. Tryph.* 35; Iren., *Adv. Hær.* I. vi. 3; Tert., *Apol.* 9. We cannot suppose that these Fathers were conscious of being in opposition to the Apostle. The explanation is that in times of persecution tasting the wine of the libations or eating meat offered to idols was understood to signify recantation of Christianity. The subsequent history is chiefly of interest because it shows the difference between the Greek and the Latin Churches. For the decree of the first Council of Jerusalem was confirmed at the Council of Gangra (? A.D. 362-370); and the second Trullan Council (A.D. 692) forbade the eating of things that had been strangled, but its œcumenical authority was not acknowledged by the Western Church. The view of the Latin Church is given by Augustine, who considered that the decree of the Council of Jerusalem was only of temporary application, because Christ condemned "nullam cibi naturam, quam societas admittit humana, sed quæ iniquitas committit peccata" (*Contra Faust.* XXXII. 13).

The Apostle's discussion of the subject may be thus divided: A. A statement of the two opposite Christian conceptions of liberty and love (ch. viii.). B. Their reconciliation exemplified in the Apostle's own conduct (ch. ix.). C. The temptations to sin to which the Corinthian Christians would expose themselves, as the Israelites had done, by taking part in the idol-

<sup>1</sup> The reason given in Rev. ii. 14, is noteworthy; for it has been alleged that the reproach of being a Balaam is directed against St. Paul.

feasts (x. 1-14). D. Partaking of the idol-feasts inconsistent with coming to the Lord's Supper (x. 15-22). E. A practical summary (x. 23-xi. 1).

A. *A Statement of the two opposite Christian Conceptions of Liberty and Love.*

(viii. 1-13.)

V. 1. δέ, transitional. The Apostle enters on another of the casuistical questions of the Corinthian Church, and introduces the discussion with *περὶ*. Cf. vii. 1; xii. 1.

The repetition of *περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων* in ver. 4 shows that a parenthesis intervenes between the beginning of ver. 1 and ver. 4, though, as we shall see, we must seek here the basis of the discussion. But does the parenthesis begin with *ὅτι πάντες γινώσκιν ἔχομεν* or with *ἡ γινώσις φυσιοῖ*? If we adopt the former view, *ὅτι* in ver. 1 must be rendered "because," while in ver. 4 it means "that," and yet ver. 4 seems to be resumptive of ver. 1. The fact is, the *οἶδαμεν* in ver. 4 is resumptive, not of *οἶδαμεν*, but of *γινώσκιν ἔχομεν* in ver. 1. But, if so, *οἶδαμεν* in ver. 1 is really meaningless, unless we translate *ὅτι* by "because." Why should the Apostle say "we know that we know"? In his answer to every one of the casuistical questions put to him by the Corinthians, he begins with an allusion to their and his degree of spiritual judgment and knowledge. For instance, as touching the question of marriage, he gives an opinion and tells his readers that he does not know for certain. Again, in reference to the man's headship over the woman, he claims that he knows and that his readers do not (xi. 3). Similarly, he wishes to give them fuller knowledge of the nature of the spiritual gifts, but admits that they know something (xii. 1-3). Once more, the place occupied in the Gospel by the doctrine of the resurrection he reveals to them who have no knowledge of it (xv. 1). For this reason I think Wolf, Bengel, Olshausen and Maier are right in rendering *ὅτι* in ver. 1 "because." Wycliffe has "for." Whatever doubt the Apostle may have felt in reference to the subject of marriage, he *knows* what to say on the question of eating sacrificial meats; for *all* have knowledge

touching this matter. I take it to be an allusion to the other Apostles and their decree at the Council of Jerusalem. Even when they forbade the Gentile converts to eat things offered unto idols, they did so because they saw that partaking of idol-feasts was one of the sorest temptations to fornication that would beset Christians in the heathen cities of that age. They acknowledged that ceremonial cleansing and abstinence from sacrificial meats was not in itself essential to salvation, inasmuch as all are saved through faith. That is, they had knowledge. But they had also love. For they enjoined Christians to abstain from what is not *per se* a moral evil, for the sake of the weak. We have no need of the arbitrary shifts with which some have tried to shun the difficulty of harmonizing this verse with ver. 7; such as that in ver. 1 the Apostle speaks ironically (Theod., Theod. Mops., Erasm., Muscul., Evans, and Bp. Lightfoot on Phil. iii. 15).

ἡ γινῶσις φυσιοῦ κ.τ.λ. A maxim; hence the asyndeton. Its meaning is that love is both the complement and preservative of knowledge: the complement, for there is in the spiritual man a moral no less than an intellectual element, love of man as well as apprehension of Divine truth, and he seeks the well-being of others no less than his own growth; its preservative, for knowledge without love, far from raising a solid superstructure, puffeth up and renders men—to borrow Plato's words—*ρηνμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὥσπερ λίμνας ἐμπιπλάμενους*. Cf. xiv. 3, 4, 17; 1 Thess. v. 11.

ἀγάπη. Ἀγαπάω and ἀγαπητός occur in class. Greek, but ἀγάπη first in LXX. It is "a word born within the bosom of revealed religion." (Abp. Trench, *Syn.* § XII.) Probably akin to ἄγαμαι, it denotes the love that springs from admiration for excellence. Though ἀγαπῶ and φιλῶ are both used to express love to Christ, ἀγάπη, not φιλία, became the designation of the Christian grace of love to God and our neighbour, partly because the associations of φιλία, not to say ἔρως, had become too corrupt to admit of its consecration to the service of Christianity, partly because Christian love is not the affection that springs from desire, however pure, but the willing devotion of veneration for goodness. The rest of the chapter is an expansion of the statement that love buildeth up.

V. 2. The δέ after εἰ is omitted in *NA B*. Its omission

makes the clause more sententious. For εἰδέναι & A B C read ἐγνώκεναι. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. For οὐδέπω οὐδὲν ἔγνωκε & A B read οὐπω ἔγνω. This preserves the usual distinction between οἶδα, "I know a fact," and ἔγνωκα, "I know the nature of a thing." Cf. Evans's good note. What the Apostle expressed in general terms in ver. 1 he now puts in a concrete form, first in reference to knowledge without love (ver 2), then in reference to love as the complement and preservative of knowledge (ver. 3).

First, ver. 2 sets forth the conceit and the emptiness of knowledge without love. Its conceit is implied in δοκεῖ, its emptiness in οὐπω ἔγνω, and the former is said to be the evidence of the latter. Cf. Plat., *Apol.* p. 23: "he is the wisest who knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing." For δοκεῖ in the sense of "pretending," "conceitedly professing," cf. xi. 16; Matt. iii. 9; Mark x. 42. Ἐγνω is "came to know"; ἐγνώκεναι is "possesses knowledge." Cf. 1 John iii. 2. The man imagines himself in the abiding possession of spiritual knowledge; really he never once attained to it. Some render τι by "something great." But it has this meaning only with verbs of saying, and here τι must express the knowing man's assumed modesty: "if any one pretends to have *some* knowledge." Οὐπω, that is, not until he adds to his knowledge love.

V. 3. *Second*, love is the complement and preservative of knowledge. The profounder thought of this verse differs from that of ver. 1 in three things: (1) The maxim is put in a concrete form, in order to introduce the great conception, "is known of God," which cannot be stated in the abstract. (2) For "love of men" we have now "love of God," the latter being the source also of spiritual knowledge. For knowledge of Divine truth and Divine morality is founded on knowledge of God's moral nature, and true knowledge of God, who is love, is attainable only by love (cf. 1 John iv. 7, 8). (3) For "love buildeth up" we have now "this man is known of God." What this means has been variously explained:—

(i.) Beza, Rosenmüller, Heydenreich think it is an instance of the hophal construction. Cf. Aug., *Tract.* XCVIII. in *Johan.*: "ipse dicitur cognosci a Deo, quia Deus illum cognoscentem facit." But such a construction is foreign to the

genius of the language, and no other instance of it is adduced in Hellenistic Greek, unless it be in xiii. 12.

(ii.) Aquinas, Hervæus, Estius, Grotius, Wolf render "he is approved of God," as in Ps. i. 6. But it is fatal to this otherwise natural rendering that it changes the meaning of *γινώσκειν* from the signification of the word in ver. 2. Any intentional antanaclasis must not be thought of; it would destroy the connection. The same objection is good against the slightly different rendering of Theod., Severian, Theophyl., Usteri (*Entw.* p. 283): "he is cared for by God;" and against Calvin's paraphrase: "he is reckoned among sons."

(iii.) Augustine is much better in *De Trin.* IX. i. 1: "Nec sic quidem dixit, Cognovit illum, quæ periculosa præsumptio est, sed, Cognitus est ab illo. Sic et alibi cum dixisset, Nunc autem cognoscentes Deum; statim corrigens, Imo cogniti, inquit, a Deo." Cf. Philo, *De Cherub.* p. 160, Vol. I., Mang. *γνωρίζομεθα μᾶλλον ἢ γνωρίζομεν.* But even this is not altogether satisfactory. For the Apostle John does not hesitate to use the expression *γινώσκει τὸν Θεόν* (1 John iv. 7; cf. John xvii. 3), and St. Paul (ii. 10) infers from the fact that the Spirit of God searches the depths of God, that the spiritual man also, in whom the Spirit dwells, can know them (cf. xiii. 12). It is not, therefore, "a dangerous presumption" to say that the spiritual man knows God, whom the only begotten Son hath declared.

(iv.) Canon Evans makes *οὗτος* refer to God: "This one (God) is known by him." The meaning so obtained is most suitable. But I cannot persuade myself that the Apostle would not, if this had been his meaning, have written *Θεός*. Cf. John xi. 22.

(v.) The point of the verses is spiritual discernment of the true nature and content of moral, as distinguished from ceremonial, obligation. The healthy action of this faculty depends on love of the brethren. But love of the brethren springs from love to God, which is, therefore, the necessary condition of enlightenment of conscience. The reason is that without loving God we cannot know God, and without knowing God we cannot know the nature of the good. Seraphic love accompanies "the cherub contemplation." But what is meant by knowledge of God? Not a comprehension of His being or

attributes in themselves. The creature can know God only in so far as the mind of God is directed towards him. Knowledge of moral truths differs from other knowledge in being accompanied by a consciousness of being in the sight of God; that is, of being ourselves in a certain moral condition. We cannot discern the nature of goodness without judging ourselves as being or as not being good; and this act of self-judgment involves a sense of God's judgment. Hence knowledge of God gives us knowledge of moral truths only when knowledge of God means that we are conscious of being known of Him.

According to St. Paul, therefore, two distinct elements combine to form an enlightened conscience—knowledge and love. Conscience is impossible without reason and emotion. This would have been his answer, we may conjecture, if he had consciously put to himself the modern question, What is conscience? His words may be compared with Aristotle's definition of *προαίρεσις* as *βουλευτική ὁρεξις* (*Eth. Nic.* III. iii. 19), or what is the same thing, *ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς* (*ib.* VI. ii. 6); and with Bp. Butler's account of conscience, "whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both." (*Dissert.* II.)

**Vv. 4–13.** Having stated these two principles of action, knowledge and love, in an abstract and in a concrete form, the Apostle resumes consideration of the question respecting sacrificial meats. To mark resumption *οὖν* is used more frequently than any other particle. Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 22. So in Mark iii. 31. From ver. 4 to ver. 8 the content of Christian knowledge, considered apart from love, is set forth; from ver. 9 to ver. 13 the effect of Christian love is explained.

**V. 4.** Knowledge, even without love, can attain to an apprehension of the spirituality and oneness of God. *First*, God is a Spirit, and there is no image of Him in the world. It is a question whether *οὐδέν* is predicate ("an idol is nothing in the world") or an attributive ("there is no idol in the world"). The former is the view of Tert. (*Contra Marc.* V. 7), Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Hervæus, Calvin, Estius, Cor. a Lap., Stanley, etc. It has in its favour that the appellation given

in the Old Testament to the heathen gods is Elilim ("no-things"), which are mockingly contrasted with Elohim. Cf. Lev. xix. 4; 1 Chron. xvi. 26; Jer. viii. 19; Acts xiv. 15; 1 Cor. x. 19; xii. 2. Against it are the following considerations: (1) the position of οὐδέν, (2) the parallelism between οὐδέν εἰδωλον and οὐδεὶς Θεός, (3) the redundancy, according to this view, of the words "in the world." It is, therefore, much more probable that the Apostle intended to say "that there is no idol in the world." So Meyer, De Wette, Maier, Osiander, Hofmann, etc. But the words are still obscure. For what is meant by "idol?" The usual explanation is that it means, not the image, but the deity represented: The objects of heathen worship have no real existence; they are merely the creatures of the worshipper's imagination and, consequently, cannot either sanctify or pollute the meats offered to them. But this is in direct contradiction of the Apostle's statement that the objects of heathen worship are the demons (cf. x. 20). Meyer, De Wette, Kling think the meaning is that the heathen gods do not exist in the form in which they are conceived to exist by the heathen, as Zeus or Apollo; they exist as demons, but not as gods. This makes the next clause tautological. Chrys., on the other hand, understands by εἰδωλον, not the deity represented, but the image of wood or stone. Similarly Augustine (*Enarr. in Ps. cxxxv. § 3*) says the reference is "ad materiam terrenam sensu carentem." It is very doubtful that εἰδωλον ever means a false god, apart from the image. The examples cited by expositors do not prove it. If, therefore, εἰδωλον denotes the visible image, the words will mean that there is no such thing as an image of Deity in all creation. In the supramundane sphere there is an εἰκὼν of the Divine μορφή. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15. But as there is no Divine σχῆμα, there is no εἰδωλον of God. *Second*, God is one, and there is no God except that One. ("Ἄλλος is omitted in  $\aleph$  A B D. So Lachm., Treg., Westc. and Hort; but Tisch. now retains it.) The heathen deities are not gods. From these two fundamental contrasts between Christianity and heathenism it follows that no meats offered to an idol are holy either because they are sanctified to the service of the true God, who is a Spirit, or because they are offered to heathen deities, which are non-existent.

**Vv. 5, 6.** The two statements, that God is a Spirit and that God is one, are proved by an appeal to the Christian consciousness. Thus the words "we know" are justified, and that knowledge is declared to be something deeper than an intellectual conviction. God is now designated Father, and the Lord of all is said to be Jesus Christ, and we, Christians, are shown to be in intimate relation to Christ and to the Father. The argument is to this effect: The heathen gods are not gods, and we know it; but even if they have some sort of existence—as indeed they have—yet to us, Christians, they are as if they were not; for our conception of Divinity includes the two notions of fatherhood and lordship, and these we find only in our Father and our Lord.

**V. 5.** This protasis and the appended parenthesis are explained by most expositors to be a virtual denial of the existence of the heathen gods in any form, as if the Apostle were assuming the point of view of their worshippers. But the following considerations seem to me to tell against this view: (1) It makes *καί* useless; *καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ* must mean "for even if," not "although." Cf. note on vii. 21. (2) The position of *εἰσι* makes the word emphatic; for of course it cannot be joined to *λεγόμενοι*, as if the two words were synonymous with *εἶναι λέγονται*. (3) This view makes the parenthetical clause *ὥσπερ . . . πολλοί* a mere repetition in an expanded form of the conditional clause *εἴπερ . . . γῆς*. If the parenthetical clause be regarded as proof of the statement that the heathen believed in many gods, it may be replied that to prove this was unnecessary. For these reasons I understand the protasis in ver. 5 to be an admission that the gods of the heathen do exist in some form. In what form, the Apostle does not say in this place. He says it in x. 20. There is only one God; and even if we admit, as admit we must, that there are real beings to whom the sacrifices of the heathen are offered, still the Christian spirit refuses to acknowledge that these beings can pollute the good creatures of God or touch God's children. The Apostle's denial that these beings are gods is contained in the word *λεγόμενοι*, "called" what they are not.

*εἴτε ἐν οὐρανῷ εἴτε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*. Heathen mythology contains two conceptions. On the one hand, it is the expression of men's natural theology or universal belief in the existence

of one unseen Being, who made all things. The primitive worship was monotheistic, and "every new name threatened to obscure more and more the primitive intuition of God." (Max Müller, *Chips*, Vol. II. p. 358.<sup>1</sup>) The Apostle's statement that heathenism filled heaven with gods many implies that it not only contradicted the Christian revelation, but that it is also false to its own original monotheism. Again, on the other hand, the heathen mythology, especially in its Greek development, may be regarded as the religious expression of national ideas and civilization. The Greek conception of the independence of every unit in nature and society was embodied in the mythology. Every city had its tutelary deity; every spring of water was haunted; every crop of corn was under the protection of a goddess; every movement of the elements and every human action might assume a sacred character and become, the one a prayer, the other its answer. There were gods on the earth. The Greeks themselves recognised the distinction between *ἐπουρανίοι θεοί* and *θεοὶ ἐπιχθονίοι*. Thus heathen religion denied or ignored the oneness and the spirituality of God,—in its departure, that is, from primitive monotheism and its deification of the forces of nature.

Chrys. and most expositors think the sun, moon and stars are meant by the gods in heaven, and deified heroes and kings by gods on earth. But this limits the deification of nature to the heavenly bodies.

*ὥσπερ εἰσὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί.* A parenthetical clause, intended to justify the supposition now made. Its force consists in its being an expression of the Apostle's own belief in the objective existence, in some form or other here not stated, of the beings whom the heathens worshipped. The emphasis, therefore, is, first of all, on *εἰσὶν*. But *πολλοί* also is emphatic; the multitude of heathen gods standing in contrast to the One God of Christians. *Κύριοι* is added to *θεοί* for the sake of the distinction between *εἰς Κύριος* and *εἰς Θεός* in ver. 6. But for that reason the distinction between *θεοί* and *κύριοι* must be more than verbal. *Κύριος* is, as Stanley observes,

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Max Müller, I am bound to acknowledge, more recently explained that his words must not be understood as a declaration of belief in the priority of monotheism.

“the correlative of the Syrian Baal.” But, as *θεοί* implies that there is a true God, so *κύριοι* implies the existence of the true Lord, that is, Jehovah, who is contrasted with Baalim and denotes the God that revealed Himself to Moses and the prophets, the moral Governor, who is “longsuffering, abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, but not always pardoning the guilty.” The Apostle contrasts the polytheism of degenerate heathenism with the true monotheism, and the Baalim of other Semitic nations with Jehovah. He speaks of heathenism as it is both the corruption of natural and the antagonist of revealed theology.

V. 6. To us, Christians, there is but one God and one Lord. The inference—which the Apostle leaves to his readers to draw—is that we, Christians, at least, should not regard meat offered to an idol as either sanctified or polluted. He proves that to us there is but one God and one Lord by declaring who and what the one God and the one Lord are:—

| I. One God ;         | II. One Lord ;             |
|----------------------|----------------------------|
| who is, (1) Father ; | who is, (1) Jesus Christ ; |
| (2) He from          | (2) He through             |
| whom are             | whom are                   |
| all things ;         | all things ;               |
| (3) He to            | (3) He through             |
| whom are we          | whom are we                |
| Christians.          | Christians.                |

*ἡμῖν*, “for us,” as in ix. 2. Cf. note on i. 18.

*ὁ πατήρ*, not to be joined with *Θεός*, “God the Father”; but in apposition to it, “God, who is the Father”; as, in the corresponding clause, *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* is in apposition to *Κύριος*, “one Lord, who is Jesus Christ.” Again, *πατήρ* must not be restricted to God’s being the Father of Jesus Christ (Cajet., Alford). For, (1) this would require the corresponding words to be, “one Lord, even the Son;” (2) the subject of the whole passage is, not what God is to Christ, but what He is to us, and the truth of God’s fatherhood as He is related to men is a notion in advance of that of the spirituality and oneness of the Divine nature (ver. 4), or rather, it is that conception of God in which the spirituality and oneness of His nature is revealed to us and accepted by us in its practical

influence. On the other hand, God's fatherhood must not in this passage be restricted to the correlative of Christian adoption (Meyer). The words "from Him are all things" express the entire content of the fatherhood of God. The idea is partially realized in creation, but fully in Christian sonship. Believers are from and unto God. In the series from God man is the τέλος, the last and highest term; in the series unto God the believer is the ἀρχή, the first term. In Rom. xi. 36 the three expressions "from Him," "through Him," "unto Him," are used in reference to God. But in both passages the prepositions do not express Trinitarianism, inasmuch as, not εἰς, but ἐν, would be used in speaking of the Holy Spirit. At the same time, the use of "through Him are all things," in Rom. xi. 36 of God and in this passage of Christ, is some evidence that St. Paul understood the words in the Johannine meaning (John i. 3) and ascribed to the Lord Jesus the attributes which St. John ascribes to the Logos. Pfleiderer (*Paulin.* p. 146) infers from Col. i. 16 that the Christology of the Epistle to the Colossians is inconsistent with that of the present chapter. The inference is not warranted. On similar grounds it might be argued that the doctrine of the Epistle to the Romans, in which "through" is said of God, is inconsistent with our Epistle, in which all things are said to be "through" Christ. Baur (*Die Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, I. p. 85; *Neutest. Theol.* p. 193) objects that Κύριος in St. Paul's Epistles always means the Lord of the Church, through whom everything is done that has for its object man's salvation through God's grace. He infers that the words "through Him are all things" must refer to the moral creation; adding that St. Paul nowhere ascribes the creation of the world to Christ. But against his interpretation are, (1) the resemblance between this ver. and Rom. xi. 36; Col. i. 15-19; (2) the manifest parallelism between "through Him are all things" and "from Him are all things"; (3) the antithesis between "all things" and "we," Christians; (4) the purpose of the passage, which is to prove that eating meat offered to an idol is not sinful, inasmuch as all things were made through Christ. It is true that Κύριος means the Lord of the Church. But this only adds to the significance of the statement. All things were made

through Him who is Lord of the Church. Consequently everything created is consecrated to His service and the service of His Church. Even Zeller rejects Baur's view (cf. *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1842, p. 74). The words "through Him" imply, moreover, not an ideal, but a personal pre-existence of the One Lord Jesus Christ. That this was St. Paul's doctrine is certain from the word "sent" in Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 4, and the words "became poor" in 2 Cor. viii. 9, to cite only from Epistles on all sides acknowledged to be genuine. On the other hand, the use here of the name "Jesus" does not justify Pfleiderer's assertion (*Paulin.* p. 142) that the Apostle regarded Christ as being man in his pre-existing state.<sup>1</sup> On the theology of the ver. cf. Chrys., *De Incompr. Dei Nat.*, Hom. 5. That writers coming so soon after the Apostle as Clement of Rome and Barnabas, whose teaching is most probably formed on the type of St. Paul's, believe in the pre-existence of our Lord is in itself almost enough to prove that the Apostle taught the same doctrine. Cf. Barn., *Ep.* V. 5 sq. εἰς αὐτόν, for εἰς ὃν. Cf. vii. 13.

V. 7. But this knowledge is not in all. Some brethren are weak. He distinguishes between *having* knowledge (ver. 1) and its being *within*; between the merely intellectual belief and the inward illumination of moral strength. In this connection γνῶσις is equivalent to σοφία. It is the prerogative of the spiritual man, who knows the mind of Christ. Every Christian, it is true, has the indwelling Spirit, and, consequently, knowledge in germ. But in the spiritual man only, that is the mature Christian, is it fully developed. Cf. 1 Tim. iv. 3, τοῖς πιστοῖς καὶ ἐπεγνωκόσιν, that is, knowledge is developed faith. It is at this point that Clement of Alexandria and Origen sometimes deviate from the Apostle's teaching, by representing faith as blind acceptance and knowledge as superadded insight (θεωρία) into the original reason or Logos; whereas in St. Paul's Epistles they differ only as the babe in Christ differs from the more developed believer, as the bud differs from the ripe fruit. Cf. Clem. Al., *Strom.* VI. pp. 817 sqq. Potter.

For συνειδήσει (N<sup>3</sup> D, Vulg.) N<sup>1</sup> A B read συνηθεία, which is

<sup>1</sup> No Jew could have conceived of a man being a medium of the creation of all things.

adopted by Bengel, Lachm., Treg., Tisch., Westc. and Hort. But Reiche, Osiander, De Wette, Meyer retain *συνειδήσει*. The difference of meaning is not great. *Συνειδήσεις* expresses the result, *συνήθεια* the process that leads up to it. But the weight of evidence is in favour of *συνηθεία*, which is also apparently, though not really, the more difficult reading. For it seems at first strange that the Apostle should speak of Christians associating with an idol. The fact is that he introduces it as an instance of the formation of a moral conviction by habituation. *Ἐθισμῷ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ γινώσκονται*. (Andron. Rhod. *Paraphr. Arist. Eth. Nic.* I. 7). Consequently the opposite conviction can be formed only by habituation; that is to say, it is not every Christian that can entirely free his conscience from the vague dread that behind the idol there lurks a divine power. From a similar source comes the belief in witchcraft among Christians. Missionaries bear witness to the same fact among their converts to this day. Hence the words "until now." It is not mere faith, but faith developed into knowledge that liberates conscience; and that knowledge must be, not a merely intellectual belief in a doctrine, but the inmost conviction that grows through habituation with the truth of God's spirituality and oneness. This is the force of *ἐν* in the previous clause. If *συνειδήσει* is read, then *τοῦ εἰδώλου* will be objective gen.: "conscious convictions in respect of the idol." So *συνείδησιν τοῦ Θεοῦ* in 1 Pet. ii. 19.

*ὥς ἄρτι* must follow *συνηθεία* (or *συνειδήσει*) as in *8 B D Vulg.* Hence it is not to be connected with "eat" (Theophyl., *Æcum.*, Calvin), but closely with "habituation," which has not yet ceased. The words imply that some at least of the weak brethren belonged to the Gentile portion of the Church. In Rom. xiv. they are Jews. The moral influence of Mosaism was in this matter similar to that of pagan religions. Both enfeebled the conscience. On adverbial phrases attached to substantives in the place of adjectives and the omission of the article cf. Winer, *Gr.* § LIV. 6; Buttman, *N. S.* p. 83. So in xii. 31, *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁδόν*. Examples occur in the classics. Cf. Bernhardt, *W. S.* p. 338.

*ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον ἐσθίουσι*, "meat offered to an idol they eat as such," not as ordinary meat. Hence the supposed defilement.

*συνειδήσεις*. The word first occurs in a passage of Chrysip-

pus cited by Diog. Laert. VII. 85, *πρῶτον γὰρ οἰκείον πάντι ζῳῷ ἢ σύστασις καὶ ἡ ταύτης συνειδήσις*, where it means "consciousness." But the passage proves that when the word came to mean "conscience," the *συν*-expressed, not "knowing together with God," as Bp. Sanderson held after the Schoolmen, but "knowing together with oneself"; that is, it signifies that man cannot be conscious of himself without knowing himself as a moral creature. In the language of Stoicism it conveys also the ethical notion of an internal judge. Cf. Epictet., *Fragn.* 27, *ἄνδρας δὲ γενομένους ὁ Θεὸς παραδίδωσι τῇ ἐμφύτῳ συνειδήσει φυλάττειν*, and frequently in Seneca. So in LXX., Ecces. x. 20, but not in the Old Test. In our passage it means the sense of guilt which a Christian has when he thinks he has contracted moral defilement by contact with an idol.

*ἀσθενής*, "a weak" or, as we might say, "diseased" conscience, incapable of forming a sound, healthy judgment. As we speak of weak nerves, the Apostle speaks of a weak conscience. A person who has been taught when a child to believe in ghosts will sometimes be seized with dread if he is alone at night, though his reason has long since convinced him that spectres do not appear. Similarly, though the moral reason of a Christian tells him that the heathen deities which he formerly worshipped do not exist, yet it requires spiritual knowledge of the true God to allay his dread. Cf. 1 Tim. i. 5, where the Apostle joins "a good conscience" with "faith unfeigned." The metaphor is more apparent in *ἀσθενής* than it would be in *ἀσθενούσα* (ver. 12).

*μολύνεται*, "is continually defiled"; that is, the weak Christian contracts moral defilement in his own eyes, and that more and more. The New Test. speaks of the conscience itself being defiled or pure (1 Tim. iii. 9), evil (Heb. x. 22) or good (1 Tim. i. 19), because the word still carried with it the idea of self-consciousness. A pure or defiled conscience is a consciousness of being pure or defiled. But if, in the language of Butler, we assert the sovereign authority of conscience as judge, then we cannot ascribe to conscience either moral goodness or moral depravity. Even "an erring conscience" is a phrase without meaning. Conscience is the judge that pronounces sentence. But the correctness of the verdict depends

on the evidence submitted to the reason and the capacity of the intellect to form a judgment upon it; and the moral value of that judgment arises from considerations extraneous to the conscience. Further, this consciousness of defilement from contact with an idol is produced only in the weak Christian. A heathen does not consider it to be a defilement; for the idol is to him the manifestation of God. A strong Christian will not think it a defilement; for he has no dread of the demons and does not believe they can defile him apart from his own will. Curtius (*Grundz.* p. 372) connects *μολύνω* with *μέλας* and Lat. *malus*.

**V. 8.** *παραστήσει.* So  $\aleph^1$  A B, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. D has *παρίστησι*, which De Wette and Hofmann prefer, because the first may have crept in from Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. iv. 14. The meaning is given in Rom. xiv. 10, *παραστησόμεθα τῷ βήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which again is expounded by *κάμψει πᾶν γόνυ*. Food will not present us before God as our judge. It is true that conscience is essentially the power which sets a man in God's presence. But eating and abstaining from eating are things indifferent. God condemns neither the one nor the other. If conscience condemns either, it places the man before a phantom tribunal, not before the living God. The Anth. and Rev. Versions render the word by "commend," as if it were synon. with *συνίστημι*. But this would be applicable only to one limb of the antithesis that follows, *περισεύομεν*. The words *ὑστερούμεθα* and *περισεύομεν* must, therefore, have a comparative force, and be connected, the former with *ἐὰν μὴ φάγωμεν*, the latter with *ἐὰν φάγωμεν*: "For neither, if we abstain, are we inferior on that account to him that eats; nor, if we eat, are we on that account superior to him that abstains." The man of over-scrupulous conscience often admires the superior knowledge of the strong Christian and, at the same time, condemns the liberty of action which is the direct result of largeness of view; while the strong Christian is conscious of a superiority that often degenerates into pride and contempt of the brethren. Hence it is that the term "weak" is applied to him who abstains, the term "strong" to him who eats.

**V. 9.** Having stated the principle that eating and abstinence are in themselves indifferent, he proceeds to state the

opposite principle, that the strong Christian ought to abstain, if by eating he tempts the weak brother to do what his conscience condemns as a sin.

δέ, adversative. Though food does not affect our relation to God, it may affect our relation to our brethren and so bring us indirectly under the condemnation of God.

ἐξουσία, "authority." Chrys. observes that a rebuke lies hid in the word.

πρόσκομμα, that at which one strikes one's foot. Cf. note on i. 23; Rom xiv. 13.

τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν. So **NA BD**, which is decisive against ἀσθενούσιν. The weakness precedes and occasions the stumbling. Cf. Rom. xiv. 21, where a climax is observable, προσκόπτει—σκανδαλίζεται—ἀσθενεῖ.

**V. 10.** That the example of a strong brother may lead a weak brother astray is proved by supposing a case, an extreme one, it is true, but likely to have occurred in Corinth. He supposes a Christian taking part with heathen friends at a sacrificial banquet, and that before the shrine of an idol. In x. 14 he condemns the practice on other grounds.

γάρ, introducing an instance.

εἰδωλείω, "the place of an idol." Cf. Macc. i. 47. So Ἀσταρτεῖον, 1 Sam. xxxi. 10. The Apostle shuns the use of the word "temple" or "house" in speaking of dead gods, in the same way as θυσιαστήριον is used of the altar of the true God, to distinguish it from the heathen βωμός.

κατακείμενον, "reclining at table." So also ἀνακείσθαι in late Greek, as John xii. 2. A banquet in a public place, but not worthy to be designated a sacrifice in a temple.

οἰκοδομηθήσεται, ironical: "built up." The irony is lost if we render it "emboldened" (Tyndale, Auth. and Rev. Versions). The word implies a consciousness of superiority in being permitted by one's conscience to sit at a banquet in the place of an idol. Cf. Tert., *De Præscript.* 3: "ædificari in ruinam."

**V. 11.** The best attested reading is ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ὁ ἀσθενῶν ἐν τῇ σῇ γνώσει, ὁ ἀδελφὸς δι' ὃν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. So **NA BD**, except that A has οὖν, not γάρ, D an asyndeton, and that B omits σῇ. The ver. is, therefore, not part of the question of ver. 10, but the answer to it: "Built up, did I

say? Nay, he is perishing!" Hence the pres. ἀπόλλυται is not intended to express the certainty of a future occurrence, but implies that the weak brother is now, by reason of his guilt, in the act of perishing.

ἐν τῇ σῇ γνώσει, not merely "by reason of thy knowledge," but "by attempting to share in thy knowledge," without making it really his own. An antithesis is implied between ἐν and σῇ. Ἐπὶ would express only the external occasion of his perishing; ἐν means "in the midst of, surrounded by, thy knowledge." The knowledge increases the sinfulness of ensnaring the weak. He uses the largeness of his own Christianity to destroy a brother Christian, whereas that largeness of view ought to have enabled him to understand his brother's position and taught him how to save his brother. The words "a brother, for whom Christ died," are a most effective close to the Apostle's remonstrance. They express the idea of love in two of its aspects; first, as it is based on Christian brotherhood, and second, as it is the manifestation of Christ's death in the Christian's life. The Apostle contrasts the reckless indifference of a brother to a brother and the generous self-sacrifice of Christ for an enemy. Cf. Rom. xv. 3. Another thought, that the strong Christian was undoing the work of Christ, is included, but is not the most prominent idea of the words.

V. 12. δέ, "yea moreover." Cf. Heb. ii. 6; iv. 13; xii. 6; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* p. 421.

καί, not exactly explicative of ἀμαρτάνοντες (De Wette), but adding to the notion of sin that of injury.

τύπτοντες. Elsewhere in the New Test. τύπτω is not used metaphorically, as it is occasionally in class. Greek and LXX., as Prov. xxvi. 22. The metaphor of "smiting" conscience is suggested by the word "weak."

τὴν συνειδήσιν ἀσθενοῦσαν, "their conscience, and that when it is growing weaker."

εἰς Χριστόν. Not only their conduct is in direct contrast to that of Christ, but also they sin against Him. How it is a sin against Christ is told us in the word οὕτω, which should be closely connected with ἀμαρτάνοντες, "thus sinning." For, first, they sin against a brother, who is equally loved by Christ; second, they sin against conscience, emancipated and

endowed with sovereign authority by Christ; *third*, they destroy him for whom Christ died.

**V. 13.** διόπερ, "just for this reason." The περ adds vividness and force to the δι' ὃ. Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. pp. 327-344. The meaning here is that the Apostle is resolved not to offend a brother because he would be sinning against Christ by so doing. On περ cf. ἐάνπερ ("if as a matter of fact"), Heb. iii. 14.

βρῶμα, generally: "if such a thing as food." There are things which the Apostle will not sacrifice; and some of them are in themselves indifferent, provided his action does not wound the conscience of a weak brother but condemns the insidious doctrines of false brethren. He would not, for this reason, consent to circumcise Titus (cf. Gal. ii. 5).

οὐ μή. Understand some such word as φόβος, as in Xen., *Mem.* II. i. 25, οὐ φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω. The fut. indic. is accounted for by supposing that the origin of the phrase was forgotten and it came to be regarded as a mere strong negative. Elmsley (on Eur., *Med.* 1151) explains it as a question; οὐ μὴ μενέῃς; "will you not not-remain?" But this does not account for the use of οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive, and the second negative cannot be μὴ. Goodwin (*Greek Moods*, §§ 87 and 89, Note 2, Rem. 1) considers this subjunctive to be a relic of the Homeric use of that mood with the force of a weak fut. indic. But, in that case, we should expect οὐ, without μὴ, to take the subjunctive sometimes; and, as οὐ μὴ is an emphatic negative, we should expect it to be followed by a strong, not a weak, future.

κρέα, "flesh-meat," that food which, as a matter of fact, caused the weak brother to stumble. The Apostle's sudden vehemence arises from his mention of Christ; and the declaration of his resolve prepares the way for the mention of his own example in the next chapter.

*B. The Reconciliation of the opposite Christian Conceptions of Liberty and Love.*  
(ix. 1-27).

This chapter stands in close connection with the preceding discussion of the law of love as it regulates the action of Christian liberty. The Apostle's conduct is an instance of

self-denying abstinence from lawful things for the sake of others. The main thought of the chapter is stated in ver. 19, the rest being either an expansion or a proof of this thought in its two opposite aspects. First, he proves from the fact of his apostleship that he is free. As instances of the application of the Christian conception of liberty, he specifies freedom from restrictions as to food, freedom from obligation to abstain from marriage, and freedom to claim maintenance at the hands of the Churches. Second, he is resolved, notwithstanding this, to forego the exercise of his rights in these things, that he may have more power to gain men through the Gospel, as a runner or a boxer undergoes hardship when he is in training for the race or the ring.

**V. 1.** The impassioned language of viii. 13 continues. This justifies the asyndeton. **Σ** A B Vulg. read *οὐκ εἰμι ἐλεύθερος; οὐκ εἰμι ἀπόστολος;* So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Reiche defends the tex. rec. on the ground that the mention of liberty ought to follow the mention of the apostolic office from which it springs. But the liberty here spoken of is the Christian liberty; only its application is different in the case of an Apostle. Meanwhile he takes advantage of the reference to his apostleship to prove by the way that he is an apostle. For a similar short digression cf. xv. 9, 10. The two essential constituents of apostleship were, first, that the Apostle should bear witness to the world of the central fact of Christianity, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and, second, that he should preach the risen Saviour in the demonstration of Spirit and of power. Paul has seen Jesus after His resurrection and is, consequently, a witness of the Lord's heavenly life. His ministry also has been effectual in making the Corinthians themselves Christians, so that they at least must acknowledge his apostleship.

*Χριστόν* should be omitted, as in **Σ** A B. He means that he has seen the historical Jesus of Nazareth. The reference must be to the appearance of Jesus to Saul on the way to Damascus. Rückert objects that no mention is made of his having *seen* Jesus. But cf. Acts ix. 17, 27. To have seen Him in the days of His flesh or in a vision would not have made St. Paul a witness for the resurrection.

*έώρακα*. The perf. expresses the abiding result of having seen Jesus in the power of his apostleship.

ἔργον. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 34, "meum opus es."

V. 2. ἄλλοις. They cannot be identified with any degree of certainty with any party in the Church, such as the Petrine party (Räbiger). The word implies that St. Paul's apostleship was denied in many Churches. His vindicating his apostleship in writing to the Corinthians proves that it was questioned in Corinth also. Almost all his epistles lead to the same conclusion, and show the widespread influence of his antagonists.

ἀλλά γε, only here and Luke xxiv. 21 in the New Test. In both places it seems to mean "yet at all events." In class. Greek some word comes in between.

σφραγίς, not only a *σημεῖον*. What they were was a Divine attestation to his apostleship. Cf. Rom. iv. 11. "In the Lord," belongs, not to "apostleship," but to ὑμεῖς: "You, as being in the Lord."

V. 3. αὕτη is referred by Chrys. to what follows, as if the Apostle were justifying his practice of not depending on the Churches for his maintenance. But no one questioned his right to do so, whereas many denied his apostleship. The word must, therefore, refer to what precedes: "That I have seen Jesus, and that you are my work in the Lord—these are the proof of my apostleship." Αὕτη is not subject (De Wette), but predicate, in gender of subject. For the clause answers the question, "what is the seal of my apostleship?" Cf. John i. 19; xvii. 3.

ἀνακρίνουσιν, a legal term. Cf. Luke xxiii. 14. It means, not merely "questioning it," but "examining into it."

V. 4. Christian liberty is not in all cases identical in its manifestations. To an Apostle it means authority to expect maintenance from the Churches for himself and his family.

μὴ οὐ, *num non*, gives an ironical turn to the question. It expresses surprise. Cf. Xen., *Mem.* IV. ii. 12, μὴ οὐ δύναμαι, "Is it, then, come to this, that I cannot," etc.

φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν, that is, to be maintained at the expense of the Churches. Cf. Luke x. 7. Here is no allusion to eating things offered to idols (Olshaus.), or to asceticism (Hofm.), as in Matt. xi. 18. Cf. vv. 7, 9, 11, 14. It was necessary for the Apostle to discuss the question of his claim to receive maintenance from the Churches, partly in consequence of the doubts cast upon his apostleship, partly perhaps because a reaction

was setting in against the enthusiasm of the earliest Christians of Jerusalem, who considered nothing their own, and of such men as Barnabas, who sold his land and laid the money at the Apostles' feet, partly on account of the "peculiar difficulties," as Wordsworth observes, "the two Apostles of the Gentiles had to contend with arising from the absence of any regular code of ministerial maintenance for the priests of heathen nations."

**V. 5.** Another form of Christian liberty is the right to enter the married state.

ἀδελφὴν γυναῖκα, "a sister as wife," that is, a wife who is a Christian. So Tert., *Exhort. ad Cast.* 8. But in *De Monog.* 8 he offers the explanation afterwards mentioned by Theod. and accepted by Jerome (*Contra Jovin.* I. 26), Augustine (*De Op. Monach.* 4), Ecum., Theophyl., Cor. a Lap., Est., that the Apostle is speaking, not of a wife, but of a female attendant who ministered of her substance to the Apostles as rich women had ministered to Christ. Helena, the companion of Simon Magus, was an instance of the abuse of this very thing. The only argument favourable to this view is the general tradition of the early Church that few of the Apostles were married. Peter only, says Tertullian (*ut sup.*). Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* III. p. 535, Potter) adds Philip and Paul, from having misunderstood Acts xxi. 9; Phil. iv. 3.<sup>1</sup> But γυναῖκα would surely be redundant, if it did not mean "wife." The practice among the clergy of having γυναῖκας συνεισάκτους, which prevailed widely in the time of Chrysostom, was forbidden by several Councils. We may infer that the Apostle speaks here of marriage as a thing indifferent no less than as an example of the application of the principle that an Apostle, who journeys from place to place to found Churches, has a right to expect the Churches to maintain him and his family.

ὥς . . . Κηφᾶς, "as the rest of the Apostles and, to particularize, the brothers of the Lord and Cephas." If Cephas is here included among the Apostles, so also are the brothers of the Lord. In Gal. i. 19 James is almost certainly styled an Apostle as well as brother of the Lord, and apparently so, but

<sup>1</sup> I cannot account for the statement in the interpolated Ignatian Epistle to the Philadelphians. ch. 4, that all the Apostles, including Paul, were married. It is an interpolation not in the interest of asceticism. Ambrosiaster also (on 2 Cor. xi. 2) speaks to the same effect, but excepts Paul and John.

not so certainly, in 1 Cor. xv. 7. On *καί* in the sense of "to particularize" cf. note on ver. 5. All the Apostles had confessedly the right; the Lord's brothers and Cephas exercised it. On the difficult question whether the Lord's brothers were sons of Joseph and Mary or sons of Joseph by a former wife or sons of another Mary, sister to the Lord's mother, cf. Bp. Lightfoot's exhaustive note, "Galatians," pp. 246 sqq.

V. 6. *ἥ* throws some degree of emotion into the question.

*ἐργάζεσθαι*, the usual word for manual labour. Cf. Acts xviii. 3; 2 Thess. iii. 8.

V. 7. Passing from his claim to maintenance as the equal of the other Apostles, he argues the question on its own merits. He mentions, as every-day illustrations of the principle that the labourer is worthy of his meat, the soldier, the vine-dresser, and the shepherd. Such secular vocations are mentioned as are themselves types of the Christian ministry. The first represents the Apostles going forth to wage war with the world; the second represents them, after conquest, planting Churches; the third represents their pastoral care of the Churches which they have founded. Again, the soldier is a mercenary; the vine-dresser an owner; the shepherd a slave. Yet in all alike labour implies reward.

*τὸν καρπὸν*. So A B C D. The accus. would scarcely be used if the reference were not to the owner of the vineyard.

Vv. 8, 9. He will not rest content with illustrations taken *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*, from human affairs. Cf. Gal. iii. 15; note on iii. 1. He will appeal to the Divine law given through Moses. Cf. Deut. xxv. 4. The correct reading is *ἡ καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λέγει*; So A B C D. The form of expression intimates that some one has objected that, whatever may be the practice of men, God does not enjoin upon the Churches the duty of maintaining the Apostles: "Or is it indeed true that the law says nothing about these things?"

*φιμώσεις*. B D read *κημώσεις*. So Tisch. It is a various reading in 1 Tim. v. 18 also. *Φίμος* is for *σφιγμός*, the root being *φυγ*, as in Lat. *figo*.

*ἀλοάω* is akin to *εἰλύω* and Lat. *volvo*. In the East to this day oxen tread out the corn, and the Arabs do not muzzle them.

V. 10. *μὴ . . . Θεῷ*; "Is it for the oxen that God cares," that is, when He enjoins the Israelites not to muzzle

them? "Or does not" God in the law "generally," as also in every particular command, "speak on our account?" The command not to muzzle the ox that treads the corn is given with an ulterior reference to ministers of the Gospel. The proof of this is that the Mosaic Law, as a whole, has a spiritual, Christian meaning underlying the more immediate application of its provisions. The meaning is not that every law has for an ulterior purpose the care and government of rational creatures, as the words are understood by Cajetan, Wolf, Neander, Alford, and De Wette, who cites an apposite parallel from Philo, *De Sacrif.* p. 848, οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλόγων ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἔχόντων. Cf. *De Somniis* I. p. 579, where Philo declares it would be unworthy of God to take thought of a garment; quite in the spirit of Heraclitus' words, πάντη γὰρ ἡσέβησεν Ὀμηρος εἰ μὴ ἡλληγόρησεν. But this would not prove the right of Apostles to maintenance. Besides, we cannot imagine St. Paul departing so far from the spirit of Christ's teaching, that God cares for the raven and sparrow because they are His creatures, not merely for the sake of man. The Apostle here applies the doctrine of the typical nature of the Mosaic dispensation. Cf. Tert., *Contra Marc.* V. 7, "et legem allegoricam secundum nos probavit." The allegory of Sarah and Hagar in Gal. iv. is another instance in which the Apostle ascribes to the Law a spiritual meaning. This interpretation explains πάντως, which in a question must mean "as a whole," "generally," and cannot be rendered "certainly." Cf. Pfeiderer, *Paulin.* p. 72. The Epistle of Barnabas differs from our passage only in the forced character of the allegories. The general theory of both writers is one and the same, and the more extreme form which it assumes in that Epistle gives a clue to the true purport of the doctrine in the hands of St. Paul. Cf. Barn., *Ep.* X. 2, ἄρα οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐντολὴ Θεοῦ τὸ μὴ τρώγειν, Μωϋσῆς δὲ ἐν πνεύματι ἐλάλησεν. What this sentence affirms is in accordance with the present passage; what it denies is anti-Pauline.

μέλει. Cf. Barn., *Ep.* XI. 1, ζητήσωμεν δὲ εἰ ἐμέλησεν τῷ Κυρίῳ προφανερῶσαι κ.τ.λ., that is, in the Law.

γάρ κ.τ.λ., sc. ὁ νόμος, "Yes, it was written because of us." Γάρ is used when the answer is a repetition of a question in the form of an assertion. Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 20.

ὅτι, demonstrative, "to show that" (Evans). If it is causal ("because," Revised Version), then the argument is that the Mosaic injunction is proved to have a typical meaning because it is in accordance with natural equity. But, if this were the Apostle's purpose, an appeal to the general principle would be sufficient and render an allegorical use of the law of Moses needless. Again, the ὅτι clause is not the subject of ἐγράφη (Authorized Version); for then we should expect γέγραπται and also be compelled to suppose, with Rückert, that the subsequent words were taken from a lost apocryphal book. Meyer, De Wette, Alford, Evans rightly understand the words in a spiritual, not in a literal, sense. "Ploughing" denotes the work done by him who breaks the fallow ground to form a Christian community; and "threshing" refers to the work of subsequent teachers. The reading of A B C, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort, is ὁφείλει ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ὁ ἀροτριῶν ἀροτριᾶν καὶ ὁ ἀλοῶν ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν. Paraphrase: "Surely it is because of us Apostles that this particular injunction was put in writing, to show that it is right for him who ploughs, that is, first preaches the Gospel in any place, to do so with the prospect of reaping, that is, of receiving maintenance from the Church he has formed, and for him that threshes, that is, teaches and administers, to do so with the prospect of sharing in that maintenance."

V. 11. A sudden, we may almost add humorous, descent from allegory to practical common sense. The irony of the transition is slightly marked by the antithetical balance of the two clauses and the use of μέγα. "Is it a great matter? Is there a principle at stake, which renders it incumbent upon us to thrust aside as unworthy of notice the injunction of so great a man as Moses?" Hence perhaps it is that the name of Moses is introduced in ver. 9.

τὰ πνευματικά, that is, the things of God. Cf. ii. 14; xii. 1-3; xiv. 1; Rom. xv. 27.

ἐσπείραμεν. Cf. Luke viii. 11; Gal. v. 22. The Apostles sowed the word; believers reaped the graces of the Spirit. Τὰ σαρκικά (in accordance with the synecdochical use of σὰρξ for "body") is synon. with τὰ βιωτικά (vi. 3), oppos. to δυνατὰ τῷ Θεῷ (2 Cor. x. 4). Cf. Col. iii. 22.

θερίσομεν. So  $\aleph$  A B, adopted by Lachm., Treg., Westc.

and Hort. So Tisch. in 8th edition. Hermann (*De Part. ãv*, II. 7) vindicated the use of *εἰ* with the subjunctive in the classics, though in prose its occurrence is extremely rare. Cf. Thuc. VI. 21, *εἰ ξυστῶσιν*, Luke ix. 13. But the fut. indic. is preferable here. It expresses the certain connection between the sowing and the claim to reap.

V. 12. The usual explanation is that of Chrys.: "If false teachers are permitted to make slaves of you, we have a greater right to do it than they; yet we have not used that right." The gen. *ὑμῶν* will then be objective: "power over you." Cf. Matt. x. 1. But (1) "authority over you" is not a natural expression for maintenance; (2) this interpretation assigns no meaning to *μετέχουσιν*, "partake of." Canon Evans' suggestion that *ὑμῶν* is subjective gen. appears to me to be excellent. But I cannot think that *ἐξουσία* means nothing more than "license to expect maintenance." "All things are yours," says the Apostle elsewhere. Whatever rights and prerogatives a teacher has, they are simply an embodiment of the rights that belong to the Church. Here, therefore, the Apostle speaks of the claim to maintenance as being one phase of the Church's possession of all things. Community of property had been tried and abandoned. But the principle on which that experiment was based was a truth intact. "*Omnia indiscreta sunt apud nos.*" In an ideal Church that application of the principle may be resuscitated in its integrity. The maintenance of Christian ministers is only a partial application of it in one direction. In ver. 11 the Apostle asks if there is any great principle that forbids his receiving maintenance at the hands of the Church; in this verse he reminds them of the principle, already stated in iii. 22, which sustains the claim.

*ἐγκοπὴν*. *Ἐγκόπτειν* is properly "to cut up a road to check the advance of an enemy or runner." The oppos. is *ὁδοποιεῖν* and *προκόπτειν*. Cf. Chrys., *ἀναβολὴν τῷ δρόμῳ τοῦ λόγου*. Cf. 2 Thess. iii. 1.

V. 13. Another argument, which differs from the previous ones in two things: (1) it is not an argument from analogy, but represents the maintenance of the ministers at the hands of the Churches as being truly an application of a principle acted upon under the Old Test.; (2) that principle is that their

maintenance is, not an earthly and secular matter (*σαρκικόν*, ver. 11), but a spiritual offering to God.

The Apostle mentions those who performed sacred rites and those who gave attendance at the altar. Ambrosiaster thinks the former are Gentiles, the latter Jews. It is not likely the Apostle would have based an argument on heathen customs. Theophyl., Œcum., Vitringa (*Synag. Vet.* p. 74), etc., consider the former to be Levites, the latter the priests. Certainly *ἐργάζεσθαι* includes more than the act of oblation, and in Num. viii. 12 sqq. it describes the peculiar duties of the Levites. At any rate it comprehends in its range of meaning the preparation of the sacrifices, while *παρεδρεύοντες* refers specially to the subsequent act of offering them to God; that is to say, the former clause is another allusion to founders of Churches, the latter to the men that carried on the work locally.

*ἐργάζεσθαι* is Hellenistic in the sense of offering worship and performing sacred rites. This usage is a survival of the ordinary meaning of the Ionic *ῥέζειν*. For *προσεδρεύοντες* A B C D read *παρεδρεύοντες*. The meaning is the same. Cf. Heb. vii. 13.

*θυσιαστηρίῳ*, "with the altar." A portion is consumed by the fire on the altar, a portion by the priest, who shares it with the altar. *Θυσιαστήριον*, the altar of Jehovah; *βωμός*, a heathen altar. Philo uses *βωμός* of the altar of the Lord. So also Barn., *Ep.* I. 7.

**V. 14.** As God enjoined under the Law, so also Christ ordained in His Church (cf. Matt. x. 10; Luke x. 7). *Οὐ ἐκ* cf. Rom. i. 17. So *ἀποζῆν*, Thuc. I. 2.

**V. 15.** *κέχρημαι*. So **Σ** A B C D. Copyists are apt to change a perf. into an aor.

*οὐδένι τούτων*, not "none of these arguments" (Heinrici), but "none of these prerogatives," such as, freedom from restrictions as to food, freedom to marry, and authority to claim maintenance from the Churches. Cf. Phil. iv. 10 sqq.

*ἔγραψα*, epistolary aor. He avows his intention to abide by his resolution henceforth.

*ἐν ἐμοί*, "in my case" (cf. Matt. xvii. 12). In xiv. 11 it means "in my judgment." Sometimes it means "in my power."

καλόν, "a noble thing." Cf. Soph., *Ant.* 72, καλόν μοι τοῦτο ποιούσῃ θανεῖν. Theophyl. and Ecum. wrongly understand λιμῶ.

ἢ τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει. A reads οὐθεὶς μὴ κενώσει, B D read οὐδεὶς κενώσει, C reads ἵνα τις κενώσει, which appears in Chrys., Theod., etc., in the subjunctive κενώσῃ. Reiche adopts the reading of C. This would make the construction easy. Cf. Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 202. The use of ἵνα with the fut. indic. in the New Test. is unquestionable. Cf. Gal. ii. 4, καταδουλώσουσιν (B A B C D), Phil. ii. 11, ἐξομολογήσεται (A C D), 1 Pet. iii. 1, κερδηθήσονται (B A B C), etc. But the better attested reading is οὐδεὶς κενώσει, a more difficult and, on that ground, preferable reading. So Lachm., Tisch. (8th ed.), Treg., Westc. and Hort. What then is the explanation? Meyer renders ἢ by "or": "it is better for me to die than use my authority in this matter; or at least, if death will not be the consequence, still nobody shall make void my boast." But the μάλλον before the ἢ and the unnatural weakening of the Apostle's asseveration by the introduction of another asseveration intended to modify it are fatal to this forced interpretation. Canon Evans supplies ἵνα in thought after ἢ. But this compels him to understand οὐδεὶς as if it were equivalent to τις, and introduce into Hellenistic Greek the class. idiom μάλλον ἢ οὐ in the sense of "rather than." We are driven to the supposition of an aposiopesis, though we need not suppose an anacoluthon and place a colon after μου. The Apostle started with the intention of saying "than that any one should," etc. But he turns the sentence into a direct denial: "than that—no one shall make void my boast." The boast is that he preaches the gospel without accepting maintenance from the Churches. This he regards as representative of all the other instances of his self-denial.

V. 16. This matter of boasting, the loss of which is worse than death, does not consist merely in preaching the gospel. That is a charge laid upon him, and woe to him if he neglects it. The "necessity" laid upon him is certainly not the need of maintenance (Aug., *Serm. in Monte*, II. 18; Jonathan Edwards, *Notes on the Bible*), but the command of Christ and the consequent urgency of obedience.

V. 17. Of the various interpretations offered of this diffi-

cult ver. two only need be here considered. Calvin, Estius, Neander, Wordsworth, Stanley, etc., thus: To prove that woe is to him if he preaches not the gospel, the Apostle makes two suppositions. The one is that he preaches the gospel with readiness of mind, in which case he may expect a reward; the other is that he preaches the gospel against his will, in which case he would only be a slave in charge,—but this he is not. But in either case, therefore, woe is to him if he neglects to preach the gospel. For if he neglects to do it with readiness of mind, he forfeits the reward promised to the earnest worker; if he neglects to do it as a duty, then he, as being a slave, is liable to punishment. This interpretation is beset with difficulties. (1) Why, if this view is correct, does the Apostle make these two suppositions? Was he doubtful whether he preached with a willing or an unwilling mind? (2) This interpretation implies that Christ rewards only zeal, whereas faithfulness in discharging a duty will secure a reward (cf. iv. 5). (3) The turn sometimes given to this interpretation implies that *οἰκονομία* conveys the notion of degradation. The steward was often a slave (cf. Luke xii. 42, 43). But in iv. 1; Eph. iii. 2; Col. i. 25; Tit. i. 7, *οἰκονομία*, far from being less honourable than *μίσθος*, is as much more honourable as trust is superior to mercenary service.

Meyer, De Wette, Hofmann, Alford, Hodge, etc., thus: To prove that woe is to him, if he preaches not the gospel, or, better still, that preaching the gospel is no matter of boasting, the Apostle makes two suppositions. The one is that he takes this honour unto himself (Heb. v. 4), without being called of God. The other is that he preaches, not for the gratification of his own ambition, but in strict obedience to the constraining command of Christ (cf. 2 Cor. x. 5). In the former case he will, it is true, expect a reward. But this is not his case. He is but a steward, who can demand no payment, not a mercenary, who claims his wage. To this interpretation the objection at once suggests itself that it seems to assign to *ἐκών* and *ἀκών* meanings which they do not easily bear. But cf. Rom. viii. 20, *οὐχ ἐκούσα*, “not of its own accord”; Hom., *Il.* III. 66, *ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις ἔλοιτο*, “which a man by his own efforts is not likely to obtain”; Æschyl., *Agam.* 38, *ἐκὼν λήθομαι*, “of set purpose I forget;” and espec. *ib.* 1613,

where ἐκὼν κατακτανεῖν explains τοῦδε τοῦ φόνον ῥαφεύς. This view of the passage is the only one that assigns to πρᾶσσω a distinct meaning, that of "engaging in a transaction," the opposite of which is "being entrusted with a stewardship." If his preaching is a business transaction, he expects to make a profit of some kind or other; if it is not, then the only explanation that can be offered of his having undertaken such a work is that he is a steward carrying out the injunctions of his Lord. As a preacher of the gospel, therefore, he has no occasion of boasting. His glorying and his reward must be sought in his preaching the gospel without charge.

V. 18. τίς . . . ὁ μισθός; "which reward, then, is the reward that is reserved for me?" The art. is intended to intimate that he considers his reward to be assured. But the boasting and the reward are not the same thing. The former is the Apostle's own act, the latter a future good to be bestowed upon him. Meyer is surely wrong in supposing the answer to be, "I have no reward." But other expositors are no less in error in supposing the reward to consist in the praise awarded by Christ in the day of judgment to all his faithful servants. This reward he will receive for preaching the gospel. Here he speaks of a peculiar reward which would be bestowed upon him for preaching the gospel without charge. Alford and Evans continue the question to the end of the verse. But the emphasis on εὐαγγελιζόμενος and its close proximity to ἀδάπανον suggest that this clause is really the answer. "Proclaiming the gospel, the free, glad tidings of God, I am resolved that my preaching shall be like the gospel, free." The felicitous and characteristic paradox should be noted. The consciousness of preaching freely a free gospel was the Apostle's pay for declining to be paid.

ἵνα, in the sense of a substantival infin. Cf. John viii. 56, ἡγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ, which in class. Greek would have been τῷ ἰδεῖν. Cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XLIX. 8.

ἀδάπανον, here only in the New Test. The root δαπ, a lengthened form of δα, *to give*, occurs in δάπτω, δειπνον, δέπας.

θήσω, "make the gospel to be without charge." This use of τίθημι with a secondary predicate occurs in class. Greek,

though seldom in prose (cf. Ast, *Lex. Plat.* III. p. 385). The usual word is ποιῶ (cf. note on xii. 18). On the fut. θήσω cf. notes on ver. 15 and iv. 6.

καταχρήσασθαι, "make full use." Cf. note on vii. 31.

εἰς. Meyer (on Rom. i. 20) insists that εἰς with the substantival infin. always expresses purpose. It expresses result in Heb. xi. 3, perhaps in 2 Cor. viii. 6. Yet, in our passage, that the Apostle refrained from asserting his rights in the sphere of the gospel is probably represented as the *motive* that prompted him to preach gratuitously.

ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ may be joined with ἐξουσίᾳ, without repetition of τῇ. Repetition of the article is dispensed with, (1) before oft recurring phrases, such as ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, κατὰ σάρκα, and, no doubt, ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, (2) after substantives derived from verbs that are construed with the preposition used in the phrase, as τὴν συνεσιν μου ἐν τῷ μυστηρίῳ. But here it is better to join the words with καταχρήσασθαι. For he could not be thought to refer to any other than his apostolical authority. Joined with the verb the words are another statement of the contrast between the free gospel preached and the exacting spirit of the preacher who demands pay, when it is not voluntarily offered.

Vv. 19-22. A detailed enumeration of instances in which he found his reward for preaching the gospel gratuitously in assimilating his ministry to the free character of the gospel.

V. 19. ἐκ only here with ἐλεύθερος, for ἀπό (Rom. vii. 3) or ethical dat. (Rom. vi. 20). It expresses, not exemption from, but deliverance out of, bondage. But πάντων is masc., like τοὺς πλείονας. Origen (*Out.*) limits it unduly to freedom from sin. It means the liberty with which Christ hath made us free from bondage to men. But, in the spirit of Christ and the gospel, he used his Christian freedom to make himself, by a voluntary act, every man's slave. Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 7; Mark x. 44; Rom. xv. 1.

τοὺς πλείονας, "the more"; not "the majority" (Meyer, De Wette); not "more than the other Apostles" (Alford); but "more than would otherwise be gained." It is virtually equivalent to the Eng. phrase, "the more," where "the" is a comparative ablative. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 15.

κερδήσω. The word both explains μισθός and carries on

the metaphor of the steward. He refuses payment in money that he may make the greater gain in souls. But the gain is that which a faithful steward makes, not for himself, but for his master.

**Vv. 20-22.** In his voluntary subjection to others he regards them from three distinct points of view—race, religion, conscience.

**V. 20. Race.** To Jews he became a Jew. He does not in this instance add that to the Greeks he became a Greek. This was unnecessary, partly because the old Hellenic pride and exclusiveness had in great measure ceased at this time, partly because the Apostle himself was practically a Greek in sentiment and language. Great as is the moral altitude and equilibrium of St. Paul, it falls short of the perfect, universal character of Jesus Christ, in which we can perceive no effort to be a Jew to the Jews or a Greek to the Greeks, but an entire oneness with both.

**Religion.** The Apostle circumcised Timothy at Lystra, and on that very journey he was carrying to the Churches of Asia the decree of the Council of Jerusalem, which released Gentile Christians from the yoke of circumcision (cf. Acts xvi. 4). Contrast the Apostle's address in the synagogue of Antioch in Pisidia (Acts xiii. 14-41) and his address to the Athenians (Acts xvii. 22-31).

The clause *μὴ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον* must be inserted from **ⲛ A B C D**. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The clause proves that the words "under the law" are not precisely synonymous with "Jew." The Apostle was a Jew, but he was not "under the law." It proves also that by "law" the Apostle means the complex of the Mosaic institutions; not the moral law alone, nor the ceremonial law alone, but both regarded as one. He does not distinguish them as if they were two laws. But his conversion had produced so mighty a revolution in Paul that he who was previously a Hebrew of the Hebrews and a Pharisee had to assume deliberately a new mode of religious thought and feeling in order to put himself in sympathy with the Judaists in the Church.

**V. 21** *ἄνομος*, not merely "one not under the law," but "an outlaw." The word describes the Gentiles from a Jewish point of view. As *ἄνομος* is more than *μὴ νόμον ἔχων* (Rom.

ii. 14), so also *ἐννομος* is more than *ὑπὸ νόμον*. Not that the Apostle uses the word in the ethical meaning which it has in the classics, "just" (cf. Plat., *Rep.* p. 302), but that the difference between Jew and Christian is that the former lives *under* the law, which speaks from without and from above, the latter *in* the law, because that law is itself love.

*μὴ ὧν*, "not regarding myself as being," etc. These clauses contain the reason why he made himself all things to all men. He is without law to those who are without law, because he is in the law of Christ and, therefore, not without law in respect to God, the ultimate lawgiver and judge.

For *Θεῶ* and *Χριστῶ* we must read *Θεοῦ* and *Χριστοῦ*, as in A B C D. They are gen. of possession, as in *κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

*κερδανῶ*. So A B C, adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort.

V. 22. *Conscience*. The Apostle reverts to the special point in which he made himself an example to the Corinthians (cf. viii. 10). This, together with the fact that *ἀσθενής* elsewhere, always means weak Christians, is decisive against Alford's view that the Apostle here speaks of unbelievers. Cf. x. 32, where he mentions Jews, Greeks, and the Church of God.

*γέγονα*, "I became and have ever since continued to become" all things to all men. This is what the Fathers meant by *οἰκονομία* and *συγκατάβασις*. An interesting correspondence passed between Jerome and Augustine as to the import of the Apostle's words. The former held that they justify dispensatory dissimulation. The latter maintained that the Apostle's observing Jewish ceremonies was quite consistent with the doctrine that these ceremonies have no saving power. They had been instituted by God, whereas the religious rites of the Gentiles owed their origin to the instigation of demons. As the Apostle did not conceal his belief that men's salvation is through Christ alone, his occasionally observing ceremonies which he confessed to be to him unmeaning, in order to avoid giving offence, was not an act of dissimulation. Jerome was convinced by his friend's arguments.

*ἵνα σώσω*. Peter did it from moral weakness. Cf. Gal. ii. 12.

πάντως τινας, "in every way some"; that is, one man in one way, another in another. His desire was to save all in some way or other, and if he failed of this, yet in all these ways some at least.

V. 23. πάντα. So  $\Sigma$  A B C D.

διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, not "for the sake of," but "because of the gospel;" that is, because the nature of the gospel is such that self-denial in its ministers is the only spirit worthy of it. Hence συγκοιν. means more than "partaker of salvation." The word sums up the detailed statement of the previous verses that he assimilated his ministry to the character of his message. He wished to be a sharer with others in the spirit of the gospel.

Vv. 24-27. By the two illustrations of runners in a race and boxers, he shows the necessity for special exertion and unusual self-denial in order to win the reward. That reward is not eternal life (which is not a μισθός), but assimilation to the spirit of the gospel. To gain the prize has not been given to all Christians.

V. 24. βραβεῖον (derivation conjectural).<sup>1</sup> Vulg. has *bravium*. The Latin Fathers liked to use the Apostle's word for the Christian prize, in preference to ἀθλον or *præmium*. The allusion is probably to the Isthmian games, though there is nothing in the passage to exclude allusion to the Olympic.

οὕτω, that is, as athletes do, with full resolve to win, remembering that all do not win.

τρέχετε, imperat. The indic. we have already in πάντες τρέχουσιν.

καταλάβετε, "that ye may (=so as to) lay hold of," etc.; synon. with ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι of 1 Tim. vi. 12. Cf. Phil. iii. 12. This is better than "to overtake the other runners" (Evans). The word means "to catch at," not "to out-strip."

V. 25. The two lessons the Apostle wishes to teach are the difficulty of winning and the unspeakable worth of the prize. Both illustrations of the runner and the boxer would equally well serve to teach both lessons. As simply matter of style, the Apostle attaches the one lesson to the latter comparison, the other to the former.

<sup>1</sup> Is it akin to the Eng. *brave*, which formerly meant "handsome," like the Welsh word *braf*?

πάντες, "every athlete, whether runner or boxer"; thus preparing the way for πυκτεύω.

ἐγκρατεύεται. The hardship is not confined to the actual race, but includes the severe training that prepares for it.

μὲν οὖν. The οὖν calls attention to a special point, the μὲν is correlative of δέ. It is not the μὲν οὖν of argument, as in vi. 4, 7. Cf. Winer, *Gr.* § LIII. 8. α, Moulton's note.

φθαρτόν, at the Isthmian games a wreath of pine leaves. The victor won, it is true, a crown of glory. But the withering of the leaves was no less symbolical than their greenness. In every ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα the glory fades almost as fast as the wreath. The memorable men of Greece are not the Olympic victors. Cf. 1 Pet. v. 4.

V. 26. ἐγὼ τοίνυν, "I therefore," that is, because I am running in a race for a special prize; because a long course of training is needed; and because an imperishable wreath is held before me. Whatever you may do, this I will do, being ἀθλητὴς ἄθλου τοῦ μεγίστου (M. Anton. III. 4).

ἀδίλως, "without steady aim." Cf. 2 Macc. vii. 34. It is, I think, late Greek in this sense. Uncertainty of purpose and vagueness in realizing the nature of the Christian aim is one of the most wide-spread and enervating dangers of the spiritual life.

τρέχω. Cf. Acts xx. 24.

οὐκ ἀέρα δέρων, that is, "as hitting, not the air, but my antagonist." A lively description of a σκιαμαχία, a mere fencing. So Chrys. Cf. Vergil's "ictibus auras verbero." This is more to the purpose than the usual explanation that "hitting the air" means "missing one's man," "hitting wide of the mark." The οὐκ negatives ἀέρα, μὴ would have negatived the δέρων. Cf. Xen., *Mem.* III. ix. 4, παρούσαν . . . οὐ τῇ τυχοῦσῃ. The words ἀλλά μου τὸ σῶμα were in the Apostle's mind. But, instead of connecting them with δέρων, he uses a stronger expression, ὑπωπιάζω, thus adding to the meaning. Δέρω, etymologically the same word as "to tear."

V. 27. What he has said negatively he now states affirmatively with greater emphasis and detail. He not only hits, but he bruises, and his antagonist is his own body. Even this is not enough. To the metaphor of boxing is added that of capturing in war and enslaving, to show the abiding effect

of the combat. And all this, lest the umpire, Christ, after investigation made into the victor's strict adherence to the conditions of the contest, should in the end refuse to acknowledge his victory or to bestow on him the crown. This would be the more galling to him, because his work as an Apostle consisted in heralding the contest and summoning others into the lists.

*ὑποπιύζω* (from *ὑπώπιον*, hence "to hit under the eye"), "to bruise." The reading *ὑποπιέζω*, though adopted by Reiche and Hofmann from Clem. Al., *Strom.* III. p. 558 Potter (cf. his note), is not the reading of  $\aleph$  A B C.

*τὸ σῶμα*, not because the body is necessarily evil, but because it is the weapon with which the law of sin and death fights us and, at the same time, the sphere within which the spiritual powers of evil come within our reach to be bruised and destroyed.

*δουλαγωγῶ*. He again changes the metaphor to that of a battle, in order to express the permanence of the result. The Christian victor does not destroy the body, but makes it his slave; so that it now serves the soul which it sought to slay.

*κηρύξας*. It is difficult to reject the allusion, admitted by Wolf, Osiander, Maier, Meyer, etc., to the heralds whose duty it was not only to proclaim the victor (*Ælian*, *Var. Hist.* II. 23), but also to summon the runners (*Plat.*, *Leg.* VIII. p. 833). Yet in Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 5, *βραβεῖον* . . . *κήρυξ γενόμενος*, the word does not seem to mean more than "preacher of the gospel," notwithstanding the proximity of the metaphor in *βραβεῖον*.

*ἀδόκιμος*, "rejected by the umpire;" in allusion to the examination of the combatants at the close of the contest, when, if the victor was proved not to have contended in strict accordance with the conditions, he forfeited the crown. The word is derived, not from *δοκιμάζειν*, but from *δέχομαι*, and always has the passive meaning "rejected." There is no allusion to "assaying in fire" (Evans). "Castaway," "rejected," are better renderings than "unapproved." The Genevan version has "reproved," that is, of men; and it has been said that the rendering was adopted for doctrinal reasons.

C. *The Temptations to Sin to which the Corinthian Christians would expose themselves, as the Israelites had done, by taking part in Idol-feasts.*

(x. 1-14).

This chapter is to be closely connected with ix. 27. In the history of the chosen race we see men becoming ἀδόκιμοι and falling short of the promised inheritance. But the warning is the more pointed inasmuch as the danger of the Corinthians and of the Israelites alike lay in contact with idolatry. The chapter, therefore, is also closely connected with the subject of this division of the Epistle.

V. 1. γάρ. So **8** A B C D, Vulg. It introduces an instance of rejection by God.

οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν. Cf. xii. 1; Rom. i. 13; xi. 25; 2 Cor. i. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 13. The words are always used, not by way of rhetorical impressiveness, but to introduce what could not otherwise be known to the reader; such as the Apostle's intention to visit Rome, his afflictions, revelations vouchsafed him concerning the spiritual blessings to be bestowed on Israel, spiritual gifts in the Church, the hope of the resurrection, or, as here, the sacramental character of the cloud and of the passage through the Red Sea.

πατέρες. Estius, Meyer, etc., explain it of the national ancestors of the Apostle and other Jews in the Church. The name was so used by the Jews themselves. But Christ gave it an ethical meaning, and significantly added the word "your," implying that the unbelief of that generation was the same as the unbelief of their forefathers. The Apostle also uses the word ethically, but says "our," to intimate that the Church under the Old Testament was the spiritual ancestry of the Church under the New. But he speaks of the Church as a whole, not as in Rom. iv. 16; Gal. iii. 29, of individual Christians. Cf. Gal. vi. 16; Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 4, ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Ἰακώβ.

ὑπό. Cf. Exod. xiii. 21; Wisd. xix. 7, σκιάζουσα νεφέλην, and Ps. civ. (cv.) 39, διεπέτασε νεφέλην. Though ὑπό is sometimes used with the accus. to denote extension under, without the idea of motion (as in Acts ii. 5; cf. Thuc. II. 99, ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον . . . ὑπὸ τῷ Παγγαίῳ, without differ-

ence of meaning), the act of going under the cloud was probably in the Apostle's mind, as it helps the analogy between the baptism of the Israelites and ours.

V. 2. *εἰς*. Moses represented Christ. Cf. Gal. iii. 22. So Basil, *De Spir. Sancto*, xiv. 3, ὡς εἰ σκιὰν καὶ τύπον. All other renderings of *εἰς*, such as "under the leadership of," "through" (Aug., *Enarr. in Ps. lxxvii.*), "having confidence in" (Chrys.; cf. Exod. xiv. 31), are grammatically and exegetically inadmissible. If Moses was the representative of Christ, the baptism of the Israelites under the cloud and in the sea was not a mere allegory, but a true baptism unto Christ and implied more than the baptism of John. Cf. note on ver. 4.

Whether we read *ἐβαπτίσαντο* with B, or *ἐβαπτίσθησαν* with  $\aleph$  A C D, the word implies that it was their own voluntary act. Their rebellion was so much the more sinful. Though the aor. mid. is never used in a passive sense, the aor. pass. has sometimes a reflexive meaning. Cf. Jelf, *Gr.* §§ 364, 5; Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 46. "Received baptism." "Commiserunt se aquis" (Melanch.). The *ἐν* should not be pressed, as if the Israelites immersed themselves in the cloudy vapour, which they did not. It is used, as Hofmann rightly observes, to make the analogy between the baptism of the Israelites, which was not by immersion, and the baptism of Christians, which was, at least as a rule, by immersion, more complete.

*Μωσῆν* (A D) or *Μωϋσῆν* ( $\aleph$  B C). In Luke xvi. 29 *Μωϋσεία* or *Μωσεία* occurs. The prominence given to the man Moses in the New Test. is worthy of note, coming as it does after the comparative silence of the Old Test. Scriptures. Cf. John v. 45; ix. 28. We cannot conceive David or Isaiah calling himself a disciple of Moses, who was truly what Spinoza calls him, "a voice in the air." It is one of the symptoms of the decay of a religion that the name of its founder should be thrust into the front. Reverence of the man takes the place of faith in his doctrines. Christianity, on the other hand, would cease to exist, if it were severed from the living person of its founder. The writers of the New Test. mark the contrast between Judaism and Christianity by personifying the former in Moses, as they find the latter in Christ. Cf. John i. 17; Heb. iii. 3.

**V. 3.** *πνευματικόν*. Theod. Mops., De Wette, etc., understand this to mean that the meat was of supernatural origin. Cf. Ps. lxxvii. 24; Joseph., *Antiq.* III. i. 6, *θεῖον βρῶμα*. But the notion that the bread, the water, and the rock had an allegorical (Baur), and even sacramental meaning is more to the purpose and must, at least, be added to the other meaning. Cf. Rev. xi. 8. So Chrys., De Lyra, Estius, Bengel, Osiander, etc. Cf. Aug., *ut. sup.*: “eundem potum spirituales biberunt, non corporalem eundem.” On the attributive without the art. cf. note on iv. 19.

*τὸ αὐτό*. omitted in **NA**, but necessary and emphatic. Calvin and Heinrici correctly explain it, “the same which we Christians eat and drink”; not “the same all of them”, which is unimportant, whereas the identity of the sacrament in the wilderness and under the new dispensation is the central truth of the passage.

**V. 4.** *πόμα* occurs in class. Greek; but the usual form is *πῶμα*.

*ἀκολουθούσης*. From the initiatory sacrament of baptism the Apostle passes to the sacrament of sustenance, which follows the Israel of God to the end of their journey. The use of the word *ἀκολουθούσης* shows that the Apostle has in his mind the rabbinical tradition that the rock smitten by Moses followed the Israelites through their wanderings. But it does not prove that he believed and gave his sanction to the legend (Alford), nor that he represents the water that gushed out of the rock as flowing by the side of the host during their march (Theod. Mops., Calvin, Estius, etc.). Both suppositions are inconsistent with Num. xxi. 5, 16. On the contrary the Apostle purposely adds, in order to obviate the inference that he believed the legend and to introduce a beautiful allegorical use of it, that the true rock which followed the Israelites was Christ. Now this cannot mean merely that the rock was a type of Christ (Tert., *Adv. Jud.* 9; Theod. Mops., Baur, *Neut. Theol.* p. 193), which would have required *ἐστι*, as in Gal. iv. 24. Rather, the Apostle finds in the legend an allegorical expression of the truth that Christ was the constant source of spiritual blessings to all that partook of the sacrament instituted in the wilderness. So Chrys., Theophyl., Hervæus, Meyer, etc. Philo (*Deterius*, etc., p. 176), makes a similar

use of the allegory: πέτραν τὴν σεῖρῶν καὶ ἀδιάκοπον ἐμφαίνων σοφίαν Θεοῦ, τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τιθηνοκόμον καὶ κουροτρόφον τῆς ἀφθάρτου διαίτης ἐφιεμένων. According to Philo there was a rock that could not be cleft, which was no other than the Word or Wisdom of God, and only such as desired incorruptible or spiritual sustenance were nourished by it. The Apostle declares that the ever-present Wisdom was Jesus Christ. The passage is important as a statement of Christ's pre-existence. Cf. note on viii. 6.

The point of these four verses is the real identity of the sacraments under both dispensations. Without this there is not much force in the Apostle's warning. The dispensations differed, as law differs from Gospel, and as the covenant from Mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, differs from the liberty, wherewith Christ has made us free. But though circumcision, to take an example, or the paschal sacrifice was a symbol of legal bondage, the Mosaic dispensation had also a spiritual side. Cf. note on xiv. 21. It had real sacraments, and not mere types of sacraments. Bp. Bull is surely in error when he says (*Harm. Diss.* 2, cap. 7, § 5), "that the old covenant laboured under a want of pardoning grace or the remission of sins." The Christian Church existed under the Old Testament. Cf. Heb. iii. 4, 5; iv. 2 (they had the Gospel preached to them); xi. 26 (the reproach of Christ). The prophets spoke of the sufferings of Christ and were inspired by Christ's Spirit. Cf. 1 Pet. i. 11, where Χριστοῦ after πνεῦμα is subjective gen.: "the Spirit sent by Christ," implying Christ's pre-existence and presence. Stephen speaks of the "Church in the wilderness" (Acts vii. 38).<sup>1</sup> The strange

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mozley, *Review of the Baptismal Controversy*, p. 108: "There has been but one fundamental dispensation in the world since its creation, viz. that of the Gospel." He cites Augustine, *Ep.* 157, § 14: "Antiquos justos non nisi per eandem fidem liberatos per quam et liberamur nos, fidem scilicet incarnationis Christi." Similarly Calvin, *Inst.* IV. xiv. 23; Witsius, *De Œcon. Fœd. Dei*, IV. xii., where he refutes with considerable spirit the doctrine of Cocceius that salvation was not revealed under the Old Testament. Cf. Cocceius, *Summa*, liii. § 7. Dr. Arnold (*Fragm. on the Church*, p. 78) calls attention to the error that lurks in the summary of the present passage in the English Bible, "The sacraments of the Jews are types of ours." "Here is the error," he says, "of making the outward rites or facts of the Jewish religion subordinate to the outward rites of ours, instead of regarding both as co-ordinate with one another and subordinate to some spiritual reality, of which both alike are but signs."

thing is that the Apostle should find these sacraments in the miracles of the Red Sea and the wilderness. But Christ also said that it was not Moses that had given the bread from heaven (John vi. 32); that is, in the sacrament of the manna God was actually giving Christ. These miraculous gifts possessed the two essential characteristics of a sacrament; for they were the evidence of the Divine authority of the dispensation which they inaugurated, and also symbols of the consecration of Israel to God's service. It is noteworthy that the Apostle recognises only two sacraments in the history of the Israelites, and that these correspond to the two sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper.

**V. 5.** οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν, that is, "very few." Cf. Num. xiv. 30. All, in fact, perished, save Caleb and Joshua. εὐδοκεῖν ἐν τινι is an Alexandrian construction for the late Greek εὐδ. τινι. Cf. LXX., 1 Macc. x. 47.

κατεστρώθησαν, cited from LXX., Num. xiv. 16. Cf. Heb. iii. 17.

**V. 6.** Τύπος has two ethical meanings in the New Testament; an example (1 Tim. iv. 12), and a type representing a spiritual truth (Rom. v. 14; Heb. ix. 24). Here it is more natural to understand it in the former meaning, but of an example to be avoided. Hence εἰς denotes God's ulterior object in events which also answered more immediate purposes.

ἐγενήθησαν. Cf. note on i. 30. It is unnecessary to explain the plur. after ταῦτα by the attraction of the predicate τύποι. The plur. verb occurs in class. Greek with a neuter subject especially when instances of a general statement are mentioned, as here. Cf. Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 418. So συνέβαινον, ver. 11, in A D.

ἡμῶν. For the gen. cf. 1 Tim. iv. 12; 2 Pet. ii. 6.

ἐπιθυμητὰς κακῶν. The Apostle begins with a general expression, to connect the sins of the Israelites with those of the Corinthians and include under one head the various sins afterwards enumerated.

καὶ κεῖνοι, "even those men," who had enjoyed such privileges.

**Vv. 7-10.** The moral ground of all forms of sin is desire of evil things. This leads to the sin of idolatry, idolatry to

fornication, fornication to tempting God, and tempting God to murmuring against Him. Thus:—

|                                    |                  |                          |
|------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Desire of evil<br>assumes the form | 1. Of sensuality | of worship = idolatry ;  |
|                                    |                  | leading to               |
|                                    | 2. Of unbelief   | of lust = fornication ;  |
|                                    |                  | leading to               |
|                                    |                  | of doubt = proving God ; |
|                                    |                  | leading to               |
|                                    |                  | of despair = murmuring.  |

**V. 7.** The Israelites were guilty of idolatry when they worshipped the calf in Horeb (cf. Exod. xxxii. 6). The form of their idolatrous worship is mentioned to bring home forcibly to the minds of the Corinthians the similarity between the dangerous practices in which they indulged and those which had proved fatal to the Israelites.

**V. 8.** Idolatry led to fornication. Cf. Wisd. xiv. 12, ἀρχὴ γὰρ πορνείας ἐπίνοια εἰδώλων. The Israelites had been guilty of fornication with the daughters of Moab at an idol-feast (cf. Num. xxv. 1-6). At Corinth the fashionable cult was worship of Aphrodite, whose priestesses were harlots. But it is not merely the associations of idolatry, but idolatry itself also, that leads to sins of impurity. Chastity and holiness of mind and heart are produced by a realization of the spiritual nature of God.

ἐπεσαν. So **NA B C D**. A few instances of the 1 aor. in class. Greek are thought to be genuine. Cf. Veitch, *Greek Verbs*, s.v. πίπτω. But it frequently occurs in **LXX.** and seems to have been much affected at Alexandria. In the New Test. it is found oftener in **A** than in any other MS. Πίπτω is often used as passive of βάλλω. But here it probably implies that the agent was unseen, the fact alone visible.

εἰκοσιτρεῖς. In Num. xxv. 9 the number is four and twenty thousand. Hodge and others say both are equally correct as round numbers for a number that was really between them. But if the Apostle knew that the number given in the narrative was four and twenty thousand, why did he deliberately alter the "four" into "three?" We must suppose a lapse of memory (so Neand., De Wette, Meyer), or else say that the Apostle followed a Jewish tradition (so Evans).

Some expositors have changed the "three" into "four," to save their theory of inspiration. So Musculus.

**V. 9.** Fornication leads to tempting God. Sensuality is the parent of unbelief, both because it produces a consciousness of guilt and because it blunts the spiritual discernment. Unbelief at first assumes the form of doubt of God's goodness, especially His faithfulness to His promises as the God that hears prayer and to His threatenings as the holy and righteous punisher of sin. Such doubts draw men on to presumption. They put God's patience to the test.

ἐκπειράζωμεν, "try out and out." Cf. Heb. iii. 9, where ἐπείρασαν is explained by ἐδοκίμασαν, unless we read ἐν δοκιμασίᾳ. But even the latter reading throws light on the meaning of the words "tempting God." They put Him to the test when He was putting them to the test. The compound ἐκπειράζω is taken from Ps. lxxvii. (lxxviii.) 18, and is used because unbelief grows ever stronger, and increases in guilt till it reaches a point, fixed in God's mind, at which the Divine vengeance is no longer restrained.

A reads Θεόν, **Ⲛ B C** Κύριον, **D** Χριστόν. The weight of evidence is in favour of Κύριον. Marcion is said by Epiphanius (*Contra Hæres.* XLII.) to have altered Κύριον into Χριστόν that the Apostle might not appear to assert the lordship of Christ. Really either reading tells against him. But Marcion was right in thinking that the reading Κύριον identifies the Lord Jehovah of the narrative with the historical Jesus Christ.

ἀπώλλυντο is the reading of **Ⲛ B**, A is illegible, **C D** have ἀπώλοντο. The imperf. expresses that they perished from time to time.

**V. 10.** Unbelief, foiled in its presumption, changes to despair. Cf. Num. xvi. 41. The murmuring of the Corinthians manifested itself in party-spirit and strife—the pride, boasting, foolishness and bitterness, with which Clement of Rome charges them.

ὀλοθρευτοῦ. **A D** have ὀλεθρευτοῦ, and in Heb. xi. 28 **A D** read ὀλεθρεύων. The form in ε is the more correct, as ὀλοθρος never occurs, but always ὀλεθρος. The reference is to Num. xvi. 41. But the words "by the destroyer" are added by the Apostle, in perfect consistency, however, with the narrative.

It was suggested probably by what is elsewhere said of the destroying angel (cf. Exod. xii. 23). It is evident that an angel of the Lord is meant, not Satan.

**V. 11.** After enumerating the successive steps in the fall of Israel, the Apostle repeats from ver. 6 that these things were a warning to us.

τυπίκως. So **Σ** A B C. D, τύποι. Συνέβαιεν. So **Σ** B C. A D, -ον.

νουθεσία, Hellenistic; νοθέτησις, Attic.

κατήντηκεν. So **Σ** B D. A C, -σεν. Cf. note on κέχρημαι, ix. 15; ἐθηριομάχησα, xv. 32. In late Greek the perf. and the aor. are sometimes used interchangeably.

τὰ τέλη, synon. with συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος (Matt. xiii. 40, 49), and τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν χρόνων (1 Pet. i. 20). But, while Christ speaks of the end of the ages as future, the Apostles represent it as present or even past. In the Gospels it is connected with His second coming (Matt. xxiv. 3); in the Epistles with His death (Heb. ix. 26), when the consummation of the world's history was realized. Previously it was described as coming from the future to meet us; now it is represented as rushing from the past and "overtaking" us. "Men whom the ends of the ages have overtaken" is the appellation of Christians. The Apostle mentions it here partly to warn the Corinthians of the near approach of judgment, partly also in contrast to τυπίκως. The temptations of Christians are the more perilous, because they do not tread the low plain of earthly rewards and punishments, but belong to the spiritual sphere of the kingdom of God.

**V. 12.** Admonition is intended by the Spirit of God in recording the sins and punishments of the Israelites.

ὥστε. Cf. note on vii. 38.

ἐστάναι, "that he stands in safety." Cf. 2 Cor. i. 24. To maintain the antithesis, πέσῃ must mean "lest he fall from a position of safety and be a castaway." Cf. Rom. xi. 11; xiv. 4. The words are an allusion to κατεστρώθησαν, ver. 5. Chrys., Estius, De Wette, Meyer, etc., explain them of falling into sin and standing in righteousness. Cf. Fritzsche on Rom. xiv. 4, "πίπτειν peccare, et στήκειν recte facere." But does Scripture represent sin as a fall, except in the metaphor of falling against a stumbling-stone? Cf. Hos. xiv. 1.

**V. 13.** εἰληφεν, "has seized," *tenuit*, like καταλαμβάνω. The temptation had not only solicited but seized and overcome them. It was now holding them fast. Cf. Luke ix. 39.

ἀνθρώπινος, not "originating with men" (Mosh., Olshaus.), but "common to men." Cranmer: "such as foloeth the nature of man." Cf. M. Anton. VIII. 46, ἀνθρωπικὸν σύμπτωμα. Theirs was not an extraordinary temptation, peculiar to them; for the history of Israel had proved that others had passed through the same temptations, and Caleb and Joshua had overcome. The temptation common to men is the strength of their own lust. But some are tempted to deny Christ by the terrors of martyrdom; and Christ also had temptations peculiar to Himself. The Corinthians had not been called to resist "unto blood." Hence δέ marks an advance in the thought. "Your temptation is common to man; moreover, even should extraordinary temptations assail you in the future, God is faithful."

ὁς κ.τ.λ. God's faithfulness is shown in not permitting temptation to be too intense in degree or too long in duration.

ὁ δύνασθε, "your strength." No ellipse of an infin. Cf. Soph., *Aj.* 322, εἰ δύνασθέ τι, and note on iii. 2.

ἔκβασιν, properly "a way out of a defile," "a mountain pass." Cf. Xen., *Anab.* III. 20.

τὴν, "that way out," which is suitable to the nature of the temptation.

σύν, "simultaneously with." So Theophyl., ἅμα. Cf. 2 Pet. ii. 9, ἐκ πειρασμοῦ. It means that God makes both the temptation and the way of escape; and the way out is not an after-thought.

τοῦ δύνασθαι. Meyer rightly observes that "to bear" is not identical with "to escape." Trust in God's faithfulness to provide a way of escape, makes the Christian strong under the temptation until the deliverance is accomplished. Hofmann wrongly considers τοῦ δύν. gen. of identity.

**V. 14.** He ends the argument from the example of the Israelites with a sharp admonition. All the verses from 1 to 13 are intended to show the dangers of contact with idolatry.

ἀπο- gives to φεύγω a quasi-local meaning. Cf. Plat., *Phæd.* p. 65, φεύγει ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος. The metaphor, that is, of an army caught (εἰληφεν) in a defile and urged to flee

through the mountain-pass (ἔκβασις) is kept up. In the spirit of the Apostle's injunction the early Christians stood aloof from the games and festivals of their heathen neighbours, because of their close connection with idolatry. Cf. Tert., *De Spect.* 4 and 11; *De Idol.* 11. It is not improbable that this abstention of the Christians occasioned the first outbreak of persecution.

D. *Partaking of the Idol-feasts inconsistent with Partaking of the Lord's Supper.*

(x. 15-22).

In this section we again meet with the mystical side of the Apostle's teaching, the pith of which, from this point of view, is that every act of worship is of the nature of a sacrament, inasmuch as it brings the worshipper through outward means into communion with the unseen and spiritual. He who partakes of the idol-feasts as religious rites is in communion with demons. The Israelites of old were brought through their act of sacrifice into "communion of the altar." The Christian, when he partakes of the Lord's Supper, is in communion with Christ. But we cannot be in communion at once with demons and with Christ. Shun, therefore, the idol-feasts.

V. 15. ὡς φρονίμοις, "as being men of discernment." This is not a retraction of iii. 1; and we cannot, in such a connection, attach to the word the slightest tinge of irony, as in iv. 10. Their spiritual insight was dull; but they were not deficient in natural intelligence and worldly wisdom. Cf. ix. 13. Though they had not the spirituality to discover the truth for themselves, they could estimate the worth of a doctrine suggested by another. The new conception of the πνευματικός caused the word φρόνιμος to sink to a much lower level in the New Test. than it had occupied in Plato and Aristotle. Plato defines φρόνησις as that state of mind in which the soul "departs for the realm of the pure, eternal, immortal and unchangeable" (*Phædo* p. 79). According to St. Paul it is the spiritual man that has knowledge; the φρόνιμος has been educated on the lower plane of ἐθισμός, not on the higher plane of ἐπιστημῇ.

ἡμεῖς, emphatic: "Do ye now judge it; I have done so."

λέγω . . . φημί. "Affirmandi cum suasionē quædam vis inest in φημί." Ellendt, *Lex. Sophoc.* "Judge ye what I declare."

V. 16. The connecting particle is omitted because the ver. is explanatory of ὁ φημί.

τὸ ποτήριον and τὸν ἄρτον are accus. of inverse attraction, that is, the antecedent is put in the case of the relat. So in class. Greek, Soph., *Trach.* 282, τάσδ' ἄσπερ εἰσορᾶς χωροῦσι, in LXX., Ps. cxvii. 22, and New Test., Matt. xxi. 42. Hofmann, with his usual ingenuity, suggests that the inverse attraction is here used to denote that it is the act of blessing, not the cup itself, that makes the κοινωνία. The Apostle mentions the cup first—and in this he is followed by St. Luke—perhaps because the sacrificial feasts of the Greeks were συμπόσια rather than συσσίτια. The cup is mentioned before the bread in the "Didache" also, c. 9.

εὐλογίας, "the cup over which a blessing is pronounced." It is genit. of necessary relation, "where one term implies the other." Jelf, *Gr.* § 542. 5. ii. a. Εὐλογία is the same as εὐχαρίστια. Cf. xiv. 16; Matt. xxvi. 26; Luke xxii. 19. For some centuries the Supper was indifferently called Eulogy and Eucharist. The reference, therefore, is to the cup of blessing at the passover; and, as it is called in Luke xxii. 20 "the cup after supper," it is probably the cup of the Hallel, which was the fourth and last. Still the Apostle does not use the name as a mere technical term (Neander, Hofm.). Christ made the act of thanksgiving a reality, and imparted to it a deeper significance than it could have had from the lips of a pious Jew at the paschal meal. He introduced the new dispensation with an act of thanksgiving for the dispensation that was now about to close. But the thanksgiving became a prayer and a consecration and has continued as such in the Church.

The words "which we bless," "which we break," are emphatic. They express the sacramental acts by which the recipient is brought into communion with Christ. "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum etiam ipsum tanquam visibile verbum." Aug., *Tract. in Johan.* XV. 3. Breaking the bread and blessing the cup, that is, receiving the elements and giving thanks at the Lord's Supper, correspond

to the sacramental eating of the manna and drinking of the water out of the rock. Hence we may justly understand *εὐλογοῦμεν* with both the cup and the bread, and understand *πίνουμεν* in the former clause to correspond to *κλῶμεν* in the latter. We are not told that these are the only possible, nor that they are essential, sacramental acts. The essential thing is that the symbolical acts should be done by the recipients themselves, either individually or through their president as representing them. It is this voluntary and spiritual act of the recipient that brings him into communion with Christ in the sacrament. Cf. Justin M., *Apol.* I. 67, where the Amen of the people is spoken of as being co-ordinate with the thanksgiving of the president. Breaking the bread in Acts ii. 46 is the act of all, in accordance with the command of Christ, Luke xxii. 17.

*κοινωνία*, that is, means of communion. Cf. note on *σοφία*, i. 30. The Supper was called *communicatio* before it was called *participatio*, which appears in the Vulg. It is the complement of doing it in remembrance of Christ, xi. 24. For Christ is in one sense absent, and in another sense present. *Κοινωνία* means more than participation, as it implies that the whole is received by all; for this gift has no parts. Cf. Heb. ii. 14. But it includes also, first, that this receiving of Christ is the result of a mystical union with Him; and, second, that all that are in union with Christ are thereby brought into union with one another. Cf. Chrys., οὐ γὰρ τῷ μετέχειν μόνον καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνοῦσθαι κοινωνοῦμεν. The meaning of this word and the Apostle's evident purpose in referring to the Lord's Supper in this passage are inconsistent with the Zwinglian theory (fully stated in the *Comment. de verâ et falsâ Religione*, Opp. III. p. 269), that the sacraments are "only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession," and the Eucharist is "nothing more than a commemoration" or, at best, a mere sign, not the means, of fellowship in spirit with Christ. Cf. First Helvetic Confession, xxi. This theory destroys the analogy which the Apostle institutes between idolaters, who have communion with demons, and Christians, who in the sacraments have communion with Christ. To sustain the Apostle's argument, sign and operation must, in some way or other, intelligible or, it may be,

to us incomprehensible, coincide, or, in the words of the Second Helvetic Confession, in which Bullinger, under the influence of Calvin, advances beyond the Zwinglian position, “*signa et res significatæ inter se sacramentalia conjunguntur.*” Of course, they must be distinct as well as conjoined, otherwise the analogy breaks down on the other side. Calvin’s theory (*Inst.* IV. xvii. 10), that believers receive grace through the sacramental act from the glorified humanity of Jesus Christ is, to say the least, in perfect harmony with the general purport of the Apostle’s teaching. Meyer’s objection (offered also by Schenkel, *Herzog’s Real-Enc.*, s.v. *Abendmahls-streitungen*), that Christ could not institute before His death a sacrament of communion with His glorified humanity, if it has any force against Calvin’s view, has just as much force against the Lutheran doctrine, which rests on the assumption of the ubiquity of Christ’s glorified body. But it has no force. We cannot separate the merits of Christ’s death from the fulness of grace bestowed by Him in His state of exaltation. It is through mystical union with the living Christ that the believer receives the blessings purchased through the atoning death. To deny this is to gainsay the central principle of the Pauline theology. Justification, for instance, being a forensic act, is an arbitrary act, if it does not spring from union with Christ.

τοῦ αἵματος . . . τοῦ σώματος, genit. of the things jointly possessed, as in τοιούτου γνώματος κοινωνός, “I hold the same opinion with you.” The words mean that the believer’s spiritual life is sustained by his continued appropriation of Christ, and that the efficacy of his union with Christ is derived from Christ’s death as a paschal sacrifice. The reference is to Christ’s words at the institution of the Supper. The figurative expression “to drink My blood and to eat My flesh,” used by Christ Himself, proves that there was close affinity between His teaching and the doctrine of this Epistle.

It is observable that the blood and body are here spoken of as separated. Cf. xi. 24–28; John vi. 53, 54. The meaning of this cannot be that the bread is a symbol of the incarnation, the wine of the atonement. For Christ used the words “for you” in giving His disciples the bread and the wine.

Cf. Heb. x. 10. The shedding of His blood signified that His death was a sacrifice.

The view of Erasmus, Zwingli and Baur (*Neut. Theol.* p. 201), that the Apostle means the Church by Christ's body, and the consciousness of being a member of His Church by the communion of His body, is sufficiently refuted by the co-ordination of the body with the blood of Christ (though Zwingli says the blood also means the Church!) and the undoubted reference to the words used by Christ when He spoke of His body as being given and His blood as being shed. It is inconsistent also with the general purpose of the whole passage, which is to prove that, as idolaters are in communion with the object of their worship, so also Christians are in communion with Christ in the sacrament of bread and wine.

*κλῶμεν.* The act of breaking the bread, as it is sacramental, is also symbolical, for it represents the sacrificial death of Christ, the communicant's appropriation of Him by faith, and the fellowship of the Church. For this reason the sacramental bread came to be known as τὸ κλάσμα. So "Didache," c. 9. Cf. Luke xxii. 17, where the distribution of the cup expresses the same truth as the breaking of the bread. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Philad.* 4 (longer text), εἰς καὶ ἄρτος τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐθρύφθη καὶ ἐν ποτήριον τοῖς ὅλοις διενεμήθη. That Christ's body was not broken on the cross (John xix. 33, 36) does not render the breaking of the bread less symbolical of His sacrificial death.

V. 17. Zwingli (from whom it found its way into the First Helvetic Confession), Estius, Olshausen, Alford, render the clause ὅτι . . : ἐσμεν thus: "Inasmuch as we the many are one bread, that is, one body." But, if they understand ἄρτος in a sacramental sense, it is a mere tautology to add "one body." If they understand it literally, it is not true that we are one body metaphorically in consequence of having eaten one and the same literal bread. Chrys., Theophyl., De Wette, Meyer, etc., thus: "For there is one bread and therefore we the many are one body." Calvin, Beza, Bengel thus: "Because there is one bread, we, the many, are one body." The causal meaning of ὅτι in an antecedent occurs, it is true, though but rarely, in the Apostle's writings. Cf. xii. 15, 16; Gal. iv. 6. But the asyndeton is awkward. The meaning will be virtually the same if we render ὅτι by "inasmuch as." He

is proving that the sacramental bread is a means of communion with Christ's body. It is so, inasmuch as the body, that is the Church, is one. We all acknowledge the oneness of the Church, and call it the body of Christ. But the oneness of the Church proves the communion of all Christians with the one glorified body by means of the one sacramental bread, without which communion we, being many, would in no sense be one. The Apostle's object is to prove, not the unity of the Church, but communion with Christ. The former is here introduced to prove the latter. But the argument is expressed tersely: "Inasmuch as—one bread, one body;" that is, inasmuch as the unity of the body rests upon and proves the oneness of the sacramental bread. Cf. Eph. iv. 4. He adds, however, "we the many," which indeed is necessary to his argument. Apart from communion through the sacramental bread with the body of Christ we are many; in virtue of that communion we, though many, are one.

οἱ πολλοί, not "the assembled many" (Alford, Evans, etc.), but "we who are many." The art. marks the contrast between our being many in one sense and our being one in another sense. Cf. Rom. v. 15, τοῦ ἑνὸς . . . οἱ πολλοί, xii. 5, οἱ πολλοὶ . . . ἐν σῶμα. So Æschyl., *Agam.* 1456, Ἑλένα μία τὰς πολλὰς κ.τ.λ.

We may add two corollaries. First, since the Apostle is speaking, not of literal, but of sacramental bread, he cannot have had in his mind the notion of bread being one loaf composed of many grains of wheat.<sup>1</sup> Second, if the doctrine of transubstantiation were true, the Apostle could not have said "bread" in this verse, but must have said "body."

οἱ . . . μετέχομεν. Proof of the statement that the unity of the Church is the consequence of the oneness of the sacramental bread. For we have all the same spiritual life, having all received the same fulness of grace. "Bread" in both clauses means, not literal, but sacramental bread, the means of communion with Christ's body. Μετέχω nowhere else occurs with ἐκ. The insertion of the preposition is, therefore, prob-

<sup>1</sup> I understand the words ὥσπερ ἦν τοῦτο κλάσμα διεσκορπισμένον ἐπάνω τῶν ὀρέων καὶ συναχθὲν ἐγένετο ἓν, οὕτω συναχθήτω σου ἡ ἐκκλησία in the "Didache," c. 9, to be an allusion to the Apostle's statement and an attempt to interpret it.

ably intentional. It suggests that the bread, that is, Christ, retains its oneness after all have received of it. We do not share, but we all appropriate this bread.

**V. 18.** Another analogue, co-ordinate with that of the Lord's Supper, proving that participation in the idol-feasts is idolatry and communion with the unseen. Even under a typical dispensation (*κατὰ σάρκα*) the material of a sacrificial feast has been laid upon the altar and the meal becomes for that reason a sacrament. The imperat. *βλέπετε* is co-ordinate with *κρίνατε*, ver. 15.

*κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου*, not "partakers together with the altar," the priest having one portion and the people another (Alford, etc.), but "partakers in the altar." Again, the idea is not that God receives a part, and the worshipper a part, of the same sacrifice, but that the worshipper, in eating this meat, consisting of a sacrifice, appropriates, with his fellow-worshippers, the altar in its sacredness. His eating is the sacrament that follows the sacrifice and brings into his possession the blessings secured for him through God's acceptance of his sacrifice. Hence the word "altar," not the word "sacrifice." On the other hand, he does not say "Christ," but "the altar," because he is not speaking of that side of the Mosaic ritual which is *identical* in meaning with the Christian sacrament, but refers to the typical and ceremonial side of the dispensation. But we Christians are made partakers, as Chrys. remarks, not of the altar merely, but of Christ Himself. Cf. Heb. iii. 14; xiii. 10.

**V. 19.** The Apostle has stated that in the Lord's Supper the believer appropriates Christ and in the Jewish sacrificial meal the worshipper appropriates the sacredness of the altar. The application of this truth to the case of the idol-feasts is put vividly in the form of an objection: "Do I then recognise an analogy between the Lord's Supper or the sacrificial meal of a Jewish worshipper and the heathen feasts? Is the thing offered in sacrifice to an idol of wood or stone, or is the idol itself, a medium of communion with any real being behind the visible image?" (cf. viii. 7). The answer is "Yes." A negative answer would be inconsistent with the following verse and viii. 4.

*τί οὖν φημί*, "what then do I mean to affirm?"

V. 20. ἀλλά, “nay, but”; that is, I affirm that, not only the idol has *some* power, but actually brings the worshipper into communion with demons. Cf. Is. xlv. 11, where by the “fellows” of an idol are meant its worshippers, “who together formed a kind of guild and by partaking of the sacrificial meals are brought into a mystical union with the god whom they worshipped” (Cheyne). Cf. Hos. iv. 17; Rev. ix. 20. The Apostle seems to be citing LXX., Deut. xxxii. 17.

δαίμονις. The word occurs in St. Paul’s Epistles here and in 1 Tim. iv. 1 only. In both places it means “devil” (cf. Eph. vi. 12). Δαίμων is probably derived from δαίω, “to distribute.” Cf. Pott, *Wurzelw.* I. 127; though others derive it from the root δι, “shining.” Cf. Curtius, *Grundz.* p. 230. At any rate it is originally synonymous with θεῖον. Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* II. xxiii. 8, τὸ δαίμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ ἔργον, and Xen., *Mem.* I. i. 1, καὶνὰ δαίμονια. But simultaneously with the meaning of “a divine being” or “a divinely appointed lot,” a tendency is observable to use the word in a depreciatory sense. Cf. Eur., *Io* 1374, τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μὲν χρηστά, τοῦ δὲ δαίμονος βαρέα; Plat., *Lys.*, p. 223, ὥσπερ δαίμονές τινες, “like an evil apparition”; *Apol.* p. 27, εἰ δ’ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσι νόθοι τινές; *Symp.* p. 202, πᾶν τὸ δαίμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. This meaning became the usual one among the Stoics and, in course of time, so much prevailed over the other that, whereas Socrates was accused of introducing new divinities because he had said ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαίμονιον γίγνεται (Plat., *Apol.* p. 31 C), Augustine, on the other hand, remarks (*De Civ.* IX. 19) that no pagan even would say to his slave by way of praise, “Dæmonem habes.” Add to this that a semi-personal signification clings to the word in the classics. Cf. Verrall’s note on Eur., *Med.* 1110. The way was thus prepared among the Greeks themselves for the meaning that attaches to the word in the Jewish angelology, and they would have no difficulty in understanding the Apostle’s use of the word in the present passage. The Fathers used the word in the same sense. Cf. Justin M., *Apol.* I. 5, II. 5; both passages, however, containing notions not to be found in St. Paul; Tert., *De Spect.* 13; Origen, *Contra Cels.* VIII. 39, where he refuses to give the name of

δαίμων to the Son of God : κατὰ μὲν οὖν ἡμᾶς τοὺς λέγοντας πάντας δαίμονας εἶναι φαύλους κ. τ. λ.<sup>1</sup>

In Rom. i. 25 the Apostle says the heathen worshipped the creature, that is, nature. The two representations are not inconsistent. As the worshippers themselves understood it, the heathen cult rested on a deification of nature. But the Apostle says nothing about the demons persuading the heathen to worship them as gods (Waterland, *Charge*, etc.). Behind the intention of the worshipper lay the preternatural fact that the moral ideas represented by the heathen deities were actually attributes of devils. When we have said this, we have said all. We must not, with some of the Fathers, attempt to identify particular gods with certain demons and say, for instance, that Moloch was Mars and Chemosh Priapus (cf. Athanas., *Orat. ad Græcos* ; Theodoret, *Ad Ps.* cv. ; Jerome, *In Osee* ix. 11). The Apostle has nothing of this. Neither does he fall into the confusion met with in Tert. (e.g. *De Idol.* 10), which condemns the speculations of the philosophers as a craft of the priests. In this matter Clem. Alex. and Origen represent much more truly the Apostle's attitude.

ἀλλ' ὅτι, i.e. ἀλλὰ φημὶ ὅτι. Ἀλλά introduces an answer, not only when the answer negatives what is contained in the question, but also when it asserts more than what the question includes. Cf. Heb. iii. 16, "nay but did not all," etc. So here : "Do I affirm that a graven image has any meaning or power? Nay but I affirm more; the demons even, God's antagonists, are the beings that receive the worship offered by the heathen to their gods, and they impress upon their worshippers their own moral character." Cf. note on viii. 4.

οὐ Θεῶ, not "to a no-God" (Evans), for then we should have had the plur., but "and not to God." The words are borrowed from Deut. xxxii. 17. But the Apostle uses them in order to lay emphasis on the mutually exclusive nature of communion with demons and communion with God through Christ.

κοινωνοὺς τῶν δαιμονίων, not "partakers together with the demons" (Alford, etc.), but "partakers together with one

<sup>1</sup> I believe the word *Deva* degenerated in the same way. In the Vedas it means "God," in the Zend-Avesta "an evil spirit." The gods of one people are the evil spirits of another.

another in the spiritual influence of the demons." The contrast intended is between receiving holy influences from Christ at the Lord's Supper and unholy influence from demons at the idol-feasts. Fellowship with an object of worship and receiving from him are kindred notions. They represent the two sides of all worship, the acceptance by the divinity of the worshipper's offerings and the bestowal of gifts on the worshipper. Meals were spread for the gods in Babylon, Palestine and Greece. But the truth most pertinent to the Apostle's purpose is that the worshipper receives from the Deity in the very act of making an offering. Worship is always sacramental.

V. 21. The meaning of the words "you cannot" must not be toned down to an expression of unbecomingness. To receive the influence of Christ and at the same moment receive the influence of demons cannot be. The two things are incompatible because of the moral contrast and antagonism between the demons and Christ. Cf. 2 Cor. vi. 15, 16.

"The cup of the Lord" means the sacrament instituted by the Lord. Cf. xi. 20. "The cup of demons" will then mean the idol-feast ordained by demons. Cf. 1 Tim. iv. 1, "doctrines emanating from demons." It is called a "cup" to mark the contrast sharply: "the sacrament of demons."

*τραπέζης*. The Lord's Supper got the name of "table" because the early Christians celebrated it in connection with the family meal. Cf. Acts ii. 46, and Pliny's Letter: "Morem sibi [Christianis] . . . coeundi ad capiendum cibum, promiscuum tamen et innoxium." Heathenism turned religious rites into convivial feasts, and Christianity has made a household meal a sacrament. But the Apostle here borrows the name from Malachi, who designates the altar of burnt-offering "the table of the Lord," meaning that God's altar is also God's table, that is, that God partakes of the sacrifice in common with the worshipper. Similarly, says the Apostle, the Supper, instituted by Christ when He was here on earth, was then and is now a table at which the believer is brought into real communion with Christ. But the table is an altar, inasmuch as the communion rests on Christ's atoning sacrifice (cf. Heb. xiii. 10).

V. 22. *παραζηλοῦμεν*, in allusion to Deut. xxxii. 21.

Buttmann (*N. S.* p. 181) says this pres. indic. is equivalent to the deliberative subjunctive. Cf. Matt. xi. 3, "are we to look for another?" John xi. 47, "what are we to do?" The usage occurs occasionally in the classics (cf. Bernhardt, *W. S.* p. 396). But here it is unnecessary, and the objective meaning is much stronger: "Is it come to this, that we are actually provoking the Lord to jealousy?" (cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XLI. 3). The notion of "jealousy" must not be lost sight of. Though it holds a subordinate place in the New Test. compared with the element of holiness in God's anger, it is here appropriate, inasmuch as the Apostle speaks of the table of demons being prepared in rivalry to the table of the Lord.

μή . . . ἐσμέν, "we are not stronger than He, are we?" On μή in questions to which a negative answer is expected cf. Xen., *Mem.* IV. ii. 10. But in what way stronger? The words contain an allusion to ver. 9. The Israelites, when they tempted the Lord, were destroyed. Are we stronger than He, so as to secure ourselves against His judgments? Far otherwise; for "many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep." Cf. xi. 30.

### E. *A Practical Summary.*

(x. 23-xi. 1).

In the preceding section the Apostle has shown the danger of taking part in feasts connected with idolatrous worship. This is his reply to the question of the Corinthian Church from one point of view. All tampering with idolatry is sinful and dangerous. But another point of view is that of the weak Christian, who considers meat once consecrated to an idol to be henceforth defiled, and eating it to be in itself, whether at a sacrificial banquet or at a family meal, invariably sinful and polluting. The reply to the question from this side has already been given in Chap. viii. But the Apostle closes the section with a reiteration in a more practical form of his doctrine of liberty and love.

V. 23. A B C D omit *μοι*. It crept in from vi. 12. The difference between the expressions in the two verses marks the difference in the purport of each. In vi. 12-20 he opposes the notions of liberty and holiness, here the notions of liberty

and care for a brother's weal. What the Apostle has said of the Lord's Supper has served to impress on the minds of his readers the greatest manifestation of love ever made to the world.

**V. 24.**  $\aleph$  A B C D omit ἑκαστος. But it is to be mentally supplied. The Apostle's doctrine of holiness involves that we are not our own, but God's, and the practical lesson from it is that we should glorify God. The Apostle's doctrine of love in the present passage means that we are not our own, but belong to the brethren, and the practical exhortation from it is that we should seek the welfare of others.

τοῦ ἑτέρου, "of the other," though it be an opponent.

**V. 25.** μάκελλον, from Lat. *macellum*, akin to *mactare*, μάχαιρα and μάχομαι. The practice was Roman.

πάν, "all," even though it may have been ἱερόθυτον, as meat sold in the public shambles often, if not always, was. Πωλέω is here correctly used of the seller "qui emptorem quaerit" (Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* p. 647).

διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν, "because of your conscience." Calvin, Estius, Meyer connect the words with ἐσθίετε: "because your conscience is an enlightened one, eat, without minutely enquiring whether the meat has been offered to an idol or not." So in ver. 28 the words are connected with μὴ ἐσθίετε. We obtain, however, the same meaning if we connect the words, not indeed with ἀνακρίνοντες, but with μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντας. The reference is to an enlightened conscience: "because your conscience is healthy and strong, abstain from minute enquiries whether the meat has been consecrated to an idol." Conscience is a reason for abstaining from enquiry.

**V. 26.** From Ps. xxiii. (xxiv.) 1. This is a reason why an enlightened conscience will permit a man to eat whatever is sold in the market (cf. Matt. xv. 11; Rom. xiv. 14; 1 Tim. iv. 4; Tit. i. 15). It is only the weak Christian that from fear of pollution eats only herbs (Rom. xiv. 2).

πληρῶμα αὐτῆς = πάντα τὰ πληροῦντα αὐτήν (Theophyl.), "the earth's abundance." This is the active meaning of πληρῶμα. Some (e.g. Ellicott on Col. i. 9; Schirlitz, *Lex.*) call it the passive meaning, not so correctly. In τὸ πληρῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Eph. i. 23) we have again the active meaning: "that which fills Christ." Cf. Fritzsche's exhaustive note on

Rom. xi. 12. The notion of fulness is here pertinent, because it implies God's blessing on all creation and, consequently, the lawfulness of using all created things that are fit for food.

*Κυρίου*, emphatic, "not the possession of demons, but the Lord's."

**V. 27.** The reference in ver. 25 is to a strong Christian eating at home. The Apostle passes on to the supposed case of the strong Christian eating in another's house and in the presence of other guests. In these circumstances he should have regard to another's conscience, and abstain, if another's conscience is weak. Cf. M. Anton. I. 16, *καὶ τὸ τοῖς εἰς εὐμαρείαν βίου φέρουσί τι, ὧν ἡ τύχη παρέχει δαψίλειαν, χρηστικὸν ἀτύφως ἅμα καὶ ἀπροφασίστως*, that is, without making excuses for using them. An instance is not wanting in the early Church of a Christian relinquishing the practice of ascetism lest he should be a stumbling-block to the weak. Cf. Eus., *H.E.* V. 3.

**V. 28.** *τις*, the weak brother. Cf. viii. 7. A Gentile Christian. For *εἰδωλόθυτον* (CD) *ιερόθυτον* is read in **Σ** A B. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Reiche and De Wette retain *εἰδωλόθυτον*. Probably *ιερόθυτον* was altered by the copyists into *εἰδωλόθυτον* because it seemed to convey an admission that a thing offered to an idol was really sacred. But that is just the reason why the weak brother would have used the word. Origen (*Contra Cels.* VIII. 21) says that what things he would call *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἰδωλόθυστα*, or, if he might be permitted to say so, *δαιμονιόθυστα*, Celsus, in his ignorance of what is truly sacred, would call *ιερόθυστα*.

*τὸν μνηύσαντα*. The word implies the disclosure of what the speaker has hitherto kept to himself, and now reveals as something of grave import, which he could continue to lock up in his own bosom, were it not that he sees a brother in peril.

The words *τοῦ . . . αὐτῆς* are omitted in **Σ** A B C D. Chrys. has them. They are better away. For the Lord's possession of the earth is no reason for abstaining from certain food.

**V. 29.** *ἑαυτοῦ*, for *σεαυτοῦ*. Bernhardt (*W. S.* p. 272) says the usage is frequent in the plur. in class. Greek, but in the sing. begins with Isocrates. Poppo (on Xen., *Anab.* VII. v. 5) and Kühner (on Xen., *Mem.* I. iv. 10) are of a contrary opinion.

In every alleged instance of it in the sing. the reading is more or less doubtful, and in the New Test. the evidence of the oldest MSS. is for the most part against it. Here, however, the weight of evidence is decisively in its favour; for, while D reads *σεαυτοῦ*, **ⲛ** A B C have *ἑαυτοῦ*.

*ἵνα τί* (= *ἵνα γένηται τί*;) . . . *συνειδήσεως*; These words are sometimes explained as if they contained the reason why the strong Christian should condescend to the weakness of a brother: "why should I give occasion by a needless exercise of my Christian freedom, to others to condemn me?" But this is not the meaning of *κρίνεται*. The question expresses the reason why the strong Christian should abstain, not because of his own conscience, but because of the weak brother's scruples. As far as his own Christian liberty is concerned, he need not abstain; but he abstains from motives of Christian love.

**V. 30.** **ⲛ** A B C D omit *δε*. The verse continues the thought of ver. 29.

*χάριτι*. Chrys., Theophyl., Grot., Hofm., etc., render it "by God's grace," as in Eph. ii. 5, whether it means the grace that bestows upon us the gifts of nature for our use, or, as Chrys., the grace which enables the strong Christian to eat without defiling his conscience. But this would be too obscurely expressed by *χάριτι*. We must suppose it to be dat. of the manner, like *βίᾳ*, *ὁδῶ*, and to mean "with thanksgiving." Cf. Plat., *Ieg.* p. 796, *ἐν χάρισιν*. It is the ground of the question, "Why am I blasphemed?" The Christian who eats with thanksgiving to God rescues the act from all contact with demons. Cf. 1 Tim. iv. 5. The attitude of mind and state of heart renders the food a sacrament of demons or of Christ. The antitheses between "liberty" and "judged," between "being blasphemed" and "giving thanks," are noticeable. Liberty judged and thanksgiving reviled!

**V. 31.** The special exhortation touching abstention from meat offered to an idol yields to a more general principle, which may be couched in positive advice, that in all things God should be glorified. The Apostle's doctrine of holiness and, as it now appears, no less his doctrine of love, ultimately resolve themselves into the wider conception of consecration to God.

ποιεῖτε, a general expression, summing up all kinds of action, not eating and drinking only.

εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ. God even is glorified by your consideration for the weak; and the Christian source of self-sacrifice is a consciousness of God. Epictetus has the words, εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἀφορῶντα ἐν παντί μικρῶ καὶ μεγάλῳ. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Polyc.* 5, πάντα εἰς τιμὴν Θεοῦ γινέσθω.

V. 32. Final reiteration of the exhortation to glorify God, but now with special reference to the question of the Christian Church.

ἀπρόσκοποι, here causal: "not causing any one to stumble." In Acts xxiv. 16 it means "not stumbling." Cf. Phil. ii. 15; 1 Thess. iv. 12. We are reminded of the story related by Augustine, *Ep.* liv. (cxviii.) *Ad Januar.* When his mother first came to Milan and found that the Church did not fast on the Sabbath, as she had been accustomed to do in Rome, she asked Ambrose, in great distress, what her duty was. He replied, "When I come to Rome I fast on the Sabbath; when I am here, I do not." This is the origin of the saying, "Do in Rome as the Romans do."

ἐκκλησία. The weak brother is a member of God's Church, and, therefore, like the Church, not to be despised. Cf. xi. 22. The expression is intended to intimate that Christian love almost personifies the Church. The Apostle delights in depicting what in the eyes of the world is simply a gathering of men professing certain beliefs, as the body of Christ, in union with which the individual Christian becomes something more than an individual. The Church is to the Apostle's mind a unit and an ideal. Compare the expression, "Israel of God" (Gal. vi. 16). Both are in contrast to Jews and Greeks.

V. 33. ἀρέσκω. The pres. denotes endeavour, synon. with ζητῶ ἀρέσκειν, Gal. i. 10, where also we have the necessary complement of what is here said.

συμφέρον. The word οἰκοδομεῖ (ver. 23) shows that he is speaking of spiritual welfare. He does not seek his own salvation immediately, but mediately, by seeking the salvation of others, and of many others. Cf. note on ver. 17.

Ch. XI. 1. μνηταί, "prove yourselves my imitators"; stronger than μιμεῖσθε. Cf. note on iv. 16; 1 Thess. i. 6; ii. 14; 2 Thess. iii. 7.

καθὼς καὶ ὁ Χριστοῦ. Christ pleased not Himself (Rom. xv. 3). Whenever the example of Christ is mentioned in the New Test., the reference is to entire unselfishness in one form or another (cf. Phil. ii. 4, 5). Further, St. Paul's imitation of Christ is not precisely the same thing as that of St. Peter, who witnessed the life of Jesus (cf. 1 Pet. ii. 21). We do not find in St. Paul's Epistles the notion of Christ's earthly life being a pattern or ideal, after which men ought to fashion their lives. His mind is absorbed in the greatness of the self-denial manifested by the Son of God in taking upon Him the form of a servant and humbling Himself by His obedience unto the death of the cross.

The first verse of chap. xi. belongs to the end of chap. x., and forms a most fitting close to the whole discussion respecting things offered to idols.

## FIFTH DIVISION.

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### ABUSES IN THE CHURCH ASSEMBLIES.

(xi. 2-34).

#### A. *Women Publicly Praying with Head Uncovered.*

(xi. 2-16).

**V. 2.** δέ is more than transitional. The emphatic position of ἐπαινῶ intimates a change of tone, and the words μου μέμνησθε contain an allusion to μιμηταί μου: "But even if you do not fully prove yourselves to be imitators of me, yet I acknowledge that you bear in mind the instructions." The praise bestowed in this ver. looks forward, however, to the censure also of ver. 17.

πάντα, not object of μέμνησθε (Cajet., Erasm.), which is μου, but accus. of reference, which occurs in the New Test. only in St. Paul's Epistles. Theod., Ambrosiast., Hervæus understand this clause to be ironical. But it would be inconsistent with the evident contrast between this clause and ver. 17. Such irony at the beginning of an argument would be wanton. Cf. note on viii. 1.

τὰς παραδόσεις, the same thing as καθὼς παρέδωκα ὑμῖν. Similarly in 2 Thess. ii. 15, τὰς παραδόσεις is explained by ἃς ἐδιδάχθητε. By this circumlocution he avoids such an expression as "*my traditions.*" For they were not merely the Apostle's own advice (cf. vii. 25), but instructions which he had himself received. He could call them τὴν παραθήκην μου, but they were the παραδόσεις of Christ (cf. 1 Tim. i. 12). His former doctrines as a Pharisee the Apostle does call his own traditions, Gal. i. 14.

κατέχετε, *synon.* with κρατεῖν, Mark vii. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 15. It means "holding fast" what has been delivered to one's keeping. Cf. 1 Tim. i. 18, and espec. 2 Tim. ii. 2, where παράθου expresses the act of committing to another's keeping what has first been committed for that purpose to one's own. It was the term used among the Jews to denote the doctrines which the Rabbis professed to have received from the fathers (cf. Matt. xv. 2, 3, 6). We may safely infer that the Apostle also means a deposit of truth which he has received and delivers to others. Such a deposit must consist, not of instructions in practice and ritual only, but also of doctrines and principles, from which he deduces practical admonitions and directions for public worship (cf. Gal. i. 12). The Apostle taught, not his own inventions, but the revelation of Jesus Christ, together with the superstructure of truth which he was enabled by the Spirit of God to raise upon it. That foundation is the παράδοσις. He mentions it here to soften the seeming harshness and egotism of ver. 1. How he had delivered these traditions to the Corinthians the Apostle does not here say. His readers knew. It may have been by word of mouth or in a former letter. Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 15; Tert., *De Cor.* 3, "an et traditio nisi scripta non debet suscipi?" and Eus., *Hist. Eccles.* III. 25.

**Vv. 3-15.** The Apostle proceeds to mention an impropriety which had crept into the Church assemblies, but concerning which he does not appear to have hitherto given instruction. In praising them he delicately takes on himself the blame of not having warned them beforehand.

We are met by some preliminary questions.

First, does the Apostle discuss the opposite case, that of men praying with heads veiled? Chrys. thinks he does; and the several references made to the duty of men to uncover their heads in prayer renders it probable that the Apostle has both cases in his mind. It has been usually lost sight of by expositors.

Second, how is the position taken by the Apostle in this passage consistent with his injunction in xiv. 34, that the women should keep silence in the Churches? Calvin says the Apostle treats of one subject at a time. But if he intends the women not to pray at all in public, it is a needless waste

of words to discuss the question of the veil. Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* V. 8) thinks he permitted the women to pray and prophesy, but not to teach. But *λαλεῖν* in xiv. 34 means that special form of teaching which is prophesying. Meyer and others suggest that in our passage he is speaking of the smaller meetings for devotion, such as might be held in a dwelling-house. But there is no hint of any such distinction, and the same reason, that is, her subjection to the husband, is assigned in xiv. 34 for enjoining silence on the woman which is here used to prove that she ought to veil her face; and, therefore, her subjection would be just as much a reason for silence in the smaller assemblies as in the larger ones. Why may we not suppose that the injunction of silence had not occurred to the Apostle? When it does occur to him he bases it on the truth that underlies the symbolism of the present passage.

Third, it is remarkable that the injunction to men to pray uncovered and to women to pray with veiled faces is peculiar to the Christians. Among the Greeks men and women prayed bareheaded. Cf. Macrobius, *Sat.* III. vi. 7. Plutarch, *Quæst. Rom.* 14, says the Romans worshipped with the head covered; and among the Jews the men veiled their faces in prayer. The talith "dates back to the time of Christ and probably earlier" (Conder, *Handbook to the Bible* p. 194). We must, therefore, suppose that we have here an example of a distinctly Christian observance, that the men should pray without a head-dress, the women with faces veiled. Perhaps, as Hilgenfeld conjectures, the difference between the Jewish and the Greek customs may have occasioned the confusion in the Corinthian Church. Lightfoot (*Hor. Heb.*) supposes these men were Judaisers. If so, we should arrive at the odd result that in Corinth the Judaising party consisted mostly of the men, and the Hellenising party of the women. Anyhow, the reference in ver. 2 to the ordinances or traditions suggests that the use of the veil by the women and by them alone was a peculiarly Christian arrangement, imposed on the Churches partly to distinguish Christian worship from that of Jew or Greek, partly to symbolize the mystical doctrine of the headship of Christ.

Women are enjoined to veil their faces, if they pray or

prophecy in the Church assemblies, for three reasons: first, the veil is a symbol of the woman's subjection to the man in the Christian order (vv. 3-5); second, it is a symbol of her subjection in the order of creation (vv. 6-12); third, this symbolism is suggested by nature herself (vv. 13-15).

(1) *The Christian Order.*

(vv. 3-5).

The Christian order is that the man is head of the woman; that Christ is head of the man; that God is head of Christ. But the Apostle begins with the second term of the series, Christ's headship, because it confers on this order its peculiarly Christian character. "Every man" must be restricted to believers. So Chrys., De Wette, Meyer, etc. Apart from Church order it might with equal truth be said that Christ is head also of the woman (cf. Eph. i. 22). Again, a special meaning must be assigned to κεφαλή. For, first, it must denote here more than authority; in point of authority Christ is head of angels as well as men. Second, though there is a difference between the headship of God and the headship of Christ, and between the headship of Christ and that of the man, still a common element is discernible in the three, and that is authority springing from union. The man is head of the woman in virtue of the marriage-union; Christ is head of the man in virtue of union through faith; God is head of Christ in consequence of fatherhood and sonship. The three headships thus differ from one another as much as the different kinds of union on which they rest differ; as much, that is, as marriage differs from faith and both from sonship. Third, these three forms of union have special reference in our passage to Church order and the work of redemption. For instance, the authority of the man over the woman is here based on the Christian idea of marriage as the marriage-union borrows new characteristics from the union between Christ and the Church. Again, the authority of Christ over the man is based on Christ's redemptive work and has for its aim the advancement of Christ's kingdom. Once more, the authority of God over Christ, though ultimately derived from God's

fatherhood, actually regards Christ, not only as Son, but as God-Man and Mediator. Bringing together, therefore, the notions included in the term "head," the headship of which the Apostle speaks means *authority* having *union* for its ground and *redemption* for its object.

This subordination of the woman to the man in Church order is perfectly consistent with the equality of the man and the woman in spiritual status. It is not improbable that the custom censured by the Apostle was an attempt to symbolize by unveiling the face in public worship the spiritual equality of the woman. Since the time of Socrates there was a growing tendency to ameliorate the social position of women among the Greeks, and it received a new impulse from contact with the Romans, especially in a Dorian city such as we may suppose Corinth to be still in part. Christianity would strengthen this "enthusiasm of humanity," and the doctrine of Christian liberty would become the occasion of an abuse. But the Apostle maintains the perfect consistency of personal equality and social subordination, and shows that Christianity consecrates both to the service of Christ, by elevating personal into spiritual equality and converting social difference into Church order.

Chrysostom refers the headship of God over Christ to the eternal fatherhood and sonship (cf. note on iii. 23). But his argument breaks down inasmuch as the Apostle is speaking of subjection, not mere subordination. Chrysostom says that, if the Apostle were speaking of rule and subjection, he would have used the analogy of master and servant rather than that of husband and wife. But, first, the Apostle evidently supposes that the relation between husband and wife involves rule and subjection (ver. 9); second, the relation of husband and wife involves union as well as subjection, and the analogy in this place requires the one notion no less than the other. It follows that the headship of God over Christ refers to the mediatorial office of Christ as God-Man. So even Theodoret understands it: *κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα τοίνυν ἡμῶν κεφαλὴ οὐκ οὖν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴ ὁ Θεός.*

**V. 3.** *ἡ κεφαλὴ . . . κεφαλὴ.* The article adds emphasis, but otherwise does not change the meaning. Expressed with the first *κεφαλὴ* its force may be supposed to run on as far as

the second and third. Cf. Eph. ii. 14, ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν, "our (only) peace." Cf. Buttman, *N.S.* p. 109.

V. 4. κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων. Κάλυμμα is easily supplied. Cf. Esther vi. 12, LXX., λυπούμενος κατὰ κεφαλῆς. Chrys. thinks κάλυμμα is omitted that long hair as well as the veil may be included in the prohibition (ver. 15).

καταισχύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ. Beza, Grot., Est., Beng., Neand., Hodge, etc., understand the word "head" in the literal sense only. But, first, this would completely sever the verse from the series of subordinations mentioned in ver. 3; and, second, the opposite notion to that of shaming one's head is said in ver. 7 to be the manifesting of God's glory by having the head covered. Cajet., De Wette, Kling, Evans, etc., understand the word in the metaphorical sense only, that is, as meaning Christ. But as the argument in ver. 6 is intended to prove that it is a shame to the woman herself to worship with head uncovered, the literal meaning must be included in ver. 5 and, consequently, in ver. 4. Besides, it is a necessary part of the allegory to maintain the analogy between the glory and shame of the natural and the glory and shame of the spiritual head. The man shames his natural head by wearing a veil; that is, he shames himself by wearing a symbol of subjection to the woman, whereas Christ has given the man supremacy over the woman in Church order, and that supremacy is expressed by the symbol of an unveiled face. Again, the man that shames his natural head shames also his spiritual head; that is, he that shames himself by wearing a symbol of subjection to the woman, shames Christ, to whom alone God has subjected him. It follows that, in the case of the man, the symbol of his supremacy over the woman is, at the same time, the symbol of his subjection to Christ. This double allegorical use of the symbol is in accordance with Greek sentiment. Long hair was a sign at once of a man's effeminacy and of his pride. It was both a disgrace and a conceit.

προσευχόμενος ἢ προφητεύων. Cf. note on xii. 10. It is a hint of the coming discussion concerning spiritual gifts. In the early years of the second century Justin M. speaks of the presiding brother as offering extemporaneous prayer according to his gifts (ὅση δύναμις αὐτῷ).

V. 5. As the man shames himself and Christ by veiling his face, so the woman shames herself and the man by worshipping with face unveiled. Here also the Apostle refers to the literal and to the metaphorical head. The woman that unveils her face in public worship shames herself, inasmuch as she declines, to her shame, to wear the badge of her subjection in Church order to the man. Among the Greeks the *hetærae* only went unveiled. But she shames her husband also, inasmuch as she transgresses the Divine law that ordained her subordination.

*ἀκαταλύπτω τῇ κεφαλῇ*, "with the head uncovered"; modal dat. Cf. Col. ii. 11; Phil. i. 18.

## (2) *The Order of Creation.*

(xi. 5 fin.—12).

The Church order is consistent with and based upon the order imposed upon the man and the woman at their creation; and the veil, which the Apostle regards as a symbol of the woman's subjection in Church order, has its analogue in the long hair which nature has given her. The woman's long hair has this symbolical meaning, inasmuch as it is a shame to a woman to be shorn.

V. 5 fin. *ἐν*. For this use of the neut. in the predicate when the subject is not neut. cf. iii. 8; 1 Tim. v. 9. The subject is *ἡ γυνή*, not the uncovering of the head, as is evident from *τῇ ἐξυρημένῃ*.

V. 6. He proves that a woman that uncovers her head is one and the same with a woman whose head is shorn or shaven. The proof is that woman's long hair is intended by nature and understood by all nations to be a symbol of her subjection to the man. A married woman that threw off the yoke had her head shorn as a symbol of her shame. This, the Apostle argues, shows the fitness of the veil to be a symbol of the same subjection in the Christian order. In the Church the veil is added to the symbol of long hair, because the subjection which nature has imposed upon the woman receives a special character when it enters into the Christian series of subordinations.

*εἰ γὰρ οὐ*. Cf. note on vii. 9.

*κείρασθαι*, aor., to denote the act of cutting the hair short;

ξυρᾶσθαι, pres., to denote the state of having been shaven, which heightens and perpetuates her shame. The form ξυράω is later than ξυρέω, and is not Attic.

**V. 7.** This universal sentiment of shame that attaches to a woman that uncovers her head in public is vindicated by the natural order established at the first by the Creator. It is true the type ordained by God in nature of the order introduced into the Church is imperfect. For Christ, as the second term of the series, imparts a new significance to all the other terms and to the union that links them together. According to this verse the man is distinguished from the woman, first, in that he is the glory of God, while she is the glory of the man; second, in that he is the image as well as glory of God, while she is not the image of the man. Both points of difference are here mentioned as reasons why the man should be unveiled, the woman veiled, in public worship.

First, by "being the glory of God," we are, no doubt, to understand that the man's place in the natural series of subordinations manifests God's glory. But God's glory consists, partly at least, in authority. The man, therefore, declares the glory of God in the fact of his delegated authority over the woman. The woman, on the other hand, manifests the glory of the man. But the man's glory, as distinguished from God's, consists in subjection. The final glory of the Son of God Himself, in so far as He is Man, will be His subjection to God (xv. 28). It follows that the woman manifests man's glory by manifesting, in her subjection to him, his subjection to God. We have, accordingly, in this verse the same conception, regarded from the point of view of the natural order, which the Apostle has already stated in his explanation of the Christian order.

Second, the word "image" is evidently an allusion to Gen. i. 27. Chrys., Theod., Severian (*Cat.*), etc., infer from this verse that the image of God consists in dominion. But this is included rather in the term "glory"; that is, in the relation in which God stands to the man and the man to the woman. Image differs from glory as the ray of light that has separated itself from the sun differs from the light that constitutes the sun's self-manifestation. Image means affinity of nature or likeness in attributes to a Divine archetype. Glory

is the manifestation of God's attributes. In this sense it is said in Heb. i. 2 that Christ is, not only the impress of God's substance, but also the effulgence of God's glory. Man likewise is the image of God, the similitude in a creature of the uncreated Creator. But he is also the glory of God, that is, the self-manifestation of God in a created being. To say that any creature is the glory of God without being the image of God is pantheism. But a creature may be the image of God without being His glory. The woman, in the Apostle's series of subordinations, is not the image of the man, but is, equally with the man, the image of God. She possesses those attributes that fit her to take a place in the series of subordinations which constitute the natural and of those which constitute the Christian order of things. If she were the man's image, and not God's, she would be the image of an image, which are words without meaning, unless she is an image of the archetype.

*ὑπάρχων*, "subsisting as." Cf. Phil. ii. 6.

**Vv. 8, 9.** He proves that the woman is the glory of the man in the natural order, that is, that it is her place to manifest the man's subjection to God by her own subjection to the man. The proof is twofold: First, as a matter of historical fact the woman is from the man; for "the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made He a woman" (Gen. ii. 22, 23). But, second, the explanation of this fact must be sought in the Divine purpose that brought it so to pass; for the woman was created *because of* (*διὰ*) the man, to be his helpmeet (Gen. ii. 18). *Ἐκτίσθη* differs from *ἔστι* as purpose from fact.

*καὶ γὰρ οὐ* differs slightly from *οὐδὲ γάρ*. The latter phrase denotes that the thing mentioned is a smaller matter than other things; the former expresses a certain causal relation between the Divine purpose and its outcome.

**V. 10.** The inference from the natural order is the same as from the Christian order—that the woman ought to cover her head.

*ἐξουσίαν*, "authority," used by metonymy for the symbol of authority, whether it be the veil in the Christian order or the long hair in the natural order. Irenæus (i. 8, 2) substitutes *κάλυμμα*, in citing the verse. For a similar metonymy

we are referred to Diod. Sic. I. 47, *τρεις βασιλείας τῆς κεφαλῆς*, i.e. diadems, and Heinrich aptly cites *τιμὴν*, xii. 23, "a covering in token of honour." So in Num. vi. 7 the symbol of a Nazarite's consecration to God is designated *εὐχὴ Θεοῦ*. The appositeness of this citation is not affected by the difference between the symbol of one's own authority and that of another's, since authority and subjection are opposite sides of the same fact. The metonymy of using the name of the sign to denote that of which it is the sign is, of course, of frequent occurrence. Cf. 2 Cor. iii. 15, *κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτῶν*. But it justifies the opposite metonymy, in which the name of the thing signified is used for the name of the sign. Of the numerous explanations that have been offered the only two others that deserve to be mentioned are unsatisfactory enough. L. Capellus, while admitting that *ἐξουσία* denotes the veil as a sign of subjection, thinks the Apostle may have given it this name because the Hebrew word for veil has also the meaning of authority. Wordsworth explains the authority to be the woman's.

*διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους*. Baur proposes to omit the words as a gloss, against all MS. evidence. Tert. (*Contra Marc.* V. 8; *De Virg. Vel.* 7) thinks the reference is to the fallen angels, who might be enticed to lust by seeing the women's faces. The grosser form of this interpretation refutes itself, though it is apparently accepted by Hausrath (*Der Ap. Paul.* p. 25). But it has been resuscitated in a more refined form and in reference to good angels by Hofmann, who thinks that any disturbance of the established order of creation by the woman's refusal to abide in subjection to the man, would become a temptation to angels to depart from their appointed place in that order and assume the place of the man in relation to the woman. Ambrosiaster, Hervæus, Cajetan consider the angels to be Christian priests or ministers of the Church. But this application of the word belongs to apocalyptic language. Chrys., Aug. (*De Trin.* XII. vii. 10), Grotius, Estius, Wolf, Rückert, Meyer, Neander, De Wette, etc., think the reference is to the presence of the holy angels in the Church assemblies, and Theod. and others say the Apostle is speaking of the protecting angel of every individual Christian, in which case we should probably have had *τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτῆς* (cf. Matt.

xviii. 10; Acts xii. 15). But it seems better not to limit the reference to the presence of the angels in the Church assemblies. The Apostle has introduced into the discussion the natural order of subordinations. The holy angels behold the moral beauty of this order of creation and even occupy a place in the natural order, which they have not in the Church. In iv. 9 he has divided the kosmos into angels and men. In 1 Tim. v. 21 he charges Timothy before God and Christ Jesus and the elect angels. The Psalmist's declaration that he would play the harp before Elohim is rendered by the LXX. ἐνάντιον ἀγγέλων. In Luke xii. 8 Christ says He will confess His confessors ἐμπροσθεν τῶν ἀγγέλων τοῦ Θεοῦ. In our passage the angels are mentioned as examples to the woman of holy creatures that keep their place of subordination. Their place is to be ministering servants unto men; yet they rebel not. They are ministering as well as worshipping spirits (Heb. i. 14). And they have their reward when through the Church the manifold wisdom of God is made known to the principalities and powers in heavenly places. But we cannot exclude the notion of the moral influence of the Christian woman's holy humility on the minds of exalted creatures, who remember that they have never experienced the fierce conflict of temptations that assail the Church on earth. The moral influence of goodness is high as heaven, wide as the universe, and endless as eternity.

V. 11. A correction or limitation of the statement that in the Christian order and in the natural order the woman is in subjection to the man. In the Christian order the man is not without the woman, just as in the natural order he has his birth through the woman.

πλὴν, though derived from πλέον (Curtius, *Grundz.* p. 282), sometimes introduces a correction, as here. Cf. Matt. xxvi. 39; Winer, *Gr.* § LIII. 7. The best MSS. read οὔτε γυνὴ χωρὶς ἀνδρὸς οὔτε ἀνὴρ χωρὶς γυναῖκος.

According to Grotius the meaning is that Christ has not redeemed either man or woman exclusively of the other. This is much too narrow. So also is the interpretation of Hofmann and Heydenreich, who consider "in the Lord" to be predicate: "Neither is the woman in the Lord without the man," etc. The Apostle refers, not to personal state (Heinrici), but to Church order. Though the woman is subject to the man, both

are mutually dependent. Marriage and rearing children becomes a Christian and hallowed service to Christ (cf. vii. 14). The Christian unit of society is the family, not the city, not the empire; and when these were crushed under the heavy heel of barbarian hordes, the family life of the conquerors, when they became Christians, gave birth to a new civilization. This verse should be a corrective of any false or exaggerated interpretation of the Apostle's praise of the unmarried state in chap. vii. The life of the unmarried woman, though it is in one direction more intense, is at the same time less complete, than the life of the married woman.

ἐν Κυρίῳ, "in (the sphere of) the Lord Jesus Christ;" not "Deo jubente" (Beza, Olshaus.). It denotes the Christian order, while ἐκ Θεοῦ expresses the natural order. Cf. iv. 15, 17.

V. 12. The Apostle has already discovered in the history of man's creation an allegorical intimation of the woman's subjection to the man in the Christian order. In the law by which the race is perpetuated he sees also an allegory of the Christian mutual dependence of both. For whereas the first woman was taken out of the man, the race is perpetuated by birth from the woman; and in both, the first origin and every subsequent origin, the Apostle acknowledges the hand of God; so that the dependence of the man on the woman bears the impress of a Divine appointment no less than the subordination of the woman to the man. This inter-dependence in the order of nature is an allegory in which the mutual co-operation of the man and the woman in the higher order of the Church is typified.

### (3) *Natural Sentiment.*

(xi. 13-15).

Our interpretation of these verses will depend on the meaning we assign to the word φύσις. Four explanations of it have been offered by different expositors: (1) the custom of civilized nations (Chrys., Calvin, Grotius); (2) the physical constitution of things (Osiander, Hofmann, Evans); (3) the constitution of man (De Wette); (4) the inborn sense of seemliness (Bengel, Meyer, etc.) That the word sometimes

bears the first of these meanings and is equivalent to τὰ ἐν πάσῃ χώρᾳ κατὰ ταῦτὰ νομιζόμενα (Xen., *Mem.* IV. iv. 19) is certain. Cf. Dem., *De Coron.* p. 317, ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τοῖς ἀγράφοις νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἤθεσι διώρικεν. In later authors it is used in this signification as the equivalent of the "jus naturale" of Roman Law. The LXX. furnishes no instance; for Wisd. xiii. 1 is certainly not one. The objection to this rendering in our passage is that custom rests on sentiment. There is a "nature" anterior to custom. The third rendering is but a modification of the second. But the physical constitution of things cannot teach us anything as to what is seemly or unseemly unless there is a corresponding sense of it in men, and, on the other hand, no sentiment of men would be adduced by the Apostle unless it were grounded on an objective difference in the constitution of things. We must combine all these meanings, more especially the second and the fourth; so that the word will mean "a sense of what is seemly springing from a real distinction in the constitution of things." Here the constitution of things must mean the physical constitution of man and woman, the φύσις τῶν ὄλων as it is manifested in the φύσις αὐτοῦ (cf. Rom. ii. 14). The basis of the physical constitution of man and woman is the distinction of sex. "Nature" includes this and the entire organism that rests upon it, together with all those sentiments to which this physical constitution gives birth. What this "nature" teaches us is that to wear the hair long is to the man a disgrace, to the woman an honour. Of this the Corinthians can judge by their own sense of what is seemly. If they are not πνευματικοί, so as to understand the meaning of the allegory, at least they are φρόνιμοι (x. 15) and can judge the matter by instinctive or unconsciously formed sentiment (ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς). The reflexive pron. is not here used for the reciprocal, as it often is in later Greek.

V. 13. τῷ Θεῷ προσεύχεσθαι. This is added because it is our appearing before God in the Church assemblies that makes seemliness in the Church more incumbent than seemliness in our intercourse with the world. The Apostle omits prophesying in this verse (cf. ver. 5), because in the religion of natural sentiment there is prayer but no prophesying or preaching.

Vv. 14, 15. It was the fashion among the upper classes

in Athens to wear the hair long as if it were an honour, and *κομᾶν* came to have the secondary meaning of being proud. The Apostle distinguishes from these conventionalities the teaching of nature, which instructs men and women to cover themselves. This natural modesty is the more intense in the woman than in the man, so that she is instinctively conscious that even nature's gift of long hair is for a covering. It is nature's vesture. Hence he uses *περιβολαίον*, "a covering," which, like *πέπλος*, means more than *κάλυμμα*, "a veil."

*ἀντί*, not "instead of using a veil" (Grimm, *Lex.*), but "as a covering." So *ἀντί ἔρκους* (Basil), "for a defence." In prayer to God the veil is worn in addition to the long hair, partly to express the voluntariness of the worship (Chrys., Ambrosiaster), partly to mark the difference between worship and social life.

In previous verses the Apostle has spoken of the man's shorn head and the woman's long hair as symbols of subjection, in the one case to the man, in the other to Christ. Here he describes the man's long hair as a dishonour and the woman's long hair as her glory. The apparent inconsistency disappears when we call to mind that the man's subjection to Christ is his honour and that the woman's glory consists in being the glory of the man by subjection to him.

**V. 16.** Before finally dismissing the subject the Apostle sharply rebukes the contentiousness that insisted on peculiarities of dress as a symbol of Christian equality, while the customary dress was itself a symbol, if only rightly understood, of the equally essential and, in the public assemblies, more prominent truth of Christian order, on the maintenance of which the efficiency and success of the Church depended. Lachm. and Evans are surely mistaken in connecting this verse with what follows. The *οὐκ ἐπαινῶ* of ver. 17 corresponds to the *ἐπαινῶ* of ver. 2.

*δοκεῖ*, not "seems" nor "thinks he may dare" (Winer, *Gr.* § LXV. 7, c.), but "is minded" (De Wette, Meyer, etc.) The word contains a rebuke. It intimates a contrast between the custom of the Churches and the act of the opinionated individual who puts himself forward to contend against them. Cf. iii. 18; vii. 40.

*φιλόνηκος*, he who fights for victory, not for truth (Estius).

Like our "contentious," the word has passed from the meaning of loving contention to express the habit of creating it.

*συνθελάν.* Theod., Grot., Est., Hofm., Alford, etc., think the practice meant is the unveiling of the women in the Church assemblies. Chrys., Calvin, Meyer, Rückert, De Wette, etc., explain it to mean contentiousness. The objection is that we can scarcely call contentiousness a custom. But, as Meyer observes, this lends point to the rebuke. Some in Corinth had allowed contentiousness to run into a habit. Perhaps the word alludes to the national character of the Greeks. "We, Christians, are not partisans and litigious men, as you Greeks are known to be the world over." This interpretation is confirmed by xiv. 33, where the Apostle says that in all the Churches peace, not dissension, prevailed. Moreover, the reference to himself and fellow-Apostles, as distinguished from the Churches, would surely be out of place, if the Apostle referred to the unveiling of the women in the Church assemblies. In referring to the consent of Churches, not of officers, the Apostle is followed by ecclesiastical writers down to the time of Athanasius.

That the Apostle's censure had the desired effect we know. Tertullian (*De Virg. Vel.* 2 and 3) says that, not only the married women, but also the virgins wore a veil in most of the Churches founded by Apostles or apostolic men. He mentions the Corinthian Church as one of those that obeyed the Apostle's precept. In *Apol.* 30 he says that men uncovered the head in prayer. Chrysostom tell us that in his time the injunction imposed by the Apostle was universally obeyed. But Basil (*Ep.* 237) says that the Church of Neo-Cæsarea had, contrary to the practice of their former bishop, Gregory, permitted the men to pray with their head covered. Heinrici refers to the sculptures of the Catacombs. The men wear the hair short; the women have a close-fitting head-dress (the *ricinium*), or the *palla* over the shoulders.

### B. Abuse of the Lord's Supper.

(xi. 17-34).

V. 17. A B C Vulg. read *τοῦτο δὲ παραγγέλλω οὐκ ἐπαινῶν*. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg. Reiche defends the *tex. rec.*, which

is retained in the Rev. Version. Westc. and Hort do not decide. Whichever reading we adopt, *τοῦτο* cannot well refer to what follows (as Chrys., Theophyl., Grot., Bengel, etc.: "but in the charge I have to give concerning the Lord's Supper I cannot praise you"). For the words *πρῶτον μὲν* introduce the former of two things, both of which would be included in the pron., which would then be plur. Neither can *τοῦτο* naturally refer to the injunction that the women should wear a veil in public worship. For the connection between this command and his not praising them because they came together for worse is not apparent. *Τοῦτο* refers to ver. 16. When he says that neither Apostles nor Churches allowed contentiousness, he gives a virtual command. Ver. 17 means that this command is really a withdrawal of part of the praise bestowed on them in ver. 2. There he praises them for bearing him in remembrance and holding fast the instructions common to all the Churches. Here, on the contrary, he bids them follow his example and the example of the Churches, adding that, in giving this injunction, he withdraws his praise as touching their conduct in the Church assemblies.

*παραγγέλλω*, not "I declare" (Auth. Vers.), but "I command," the only meaning in the New Test.

*ὅτι*, "seeing that;" introducing the reason why he cannot do otherwise than withdraw part of his praise. There lurks a danger in contentiousness, which is that when they come together, they receive spiritual hurt instead of edification. Cf. xiv. 4; 1 Thess. v. 11; and, on the other side, 2 Cor. xi. 3; 1 Tim. vi. 4.

**V. 18.** *πρῶτον μὲν*. Olshausen, De Wette, Maier, etc., find the corresponding clause in ver. 20. But, first, not *οὖν*, but *δ' οὖν* (as in Isocr., *Paneg.* 54), would be used in the sense of *ἐπειτα δέ*. Second, the repetition of *συνερχομένων* shows that in ver. 20 the Apostle is resuming the train of thought interrupted by ver. 19. Third, the subject of *σχίσματα*, mentioned in ver. 18, is left unfinished unless the dissensions that broke out at the Lord's Supper are an instance of them. De Wette's objection that the Apostle does not say that *σχίσματα* had occurred at the Eucharist is true only as to the word. Rübiger (*Krit. Unters.* p. 135), Osiander, Meyer, Heinrici, find the *δέ* to correspond to this *μὲν* in xii. 1. Practically it is so. But

formally it is in τὰ δὲ λοιπά, ver. 34. The next chapter seems to be an afterthought. Instead of postponing the discussion, as he had intended, till he comes to Corinth, he proceeds to consider one of the "remaining things" in what he says of the spiritual gifts.

ἀκούω, "I hear again and again" (cf. Luke ix. 9).

ἐκκλησία. **Σ** A B C D omit τῇ (cf. xiv. 19). In no place in the New Test. need the word denote the *place* of meeting, not even in xiv. 35. Here also it means "in assembly," *cum solemniter convenitis* (Erasm.), as in "Didache" 4, ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐξομολογήσῃ. Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* vii. p. 846 Potter) observes that the word has the two significations.

σχίσματα. Cf. i. 10. It is not improbable that the dissensions at the Lord's Supper had some connection with the parties into which the Church was divided, but what connection we cannot tell. Maier and Rübiger (*Krit. Unters.* p. 136) conjecture that the rich belonged to the party of Apollos, the cultured Christians from among the heathen. But we may at least gather that some of the poorer members were forming themselves into a party in the Church against the party of the rich.

**V. 19.** The reason why the Apostle did not find it hard to believe part of what he had heard concerning their dissensions. Δεῖ means the necessity that arises from God's purpose. The notion of a Divine purpose fulfilled through the strife and selfishness of men is as old as the history of Joseph and runs through all Greek poetry and Jewish prophecy. The Apostle declares what one aspect of that purpose is. It is to bring to light the men whom God accepts (cf. Matt. xviii. 7; Luke xxiv. 26). Justin M. (*Dial.* 35) ascribes the words by mistake to Christ.

αἵρέσεις. From the first the word implied the notion of theoretical differences, not mere contentious jealousies; for it meant a sect of philosophers or jurisconsults. So in the New Test. it is used of the "sect" of the Sadducees, etc.; and the sting of the appellation "sect of the Nazarenes" lies in the claim of Christianity to be, not a theoretical school, but a universal religion founded on the only complete revelation. It is suggestive of a half-Christianized mind that Constantine should call the Church "the Catholic Heresy" (Eus., *Hist.*

*Eccles.* x. 5). In St. Paul's Epistles the word occurs only here and in *Gal.* v. 20; and here it is usually explained to be synon. with *σχίσματα*, and there with *διχοστασίαι*. In 2 *Pet.* ii. 1 the notion of erroneous doctrine is certain; it is proved by the words *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, παρεισάξουσιν, and ἀρνούμενοι*. On the whole I cannot see sufficient reason to think that the word ever means anything else in the New Test. than a doctrinal difference. It may not be a sharply defined error. Sharpness of definition was perhaps the consequence of the rise of Gnosticism, and is itself an example of what the Apostle here says, that underneath the strifes of men there lies a Divine purpose, which thus finds its accomplishment. But a well marked opposition between truth and error in doctrine appears in as early a writer as Ignatius, *Ad Trull.* 6, *ἀλλοτρίας δὲ βοτάνης ἀπέχεσθαι ἥτις ἐστὶν αἵρεσις*. The definite ecclesiastical meaning of the word includes more than this; and it soon became customary to ascribe this definiteness in the use of the word to the writers of the New Test. For instance, Justin M. (*ut sup.*) considers the errors of Valentinian and Basilides to be the fulfilment of the Apostle's prediction. Cf. Orig., *Fragm in Ep. ad Tit.* *Ἄρεσις* will, therefore, denote the intellectual embodiment of the contentious spirit; and for that reason it is a more effective test of Christian rightness than any other form that evil principles can assume.

*οἱ δόκιμοι*, that is, accepted of God. All that remains is that they should now be made manifest as such to the Church. The manifestation of an unchristian spirit in erroneous teaching ensures the manifestation of the Christian spirit in a keener insight into truth. Cf. Tert., *De Præscr.* 4, "*ut fides habendo tentationem habeat etiam probationem.*"

V. 20. *συνερχομένων* . . . *αὐτό*, "when, therefore, you come together to the same place"; *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*, local, as in *Clem. Rom., Ad Cor.* 34, *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντες*, Barn., *Ep.* 4, *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνερχόμενοι*. The rendering "for one object" (Evans) is not so suitable here. The important point is that, though they met as a Church, yet they took their meal separately even in the Church assembly (cf. *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ*, ver. 18).

*οὐκ* . . . *φαγεῖν*. The clause has been understood in three ways: (1) "You assemble not with any intention of eating

the Lord's Supper" (Alford). But vv. 29, 30 imply that the Corinthians came together to eat the Supper, but ate it unworthily. (2) "This is not an eating of the Lord's Supper" (Estius, De Wette, Maier). But *τοῦτο* would then be expressed, and this notion is unnecessarily weaker than the third rendering. (3) "It is not possible for you to eat the Lord's Supper" (Meyer, Rev. Vers.). So Cranmer's Bible: "the Lordes supper cannot bee eaten." De Wette objects that the use of *ἐστι* in the sense of "it is possible" requires the accus. of the person to be expressed before the infin. But it is not expressed in Heb. ix. 5, and many instances of its omission occur in the classics. The meaning is that there is some moral defect in them which renders their eating of the Lord's Supper not an eating of the Lord's Supper, and makes it impossible that it should be. In the next verse he begins to explain what that defect is.

*Κυριακὸν δείπνον*. Comparing the words with *τὸ ποτήριον Κυρίου* (x. 21), we infer that the Eucharist is here meant, not the preliminary feast or Agapé, as the Roman Catholic expositors say, *e.g.* Estius, Maldonatus on Matt. xxvi. 26. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Augustine (*Ep.* 54 (118), *Ad Jan.*) restrict the reference to the Eucharist. But unless the Agapé was celebrated at the same time or immediately before the Eucharist, such excesses as are here mentioned could not have occurred in connection with its celebration. That the Apostle refers to the Agapé and the Eucharist is, I think, certain, though the name Agapé does not occur before the closing years of the Apostolic age; *e.g.* in Jude 12 *ⲁⲓⲃⲏⲛ* have *ἀγάπαις*, and A B read *ἀγάπαις* in 2 Pet. ii. 13. In Ignat. *Ad Smyrn.* 8 *ἀγάπην ποιεῖν* includes the celebration of the Eucharist; for it is joined to *βαπτίζειν*. But in Justin Martyr's account (*Apol.* I. 67) of the celebration of the Eucharist there is no mention of the love-feast. The combination of the Eucharist and the love-feast may have been occasioned by our Lord's having instituted the former while eating the passover. It arose also from the earliest manner of celebrating the Eucharist as part of the family meal (cf. Acts ii. 46). Chrysostom ascribes the origin of the Agapæ themselves to the attempt of the first Christians to establish community of goods, a trace of this remaining in the love-feast. When this custom of eating together and

contributing to a common fund passed from Palestine to the Churches in Hellas, it found a congenial soil. It was the age of clubs and guilds or *universitates* in all parts of the Empire and among all classes of society. Their main features were a religious basis, a common fund, and a common meal. Through the assimilating power of Christianity the *ἑσπαιοὶ* of the Greeks became one of the most beautiful features of the primitive Church. The subsequent separation of the Agapæ arose more especially from two causes, the increasing degeneracy<sup>1</sup> of the love-feasts, and the growth of the sacerdotal doctrine of the sacraments. In the Apostolic Constitutions (II. 28) the Agapæ are described as a meal given to aged women. They were formally, though not finally, separated by a decree of the Council of Laodicea (A.D. 364), which forbade the holding of the Agapæ in the churches. Though the love-feast and the Lord's Supper were not separated when the Apostle wrote, to state the distinction in idea between them would seem to be his purpose in this passage. This is the special emphasis on the supper being *the Lord's*. The rich are not the persons that invite, the poor are not *their* guests. It is a feast given by the Lord to all alike. The words tend to discountenance the union of the love-feast and the supper, and Augustine (cf. the Benedictine "Life," III. xi. 2) was justified in using the passage in support of his recommendation "*ne honesta quidem et sobria convivia licere in ecclesiâ celebrari.*" He correctly infers that the Corinthians erred in not distinguishing the love-feast from the sacramental communion of the body and blood of Christ. Sozomen (*Hist. Eccles.* VII. 19, cited by Heinrici) says they were confounded in the Church of Alexandria.

This renders nugatory the question whether the celebration of the Eucharist immediately preceded or followed the love-feast. Chrysostom, Theodoret, etc., say the Eucharist preceded the Agapé, in accordance with the Greek custom of pouring a libation before sitting down to meat. But their testimony on this point is of less value because it was in their time universally held that the Eucharist must be taken fasting. Estius and Cave (*Primit. Christian.* P. I. Ch. xi.) think the irregularity in the Corinthian Church consisted in their not tarrying one for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tert., *De Jejun.* 17, "appendices gulæ lascivia atque luxuria." It is hard to believe that Tertullian, though now a Montanist, does not speak the truth.

another to partake of the love-feast together before celebrating the Eucharist.

V. 21. He proves the moral impossibility of their eating the Lord's Supper from their unworthy behaviour at the love-feast. Not only did they confound the Eucharist and the Agapé, but they converted the love-feast into an occasion for the rich to indulge to excess and make an invidious distinction between themselves and their poorer brethren.

τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον. It was essential to a love-feast, whether Eranos or Agapé, that all the members should share it in common, rich and poor contributing according to their means, and the larger contributions of the rich making up for the deficiency of the poor. The Christian love-feast was held in the place of assembly and partook of a religious no less than a social character. As the meal proceeded, it glided naturally, perhaps without a formal break, into a celebration of the Eucharist, in the same way in which our Lord's last passover ended in the institution of a Christian sacrament. When therefore the rich took the meal before and apart from their poorer brethren, the very nature of a love-feast was destroyed and with it an essential feature of the Eucharist as well. What was intended to be a communion became an occasion of discord.

προλαμβάνει, not "takes it at home before he comes to the love-feast," which is inconsistent with ver. 22, but "takes it with indecent haste before the poor come in with whom they were ashamed to eat." The opposite is ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθαι, ver. 33. Chrys. excellently, τὸ κυριακὸν ἰδιωτικὸν ποιοῦσιν.

ἐν τῷ φαγεῖν, "when he is taking his seat at the Lord's table." The aor. denotes the beginning of the act of eating. Cf. Goodwin, *Greek Moods*, p. 24. The object of the verb must be mentally supplied from the previous clause.

ὅς μὲν . . . ὅς δέ. Cf. note on vii. 7.

πεινᾷ. The Attic form is πεινῇ. Aristotle is the first to use πεινᾷ, which is the prevailing form afterwards. The meaning is, not that the rich man alleges hunger as an excuse for eating before the poor come in, but that the poor go home without tasting any food, while the rich have drunk to excess. There can be but little doubt that Chrys. is right in giving the word μεθύει its full meaning. "He does not say 'drinks to satiety,'

but 'is drunk.' " The Corinthian Christians were assimilating the love-feast to the symposia of the heathen.<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plat., *Sympos.* p. 223. Long afterwards Ambrose was compelled to forbid the use of wine at festivals held in honour of the martyrs, because it led to revelry and drunkenness.

**V. 22.** "Hold your social banquets at home. To do otherwise is to lower the Church to the level of a heathen club and to put to shame the poor."

μη γὰρ οὐ. Ironical and denoting surprise. This is true of μη οὐ and of γάρ (against Meyer). Cf. Dem., *Phil.* I. p. 43, γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τι καινότερον ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν; Cf. Acts viii. 31; probably also Heb. iii. 16.

τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, that is, not a heathen symposium, but an assembly of men consecrated to the service of the holy God. For a similar emphasis cf. xv. 9; Phil. iii. 6. The Apostle was chief of sinners because he had persecuted the Church; yet this Church of the living God the Church in Corinth despised. The effect of contempt for the spiritual majesty of the Church is a readiness to put the poorer brethren to the blush because of their poverty; for in the Church, the presence-chamber of God, the distinction between rich and poor has no place.

τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας, not "those who have no houses" (Alford), but "those who have nothing," "the poor." So Chrys. In class. Greek οἱ ἔχοντες often means "the rich," and οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, "the poor." Cf. Plat., *Leg.* V. p. 735. In ver. 34 it is assumed that the poor had houses. Μή, not οὐ, before ἔχοντες, because their poverty was the reason why they were put to shame. In putting to shame the indigent, who brought no contribution or a meagre one to the common meal, the wealthy Christians in Corinth did but imitate their heathen neighbours. Cf. Schol. ad Aristoph., *Acharn.* 570, ἔθος εἶχον τέλεσμά τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν διδόναι, ὅπερ οἱ μὴ διδόντες καὶ ἄτιμοι ἐνομιζοντο καὶ μετὰ βίας ἀπηγοῦντο. Some of the ἔρανοι had, however, for their special object to help the needy, who, in their turn, when they might be in better circumstances, were expected to help others. It was this feature of the heathen

<sup>1</sup> According to one reading Ælian (*Var. Hist.* III. 15) says the Corinthians were ἀκρατέστερον τῷ οἴνῳ προσιόντες.

Eranos, in addition to the nature of the Christian Agapé, that made the conduct of the wealthy Christians of Corinth so deserving of reprobation.

ἐπαινέσω is, like εἴπω, deliberative subjunctive. Buttman (N.S. p. 46), and Grimm (*Lex.*), however, consider it to be fut. indic. for the more usual ἐπαινέσομαι.

ἐν τούτῳ, connected by Neand., Meyer, De Wette, etc., correctly with οὐκ ἐπαινῶ. In other matters he has praised them.

**V. 23.** The reason why he cannot praise them lies, not only in the contrast between their selfishness and the love of the Lord Jesus, though this is not to be lost sight of, but also in their complete misapprehension of the purpose of Christ in instituting the Eucharist. The Apostle proceeds to explain, on the authority of Christ, the nature of the Lord's Supper as it is unfolded in the history of its institution.

ἐγώ, "I personally." Αὐτὸς ἐγώ would express the same thing, only more emphatically. Cf. 2 Cor. x. 1 with Gal. v. 2. Buttman (N.S. p. 115) maintains that ἐγώ is often expressed in the New Test. without emphasis. There are some instances (though I think only one of the passages he cites, Matt. x. 16, is an instance), in which we may fairly doubt that emphasis was intended, e.g. Gal. vi. 17. But in our passage ἐγώ is emphatic (against De Wette). It renders the Apostle's account of the institution more reliable that he had it personally from the Lord.

παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου. Beza, Winer (*Gr.* § XLVII.), Ellicott (on Gal. i. 12), Neander, Meyer, Hofmann, etc., think the Apostle means that he received it from Christ, not directly, but through the Apostles or by tradition. Their strongest argument is the alleged difference in meaning between ἀπὸ and παρὰ, the former denoting the more remote, the latter the nearer, source. But this is not invariably the case. Cf. Thuc. I. 125, ἀφ' ἀπάντων ἤκουσαν, on which Poppo observes, "insolentius." So Matt. xi. 29, μάθετε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, which immediately follows δεῦτε πρὸς με, Col. i. 7, ἐμάθετε ἀπὸ Ἐπαφρᾶ, and 1 John i. 5, ἣν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. This is admitted by Buttman (N.S. p. 145). Chrys., Calvin, Estius, Bengel, Osiander, Olshausen, Alford, Evans, etc., understand it to mean an immediate communication made by the risen Lord to the

Apostle himself. It is the only interpretation of the word that adequately explains why the Apostle should mention the thing. If he can declare to his readers that the Lord's Supper, instituted by Christ before He suffered, was again instituted by the risen Lord, and that its celebration in the Church from age to age was thus sanctioned by an immediate revelation of His will to the Apostle and, as Chrys. observes, proved to be no less significant and effective than at the first institution, the Apostle's words have a worthy purpose in reference both to the Corinthians and to himself. Another institution of the Supper by the risen Christ occurred in Einmaus. May we not suppose it was one purpose of His appearance to the two disciples? That Christ should vouchsafe an immediate revelation of it to St. Paul is in keeping with, though distinct from, the revelation of the Gospel which he declares he received from Jesus Christ, not from men (cf. Gal. i. 12). In this Apostle Christianity makes a new start as the Gospel of the risen and glorified Christ. But it is not a new Christianity; and this identity of the Gospel taught by Jesus in the days of His flesh and again revealed after His resurrection to Paul is set forth in the identity of the sacraments. Ideas mark the progress, sacraments the fixedness of Christianity. Doctrines are more fully developed in the New Test. than in the Old, and more fully in the Epistles than in the Gospel narratives. But the same sacraments continue in one form or another through all dispensations, and help to anchor theological thought to its moorings. The Apostle does not hesitate to develop new truths; but he does not institute a new sacrament. Indeed *ἀπό* is more forcible in this connection than *παρά*. For it signifies that the Lord Jesus Christ was the original source of all revelation touching the nature of the sacrament. Here as well as elsewhere the Apostle claims to have received revelations direct from the Lord. Cf. 1 Thess. iv. 15, *ἐν λόγῳ Κυρίου*, which Theod. correctly explains by *ἐκ θείας ἀποκαλύψεως*, and Eph. iii. 3.

*παραλαμβάνω* is the precise word to denote the receiving a deposit or trust. Cf. Thuc. II. 72, *ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλάβωμεν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦδε ἔξομεν παρακαταθήκην*.

*καί*, "also," identifies that which the Apostle received with what he delivered. In this matter of the Lord's Supper they

had forgotten his instructions (cf. note on ver. 2). On  $\eta$  cf. note on vii. 20.

*παρεδίδετο*. The close connection between the betrayal and the Lord's Supper, noticed by the Evangelists, proves that the word here means, not the delivering of Christ by God, but the betrayal by Judas. The imperf. intimates that the betrayal was not the result of sudden impulse, but the fulfilment of well planned and now ripening counsels, known to Jesus when He was instituting the sacrament. The betrayal was the crisis in His history. It determined that He must die. Hence the night in which this act was consummated was chosen by Christ for the institution of that sacrament which derives its meaning and virtue from His death. The form of the expression, not "when," but "in the night in which," intimates that Judas was present at the supper. The form *παρεδίδετο* is read in  $\aleph$  A B C D and adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort, etc. Chrys. and Theod. have *παρεδίδοτο*. Similarly in Acts iv. 35  $\aleph$  A B D read *διεδίδετο*. Cf. Winer, *Gr.* § XIV. 1.

The account given by the Apostle is almost identical with that given by Luke. This corroborates the statement of Irenæus (*Adv. Hær.* III. 1), that Luke was a follower of Paul and consigned to writing the Gospel which the Apostle preached. Our passage is also the first written account of the institution of the Supper.

**V. 24.** *εὐχαριστήσας*. Cf. note on x. 16. From this the Supper came to be called the Eucharist as early as the time of Ignatius, the only one of the Apostolic Fathers that makes mention of the Lord's Supper. Cf. *Ad Smyrn.* 7 and 8; Justin M., *Apol.* I. 66, *ἡ τροφή αὕτη καλεῖται παρ' ἡμῖν εὐχαριστία*.

The words *λάβετε, φάγετε* are omitted in  $\aleph$  A B C D. St. Luke and St. Mark omit *φάγετε*. The copyists inserted the word here from St. Matthew.

The word *κλώμενον* is omitted in  $\aleph$  A B C. (D has *θρυπτόμενον*). Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort omit, De Wette, Reiche, Hofmann retain it. Rightly; for, first, *τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* is very harsh, perhaps unexampled; second, breaking the body was essential to the sacrifice; third, its omission by the copyists is accounted for on the supposition that they

suspected a contradiction between this passage and John xix. 36. Meyer is wrong in supposing the Apostle omitted *κλώμενον* because it could be supplied from *ἔκλασε*, for that breaking refers to the bread, this to the body.

*εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*. Cf. note on x. 16. The words of Christ contain two distinct but connected ideas. The one implies His presence in the sacrament: "this is My body; this is My blood." The other implies His absence: "in remembrance of Me." Both meet in the Apostle's word, "communion," which involves, first, that the communicant appropriates Christ, and, second, that the instrument of this appropriation is conscious, voluntary faith. Appropriation of Christ necessitates His real presence; faith implies His equally real absence. The Apostle's teaching is inconsistent at once with the doctrine of transubstantiation and with Zwinglianism.

*ἐμὴν*. On the poss. pron. in the sense of an objective genit. cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 652. 3, Obs. 6; Winer, *Gr.* § XXII. 7. So in xv. 31; Rom. xi. 31. It occurs in class. Greek, *e.g.* Thuc. I. 77, τὸ ἡμετέρον δέος, Eur., *Io* 1276, ὁ οἶκτος ὁ σός. In the New Test. the usage is somewhat rare. It seems to convey some degree of emphasis, which is helped in this ver. by the position of *μου*. The words, thus emphatic, contribute to the object of the passage. They indicate the special character of the Lord's Supper. Hitherto they had celebrated the paschal Supper, in remembrance of Israel's deliverance from Egypt (cf. Exod. xiii. 9). Henceforth Christ takes the place of that deliverance. Instead of a temporal and national redemption a spiritual and, therefore, common salvation becomes the centre of men's thoughts, of their memories and their hopes. The words cannot, without great violence, be explained of a commemoration or an offering of Christ to God.

V. 25. *μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι*, that is, "after the paschal meal." St. Luke is the only one of the evangelists that records this. But even he combines it with another account. For he mentions the cup twice. The first time Christ takes the cup and gives thanks during the paschal meal, after which He says He will no more drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God is come (cf. Luke xxii. 17, 18). According to the other evangelists he uttered these words after taking

the cup of the Eucharist. The second time Christ takes the cup, according to St. Luke, after supper; and this cup, says St. Paul, was the cup of the Eucharist. The Apostle's account is quite consistent with the accounts of St. Matthew and St. Mark. The difficulty is to harmonize it with the words of his own follower, St. Luke, who received, we may suppose, his information from him. However this may be, we must understand that the Eucharistic cup was drunk after the paschal meal. But why does the Apostle say this? Hofmann thinks it is to warn the Corinthians that after the Agapé wine may be required for the Eucharist. Bengel suggests, what is more to the purpose, that it is intended to distinguish the Eucharist from an ordinary meal. It is remarkable that the Apostle fixes the time at which Christ took the bread and the time at which He took the cup. Both data advance his main purpose, which is to mark the essential difference between the Lord's Supper and every other feast. It was instituted on that critical night in which His death was irrevocably determined upon, because it was to be communion with Him in His death. Again, part of the Eucharist accompanied the paschal meal, part followed. The new dispensation was grafted on the old. Mosaism expired in the birth-throes of Christianity.

*ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη.* Since the expression in St. Luke and St. Paul, "this is the new covenant in My blood," must mean the same thing as the expression, "this is My blood of the new covenant," in St. Matthew and St. Mark, it follows that the substance of the wine does not undergo a change at consecration; for the cup cannot be called a covenant except in a metaphorical sense. If so, the words "this My body" (ver. 24) do not imply that the substance of the body is changed. We can now, therefore, determine the precise meaning of the word "is" in these two verses. On the one hand, it cannot denote a change of substance in the bread or the wine. On the other hand, because the Apostle teaches that the sacrament is a communion with the body and blood of Christ, the word "is" must mean more than "represents;" though this notion is part of its meaning, inasmuch as the Apostle teaches also that the sacrament is a commemoration. Cf. Tert., *Contra Marc.* I. 14, "panem . . . quo corpus suum repræsentat;" and IV. 40, "acceptum panem et distributum discipulis corpus

illum suum fecit, hoc est, corpus meum dicendo, id est, figura corporis mei." What more, then, than "represents" can *ἐστίν* signify? Surely the answer is that it expresses communion. The sacrament is a medium of communion with the body and blood of Christ, and a real means whereby faith appropriates the blessings which flow from the glorified Christ in virtue of His death.

*διαθήκη* undoubtedly means "covenant" in the LXX., though *συνθήκη* would be the class. word. Even in the Epistle to the Hebrews the invariable meaning of *διαθήκη* is covenant. It is the only adequate meaning in our passage. The Gospel not only proclaims a Divine institution, arrangement or intention to bestow gifts on men, but also offers those gifts on conditions and declares that God, on His part also, has pledged Himself to bestow them on the fulfilment of those conditions. This mutual pledge is ratified in the sacrifice of Christ, in whom God and man meet. The sacrament involves faith on the part of the communicant. But the emphatic words are "new" and "in My blood." The covenant is new because it no longer consists in the letter, but in the Spirit (2 Cor. iii. 6); no longer in a law of commandments contained in ordinances, but in the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.

*ἐν*, "resting upon," "ratified through." The same idea might have been expressed by *ἐπὶ*, as in Ps. l. (xlix.) 5, *τὴν διαθήκην αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ θυσίαις*. The covenant rested on Christ's blood, that is, the death of Christ was a sacrificial propitiation.

*ὅσάκις ἂν πίνητε*, "as often as ye drink this cup of the Lord's Supper;" not "as often as ye take your ordinary meal."

V. 26. That these are not the words of Christ is certain. St. Luke has them not, and *μου* would have been used instead of *Κυρίου*. *Γάρ* does not here introduce a proof of the truth of Christ's declaration that the bread and wine are His body and blood. The act of the Church would be no proof of their truth. Nor is *γάρ* inferential (Meyer): "such, then, being the fact." It has here its explicative force. The Apostle applies the general statement of Christ to the case of the Corinthians. This explicative meaning of *γάρ* is proved by the repetition of Christ's words, "as often as." The meaning seems to be that the words of Christ at the institution of the

Eucharist explain the distinctive nature of the Lord's Supper, which is to declare His accomplished death as our propitiation. In this it differs from a Christian love-feast and from the Jewish passover.

*καταγγέλλετε*. If *γάρ* is explicative, the verb is indic.: "ye do announce." So Vulg., Bengel, De Wette, Maier, Meyer, etc. It is present of indefinite frequency. We announce the Lord's death, not orally (Meyer), but in the act of eating the bread and drinking the cup. The word explains "in remembrance of Me." It is true *καταγγέλλειν* properly means "to proclaim by word of mouth." But the Apostle intentionally uses the word to denote more than would be conveyed by "represent" or "signify." In the Supper we *preach* the Lord's death, and this silent ministry of the Eucharist excludes the pride or shame of social distinctions, as the oral ministry excludes excellency of speech or of wisdom. Cf. Cyprian, *Ep.* 63 Ad Cæcil.: "Qui [Christi sanguis] scripturarum omnium sacramento ac testimonio effusus *prædicatur*."

*ἄχρις οὖν*. The *ἄν* is omitted in **ABCD**. But it is an unreal refinement to detect a difference of meaning. Cf. note on iv. 5; xv. 25.

*ἐλθῇ*. Theod., De Wette, Meyer think the Apostle's purpose in mentioning the Lord's second coming was to intimate that the celebration of the Lord's Supper will cease when Christ Himself is present, as there will be no need of symbols when His glorified humanity has again appeared to His Church. But there does not appear to be a sufficient reason for referring to its cessation in this place. The Apostle mentions the two *termini* in the history of the Church, the Lord's death and His second coming. These are the events that stamp upon the development of Christian life and Church history its peculiar character. "All time is a festival," says Chrysostom, "because the Son of God delivered thee from death." But the ages of history are to the Church much more than an after feast. They are a preparation also for the Lord's coming. This the Corinthians had forgotten, and consequently turned the means of renovation and strengthening into a drunken meal. The Apostle, therefore, reminds them of the same truth which Christ taught in His later parables of the ten virgins and the talents.

**V. 27.** He draws the practical inference that those who eat the Eucharistic bread and drink the cup have a duty to perform towards the body and blood of the Lord. To fail in this duty renders the communicant guilty, and exposes him to God's judgments. The inference rests, not on *καταγγέλλεται* (Meyer), but on the entire statement concerning the nature of the Eucharist, as the communion of the Lord's body and blood.

*τοῦτον* is omitted in **N A B C D**. Hence *τοῦ Κυρίου* belongs to *ἄρτον* as well as to *ποτήριον*.

*ἄρτον*. He still says "bread." If the Apostle had taught transubstantiation, it would have made his argument much stronger to say that they were eating the body.

*ἢ*, "or." It cannot mean "and," which *ἢ* never means, except in negative sentences; though *καί* is sometimes used for *ἢ* (e.g. Dem., *De Cor.* p. 270, *χθὲς καὶ πρόην*). A reads *καί*, which has apparently crept in from ver. 26. The words prove neither the Protestant doctrine that participation in both kinds is necessary, nor the opposite doctrine of "communio sub unâ specie" (Estius, *Cor. a Lap.*, Messmer; but not Maier). In fact the doctrine of concomitancy is meaningless without the doctrine of transubstantiation or of consubstantiation. The Apostle says *ἢ* to intimate the consequence of unworthy participation of either of the two elements. A sudden revelation of Christ's glory may bring a blessed change of heart even during the celebration. Yet he who unworthily partakes of either of the two elements incurs guilt in reference to both the body and the blood, inasmuch as he sins against Christ, from whom each part of the sacrament derives its efficacy.

*ἀναξίως*. The Apostle has brought to light the special worthiness that belongs to the Lord's Supper. He who confounds it with the love-feast does not acknowledge its peculiar character. He eats and drinks unworthily. The meaning of *ἀναξίως* is explained by *μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα*, ver. 29, and it must be here restricted to this, though of course there may be other ways in which men eat and drink unworthily. But this passage is not a full and systematic statement of the nature of the Lord's Supper. Like the parallel passage in chap. x., it was occasioned by a practical emergency.

*ἐνοχος*=*ἐνεχόμενος*, "held in," hence "liable to." The

original construction with ἔνοχος is, therefore, the dat., whether we call it the instrumental or, as Jelf (*Gr.* § 605. 5), local dat.; first generally, as in Job xv. 5; then specially, as a law phrase, when the dat. expresses either the law or indictment (τοῖς νόμοις, τῇ γραφῇ) or the crime (e.g. τῇ προδοσίᾳ) or the punishment (e.g. τῷ θανάτῳ). The next step was the use of the genit. instead of the dat. This may have arisen either from the omission of τῇ γραφῇ, or from the assimilation of the construction to that of judicial verbs of prosecution. Hence the genit. with ἔνοχος expresses, not the law, but the crime (e.g. λιποταξίου). The third step was the use of the genit. to denote the punishment, as in Matt. xxvi. 66. The last (and latest) step was to use the genit. to denote the person against whom the crime is committed. This stage is not reached, I think, in class. Greek. But it is after the analogy of αἷτιος, which takes genit. of the person in the classics. Cf. Isa. liv. 17, οἱ ἔνοχοι σου, James ii. 10, πάντων ἔνοχος. These passages justify us in so explaining σώματος and αἵματος here, in preference to considering them genit. of the crime: "corporis et sanguinis violati" (Jerome). The sin against the body and blood of the Lord consists in not recognising the peculiar nature of the Lord's Supper, not (as Chrys., Theod., Œcum., Theophyl., Ambrosiast., Hervæus, the *Formula Concordiæ*, Olshausen, etc.) in crucifying to oneself the Son of God afresh. The reference is not at all to unbelievers or hypocrites, or apostates to Judaism (Lightfoot, *Hor. Heb.*). For ver. 32 implies that those who were punished by the Lord for unworthy eating and drinking were believers, who were not condemned with the world. Lutherans argue from this ver. that unbelievers eat the body and drink the blood of Christ. Cf. Gerhard, *Loci XXI*<sup>1</sup> xxii. 135. The words imply the reverse. Instead of proclaiming the Lord's death, the unworthy partaker of the bread and wine is guilty of sinning against Him by not recognising the difference between the Eucharist and any social meal. He thus refuses to proclaim the Lord's death, and declines communion.

V. 28. To shun this guilt let every man bring his motives and the attitude of his soul to the test.

δέ, adversative. "Let him on the contrary," etc.

δοκιμαζέτω, not "let him make himself worthy or approved"

(Beza on Gal. vi. 4, Lightfoot, *Hor. Heb.*, Rückert, Linden, *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1862, p. 570), which would be expressed by *ἐαυτὸν δόκιμον παραστήσάτω*, as in 2 Tim. ii. 15. But *δοκιμάζειν* means only (1) “to put to the test,” as in Gal. vi. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 10; (2) “to approve,” as the result of putting to the test, as in Rom. xiv. 22. As the meaning of self-approval would be here out of place, we must render the words “let every one test himself.” Cf. 2 Cor. xiii. 5, *ἐαυτοὺς πειράζετε, ἐαυτοὺς δοκιμάζετε*. Having censured the Corinthians for allowing the Eucharist to degenerate into a feast, which marked their differences, not their union, the Apostle intimates that the root of the mischief was their spiritual pride, only that they did not know it. If they would but bring to the test “the wretchedness of their disordered passions,” their lack of love, of humility and spiritual insight, they would then see their need of communion with Christ, the one source of all grace. For this communion is not ecstatic, but moral and sanctifying; so that a sense of unworthiness, sincere repentance, faith in Christ, promise of amendment, and thankfulness for God’s mercy, are necessary to secure the blessings which the Lord’s Supper is designed to bestow. The use made of the Apostle’s words by devotional writers of various schools is, therefore, exegetically legitimate.

*ἀνθρῶπος* = *ἑκαστος*. Cf. note on iv. 1.

*καὶ οὕτως*, that is, “when he has examined himself.” This use of *οὕτως* must be distinguished from its inferential meaning, “this being so,” “*quæ cum ita sint*.” It occurs frequently in class. Greek, especially after participles, and is often followed by *δή*, but not often, as here, preceded by *καί*.

*ἕκ*, “a portion of the bread.” The word implies, what is explicitly stated in ver. 33, that all should wait for one another and so take each his portion of the bread. Breaking the bread was part of the rite in the early Church. Distribution (*διάδοσις*) implied communion.

V. 29. A reason for the exhortation to self-examination. Communion with Christ in the Lord’s Supper is the result of faith; faith is impossible without thought and a right estimate of Christ. On the other hand, thoughtlessness produces unbelief and incurs God’s displeasure.

*ἀναξίως* and *τοῦ Κυρίου* are omitted in  $\aleph$  A B C, but in-

serted in D. Most critics omit them; but Rückert hesitates. Without ἀναξίως the construction and meaning may be explained in one of four ways: (1) We may, with Meyer, and, in effect, Evans, supply ἀναξίως in thought. This is harsh; though it is likely ἀναξίως so crept in. (2) Osiander puts a comma after ἐαυτῷ, omitting it after πίνων and πίνει: "for he who eats and drinks judgment to himself eats and drinks without discerning the Lord's body." Nothing can well be more unnatural. (3) Rückert thus: "for he who eats and drinks without discerning the Lord's body eats and drinks judgment to himself." The position of the participle is decisive against this. (4) Meyer and De Wette thus: "for he who eats and drinks, eats and drinks judgment to himself, if he does not rightly estimate the body." Canon Evans doubts that the hypothetical participle is a Hellenistic usage. But cf. xi. 5; Gal. vi. 9; Heb. x. 26; xi. 32. This is the best interpretation.

κρίμα (or κρίμα, cf. Winer, *Gr.* § VI. 1 e), "judgment," "judicial sentence," as in Mark xii. 40; Rom. ii. 2, 3. Hervæus, Estius, Mosheim explain it of eternal perdition. The subsequent verses prove that temporal judgments are at least included. But from the absence of the article we may, I think, gather that the Apostle intentionally refrains from fixing more particularly what punishment. Some of the unworthy recipients may have incurred such guilt as rendered them obnoxious to severer punishment than others.

ἐαυτῷ, "against himself." Cf. Matt. xxiii. 31; Rom. xiii. 2; Heb. vi. 6.

μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα. Justin M. (*Apol.* I. 66), Augustine (*Tract. in Johan.* LXII.), Hervæus, Beza, Grotius, Estius, Hofmann explain the clause to mean "not distinguishing between the Lord's body and common bread." But as "body" cannot mean "the symbols of the body," the sin against which he warns the Corinthians cannot consist in not distinguishing the efficacy of the sacramental bread from ordinary food, but rather in an imperfect apprehension of the sanctifying influence of fellowship with Christ. Moreover, διακρίνομεν in ver. 31 must have the same meaning as διακρίνων in ver. 29, that is "if we estimated ourselves aright." The meaning is that a right estimate of ourselves is necessary

for a right estimate of the Lord's body (cf. Matt. xvi. 3). This is the rendering of the Vulg., "*nos dijudicans . . . quodsi nosmet ipsos dijudicaremus,*" etc., which is much better than Beza's "*discernens . . . etenim si ipsi nos dijudicaremus.*"

τὸ σῶμα. He does not now say "the body and the blood," because he is speaking, not of the symbols on earth, but of Christ's glorified humanity in heaven. This accounts also for the otherwise harsh omission of τοῦ Κυρίου. The "body" is the Lord Himself in His glorified humanity. In the σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ the distinction of flesh and blood has no place. The notion of Dean Jackson and Bengel, that the material blood which flowed from the Lord's body on the cross, was gathered up and restored by the power of God, is, therefore, though reverently conceived, a mere fancy.

V. 30. What is a hypothesis only in ver. 29 is actually the case at Corinth. Some among the Corinthians were guilty of dishonouring the glorified body of the Lord, and this was proved by the numerous sicknesses and deaths that occurred among them. If we ask how the Apostle is justified in connecting the two things as cause and effect, it is not enough to answer, with Hofmann, that he observed the connection from the large number of Christians that had recently died at Corinth. The Apostle and prophet is here uttering an oracular decision, with certitude and authority. Several expositors (Estius, Osiander, etc.) notice the parallel between the circumstances that ushered in the Old and the New Dispensations. And as Ananias and Sapphira fell dead at the feet of Peter because they had lied to the Holy Ghost, so also many Christians in Corinth were stricken with sickness and some with death because they had dishonoured the majesty of Christ's glorified human nature. That the reference is not to spiritual feebleness is evident from his using the word κοιμῶνται, the Christian designation for death. Cf. note on vii. 39. The pres., which occurs only here in the New Test., denotes the act of "falling asleep." Cf. 1 Thess. iv. 13. Or it may mean frequency. Many died from time to time.

V. 31. For γάρ read δέ with **8** A B D, against C.

διεκρίνομεν . . . ἐκρινόμεθα. This may be rendered either, "if we were to judge ourselves, we should not be judged" or with equal correctness (against Canon Evans), "if we had

judged ourselves, we should not have been judged." Cf. Goodwin, *Moods*, § 49, 2. The context must in each case decide to what time the imperfect refers. But the *δέ* and the 1st pers., making the reference general, are decisive in favour of the present time. "It is true that God's judgments are descending; but we, who have hitherto escaped, may shun them by judging and testing ourselves. If we examined and formed a right estimate of ourselves so as heartily to repent, we should be spared God's temporal judgments, which are intended to make us sorrow after a godly sort." Augustine used this verse as a motto to his "Retractions."

**V. 32.** God's temporal judgments are a father's chastisements, inflicted to lead the erring child to repentance, that he may not be condemned with the unbelieving world by Christ at His coming.

The words "by the Lord," though implied with "chastised," must properly be connected with "judged," for we shall then preserve the antithesis between it and "judging ourselves," ver. 31; and it is because the judgment has been sent by the Lord that it has the chastening effect of discipline.

*παιδενόμεθα*, "we are chastened," that is, disciplined, corrected. *Παιδεία* is correction by act, *νουθεσία* by word. In class. Greek *παιδεία* is "education." But in Scripture it has acquired the further meaning of correction by a father. Cf. Prov. xxii. 15; Heb. xii. 5-11; 2 Macc. vi. 12. It differs also from *κόλασις* and *τιμωρία*. Cf. Chrys., *νουθεσίας μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ καταδίκης τὸ γινόμενον, ἰατρείας ἢ τιμωρίας, διορθώσεως ἢ κολάσεως*.

*κατακρίθωμεν*, "that we may not be judged unto condemnation." Cf. Rom. v. 16, *κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*. The Apostle means at the Lord's second coming, ver. 26. Cf. Luke xxi. 34; Matt. xxiv. 49-51. This makes it probable, against the view of expositors generally, that "the Lord," by whom the Corinthians were now judged, is Christ.

**Vv. 33, 34.** He closes the discussion concerning the Eucharist with two practical exhortations. The one is that they should make it a common feast, the other is that, notwithstanding this, it should not be allowed to degenerate from a spiritual into a carnal feast. The common character of the Eucharist will be preserved by their waiting one for another;

its religious character will be secured by their satisfying their hunger at home.

**V. 33.** ἐκδέχεσθε, probably not "receive ye one another" to the feast (Mosheim, Olshausen, Hofmann, etc.). This is the more usual meaning of the word in class. Greek and LXX., only with the additional notion of receiving *from* another, e.g. ambassadors (Polyb. XXIV. iv. 11), whereas receiving a guest is δέχεσθαι (Luke xvi. 9) or ἀποδέχεσθαι (Xen., *Mem.* IV. i. 1). The meaning here is "wait ye for one another." The word is an intentionally formal antithesis to ver. 21. To wait for one another would render the occasion more solemn.

**V. 34.** The omission of δέ (with **Σ** A B C D) makes these two closing exhortations more impressive. He now speaks to rich and poor. The poor must not use the Lord's supper to satisfy hunger; the rich must not allow the poor to want food. Let them be fed from the provision made by the Church for the purpose, but let them be fed at home.

ἐν οἴκῳ, "at home," as xiv. 35. Cf. note on ver. 22.

εἰς, expressing consequence. Cf. Rom. vii. 4, 6, where εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρῳ is explained by ὥστε δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς.

τὰ δὲ λοιπά. Cf. note on ver. 18.

ὥς ἂν ἔλθω. Cf. note on iv. 5; xi. 26. The use of ὥς ἂν with subjunctive is very rare in class. Greek. In the New Test. it occurs only here and Rom. xv. 24; Phil. ii. 23. The Apostle, it appears, purposed visiting Corinth. But afterwards he deemed it expedient to write another letter to the Corinthians, as they had not received his censure with entire friendliness.

διατάξομαι. Cf. note on vii. 17. The word refers to external, practical arrangements, and conveys the notion of authority as well as of order. Cf. xvi. 1; Acts xviii. 2. Ignatius (*Ad Trall.* iii. 3 et al.) will not use the word in speaking of his own advice, as it implies apostolic authority.

## SIXTH DIVISION.

### THE SPIRITUAL GIFTS.

(xii. 1-xiv. 40).

#### A. *Description and Vindication of the Spiritual Gifts.*

(xii. 1-31).

V. 1. Rübiger and others think the δέ of this ver. balances the μέν of xi. 18. The discussion that follows may well be considered a third sub-division of the Fifth Division of the Epistle, inasmuch as it has reference to the conduct of the Corinthians in the Church assemblies. But as the Apostle is answering a distinct question of the Church, he probably ranked the discussion as co-ordinate with his answers to the other questions. Δέ is, therefore, transitional, with some slight notion of antithesis to τὰ λοιπά . . . διατάξομαι. (xi. 34): "Whatever subject I postpone I must not delay to explain the nature of spiritual gifts."

περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν. Cf. vii. 1, 25; viii. 1. From the form of the Apostle's answer we gather that the question arose partly from the strangeness of the phenomena that had presented themselves in the Church, partly from a natural suspicion that they were but another manifestation of the demoniacal influences which the Corinthians must have often witnessed in connection with the religious rites of heathenism. The Apostle seeks to show that unwonted manifestations of a supernatural presence in the Christian assemblies were to be expected. Some appear to have lost their moral balance in consequence of ecstatic possession. He thinks it necessary to estimate the relative worth of ecstasy and Christian love, tongues and serviceable prophecy.

The word *πνευματικά* must not be understood to denote "spiritual things" in general (Kling), nor quite specifically for "the gift of tongues" (Baur, Heydenr., Stanley). Cf. note on xiv. 37. It means the Charismata, the nature of which generally is first declared, and the necessity of which in the Church is first proved. Grotius, Hofmann, Heinrici consider *τῶν πνευματικῶν* to be masc., synon. with *τῶν πνευματοφόρων*, as in xiv. 37. This is not so, simply because the spiritual gifts were, not the prerogative of a few, but a gift bestowed in various forms and degrees on all Christians. Cf. note on *ιδιότης*, xiv. 16. The universality of the gifts is one of the arguments which the Apostle uses to prove that no member of Christ's body, the Church, should envy another member, inasmuch as every member has its own function assigned it in the body. The gifts are called *πνευματικά*, not because of any connection with the human *πνεῦμα*, but because they are bestowed by the Spirit of God. Cf. note on ix. 11.

*οὐ θέλω*. Cf. note on x. 1. The phrase is always accompanied by the endearing address, *ἀδελφοί*.

V. 2. After *ὅτι* we must certainly insert *ὅτε*. So  $\aleph$  A B C D, Vulg. (quoniam cum). So Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. But Lachm. hesitates, apparently because he thought B had not *ὅτε*. Reiche defends the tex. rec. If we omit *ὅτε* the construction is easy, and requires none of Hofmann's ingenious manipulations. Inserting *ὅτε*, we may explain the construction in one of the following ways: (1) Alford supposes the Apostle to have begun with *οἶδατε ὅτι*, and then to have passed into the construction of placing *ὅτε* after such verbs as *μέμνημαι*, *οἶδα*, *ἀκούω*, an ellipsis of *τοῦ χρόνου* taking place. Is it certain that *οἶδα* can have this construction? Alford cites Hom., *Il.* xiv. 11, *ἤδεα μὲν γὰρ ὅτε πρόφρων Δαναοῖσιν ἄμυνεν*. But the object of *ἤδεα* is not the temporal clause, but *ἀπολέσθαι Ἀχαιούς*. (2) Valckenaer and Meyer think there is a confusion of two constructions after *οἶδα*, viz. a *ὅτι* clause and a participle, *ἀπαγόμενοι*. This occasionally happens. Cf. Thuc. IV. 37, *γνοὺς . . . ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ὅπως οὖν μᾶλλον ἐνδῶσουσι, διαφθαρησόμενους αὐτούς*, and Plat., *Gorg.* p. 481, *αἰσθάνομαι . . . ὅτι, ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν*. It occurs also with *ὥστε*, *ὥς*. Cf. Isocr., *Paneg.* § 64; Xen., *Mem.* IV. ii.

30. But the usage is too rare and exceptional to be of much weight in reference to a construction in the New Test., especially as the participial predicate after *οἶδα* occurs but once in St. Paul's Epistles (2 Cor. xii. 2). (3) Castalio, Bengel, Buttmann (*N. S.* p. 328), Heinrici consider *ὥς* to be resumptive of *ὅτι*, the temporal clause *ὅτε ἔθνη ἦτε* intervening. It may be some objection to this that the intervening clause is too short to render the repetition of *ὅτι* probable. But this is apparently the construction adopted by Chrys. (*οὗτοι οἱ μάντις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἤγοντο ἐλκόμενοι*) and Basil (*ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἂν ἤγεται ἀπαγόμενος ἄλογον λατρεύει λατρείαν*). That the participle *ἀπαγόμενος* hangs is not a sufficient objection. It expresses what could not so emphatically be stated otherwise, that the heathen worshippers are "led by being led away like prisoners at the will of the demons."

*οἶδατε*. By referring to their former condition as being what they themselves acknowledged, he avoids the harshness of the reference, and also prepares them for a statement of the opposite truth, which they did not yet understand. Hence *γνωρίζω*, ver. 3.

*ἔθνη*, not "nations" generally (Baur), but "Gentiles," in the sense attached to the word among the Jews. Cf. Rom. iii. 29, where it is distinguished from *Ἰουδαῖοι*; Gal. ii. 8, from *ἡ περιτομή*; Rom. xv. 10, from *ὁ λαὸς αὐτοῦ*, and Eph. ii. 11. The peculiarity of the present passage is that the Gentiles are here distinguished from Christians, from *ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαίος* (Rom. ii. 29). The Christian Church is, in the Apostle's eyes, the true Israel of God. Cf. Gal. vi. 16; Heb. iv. 9. Sometimes the name is applied to the Gentile Christians. Cf. Gal. ii. 12, where *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι* are Jewish Christians, *οἱ ὄντες ἐκ περιτομῆς* as distinguished from *ἡ περιτομή*.

*εἰδωλα*, that is, images and not realities. Cf. note on viii. 4.

*ἄφωνα*. Cf. LXX., Hab. ii. 18, *εἰδωλα κωφά*. So *Ep. ad Diogn.* 2, *οὐ κωφὰ πάντα*; In speaking of idols *ἄφωνα* is more correct than *κωφά*. They are not mutes, but voiceless things, *θεοὶ νεκροί* (*Didache* 6).

*ἂν ἤγεσθε*, the iterative imperfect with *ἂν*: "how ye were led whenever the occasion happened." Cf. Mark vi. 56. Few

instances occur in the New Test., but it is a frequent usage in class. Greek. Cf. Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 186. Erasm., Valcken., Hofm., Heinrici consider the *ἀν* to be the prefix of the verb and read *ὡς ἀνήγεσθε*, that is, “were led up as sacrifices are led up to the altar.” Cf. Acts vii. 41. But is this metaphor a natural one? The clause expresses the self-abandonment of the worshipper, as *ἀπαγόμενοι* denotes his going astray from the truth.

*ἀπαγόμενοι*, “being led away,” that is, “inasmuch as ye were led away;” causal participle, as in Mark vii. 19. *Ἀπάγω* may mean either “to lead from the truth,” or “to lead away at one’s own will.” Both notions would be to the Apostle’s purpose. But the former is the usual one when the Apostle speaks of the heathen. Cf. Tit. iii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 18. So Lactantius vi. 8: “Errant [pagani] velut in magno mari nec quo ferantur intelligunt.” The word presents an instructive contrast to *ἄγονται* of Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 18. By whom were they led? The answer is given in 2 Tim. ii. 26; Eph. ii. 2. Cf. Athenag., *Leg. pro Christ.*, καὶ οἱ μὲν περὶ τὰ εἰδῶλα αὐτοὺς ἔλκοντες οἱ δαίμονές εἰσιν, and Just. M., *Apol.* I. 5, μάστιγι δαιμόνων φαύλων ἐξελαυνόμενοι, which is seemingly a paraphrase of the Apostle’s *ἀπαγόμενοι*.

This ver. is not merely a statement of their ignorance of the nature and use of the Charismata (Meyer, Alford, etc.). For, first, they must have known that these manifestations were the gift of the Spirit; the question put by the Corinthians probably contained the words *περὶ τῶν πνευματικών*. Second, the contrasted notions in this and the following verses are clear. The Apostle starts with what the Corinthians know in order to show the vast difference between the influence of evil spirits on the heathen and that of the Holy Spirit on Christians. There is a threefold contrast: (1) The objects to which they are severally led differ as idols differ from the Lord Jesus. (2) The heathen are led away captive at the will of evil spirits, whereas Christians are led rationally and morally by the Spirit of God. (3) The worshippers of voiceless idols are, for that very reason, mute themselves concerning God, while the saints unceasingly proclaim that Jesus is Lord. Beyond these three points of contrast we cannot legitimately go. We may not say with Chrys., Theod., Theophyl. and Neander that the

Apostle contrasts the ecstatic phrenzy of heathen possession with the conscious, intelligent nature of the Christian gifts; for some of those gifts seem to have been ecstatic. At the same time the distinction so well drawn by Chrysostom is true in reference to Christianity as a whole. It is the supernatural made natural, the Divine becoming human, whereas in the heathen religions the gulf between the two was ever widening. Their union is possible in Christianity, because it is erected on the Divine-human person of Jesus Christ and on the indwelling of His Spirit in the Christian.

**V. 3.** The threefold difference now mentioned enables the Apostle to lay a broad foundation for his discussion of the spiritual gifts. His vindication of these extraordinary manifestations of power rests on the two supernatural elements in the Church. The one is the Divine purpose in the creation of the Church, which is the exaltation of Jesus as Lord. The other is the presence in the Church of a Divine worker, the Spirit of Christ, who will bring this purpose to pass. The exaltation of Jesus Christ is the external standard, and by their relation to it all actions and thoughts, natural and supernatural, are to be estimated. The Spirit is the inward power that directs all to this end and creates supernatural energies, when natural fail, for the attainment of so high a purpose. The Apostle presents the mutual relation of purpose and worker in two aspects. On the one hand, the work of the Spirit is effectual. No man speaking by the Spirit of God can anathematise Jesus. All intellectual ideas, political combinations, force and sentiment, if they are derogatory to the honour and lordship of the historical and living Jesus, are thereby at once and absolutely excluded from the sphere of Christian influence and the development of the Christian society. They are not the material from which the spiritual gifts are fashioned. On the other hand, the Spirit's work is necessary. No man can truly acknowledge the lordship of Jesus but by the Holy Spirit. At this point the two meanings of the word *πνευματικός* unite. The attainment of the highest form of the spiritual gifts, which consists in worship of the Lord Jesus, demands that the man should be spiritual in the sense of chap. ii.

*γινώσκω*, not "I expound," but "I make known." These

facts they must accept on the Apostle's authority. Cf. John xv. 15.

ἐν, that is, "entirely possessed by." Cf. Luke iv. 1, where ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι is explained by Πνεύματος Ἀγίου πλήρης.

For Ἰησοῦν and Κύριον Ἰησοῦν (so D, Chrys., followed by Reiche), we must read Ἰησοῦς and Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (so  $\aleph$  A B C, Vulg. etc., followed by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort). With the accusatives we should have to supply mentally the infin. εἶναι which is a late Greek construction after εἰπεῖν, the classical construction being ὄτι.

ἀνάθεμα. Lobeck cites Mœris: ἀνάθημα ἀπτικῶς, ἀνάθεμα ἑλληνικῶς. Several words in -θημα have the form -θεμα in later Greek. Cf. Lobeck, *Paralip.* II. p. 424; *Phryn.* p. 249. But Hesychius says they have different meanings: ἀνάθεμα ἐπικατάρατος, ἀκοινώνητος· ἀνάθημα, κόσμημα. The LXX. certainly appears to draw a distinction, using ἀνάθημα for the clean thing that is dedicated or sacrificed to the Lord. Cf. Judith xvi. 19, where the armour of Holophernes, having been so dedicated, is called ἀνάθημα; 2 Macc. ix. 16; Luke xxi. 5 (ἀνάθημα is the correct reading). But ἀνάθεμα is the unclean thing which a man devotes to the Lord, but may not offer in sacrifice nor redeem, and must put to death (cf. Lev. xxvii. 28, 29). The Apostle has only ἀνάθεμα, and always in the sense of "accursed." The words Ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς may, therefore, mean that the death which Jesus suffered proved Him to be under God's curse and the object of God's hatred, or they may be the imprecation of a curse upon Him (so Theophyl.). Cf. Acts xxvi. 11, ἡναγκάζον βλασφημεῖν. We know from Pliny's letter (*Ep.* 97) that "to curse Christ" was enjoined as the final test by which to determine if a man was a heathen or a Christian. Αἶρε τοὺς ἀθέους, said the proconsul to Polycarp, λοιδορήσον τὸν Χριστόν, to which the martyr replied, πῶς δύναμαι βλασφημῆσαι τὸν βασιλέα μου; Origen tells us that the Ophiites were not more sparing than Celsus in their accusations against Jesus and admitted none into their assembly unless he imprecated curses upon Him (*Contra Cels.* VI. 28). Cf. *Dial. c. Tryph.* 138, ἀδιαλείπτως δέ καταρᾶσθε αὐτῷ τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. It is hardly necessary to observe that St. Paul never uses the word ἀνάθεμα in the ecclesiastical signification for excommunication, which crept

into the Church from the LXX., though the Fathers so explain it in some passages (cf. Fritzsche, Rom. ix. 3). The antithesis between ἀνάθεμα and Κύριος does not *necessitate* our understanding the latter as the Greek equivalent to Jehovah. But, as it is so used in the LXX., we may explain the antithesis here to be between imprecating the curse of Jehovah on one who is Himself Jehovah and acknowledging Him to be Jehovah whom others call accursed. In point of doctrine all that is required to distinguish a Christian is an acknowledgment of the lordship of Jesus of Nazareth. Cf. 1 John ii. 22; iv. 2, 15; v. 1, 5.

Vv. 4-16. Having stated that the acknowledgment of Jesus as Lord is the one universal and decisive *test* of the spiritual gifts, the Apostle proceeds to the one essential *characteristic* of the gifts, which is diversity in unity—diversity in their action, unity in their origin; diversity in relation to the Church, unity in relation to God; diversity making them useful, unity proving them to be Divine.

V. 4. διαίρεσις may mean either “distribution” (so Vulg., Erasm.), like μερισμός in Heb. ii. 4, or “distinction” (so Beza, after Chrys., Theod.), like μερισμός in Heb. iv. 12. In favour of the former meaning is ver. 11; in favour of the latter the antithesis between διαίρεσεις and τὸ αὐτό or ὁ αὐτός. Cf. Rom. xii. 6, χάρισματά διόφορα. The pivot of the whole paragraph is the notion of a difference in kind between one gift and another. But this again implies that one man has one gift and another has another. I have not much doubt that the Apostle uses the word in both meanings. It signifies “a distribution of gifts involving diversity of gifts.” Cf. Grimm, *Lev.*: “discrimen e distributione aliis aliâ factâ ortum.” Grotius, Cor. a Lap., Maier, etc., think the words χάρισματά, διακονίαι, and ἐνεργήματα denote three distinct things: χάρισματά signifying the gifts themselves; διακονίαι, the Church offices in which the gifts are exercised, such as apostleship, as in ver. 28; ἐνεργήματα, the physical and spiritual effects of the gifts. The objection to this is that it separates the action of the Spirit from that of the Lord, and both from that of God, whereas all gifts are bestowed by Christ through the Spirit from God. The view of Chrys., Theod., Æcum., Phot., Theophyl., and the most recent expositors, Meyer, De Wette,

Hofmann, etc., is much more probable and richer in thought. The three words denote the gifts regarded from three distinct points of view. As they are supernatural conditions of the human spirit, they are immediate graces (*χαρίσματα*) of the Spirit of God. As their exercise gives rise to various forms of service in the Church, they have respect to the Head of the Church, and in this relation to the Lord Jesus they are *διακονίαι*. As they are effectual (*ἐνεργήματα*) to do this service, their source is in God. This is the threefold relation to the Church which God the Father, the Lord Christ and the Holy Spirit are elsewhere represented as maintaining. It is in accord with the intrinsic relations of the Divine Persons to one another. Cf. Eph. iv. 4, where the Christian calling is mentioned in connection with the Spirit, faith and baptism in connection with the Lord, and the universal, pervading efficacy of grace is ascribed to God the Father. Similarly we are told in 1 Pet. i. 2 that the foreknowledge of God the Father operates through the sanctification of the Spirit and results in obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ. This threefold aspect of the spiritual gifts is applicable also to the recipients. Effective work for God involves as its conditions that the worker should have a deep and abiding sense of his dependence on the Spirit of God, that he should toil on in self-sacrificing consecration to the service of Christ, and that he should manifest his possession of a Divine and conquering force.

The Greek expositors, more at large Photius, regard this verse as one of the buttresses of Trinitarianism. The thought rests on that doctrine and implies it. But the passage does not expressly state it. The Lord is Christ the Mediator, the eternal Word, but the Word made Man, who, as Lord and Head of the Church, receives from the Father and sends the Spirit. The verse must not, therefore, be adduced, as is done by Meyer, in proof of a subordination within the Trinity.

*χαρίσματα*. Cf. note on i. 7. The word is here used in the special meaning of excellences or endowments bestowed on Christians by the sovereign grace of God. Cf. Rom. xii. 6, on which Theophylact. remarks, *οὐ κατορθώματα, ἀλλὰ χαρίσματα*.

**V. 5.** *διακονίαι*. The plur. expresses the various *kinds* of service. The word denotes official service, but it expresses the nature of the work, not merely the office. It represents the Church as a realization, however imperfect, of the kingdom of God, and for that reason it became an official name from the first. Cf. Acts i. 17.

**V. 6.** *ἐνεργήματα*, not passive (Maier, Grimm, after Theod., ὡς ὑπὸ τῆς θείας ἐνεργούμενα δυνάμεως. Similarly Athanasius, *Ep. ad Serap.* I. 30, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ λόγου χορηγείται). It is active: "effectual operations." So Erasmus. The notion that the gifts are wrought by God is contained in ὁ αὐτὸς Θεός, in the same way as it is contained, from another point of view, in τὸ αὐτὸ Πνεῦμα and ὁ αὐτὸς Κύριος. The Apostle exults in the thought that Christianity is the ἐνέργεια of Divine possibilities in human nature. Cf. Gal. ii. 8; Phil. ii. 13.

ὁ ἐνεργῶν . . . πᾶσι, that is, "who produces effectually all spiritual gifts in all Christians." This is an explicit statement of the notion implied in ὁ αὐτὸς Θεός.

**V. 7.** Ἐκάστω and πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον are the emphatic notions, the former expressing the diversity, the latter the unity of the gifts of the one Spirit. Their diversity appears in their distribution to every Christian according to the measure of the gift of Christ; their unity, in the one purpose which the Spirit has when he confers divers gifts on individual men. Edification is the practical test by which to decide on the admission of any manifestation of power into the Church and estimate the comparative value of the gifts.

δίδονται, pres. of indefinite frequency. The aor. ἐδόθη occurs in Eph. iv. 7; for in the act of ascending on high Christ virtually gave all gifts.

φανερώσεις, only here and 2 Cor. iv. 2 in the New Test. Ἀποκάλυψις is the revelation of a truth by the Spirit of God to the Christian prophet; φανερώσεις is the declaration of that revelation by the prophet to other men.

τοῦ πνεύματος, that is, the Spirit of God. Chrys., Hervæus, Estius, Meyer, Hofmann consider it to be genit. of the object: "the manifestation of the fact that the man has the Spirit" (cf. 2 Cor. iv. 2). But it is better to understand it as genit. of the subject. So Calvin, De Wette, Rückert,

Heinrici, etc. This is in accordance with ver. 11, which ascribes the power of the gifts to the Spirit. At the same time Neander is not justified in saying that the notion of manifesting the presence of the Spirit is not Pauline (cf. xiv. 25). The Apostle must be speaking of the self-revelation of the Spirit, who is seen, like the sun, in His own light.

*πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον*, that is, both the man's own advantage and the profit of the Church. Because it is to his own advantage, the brother of slender gifts should not envy him who has received a larger measure; because it is to the profit of others, the latter should not despise the former. *Πρὸς*, not here "according to" the profit (as in 2 Cor. v. 10, and perhaps Gal. ii. 14), but "with a view to." This is proved by the corresponding words in xiv. 12.

Vv. 8-11. *Γὰρ* connects these verses closely with ver. 7. They prove the three statements which that ver. contains: that every Christian receives gifts; that all the gifts are bestowed by the Spirit; that edification is the purpose of God in bestowing them.

Attempts have been made to classify the gifts here mentioned. The earliest is that of Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* V. 8), who divides them into four classes: (1) *λόγος σοφίας* and *λόγος γνώσεως* (*sermo intelligentiæ et consilii*); (2) *πίστις* (*spiritus religionis et timoris Dei*); (3) *ιάματα* and *δυνάμεις* (*valentiæ spiritus*); (4) *προφητεία*, *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*, *γένη γλωσσῶν*, and *ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν*. The most plausible classification is that of Bengel and Meyer, who think *ἕτερος* introduces the generic, *ἄλλος* the specific differences, thus:—

I. Charismata which have reference to intellectual power,

1. *λόγος σοφίας*,
2. *λόγος γνώσεως*.

II. Charismata which depend on special energy of faith,

1. *πίστις* itself,
2. *πίστις* in its operation in deeds, viz.
  - a. *ιάματα*,
  - b. *δυνάμεις*.
3. *πίστις* in its operation in words, viz. *προφητεία*.
4. *πίστις* in its operation in criticism, viz. *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*.

III. Charismata which have reference to the *γλῶσσαι*,

1. τὸ γλῶσσαις λαλεῖν,

2. ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν.

The objection to this classification is in the second division of gifts. It seems arbitrary and unnatural that prophecy and criticism should be in the same class with healings and powers. Though the distinction between *ἕτερος* and *ἄλλος*, on which the classification depends, is generally speaking a correct one, it is not always observed in the New Test. Cf. xv. 39, 40. But if we omit *δέ* before *προφητεία* (as in B D; so Lachm., Treg.; Westc. and Hort are doubtful) and *δέ* before *διακρίσεις* (as in *κ* B D; so Lachm., Treg.; Westc. and Hort doubtful), we may perhaps recognise, not three, but five main divisions, thus:—

I. *φῶ μὲν*:

- |                   |                       |
|-------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. λόγος σοφίας,  | } Intellectual power. |
| 2. λόγος γνώσεως. |                       |

II. *ἐτέρῳ*:

- |              |                     |
|--------------|---------------------|
| 1. πίστις,   | } Miraculous power. |
| 2. ἰάματα,   |                     |
| 3. δυνάμεις. |                     |

III. *ἄλλῳ*:*προφητεία*. Teaching power.IV. *ἄλλῳ*:*διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*. Critical power.V. *ἐτέρῳ*:

- |                      |                    |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. γένη γλωσσῶν,     | } Ecstatic powers. |
| 2. ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν. |                    |

While admitting a logical classification of this sort, we cannot fail to recognise a natural progress also in the series. The Apostle begins with the highest of all the Charismata, *λόγος σοφίας*, the power of the spiritual man to understand the Divine philosophy of the revelation of God in Christ. This suggests to his mind the gift of knowledge; and this its opposite, the gift of faith; and this the miraculous results produced by faith; and this the inspiration of doctrine and of judgment, of tongues and their interpretation. He proceeds from the worthiest to the least worthy.

V. 8. *Σοφία* and *γνώσις* are clearly related, but to be distinguished. Augustine (*De Trin.* XIV. and XV.) makes

*sapientia* consist in knowledge of Divine and eternal things, *scientia* in knowledge of things human and temporal. In *Confess.* XIII. 18 he compares the latter to the light of moon and stars, the former to the light of the sun. Similarly Estius, Cor. a Lap., Bengel. The reverse is the view of most commentators, that σοφία refers to practice, γνῶσις to theory. Chrys., Theod., Œcum., Theophyl. think σοφία means power to teach, γνῶσις power to know. This is refuted by the word λόγος. Outside this Epistle σοφία and γνῶσις are used generically and interchangeably for theoretical and for practical knowledge. But their use in this Epistle seems to show that λόγος σοφίας denotes the power of expounding spiritual truths, which it is the gift of the spiritual man, the τέλειος, both to understand and to speak. Its object is revealed truth; its power is the illumination of the Spirit; its method a spiritual synthesis; and its results are communicated to others in words taught by the Holy Ghost. Cf. ii. 6-13; Eph. i. 8, 17; Col. ii. 3. The objects of γνῶσις are the same; for instance, it is a knowledge of God (2 Cor. x. 5), of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ (2 Cor. iv. 6), of Christ Jesus (Phil. iii. 8); and in this part of his interpretation Augustine seems to have gone astray. But, whereas σοφία was the prerogative of the mature Christian, even the Corinthians had had γνῶσις in no inconsiderable measure (cf. i. 5). While the wisdom (σοφία) of the Gospel was spoken only to the τέλειοι, the Apostle thanks God for making known the savour of His knowledge (γνῶσις) by him in every place, wherever a door was opened unto him of the Lord (cf. 2 Cor. ii. 14; iv. 6; x. 5). Hence γνῶσις is the lower stage of Christian knowledge, σοφία the higher (cf. note on viii. 1). He who has σοφία knows the things of God more esoterically; he who has γνῶσις knows them as opinions, intellectual beliefs, matters learned, premises and conclusions. To Christian σοφία corresponds in the natural sphere ἐπιστημὴ, which indeed Plato calls σοφία (*Rep.* p. 443). The παρέκβασις of σοφία is mysticism, that of γνῶσις rationalism. The Apostle speaks of the word of wisdom or of knowledge, because he is now discussing all gifts according to their usefulness to the Church (cf. ver. 11).

διὰ . . . κατὰ . . . ἐν. All the Charismata are through

the Spirit, according to the Spirit, and in the Spirit; that is to say, God bestows them through the agency of the Spirit, in proportion to the measure in which the Spirit itself has been given, and that by the indwelling and inworking of the Spirit in the believer. The only doubtful word is *κατά*, which may mean "according to the will of," as in Rom. viii. 27, or "according to the measure of," which is the more probable meaning, inasmuch as the Apostle ascribes the Charismata to God as giver, the Spirit being the dispenser and effectuating power.

**V. 9.** *πίστις* always involves the notion of a power to realize the spiritual. Now this power is a necessary condition of prophesying (Heb. xi. 3) and of doing miracles (Matt. xxi. 21; 1 Cor. xiii. 2). In fact it is the ground of all Charismata, which abound in proportion to the strength of faith—*κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*. But when faith acts in the doing of miracles, the result is an external fact, such as healing the sick. When it acts in other directions, it creates subjective conditions or faculties in the believer, such as wisdom and the power of prophesying, which overshadow the underlying faith and assume the character and designation of distinct Charismata. The faith is lost sight of in the wisdom, but never in the gift of healing. Hence faith is to be here understood in a more extensive sense than as a mere gift of healing, which is afterwards mentioned, and than a mere power of exorcising evil spirits. That the power of seeing the invisible should be placed among Charismata is in perfect accord with the delineation of faith in Heb. xi.

*χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων*. The plur. *ἰαμάτα* means various kinds of healing; *χαρίσματα* is plur. because different powers are required to heal different kinds of sickness. Similarly Irenæus (V. 3) speaks of *προφητικὰ χαρίσματα*. Cf. Eus., *H.E.* V. 7. But why *χάρισμα* at all? To distinguish miraculous acts of healing from those of the skilled physician. Justin M. (*Apol.* II. 6) says the gift existed in his time—*καὶ ἔτι νῦν ἰῶνται*. For *ἱαμα* in the sense of *ἱασις* cf. *ἐνέργημα* for *ἐνέργεια* in ver. 10.

*ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ Πνεύματι*. So **8**. But A B have *ἐνί* for *αὐτῷ*. C deficit. The probable reading is *ἐνί* (so Treg., Westc. and Hort, etc.). It brings into prominence the oneness that underlies the diversity of gifts.

**V. 10.** ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων. In Acts vi. 8 δύναμις means the subjective power of doing miracles; in Acts viii. 13 it denotes the miracles themselves. The plur. decides in favour of the latter meaning here, especially as ἰαμάτων and πνευμάτων are also objective genitives: "the operations which result in powers." Cf. ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις, Gal. iii. 5. Healings might have been included in δυνάμεις, as in Luke v. 17; Acts xix. 11. But they have an independent place owing to the conspicuous part assigned them in the work of Jesus and His apostles. Chrys. and Heinrici incorrectly limit δυνάμεις to the power to do great and striking miracles, especially by way of punishing, such as delivering to Satan (v. 5), etc.

προφητεία. Among the Greeks the προφήτης was the interpreter of the oracular responses delivered by the μάντις. Io, for instance, was prophetess of Apollo. The notion of predicting is not in the προ-, but comes to attach itself to the word because it is concerning the future that men consult the gods. Cf. Paley's note on Eur., *Io* 413; Plato, *Tim.* 72. Among the Hebrews there was no μάντις. The seer and the prophet were one; inspiration and interpretation met. So also the prophets of the Apostolic age are under the immediate influence of the Spirit and teach the Church. Sometimes they spoke in tongues and others interpreted (cf. xiv. 29). But their immediate inspiration distinguishes them from the διδάσκαλοι. The source of prophecy is revelation (cf. xiv. 6). But sometimes revelations are given which the prophet is not permitted to divulge. Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 1, 4.

διακρίσεις πνευμάτων. Cf. 1 Thess. v. 21, where "prove all things" immediately follows "despise not prophesyings," as a consequence and a contrast. But διακρίνω means more than δοκιμάζω. It includes, not only a comparative estimate of the value of spiritual utterances, but also a separation of mutually destructive powers, the demoniacal and the Divine. In 2 Thess. ii. 2 the Apostle acknowledges the presence in the world of a false πνεῦμα, whose λόγος consists in imprecating a curse on Jesus, and this utterance the Apostle ascribes to the influence of demons. Cf. 1 John iv. 1, 2; 1 Tim. iv. 1. The power of discerning between the true and the false spirit is here said to be a gift of God. With this we may compare or contrast the doctrine of the Reformers, that

the inspiration of the Bible is known by a direct, inward revelation, and the reply of Edward Irving to his friend Campbell's enquiries, "that the answer of the spirit in the hearer is," together with confidence in God, "the ground of belief in any word spoken by any man or any spirit." (*Life*, by Mrs. Oliphant, Vol. II. p. 331). But there is some difficulty here. The Apostle has already in ver. 3 declared what he considered to be a decisive test of all utterances; and the same test is given in 1 John iv. 2, 3. What need, then, of a special gift to discern the spirits? The answer is that the gift consists in a faculty to apply the test. This is also the correction of the Reformers' doctrine of the believer's inspiration to recognise the word of God. "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God" (1 John iv. 3). But then, "every one that loveth knoweth God" (Ib. ver. 7). The power to discern the spirits is, therefore, in a special direction the power to love. Cf. note on ver. 4. However that may be, the Apostle nowhere speaks of an interpretation of prophecy, as he speaks of an interpretation of tongues, but of a discerning of prophecy, true or false.

γένη γλωσσῶν. In three sets of passages in the New Test. the gift of tongues is mentioned: (1) Mark xvi. 17, if the passage is genuine, where *καιναί* may mean either "not previously possessed by the disciples" or "having a new power." (2) Acts ii., where *λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις* (ver. 4) is explained by *τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῃ λαλούντων αὐτῶν* (ver. 6) and by *λαλούντων αὐτῶν ταῖς ἡμετέραις γλώσσαις* (ver. 11); that is, the writer describes the Apostles as speaking in the native languages of the foreign Jews who had come to the feast. That in recording what occurred in the house of Cornelius (Acts x. 46) and at Ephesus (Acts xix. 6) he refers to the same kind of thing as the miracle of Pentecost, is placed beyond a doubt, as to one part of the statement, by the words *ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀρχῇ* in xi. 15. But, though the Spirit fell on those who were present on the three occasions and they spoke with tongues, it is not said that this meant speaking in foreign languages, except on the day of Pentecost. (3) The various references made by the Apostle to the gift of tongues in chapters xii., xiii., and xiv. of this Epistle. If we had only the narrative in Acts no one would have supposed

the gift of tongues meant anything else than the power of speaking in languages colloquial knowledge of which had not in the ordinary way been acquired by the Apostles. If, on the other hand, we possessed only the references to it in this Epistle, it is hard to believe anybody would have suspected that the gift of tongues meant this, though it would be difficult to say what it did mean.

Irenæus says the gift survived in his day (*Adv. Hær.* V. vi. 1). But no inference can be fairly drawn as to the nature of it from his words, παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος γλώσσαις. The first to offer an explanation of it is Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* V. 8): "Edat [Marcio] aliquem psalmum, aliquam visionem, aliquam orationem, dumtaxat spiritualement, in ecstasi, id est amentia, si qua linguæ interpretatio accessit." He wrote this when he had become a Montanist. But his explanation is noteworthy because it disappears, perhaps in consequence of its supposed Montanistic tendency, from the exegesis of the early Church, to be resuscitated towards the close of the last and during the present century by Bardili, Eichhorn, Ernesti, Herder, Bleek, Bunsen, De Wette, Meyer, etc., with important differences, however, among themselves. The universal interpretation of the older expositors, with the exception of Tertullian, appears to have been that the gift of tongues consisted in the power to speak foreign languages, without learning them in the ordinary way. This view first appears in Origen (*Ep. ad Rom.* I. 13). Chrys. and Augustine (*De Baptismo* III. 16) adopt it, and say the gift was no longer in existence in their times.

Putting aside for the present the narrative in the Book of Acts, are the Apostle's words in our Epistle consistent with the theory that "tongues" meant foreign languages? First, the notion of preaching the Gospel to the heathen would, in that case, be an essential feature in the purpose of the gift of tongues. Apart from this practical use, the power to speak in a language not previously learned is not different from ecstatic utterance. But it is evident that the Corinthians did not use their gift of tongues to evangelize the heathen world. They spoke with tongues in their Church assemblies, and not once does the Apostle urge them to apply the power to the purpose for which it would be so eminently serviceable. From

xiv. 18 we infer that the Apostle exercised the gift in private even. Of what use would it be to speak foreign languages in the privacy of his devotions? Nay it is clear that the Apostle had formed a comparatively low estimate of the value to be attached to the gift of tongues. It is the least of the *Charismata*. To boast of it is childish (xii. 28; xiv. 20). Though it is a "sign" to the unbelievers, it is powerless apart from prophecy to convince them of God's presence in the Church (xiv. 21-25). Can we conceive of St. Paul, who made himself all things to all men that he might save some, depreciating and refraining from urging his readers to covet earnestly a gift so eminently fitted to spread the knowledge of Christ over the face of the earth? *Second*, it was a conspicuous feature of the gift that the tongues were unintelligible. Could the Apostle say of any man that speaks in a foreign language that he speaks not to men, but to God? Cf. xiv. 2. In xiv. 7-10 he compares those who speak with tongues to musical instruments that give out jarring and discordant sounds, while prophecy is said to resemble the distinction of sounds that express intelligible musical ideas. Would he have said of a man that speaks the wonderful works of God in a foreign language that he does it with the spirit indeed, but that his understanding is unfruitful, or that he cannot interpret in his own language what he utters in another? Cf. xiv. 14, 28. For these reasons it is impossible to admit that the gift of tongues, in Corinth at least, meant the power of speaking in a language not before acquired.

Ernesti and Herder suggested that by the tongues we are to understand unusual, antiquated, figurative and poetical expressions. This view is ably advocated by Bleek (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1829, Heft 1) and Baur (*Ib.*, 1838, p. 618). Lightfoot (*Harm. of the Gospel*, on Acts ii.) had proposed a theory which approximates to this, that the gift consisted in the power of speaking the true Hebrew of the Old Testament. It is probably a relic of such a custom that occurs in a prayer ascribed to Gregory Nazianzen for exorcising the demons: *ἐξορκίζω ὑμᾶς πάντα τὰ ἀκάθαρτα πνεύματα κατὰ τοῦ Ἑλοῦ Ἀδonaὶ σαβαώθ*. Bleek supplies abundant evidence of the use of the word *γλῶσσα* in the sense of *ιδιότητες διαλέκτων* from Dion. Hal., Sext. Empir. and Plutarch. But these examples

simply prove that the word was used as a technical term in grammar. We have no intimation in the Apostle's words that *καινὰ ὀνόματα* were spoken in the Church. The religious use of *γλώσσα* to designate the ecstatic response of an oracle is more to the purpose; but it disconnects entirely the gift of tongues of which our Epistle speaks from the miracle of Pentecost.

Eichhorn, Meyer and others suggest that by *γλώσσα* the Apostle meant the bodily member which we call the tongue. The Spirit is supposed to have taken possession of the person's faculty of physical utterance, so that unconsciously to himself he uttered inarticulate cries. Bunsen (*Hippol.*, Vol. I. p. 11, Eng. Trans.) calls the *λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* "a convulsive utterance, a nervous affection." Cf. Philo, *Quis Rer. Div. Hæc.*, p. 511, Vol. I. Mang., *καταχρήται δὲ ἕτερος αὐτοῦ τοῖς φωνητηρίοις ὀργάνοις, στόματι καὶ γλώττῃ πρὸς μὴνυσιν ὧν ἂν θέλῃ*. But, if so, would the Apostle have used the plur. in speaking of an individual, as in xiv. 6? (The reading in xiv. 18 is doubtful). And what meaning can we attach to *γένη γλωσσῶν*, or to *ἐρμηνεῖα γλωσσῶν*?

There was undoubtedly an element of ecstasy in the gift of tongues (cf. xiv. 2, 14, 23). So far the narrative in Acts is in accord with the Apostle's words (cf. Acts ii. 13). In this respect we are justified in drawing a comparison between this phenomenon of the Apostolic age and the ecstatic utterances of the Montanists in the second century (cf. Tert., *De Animâ*, 9) or of the persecuted Protestants of Cevennes at the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries (cf. Felice, *Histoire des Protestants de France*, IV. and V.), the "extraordinary views of divine things and the religious affections, attended with very great effects on the body," described by Jonathan Edwards (*Thoughts on the Revival*, P. I. Sect. V.) as accompanying the revival at Northampton about the year 1735, the physical effects that attended the preaching of Wesley and Whitfield (cf. their *Journals*, *passim*), and the inspiration of Irving's followers in the years 1832-3 (cf. the *Life* by Mrs. Oliphant: R. Baxter's *Narrative*). The value of the last mentioned case is lessened as an illustration of the gift of tongues by the conscious attempt which the Irvingite prophets undoubtedly made to repeat the phenomena of the

early Church. But in all these instances we recognise a sudden awakening of the man's spiritual nature, and intense emotions of overwhelming fear and rapturous joys. These are precisely the effects which we should expect the wondrous declarations of the Apostles concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ to produce on the hearers. If such startling and stupendous truths had been met with half-hearted assent, without fear and trembling, without ecstasy of joy, that sometimes overmastered men's natural powers, such callous reception would have been a weighty argument against our believing them to have been true.

Again, we have a few scattered hints as to the nature of the manifestations in which these ecstatic emotions expressed themselves. There were "divers kinds of tongues." This cannot mean the several families of languages (Hofmann). But it may include the power of speaking in foreign languages as one kind of tongues. If so, it prepares us to admit a difference between the manifestations of the Spirit at Pentecost and subsequently in Corinth. The word *παντοδαπαί* in Irenæus may signify that the expression of Christian ecstasy differed in different persons. Then we are told that the Spirit sought to express itself in prayers to God; but those prayers were often "groanings which cannot be uttered," unintelligible to men, but understood by Him who "knoweth the mind of the Spirit." They are inarticulate cries; but they are not unmeaning. The man speaks mysteries; but no one understands (xiv. 2). Hence he who speaks in tongues, though he does not edify the Church, yet edifies himself. For the edification of others articulate speech and rational is requisite; but a man's own devotion may find utterance in, yea may be deepened and purified by, sobs and tears (xiv. 4). This is so even when he cannot interpret to others his own unuttered prayers (xiv. 13). Moreover, not only prayer but praise also was one form of the expression of the gift of tongues; a chant without words (xiv. 15, 16). Lastly, various forms of expression tended to combine or even to be confused, so that disorder arose in the Church, which must not be ascribed to Him who bestowed the gift (xiv. 33).

Finally, it is a natural question why the expression of ecstatic emotions is designated "speaking with tongues?"

The answer, as we have seen, is not that *γλωσσα* means a language, nor that it means antiquated or provincial phrases, nor, again, that it means the tongue. Should we err in finding the reason for the name in the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost in the shape of tongues as of fire? It was symbolical of the work of the Church in the world. Hitherto Christianity was but a sect of the Jews. The tongues that sat on the Apostles taught them in symbol the strange truth that the Gospel was a message from God to all the race of man. The result of the Spirit's powerful inworking often appeared as a kind of ecstasy, and retained the name which had been given to the miracle of Pentecost, even when the nature of the phenomenon had greatly changed. We may further admit that the change was brought about gradually and, when accomplished, proved to be the degeneracy of a supreme gift into what was become a discredit. The quarter of a century that intervened between the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost and the date of our Epistle is sufficient time to account for the change.

*ἐρμηνεία*. Oslander, Maier, etc., hold that this word is difficult to explain if the tongues were not foreign languages. The real difficulty is to understand why, if a person spoke Christian mysteries to his own edification in a foreign language, he could not himself interpret what he said to the edification of others, so as to render a special gift of interpretation unnecessary. But it is not more inconceivable that ecstatic utterances should be interpreted in the Church than it was to Plato that a *μάντις*, whose intellect was enthralled by the very nature of the oracular responses, should require a *προφήτης* rationally to interpret his utterances. There are ideas in a musical composition or a painting which require to be translated into words in order to be understood by a person who is not a musician or a painter. It sometimes happens that the author cannot interpret his own work, and certainly no one else can do so adequately. In the same way religious ecstasy may be very real and edifying to the man himself, even though another must interpret its meaning. It is hardly correct to say, with Neander, that the *ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν* corresponds to the scientific interpretation of Scripture; for the tongues were ecstatic utterances, and the power of interpret-

ing them cannot have involved research and critical estimate of evidence.

**V. 11.** Summary of what has been said from ver. 4 to ver. 10, to emphasize the Spirit's action in the distribution of the Charismata. In the midst of diversity the creative energy of the one governing mind and sovereign, though not arbitrary, will manifests its presence, and ought to exclude all pride and envy on the part of the recipients of the Spirit's gifts (cf. iv. 7). The word *ἐνεργεῖ* is a direct reference to *ἐνεργῶν* in ver. 6. Taken in conjunction with the notion of will (*βούλεται*), it certainly implies the personality of the Spirit. The divinity of the Spirit is not here stated.

*τὸ ἓν.* Not only is it the same Spirit that works, but that Spirit is one in His inmost being and purpose. The oneness that pervades the diversity of the Church is the direct consequence of the oneness of the Spirit.

**Vv. 12-30.** The unity in diversity that characterizes the work of the Spirit is the result, not only of the oneness of the Spirit, but also of the organic nature of the Church as it is the body of Christ. This notion of "body" is applied to the Church thus: *First*, the Church is, like the human body, one (vv. 12, 13). *Second*, the Church, like the body, though one, has many members (vv. 14-16). *Third*, multiplicity of members is necessary, (a) to the perfection (vv. 17, 18), and (b) to the very being of the body itself (vv. 19, 20). *Fourth*, the superior members cannot dispense with the weak; yea, greater honour is bestowed on the weaker members (vv. 21-24). *Fifth*, all the members have a fellow-feeling (vv. 25, 26). *Sixth*, the illustration is applied to the body of Christ, which is the Church (vv. 27-30).

**V. 12.** The body is an analogue of Christ, inasmuch as it is one body but has many members. *Καθάπερ* is the usual word to introduce an analogy (cf. Rom. xii. 4). *Χριστός* cannot mean merely the Church (Grot., De Wette, etc.), nor does the Apostle speak of Christ simply as head (Chrys., Theophyl., Estius, Meyer, etc.). He regards Christ here as the personal subject, the "Ego," whose body is the Church. "Christus non localiter, sed mystice et virtualiter, sive operative et per efficientiam, est corpus, hypostasis, anima et spiritus totius Ecclesiæ" (Cor. a Lap.). Similarly Neander, Hofmann.

The expression might be formally more exact, but it would also be more modern, if the Apostle had said, "As the Person is one while the members of his body are many, so also Christ is one but the members of His mystical body, the Church, are many." Thinkers in ancient times had a difficulty to express the notion of personality. St. Paul has the expression  $\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\acute{\omega} \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  in Rom. vii. 22, which could not well be used of Christ. In Rom. xii. 5 we meet with the words  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\acute{\alpha} \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\mu\epsilon\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}$ . But this would not have sufficiently conveyed the notion of the unity of the Church as it is derived from union with Christ. It has been said that the Church is the continuation of the incarnation. It is nearer the truth to say that the Church is the express image and  $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$  of the glorified Lord. Cf. Eph. i. 23. "Totum ergo Christus" (Augustine, *Enarr. in Psalm. cxlii.*). All the members are instinct with one personality.

$\tau\omicron\upsilon$   $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  must be omitted. So  $\aleph$  A B C, Vulg. But D inserts it.

**V. 13.** He shows how the Church is one in virtue of its union with Christ. As the human body is an organic whole because of the indwelling spirit, so also the Church is the body of Christ because Christ dwells in it. "The Lord," that is Christ, "is the Spirit" (2 Cor. iii. 17), and "the quickening Spirit" (xv. 45), without whom the Church would be but an aggregate, not an organism. A human body is part of a human person because that personality is in the form of an indwelling spirit. Christ is the Spirit that dwells in the Church, and in virtue of that indwelling the Church is the body of Christ. The indwelling of Christ is, therefore, distinct in idea from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost.

$\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , not "in reference to one body," but "into one body"; and this may mean either "so as to be united to one body" or "so as to form one body." But the former notion would probably be expressed by  $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , and the latter meaning is rendered natural by the word  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ . So Chrys., Theod. Mops., Theophyl.

The  $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$  before  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  must be omitted, as in  $\aleph$  B C D.  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  will be cognate accus. after  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\tau\iota\sigma\theta\eta\mu\epsilon\nu$ . Cf. Mark x. 38; Sir. xv. 3,  $\acute{\upsilon}\delta\omega\rho \sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha\varsigma \pi\omicron\tau\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$ . But  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\tau\iota\sigma\theta\eta\mu\epsilon\nu$  may mean "were given one Spirit to drink" (as

in iii. 2) or "were watered with one Spirit" (as in iii. 7). If the former rendering is adopted, the reference will be to the Lord's Supper, and the two sacraments will have been mentioned in this verse. The aor. is not a sufficient objection, for it may be gnomic (cf. note on vii. 28). So Chrys. (at first), Calvin, Cor. a Lap., Estius, Kling, Wordsworth, Heinrici. But the metaphor is unnatural and disturbs the idea elsewhere connected with the Supper, that drinking the wine signifies participation in the blood of Christ. The other rendering will contain a double allusion: first, to the watering of plants; second, to immersion in baptism (as in Rom. vi. 4, *συνετάρφημεν*); and *ποτίζω* will express the notion of abundance and power. Hence it is not a frigid tautology. The Spirit is given in baptism (Tit. iii. 5) so copiously that our baptism virtually contains all the extraordinary and supernatural gifts and powers that manifested themselves in the Church. Like plants, we are drenched in the Spirit. The one shower waters all the fields and soaks through the earth to the rootlets of every particular blade of grass. The reference to baptism is adopted by Chrys., Œcum., Theophyl., Bengel, De Wette, Meyer.

**Vv. 14-16.** The Church, though one, has many members. The asyndeton in ver. 15 introduces an enumeration of special instances of the general statement. All members of the human body are not one member. The foot is as much part of the body as the hand, and the ear as much as the eye. That the foot is not hand does not exclude the foot from the unity of the body, and that the ear is not eye does not exclude the ear from the unity of the body. It is the celebrated apologue of Menenius Agrippa (Livy II. 32), of which St. Paul had in all likelihood never heard; applied, however, not to the political, but to the spiritual organism. Cf. Seneca, *De Irâ* II. xxxi.: "Omnia inter se membra consentiunt, quia singula servari totius interest." Chrys. well observes that the Apostle mentions the meanest and the most honourable of the members, the foot and the eye, but does not say that the foot envies the eye. The foot envies the hand, which is but a little superior to itself. It is the ear that envies the eye.

*οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.* Most expositors understand this as an interrogative sentence. So De Wette,

Maier, Hodge, Alford. But we should then expect *μή*, not *οὐ*, *παρὰ τοῦτο*, as the answer must be negative. At any rate it can only be, as Canon Evans says, a semi-interrogation: "It is not, is it?" The position emphasizes *παρὰ τοῦτο*: "It is not on this account, if on any account, not a part of the body."

*παρά*, only here in the New Test. in the sense of "on account of." It has occasionally this meaning in class. Greek, espec. in Thucydides (e.g. I. 141) and Demosthenes (e.g. *Phil.* I. p. 43). Several instances occur in M. Antoninus (e.g. *παρὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν*, II. 1). Wiener compares *propter* from *prope*. In the older English authors, and even now as a vulgarism, "along of" means "because of." Cf. Hooker, *E. P. V. i.*, "so be it not long of them."

*τοῦτο*. Meyer and Evans think this means, not the fact that the foot is not hand, but its discontent at not being hand. But this view is inconsistent with the evident purpose of the Apostle in introducing the illustration. That member of the Church which has received inferior gifts has no reason to envy his brother who has superior gifts, inasmuch as both are equally members of Christ's body. Though the foot is not the hand, it is not on that account not part of the body.

**Vv. 17, 18.** Diversity of members necessary to the perfection of the body. Not only is the ear part of the body, but hearing is no less a function of the body than seeing. The Apostle ascribes this to the will and arrangement of God, in order, as Chrys. says, to keep before the reader's mind that the diversity of gifts in the Church depends on the will of the Spirit (ver. 11).

**V. 18.** *νυνὶ δέ*, "now, however, as things are." In class. Greek *νῦν δέ* often occurs in this sense, but hardly *νυνὶ δέ*, the pronominal affix *ι* restricting the meaning to the actual present. A B C read *νῦν* here, **N** C *νυνὶ*. Cf. v. 11.

*ἔθετο* may mean "made," *constituit*, as in ix. 18; Heb. i. 2, et al.; but much more probably it means "arranged," "set," *disposuit*, and is to be closely joined to *ἐν τῷ σώματι*. Cf. ver. 28. With St. Paul, as with Aristotle, the body is in idea prior to its various members, which the Apostle describes as "set in" the body that it may attain to its complete condition and most perfect form.

**Vv. 19, 20.** Diversity of members necessary to the very

being of the body. The organic unity of the whole requires diversity of parts; and, as things actually are, God has so arranged that there shall be many members, but one body. In ver. 18 the Apostle represents the various members as being, so to speak, *inserted* in the body; in ver. 19 he represents the body itself as having no organic existence without its members.

**V. 19.** τοῦ τὸ σῶμα; Cf. Arist., *Pol.* VIII. (V.) iii. 6: ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν συγκεῖται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνάλογον, ἵνα μένη συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται.

**Vv. 21-24.** The superior members cannot dispense with the service of the meaner; yea, greater honour is bestowed on the feebler members.

**V. 21.** As the inferior member cannot envy the superior one, so the superior member cannot afford to despise the inferior one. Hence δέ has here an adversative force: "on the other hand." Οὐ δύναται is emphatic. We need not suppose that the Apostle allegorizes the eye, the hand, the head, the foot. He mentions together eye and hand, because it is apparent to all that the eye cannot do the work of the hand; and he adds that even the head, the highest and sovereign part of the body, cannot execute its own volitions without the co-operation of the feet, the lowest and least intelligent of the members.

παλιν, "to mention another instance." The *usual* phrase in class. Greek is ἀλλὰ μὴν (οὐδέ) or αὐθις δέ. Cf. 1 John ii. 8.

Ver. 22. ἀλλὰ, "nay," *quoniam immo*, as in John xvi. 2 (cf. vi. 11).

πολλῷ μᾶλλον, "much rather," *multo potius*. The μᾶλλον is not to be connected with ἀναγκαῖα. For the Apostle does not say that the weaker members are more necessary than the others, but denies that the superior members can dispense with the help of the weaker ones. Far from that, they are necessary.

τὰ δοκοῦντα μέλη emphasizes the δοκοῦντα more than τὰ μέλη τὰ δοκοῦντα does. Cf. Matt. xxv. 34, τὴν ἡτοιμασμένην ὑμῖν βασιλείαν ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, Rom. viii. 18, τὴν μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι. He is speaking, not of members of the body which are always weak members, but of those which on occasion seem to be weaker, as for instance when any member

is diseased. So Alford rightly. It cannot be said that the parts which are most indispensable for the performance of the vital functions are weaker than those parts, such as the eye, which are not absolutely essential for the subsistence, though they are for the perfection, of the body. We have also in Arist., *De Part. Anim.* II. 8 and 10, the notion that some parts of the body are more necessary than others. This ver. is cited by Clement of Rome (*Ad Cor.* 37).

V. 23. Again, the less honourable members have more abundant honour bestowed upon them; inasmuch, that is, as they are covered with dress. As the woman's long hair is a symbol at once of subjection and of glory superadded by reason of that subjection, so also dress is a bestowal of greater honour on the less honourable members. What conceals also adorns. He says ἀδοκοῦμεν to intimate that the dishonour attaching to some members as compared with others arises from our sentiments, though it is true those sentiments are natural and right.

περιτίθεμεν, not here in the more general meaning of "conferring" (as in Prov. xii. 9), but in the special sense of "putting on as a garment"; and this physical meaning the word always bears in the New Test.

τιμὴν, "a covering in token of honour." Cf. note on xi. 10.

τὰ ἀσχημόνα ἡμῶν, that is, τὰ γεννητικά, etc. Cf. Rev. xvi. 15.

εὐσχημοσύνην . . . ἔχει. Chrys., Meyer, etc., explain this more abundant comeliness to mean the more comely covering with which the uncomely parts are clothed. But in that case the clause would be merely a repetition of the previous one, and, besides, the Apostle afterwards ascribes this more abundant comeliness to the arrangement of God in tempering together the body, which can hardly mean that the uncomely parts are intended by God to be clad in more comely attire. The greater comeliness refers rather to function. Marriage is honourable (τίμιος, Heb. xiii. 4). On the other hand, the father that prevents his daughter from being married is said, in certain circumstances, ἀσχημονεῖν (vii. 36).

V. 24. The Apostle has spoken of comeliness of function as compensating for the uncomeliness of the members. This is

still more recognisable in the absence of comeliness in the functions performed by the comely members of the body. For example, seeing and hearing are, in point of sentiment, neutral functions, and the eye and the ear are comely members. These senses are admired, but their function confers no dignity and loss of them brings no shame. But the function of the uncomely parts is an honour, and mutilation a disgrace. Now this more abundant comeliness of function is bestowed by God to compensate for the uncomeliness of the members, and it is withheld from the comely parts because they have no need of it.

*συνεκέρασε*, "compounded." But the emphasis is on *ὁ Θεός*. It was God who fashioned this organic compound, the body. This is just the point of difference between the Apostle's teleology and that of the Greek philosophers. Where Aristotle says "nature" St. Paul says "God." The difference is practically important to the Apostle's argument in several ways. *First*, by ascribing the physical constitution of man to a personal and good God, the Apostle can infer at once that it must be the best, while, if it be simply the result of natural forces, its excellence can only be known empirically. *Second*, the Apostle includes among the manifold effects which he ascribes to God, not only the physical constitution of things, but also men's instinctive sentiment of seemliness. If any member is diseased, the greater care taken of it springs from a divinely implanted instinct; if any member is thought to be less honourable, it is God that has given this thought and at the same time implanted the sentiment which leads men to bestow on the function of that member more abundant honour. *Third*, the reference to God's action in the adjustment of the various members of the body reminds the readers that the bestowal of divers gifts on the members of Christ's body which is the Church is also from God. On *συνκεράννυμι* in this signification cf. Plato, *Tim.* p. 35, *τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος*. In the New Test. it occurs only here in the physical and only in Heb. iv. 2 in the metaphorical sense.

*ὑστερουμένῳ*. So *ΝΑΒC*. *D* has *ὑστεροῦντι*. Cf. note on i. 7. Supply mentally *τῆς τιμῆς*.

*δοῦς*. The aor. partic. sometimes in narrative (that is, when joined with a verb in the aor. or historical pres.) expresses

simultaneous action. Cf. Rom. iv. 20, *ἐνεδυναμάθη* . . . *δοὺς δόξαν*, Phil. ii. 7; 1 Tim. i. 12. But *χαρισάμενος* in Col. ii. 13 is not an instance. So also in class. Greek, *e.g.* Plat., *Phæd.* p. 60, *εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με*. In fact it bears its purely aoristic signification.

Vv. 25, 26. Mention of God's action in the constitution of the human body has prepared us for a statement of God's purpose in it, viz. that there may be no schism in the body. This, again, especially when the illustration has changed into an allegory through the personification of the bodily members in these verses, prepares us for the application of what the Apostle has said concerning the body to the Corinthian Christians themselves as the body of Christ.

V. 25. The word *σχίσμα* implies a personification of the bodily members, as "dissedisse" in Livy (*ut sup.*) and "consentiant" in Seneca (*ut sup.*) do. But the Apostle does not say *στάσις* with Aristotle (*ut sup.*), because he represents the unity of the body, not as that of a commonwealth, but as that of a physical organism. When factions rend the Church, it is not a sedition, but a tearing to pieces.

*μεριμνῶσι*. The opposite of *σχίσμα* is the *anxious* solicitude of one member for the well-being of the others. *Μεριμνᾶν* is stronger than *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*.

V. 26. He mentions two opposite examples of the mutual care of the bodily members. He still personifies them, especially when he represents them as glorified and rejoicing. The fellow-suffering of the members is an allegorical expression for, probably, the reflex action of the muscles. But the clause that immediately follows cannot fairly be restricted to a merely physical effect, such as the exhilaration of the system when any part recovers from acute pain. This does not assign their full meaning to the words *δοξάζεται* and *συγχαίρει*. *Δόξα* must mean something more than *εὐεξία*. To "glorify" one member is not merely to preserve it in a healthy condition; and the "joy" of the other members is more than "quies in bonâ dispositione" (Estius). We cannot have a better illustration than that of Chrysostom: "the head is crowned and all the members have a share in the honour, the eyes laugh when the mouth speaks." It is true that the connecting link between the movement of the lips and the laughter

of the eyes is mental. But that does not detract from the singular beauty of the Apostle's allegory.

**Vv. 27-30.** The application of the allegory of the human body to the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church.

**V. 27.** This verse is the minor premise of a syllogism. We must mentally supply the conclusion: "Therefore, there ought to be no schism in the Church." Cf. iii. 17.

*ὁμοῖς*, emphatic: "you, notwithstanding your factions and corruptions." The Apostle's word certainly implies that the Church is the body of Christ, not in consequence of resemblance to Christ in moral character, but mystically, through the supernatural power of Christ Himself exerted upon the *κόσμος* and the natural man. Moral growth is the effect, not the cause, of union with Christ.

*σῶμα*, not "a body" (Mosheim, Baur), as if there could be many *σώματα Χριστοῦ*, but "the body of Christ." Cf. note on iii. 16, *ναός*.

*ἐκ μέρους*. D has *ἐκ μέλους*. So also several of the Fathers, e.g. Severian (*Cat.*) and Epiphanius (*Hær.* 66); and the Vulg. has "de membro." The meaning would, I suppose, be "member joined to member," "one member springing from another," that other being, according to Severian, the head! But **ΣΑΒC** have *ἐκ μέρους*. Three explanations have been offered of the phrase. (1) Hofmann renders it "partially," in contrast to "perfectly," as in xiii. 9, 12. So Origen, *Hom.* 17 in *Lev.*, "non ex integro, sed ex parte." But the contrast between the present imperfection and the future glory of the Church is quite foreign to the Apostle's purpose. (2) Chrys., Theod., Œcum., Erasmus explain it to mean "partly" in contrast to "the whole," as in Rom. xi. 25, joining it to *σῶμα* as well as to *μέλη*, as if the Church in Corinth were only a part, not the whole, of the body and of the members of Christ. This is certainly incorrect. It is the idea of the œcumenical Church overriding that of the integral nature of the individual Church assembly. Scripture nowhere speaks of a local Church as part of the universal Church. Where two or three Christians are met in the name of Christ, there is the Church, and all Christians throughout the world are also the Church. Cf. note on iii. 16. Besides, the position of the words *ἐκ μέρους* is decisive against this view. But Theophylact does not join the

words to *σῶμα*. He says the Church in Corinth is an integral Church, but in relation to the Catholic Church a part only. He incorrectly supposes the Apostle to be speaking of the members of the universal Church, whereas the subject is the members of Christ's body, which he has already said is in its entirety in the Corinthian Church. (3) Estius, Neander, De Wette, Osiander, Meyer think *ἐκ μέρους* means "according as each one has his definite portion in the body of Christ." I am not satisfied that *ἐκ μέρους* can bear this meaning, which would, at least more usually, be expressed by *πρὸς μέρος*. But another objection to this view is that it makes membership in the body of Christ depend on distinction of function. On the contrary, each one has his own distinct work because he is a member of Christ's body. (4) Grotius, Maier and the majority of commentators explain *ἐκ μέρους* to mean "considered as individuals," making it synon. with *καθ' εἰς*. Meyer and De Wette object that to say this is unnecessary. Quite the reverse. It is essential to state how the Church can be in one aspect the body, in another aspect the members, of Christ. The Church is never said to be a member of Christ's body, and the individual Christian is never said to be the body of Christ. In this the notion of body differs from that of temple, inasmuch as the indwelling of the Spirit, which constitutes the temple, is an indwelling in persons, while the organic unity, which constitutes the body, implies diversity of members.

V. 28. Enumeration of the various functions of the members, arranged according to worth. Hooker (*Eccles. Pol.* V. lxxviii. 8) justly warns us not to surmise "incompatible offices where nothing is meant but sundry graces, gifts, and abilities which Christ bestowed." Cf. also Rothe, *Anfänge*, p. 256.

*καί*, expegetical: "that is to say," *dico autem*. Cf. Rom. i. 5, *χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν*.

*ἔθετο*, "placed for His own use." The mid. voice and the signification of the verb (cf. note on ver. 18) express the exact notion that these various functions depend on the sovereign will of God, who is source and end of all. In Eph. iv. 11 the Apostle has *ἔδωκε*, because his purpose is to declare the richness of Christ's gift, not the sovereignty of His power. Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 38, *καθὼς καὶ ἐτέθη ἐν τῷ χαρίσματι αὐτοῦ*.

ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, that is, in the Church universal and, therefore, in the local Church. Both are equally the body of Christ. Hence the sing.

πρῶτον κ. τ. λ. We have the same order in Eph. iv. 11, only that there evangelists are introduced between prophets and teachers, and pastors are joined to teachers. It is evident, therefore, that the Apostle means to enumerate the spiritual gifts according to their rank and value in the Church. Apostleship was the first gift in point of time and the most essential, because the apostles were witnesses of the facts on which the entire structure of Christianity rests and from which all the subsequent development of the Church takes its rise. Theod., Meyer, De Wette understand the name "apostle" in the wider sense, including Andronicus and Junius, who are said in Rom. xvi. 7 to be ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις. But as it is their witness to the truth of Christ's resurrection that constitutes the pre-eminence of the apostles, which is the point of the passage, we must restrict the name here to the Twelve and Paul. So Calvin, etc. Next to apostleship ranks prophecy and, next after prophecy, teaching. Apostles bore witness to facts. They and others interpreted those facts, prophets by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, teachers by the slow and often uncertain efforts of their own understanding assisted by the Spirit. Cf. xiv. 26; Rom. xii. 7. The witness is the precursor of the interpreter, and an inspired interpretation has greater authority than an uninspired. The distinction between prophet and teacher is not that the former preaches to the heathen, the latter to the Church (Estius, Neander). This is to confound the prophets with the evangelists (Eph. iv. 11). There were prophets in the Corinthian Church, whose inspired utterances were judged by the rest (xiv. 29); and Barnabas and Paul were prophets and teachers before they were set apart for their first missionary journey. Cf. Acts xiii. 1, 2.

ἔπειτα κ. τ. λ. Cf. note on ver. 10. For εἶτα & A B C read ἔπειτα. It is difficult to suppose that ἔπειτα does not express inferiority to the gifts previously mentioned. But why does the Apostle use abstract terms? It is unnatural to think that χαρίσματα means persons. It is better to consider, with Neander, that these gifts were not so strictly bound to

certain persons as the gifts of apostleship, prophecy, and teaching.

*ἀντιλήψεις, κυβερνήσεις.* From the miraculous powers the Apostle passes to the practical administration of the Church, which is of two kinds, helps and governments; that is, various ways of helping and various ways of governing. *Ἀντιλήψις* means "succour" in LXX. (e.g. Ps. lxxxiii. 6), but not in class. Greek. Vitranga (*De Vet. Syn.* II. 3), Stanley, and others identify *ἀντιλήψεις* with the *ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν* of ver. 10. This would have the advantage of making the present enumeration identical with that in ver. 10. Hervæus, De Lyra, etc., think *ἀντιλήψεις* were inferior officers appointed to assist the higher dignitaries, which is to foist on the verse the notions of later times. A comparison of this passage with Acts xx. 35 leaves no room to doubt that *ἀντιλήψεις* meant various ways of helping the poor and the sick members of the Church. So Chrys. and the majority of expositors. Again, *κυβερνήσεις* will be the various ways of administering Church government. Maybe the two words express the duties respectively of the deacons and the bishops. If so, we have here the faint beginnings of the separation of offices. When *κυβερνᾶν* is used in the sense of "governing" in class. Greek, the original meaning of steering a vessel is seldom lost sight of. But in later authors, such as Plutarch, the allusion seems to have disappeared from the word. Whether the administration of Church matters was the function of all the members or of a presbytery, the Apostle does not say in this passage (cf. note on vi. 4). But the absence of "pastors" (Eph. iv. 11), "bishops" (1 Tim. iii. 2), "deacons" (1 Tim. iii. 8), and "elders" (1 Tim. v. 17), suggests that the government of the Corinthian Church at this time was a pure democracy. In the abundance of spiritual gifts there was no room for official authority. One thing at least is evident from this verse, that the function of teaching was often separate from that of ruling.

*γένη γλωσσῶν*, last and least. Cf. note on ver. 10.

Avoiding a too artificial classification, we may yet admit that the gifts thus enumerated correspond to the various aspects in which Christianity presents itself to our notice: *first*, as a revelation of God's truth; *second*, as a deliverance

from misery by miraculous power or otherwise; *third*, as a visible kingdom on earth; *fourth*, as an assimilation and sanctification of the ecstatic side of human nature.

**Vv. 29, 30.** Not only the Divine appointment, but also the actual state of things demands and proves that diversity of function must be as essential to the mystical body of Christ as unity of life.

*δυνάμεις*. Bengel, De Wette, etc., think it is nom. If so, it means "workers of miracles." But it seems less forced to make it accus. after *ἐχουσιν* and render it "power to do various kinds of miracles."

**V. 31.** The *δέ* is, not transitional (Meyer), but adversative (De Wette). The antithesis between this and the previous verse is twofold. *First*, he has said that the lowest gifts have their place in the Church; he now urges his readers, on the other hand, not to rest content with the inferior gifts, but to aim at possessing the higher. *Second*, he has previously declared God's sovereignty in assigning to every man his gifts; now he states, with equal boldness, the opposite truth, that effort is necessary to their attainment and that the highest are within reach of the earnest seeker. He does not strike a middle course between the assertion of God's sovereignty and of man's freedom or attempt to reconcile them, but fearlessly maintains both as the foundation of practical exhortation.

*ζηλοῦν*. Cf. Eur., *Hec.* 255, *ζηλοῦτε τιμάς*. Cf. note on xiv. 1.

*μείζονα*. So **Σ ABC**; adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. D has *κρείσσονα*. Maier, Osiander, Meyer think *μείζονα* crept in from xiii. 13. Cf. xiv. 5, *μείζων ὁ προφητεύων*. Both words mean the same thing.

In the latter part of the verse the thought suddenly rises. The result is a sweet hymn in praise of Christian love. Emulous pursuit of highest gifts has been commended. But emulation, when it is purest, must yield to another and better way of seeking spiritual gifts, even the opposite of emulation. Hitherto the Apostle has urged his readers to the chase along the earthly road of ambition. Emulation in Christian work is not discouraged, until it ceases to have any glory by reason of the glory that excelleth, which is Christ's *via dolorosa* of self-forgetting love.

καὶ ἔτι, "and furthermore." The usual phrase is ἔτι δέ or ἔτι δὲ καί. The words do not mean "and yet," which would be ὁμως, though ἔτι and "yet" are etymologically the same word.

καθ' ὑπερβολήν, an adverbial phrase having the force of an adjective and qualifying ὁδόν, "a superior way." Cf. Rom. vii. 13, καθ' ὑπερβολήν ἁμαρτωλός, "exceedingly sinful." Cf. note on viii. 7, ἕως ἄρτι. If the phrase were used adverbially, ὁδόν would have the art., and it is not easy to see what intelligible meaning the rendering of Ewald and Hofmann ("I show abundantly") can yield in this place.

ὁδόν. Does he mean that love is a more excellent thing than all the Charismata, or that pursuit of love is a more sure and excellent means than eagerness of emulation to attain the Charismata? The former is the view of Tert. (*Contra Marc.* V. 8), Estius, Billroth, Olshausen, Rückert, etc.; the latter that of Chrys., Theophyl., Neander, Meyer, Osiander, De Wette, Heinrichi, etc. This seems to me to be correct, because the other view implies that a contrast is intended between the exhortation to seek the higher gifts and the exhortation to secure the more excellent grace, which would require ὁμως, not ἔτι. Besides, ὁδόν in this passage more naturally means "way" to the attainment of something beyond itself. At the same time the superiority of love as a means is lost sight of, it must be acknowledged, in a beautiful panegyric of love as it transcends in worth, not only the higher Charismata of knowledge and prophecy, but also the moral graces of faith and hope. It is not through the exercise of gifts that we attain to love; it is love that developes the gifts within us, and love is greater than gifts. The Apostle's praise of love is partly a digression, introduced to rebuke indirectly the dissensions of the Corinthian Church, partly a statement of the peculiarly Christian means to secure possession of spiritual gifts for the edification of the Church and render them innocuous to their possessor, partly also a glimpse of a moral development different in kind from gifts and greater in moral worth than all other moral virtues, partly a reiteration in a new form of the idea that the Church is an organic body. What, objectively considered, may be designated unity is, subjectively regarded, love. Thus does the Apostle, after his

wont, hold the balance even between the mystical side of Christianity and the human sentiments to which Christianity gives birth. Denial of the former ends in sheer individualism; forgetfulness of the latter transforms Christianity into an earthly polity or hardens it into a theological creed or narrows it into an intolerant sect. The conception of the πόλις as an organic whole had been vividly realized by the Greek mind. But, as the highest moral principle reached by the Greeks was τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, they failed to unite their idea of the state with a doctrine of individual morality. Either the individual was lost in the state or the state in the individual. Christianity establishes a Church and teaches goodness. It can do both by erecting its society and its morality on the most personal and at the same time most social of human sentiments. He is good who loves, and love makes the Church. It follows that the word must be understood throughout in its deeper meaning and wider application, love to God as well as to the brethren. This is sufficient reason for preferring Tyndale's rendering "love," adopted in the Genevan Bible and the Revised Version, to Wycliffe's word "charity," adopted in the Bishops' Bible and the Authorized Version.

δείκνυμι. Expositors refer this to what follows. They are right; but it is not the whole truth. The word glances at the purport of nearly all that the Apostle has said in the Epistle. The Corinthians had erred, not merely in setting too high a value on the gift of tongues in comparison with other gifts, but also in priding themselves on their gifts, yea, in despising and envying their brethren, and forming hostile factions in the Church of God. The surpassing excellence of love as the divinely appointed means of attaining possession of the higher gifts for the edification of the Church is a truth that pervades the whole Epistle. The Apostle here declares that this is the sum of all he has written, and immediately begins his hymn in praise of love.

### B. *The Praise of Love.*

(xiii.)

The thirteenth chapter may be thus divided: (1) Love confers on the gifts of the Spirit their special character and worth

(vv. 1-3). Contrast *λαλῶ* and *γέγονα*. (2) A statement of the various manifestations of love, as it is the sentiment that springs from the mystical unity of the Church, in contrast to the manifestations of the diversity of the Church's spiritual gifts (vv. 4-7). Contrast *ἔχω* and *εἰμί*. (3) The inherent superiority and consequent longer duration of love, as compared with the present forms of the spiritual gifts (vv. 8-12). Contrast *παρὰδῶ* and *ὠφελοῦμαι*. (4) The superiority of love over the moral graces of faith and hope (ver. 13).

**Vv. 1-3.** Love confers on the gifts of the Spirit their special character and worth. For instance: (1) love renders the unintelligent utterance of ecstasy significant (ver. 1); (2) love raises the gifts which are significant or powerful, such as prophecy and faith, to the rank of moral virtues (ver. 2); (3) love ensures for those gifts which are themselves moral virtues, such as kindness to the poor or the sacrifice of one's life for others, their fitting reward (ver. 3).

**V. 1.** The gift of tongues without love has no meaning, not even to its possessor; for it is love that makes ecstasy significant (cf. xiv. 4). The Apostle mentions the gift of tongues first, because the Corinthians set the highest value on it. Maier, Osiander, Alford argue that this verse proves that the tongues meant foreign languages. It proves rather that this gift consisted in ecstatic utterance, which would more readily suggest the allusion to the tongues of angels, a higher form of ecstasy than human, and the comparison of tongues to sounding bronze and clanging cymbal. As among men, so also among angels, ecstatic utterance may be the best expression sometimes of spiritual emotions, and therefore the fittest vehicle of Christian thought. It is not improbable that prayer with groanings which cannot be uttered was one form which this gift of the Spirit assumed (cf. Rom. viii. 26).

**V. 2.** The gifts of prophecy and faith have no moral worth without love. Prophecy is even without love significant, and in this differs from the gift of tongues. Faith is powerful even without love. But as love bestows on ecstatic utterance a meaning to the man's own consciousness and to God, so also it imparts to the significant and active gifts of prophecy and faith a moral value. Inarticulate tongues become intelligent; intelligent prophecy becomes a form of goodness. Without

love the man *has* many things, but in his own personal and spiritual worth *is* nothing.

Heinrici divides the verse thus: "If (1) I have prophecy and know all the mysteries, and if (2) I have all knowledge, and if (3) I have all faith," etc. He thus makes knowledge of mysteries the endowment of the prophet, and supplies ἔχω, not εἰδῶ, before γνῶσιν. Against this it may be observed, *first*, that πάντα balances πᾶσαν, so that both words are to be closely joined together after εἰδῶ, and, *second*, that the notion of γνῶσις is implied in εἰδῶ. Meyer makes γνῶσιν as well as μυστήρια subordinate to prophecy. But against this is the evident distinction and co-ordination of both in ver. 8. It is more natural to divide the clauses thus: "If (1) I have prophecy, and if (2) I know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if (3) I have all faith," etc. Yet the second clause is more intimately connected with the first than with the third. Knowledge of all mysteries is the source of prophecy (cf. xiv. 2). Even the truths that are discovered by research (γνῶσις) may be taught to others by inspiration (προφητεία). So also removing mountains is closely connected with the third clause as the effect of faith. Paraphrase: "If I have the gift of teaching the mysteries of revelation or of research, or if I have faith enough to remove mountains," etc. Hence γνῶσιν is cogn. accus. after εἰδῶ, though it must be confessed that the occurrence of a cogn. accus. (γνῶσιν) and of an objective accus. (μυστήρια) together is rather awkward.

ὄρη. Cf. Matt. xvii. 20; xxi. 21.

μεθιστάνειν, "to remove from their places, and transfer them in a mass elsewhere." The pres. enhances the exploit: "remove mountain after mountain."

οὐδὲν εἰμί. Cf. Plat., *Apol.* p. 41, εἰὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες. But St. Paul has undoubtedly a deeper conception than any the phrase conveys in class. writers. He distinguishes moral character and position before God from intellectual endowments, bestowed though they may be by the Spirit of God, and from the supernatural power to do miracles, as what the man *is* from what he *has* (cf. 2 Cor. xii. 11).

**V. 3.** Doling out one's substance to the poor and the sacrifice of one's life for others is of no avail without love. Yet another advance in the thought. As love elevates ecstasy

to the rank of intellectual prophecy, and prophecy to the rank of moral virtue, so also nothing but love will render virtue itself, even in its best manifestations, of any avail before the judgment-seat of God. Love itself cannot find a more perfect and adequate expression or show itself more lovely than in the sacrifice of one's goods and life for others. But without love they profit a man nothing in the sight of God.

ψωμίσω, "dole out in food" (Evans). The aor. adds emphasis: "if I dole out all at once." Ψωμίζω expresses, *first*, that he gives to a large number of persons, so that every one can receive but a dole, and, *second*, that every gift is made by the man himself. Chrys., τὴν οἰκείαν διακονίαν. Perhaps there is a side-glance at the "helps" (xii. 28), that is, the charity in the narrower sense of the word which formed a prominent feature in the love-feasts of the early Church.

Lachm. and Treg. read *καυθήσωμαι*, Tisch. *καυθήσομαι*, Westc. and Hort *καυχήσωμαι*, after *NA B*. It may be that the copyists changed *χ* into *θ* because they supposed the Apostle referred to the fires of martyrdom, a feature of the Neronian persecutions that left a vivid impression on the minds of the Christians. Reading *καυχήσωμαι*, the meaning is that these deeds and sufferings are profitless to the man that seeks profit in them. He does not gain even the reward of glory, which he sought. If we read *καυθήσομαι* (or *-ωμαι*), the allusion may be to the Jewish martyrology, Dan. iii. 28, *παρέδωκαν τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν εἰς πῦρ*, and 2 Macc. vii. So Augustine (*Ep. civ.*), De Wette, Heinrici, etc. At any rate, we cannot suppose, with Calvin and Neander, a prophetic allusion to the persecution under Nero. Cyprian also (*Ep.* 73) thinks it refers to Christian martyrdom. Bp. Lightfoot (on Col., p. 395) has wonderfully confirmed the otherwise strange supposition that the Apostle alludes to Buddhist self-immolation:—"An Indian fanatic, attached to an embassy sent by King Porus to Augustus, astonished the Greeks and Romans by burning himself at Athens. . . . It is clear from Plutarch that the 'Tomb of the Indian' was one of the sights shown to strangers." Cf. Clem. Al., *Strom.* IV. p. 571 Potter, *θανάτῳ δὲ ἑαυτοῦς ἀποδιδόασιν κενῶ, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἰνδῶν γυμνοσοφισταὶ ματαίῳ πυρί*. Lucian (*De Morte Peregr.* p. 772) speaks of the vanity of the

Brahmins (*κενοδόξους ἀνθρώπους*) who immolated themselves on the pyre. An instance of it is mentioned by Ælian (*Var. Hist.* v. 6). One would almost suspect that in the eyes of even honest men among the heathen, such as M. Antoninus (XI. 3), the Christians themselves came under the same category. Clement, in the context of the passage just cited, considers it necessary to say that such men are not to be found among true Christians.

*καυθήσονται.* The fut. conj. occurs in Byzantine writers and Scholiasts. Recent critics usually omit it in the New Test.; e.g. 1 Pet. iii. 1, *κερδηθήσονται* for *-σονται*, Rev. xviii. 14, *εὐρήσουσιν* for *εὐρήσης*. In Luke xiii. 28 Treg. reads *ὅταν ὄψεσθε*. If we read *ὄψησθε*, it may be an aor. from pres. *ὀπτω*. In John xvii. 2 Treg. has *δώση*, as fut., Westc. and Hort *δώσει*. But *δώση* may be aor. In Rev. viii. 3 *ἄκουσον* read *δώσει*.

*οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι.* Cf. Matt. xvi. 26.

**Vv. 4-7.** From a statement of the relation in which love stands to the gifts of the Spirit the Apostle passes to an enumeration of the main characteristics of Christian love. We may surmise that his purpose is partly to rebuke the Corinthians for their lack of love, partly to indicate in what various ways love guides the exercise of the gifts, and partly to show the superior worth of love compared with the greatest gifts. First, he has constant reference to the distracted state of the Corinthian Church. Again, a close connection subsists between the right and effective use of intellectual gifts and the moral and spiritual state of the heart. In nothing, perhaps, is this more certain than in the exercise of the gifts of prophecy and preaching. The Apostle traces the lack of the greater gifts in the Corinthian Church to a moral defect, by showing that love gives birth to those emotions from which the noblest endowments spring. Finally, these verses connect what he has said of the gifts of the Spirit with the latter part of the chapter, where he speaks of the perpetuity of love and the transient character of the gifts. This difference is the direct consequence of the moral worth of love.

The reader will not fail to observe that almost all the attributes here ascribed to love are negative, though Christian love itself is the most aggressive form of goodness. Scripture

prefers negative descriptions of moral virtue, partly because Christianity necessarily assumes an antagonistic attitude towards the world's vices, partly because, as goodness is one and evil is many, the negative action of virtue consists in avoidance of many aspects of evil, while its positive action is comprehended in a few simple forms. In our passage Christian love, on its positive side, appears only in two things, kindness to men and joy in the truth, and these two are really one. For the "truth" is the Gospel, the product of God's philanthropy; and kindness to men is a gladsome *imitatio Christi*.

**V. 4.** μακροθυμεί. Jonathan Edwards (*Charity and Its Fruits*, p. 66) defines "long-suffering" as "meekness in bearing injuries." This is too narrow, and makes μακροθυμία synon. with πραότης. Tertullian (*De Patientiâ* 12), Cyprian (*Test.* III. 3), Chrys., Theophyl. explain it to mean greatness of soul or magnanimity. Μακρόν seems to have been used for μέγα in the later Greek (cf. Hesych. s.v. μακρός). It would also appear that μεγαλοφυχία, which in Aristotle means high-mindedness, came to signify in later writers magnificence, as if it were synon. with μεγαλοπρέπεια. It is not, therefore, improbable that μακροθυμία, which is a later word than μεγαλοφυχία, was used in the sense of magnanimity. At the same time it is evident that in the New Test. μακροθυμία has always a tacit reference to difficulties, sorrows, injuries, wrongdoing. For this reason it is here said to be an attribute of love. It differs, therefore, in several points from the "high-mindedness" of Aristotle's Ethics: *First*, it is not a consciousness of greatness, but a largeness of conception. *Second*, it is not the loftiness of spirit that great men alone possess, but a moral and godly frame of mind to be exhibited in the life of every Christian. *Third*, it is not a noble pride that stands aloof, but an interested spectator of life's sufferings, though not an active combatant in the strife.

χρηστεύεται occurs here for the first time and only here in the New Test. Clem. Rom. borrows it (*Ad Cor.* 13). Origen (*Cat.*) paraphrases by γλυκὺς πρὸς πάντας. Similarly Jerome (*In Gal.* v. 22): "Benignitas sive suavitas, quia apud Græcos χρηστότης utrumque sonat, virtus est lenis, blanda, tranquilla, et omnium bonorum apta consortio." Its opposite is ἀποτομία, "sharpness," "severity" (*Rom.* xi. 22). Χρηστότης supple-

ments μακροθυμία, of which it is said by Clem. Rom. (*ut sup.*) to be the fruit (cf. Gal. v. 22). "Long-suffering" expresses the self-restraint of Christian love; "kindness" expresses its self-abandonment. The former regards the wrong-doer; the latter, the sufferer. The former represents the attitude of the Divine Government towards men under the Old Covenant; the latter tells us what God has done in the Gospel. The former is the passive, the latter the active aspect of love. Tyndale's rendering, "is courteous," refers too exclusively to manner.

ζηλοῖ. Envy is "dissatisfaction at the prosperity of another" (Jon. Edwards). Cf. iii. 3; Gal. v. 20. In its good meaning it is emulation, or the desire to be superior to another without any wish to injure him.

περπερεύεται. The words πέρπερος, περπερεία, περπερεύομαι are late Greek. Cf. Schol. on Soph., *Ant.* 334. Hence some have supposed they were formed from the old Latin *perperus*; and the Vulg. has here "non agit perperam." But *perperam* itself is probably connected with *περά* and originally denoted what, in a bad sense, is "over and above measure." The precise meaning of περπερεύομαι is doubtful. Origen (*Cat.*) explains it by προπετής. So also Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Œcum. make it to be synon. with προπετεύεται, "is hasty." In the *Cutena* Chrys. and Œcum. paraphrase it by ἀλαζονεύεται. The Scholiast (*ut sup.*) says πέρπερος is a later word for κομφός, "affected." Hesychius explains περπερεύομαι by κατεπαίρομαι, "to be arrogant;" and to the same effect Tertullian (*De Patientiâ* 12) has "protervum sapit;" and Theophylact, rather inconsistently, explains πέρπερος by μετεωριζόμενος. Erasmus also renders it by *procaax*. In Cicero (*Ad Attic.* I. 14, "quomodo ἐνεπερπερευσάμην novo auditori Pompeio") it evidently refers to the manner and expression of one who sounds his own praises rather than to disposition. Similarly Clem. Alex. (*Pædag.* III. p. 251 Potter) and Basil (*Reg. Brev. Tract.* 49) explain it by καλλωπισμός, "ostentation." Weight of authority is decidedly in favour of this interpretation. Render: "vaunteth not itself." Cf. M. Anton. V. § 5, Gataker's note.

φυσιοῦται, "is not puffed up." It denotes disposition, as περπερεύομαι denotes manner. Cf. note on iv. 6; viii. 1.

V. 5. ἀσχημονεῖ, "doth not behave itself unseemly." Cf.

xiv. 40, where seemliness is prescribed in the conduct of public worship, and xi. 6-15, where an instance of unseemliness in the Church assembly is censured. The Apostle may have had an eye in the present passage also to Church worship. But what he says is a truth of wide application. Unseemliness of behaviour is the product of lust, and lust is fatal to love. God is love and light, infinite purity and infinite goodness. Holiness only can love.

*παροξύνεται*, "is not provoked," that is, to anger. It is synon. with *παραπικραίνω*. In the Old Test. the word is used of God. But such an application of it is alien to the moral tone of the New Test. It means the exasperation of anger. Love is long-suffering when it puts away anger, and is not exasperated even when anger is justly felt. The Apostle deprecates acerbity, but allows righteous resentment. His position differs from that of the Stoics, who condemned displeasure even at wrong-doing. Cf. M. Anton. VI. 27. We have an instance of the Apostle being exasperated once (cf. Acts xxiii. 3).

*οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν*, "taketh not account of evil" (Rev. Vers.). Theodoret is perhaps the first to suggest this rendering: *συγγινώσκει τοῖς ἐπταισμένοις, οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ σκοπῶ ταῦτα γεγενῆσθαι ὑπολαμβάνων*. Cf. Rom. iv. 3, 8; 2 Cor. v. 19. Two other renderings have been proposed. (1) "Does not suspect a person of having done evil till some proof compels belief." But this, as Hammond observes, would probably be expressed by *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι*, as in Matt. ix. 4. (2) "Does not intend evil against a person." Cf. Phil. iv. 8, where *ταῦτα λογίσεσθε* means, "think on the way to attain these things." But to say that love does not design another's hurt is to utter a truism not worthy of the Apostle. Besides, he would then probably have written *τὰ κακά*.

**V. 6.** *χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ*, "rejoiceth not at unrighteousness." There is no malice (*ἐπιχαιρεκακία*) in love. The generic term is *ζῆλος* or *φθόνος*, the specific *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*. Malice is that form of envy which seeks another's hurt. Cf. Plat., *Phileb.* p. 48, *ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται*.

*ἀδικία*, not "injustice," but "unrighteousness" in the large sense of the word in the New Test. Cf. Rom. i. 18; iii. 5.

συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, "but rejoiceth with the truth." Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12, where, as here, ἀλήθεια and ἀδικία are contrasted. *Μέν* is omitted in the former clause, because the latter clause is virtually included in it. Not to rejoice at unrighteousness implies rejoicing in the truth (cf. 2 Cor. xiii. 7). By "the truth" is here meant, not "righteousness," but "the Gospel." Cf. *Test. Duod. Patr.* p. 746, συγχαρήσονται αὐτῷ, that is, the Messiah. The Gospel is the truth of God, not so much because it is distinguished from the types of the Mosaic dispensation as because it is the absolute wisdom, the divine philosophy, of which all the efforts of the human intellect and all the partial lights that had broken from heaven were but the dawn. Cf. Gal. ii. 5; Eph. i. 13; 3 John 3; all an echo of Christ's words in John xiv. 6. This revelation of God bursts upon man with a fulness of joy. The Son Himself has been anointed with the oil of gladness above His fellows, and He appoints also unto the mourner beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness. Abraham saw the day of Christ and was glad. It is the time of harvest, when he that soweth and he that reapeth rejoice together. The gladness of the early Church attracted the notice of the historian (cf. Acts ii. 46). We may conjecture that it was her joy that created song and broke forth even in ecstatic utterance. Who is not struck with the contrast between this and the profound sadness of the later paganism of Greece and Rome? "Omnes aegedum mortales circumspice," says Seneca, "larga ubique flendi et assidua materia; alium ad quotidianum opus laboriosa egestas vocat; alium ambitio nunquam quieta sollicitat; alius divitias quas optaverat metuit . . . Lacrimæ nobis deerunt antequam causæ dolendi" (*Consol. ad Polyp.* 23). A Christian Apostle alone can address to his readers without irony the exhortation πάντοτε χαίρετε (1 Thess. v. 16). In this hymn to love the Apostle personifies the Gospel and represents it as rejoicing. The truth rejoices in its power to create love; for, as Augustine says, the victory of truth is love. Then love created by the truth rejoices in the loveliness of the truth and rejoices with the truth in its love-creating energy. It is the joy of the shepherd when he has found the lost sheep; the joy of the father when the prodigal has returned; the joy of holy angels

and of God over one sinner that repenteth. Cf. Rom. vii. 22, *συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ*, where Law is personified and *συν-* expresses, as here, communion in joy. Cf. Phil. ii. 17, *συγχαίρω πᾶσιν ὑμῖν*. So Arist., *Eth. Nic.* IX. iv. 1, *συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ*. The Apostle having personified Love, it is natural that he should also personify the Truth. Neander and others are, therefore, wrong in their rendering: "rejoiceth with others in the truth."

V. 7. *στέγει* means originally "cover over," whence *tego*; then, "contain as a vessel." From this latter meaning two metaphorical uses of the word are derived, either of which may be here adopted: (1) that love hides or is silent about the faults of others; (2) that love bears without resentment injuries inflicted by others. Both meanings are classical, but the former more frequent in the poets than in prose. The latter alone occurs elsewhere in the New Test. (*e.g.* ix. 12); the former alone in LXX. (Sir. viii. 17 only). In our passage the former rendering, adopted by Estius, Hammond, Bengel, makes no real difference between *στέγει* and *οὐ λογίζεται*, while the latter rendering, adopted by Chrys., Theod., Meyer, etc., seems to make *στέγει* synon. with *ὑπομένει*. But there will be this difference: *ὑπομένειν* means that the spirit is not crushed under the weight of heaviest affliction, whereas *στέγειν* expresses the self-restraint which checks the outbreak of uncontrollable passion, whether of anger or of sorrow; that is, *ἐγκράτεια* is an attribute of love. Cf. Barn., *Eph.* ii. 2, *μακροθυμία καὶ ἐγκράτεια*, where the latter word answers to the Apostle's *στέγει*. Cf. Gal. v. 23; 2 Pet. i. 6. In *ὑπομένειν* the pressure, so to speak, is from without, in *στέγειν* from within. The former approximates to the *ἀνέχου* of the Stoics, the latter to their *ἀπέχου*. Hence in 1 Pet. ii. 20 *ὑπομένειν* is used as synon. with *ὑποφέρειν*. Plato explains *ἀκόλαστον* by *οὐ στεγανόν*, and draws out the figure at length: *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπέκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην* (*Gorg.* p. 493).

*πιστεύει*. In *Lib. de Spir. et Lit.* 32 Augustine explains it of belief of God's words, in *Conf.* X. 3 he says it means a disposition to believe the best of all men. Both are included. Trust in its higher forms is the result of love, and all love springs from simplest faith.

ἐλπίζει, that is, love hopes even when it cannot find ground for faith.

ὑπομένει, that is, love endures even when it fails to hope.

**Vv. 8-12.** Christian love abides for ever; the Charismata are for a time only. The thought is suggested to the Apostle by the word "endure." Love is imperishable in its nature by reason of its moral strength to endure hardships. It survives and exhausts all wrongs. Moral endurance is indeed the leading thought in all the previous enumeration of the attributes of love. But from the thought that love abides because it endures the Apostle rises to the conception of its abiding because it is the perfection of character. The moral perfection of love, as of any other form of goodness, pictures itself to our minds under the conception of its eternal duration.

**V. 8.** D has ἐκπίπτει. But **8** A B C have πίπτει. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The latter reading conveys a more general notion, that of falling to the ground. The former reading gives the more vivid meaning. It expresses the notion of falling off, like a leaf (LXX. Job xiii. 25) or a flower (James i. 2; 1 Pet. i. 24). Cf. διαπесεῖται, LXX. Judith vi. 9; "tanquam flosculi decidunt" (Cic.). Love, which is the fulfilling of the law, is like the law itself, no tittle of which will ever fall (πесεῖν, Luke xvi. 17).

προφητεῖαι . . . γλῶσσαι . . . γνώσις. He selects for special mention the gift which he considers to be worthiest, prophecy, and the gifts on which the Corinthians prided themselves, tongues and knowledge. A reads γνώσεις, an attempt to assimilate the word to the previous plurals.

καταργηθῆσεται. Cf. note on i. 28. Here, however, the word means, not (as Grotius, Heinrici) "to destroy the efficacy and use," but "to bring the thing itself to an end." In ver. 2 the Apostle has said that prophecy, tongues, and knowledge have no moral worth without love. Here he adds that though they may be informed with love, yet even then they will cease, and the love which survives will find for itself other vehicles of expression. They will be brought to an end by an act of Divine power.

προφητείας, plur. One gift unfolds into many gifts of the same kind.

γλῶσσαι παύσονται. Many expositors suppose this to mean

that the curse of Babel will be removed and all diversities of language cease at the coming of Christ. But the meaning surely is that the Charisma of ecstatic utterance will cease.

**Vv. 9, 10.** The temporary character of the Charismata is proved by their essentially partial nature. He omits to mention the gift of tongues, not perhaps because it needs no proof (Meyer), but because it is not capable of proof from the partial nature of the gift. To say "that we utter with tongues in part" is really unmeaning. Ecstatic utterance is not an imperfect stage, capable of being developed into higher forms. It is not, like prophecy and knowledge, part of an intelligently connected whole, but is individual and momentary. It will, therefore, cease, not because it has been absorbed in something better, but as sounds which have no music in them die away in the air and do not live in ideas. Knowledge, on the other hand, and prophecy are a partial and imperfect condition of Christian wisdom and revelation. In what sense knowledge is partial we are told in the following verses.

ἐκ μέρους, "in part," "imperfectly." Cf. note on xii. 27. It means the immature and undeveloped, in contrast to τέλειον. Cf. ὁ νήπιος, ver. 11.

τὸ τέλειον, "the fully developed;" not merely perfect knowledge, but generally "the perfect state of things." Maier and Evans well observe that ἔλθῃ contains an allusion to the second coming of Christ. The parousia will bring with it all that is perfect. The course of history is a progress towards perfection in so far as it marches onwards to the Advent.

**V. 11.** The cessation of what is partial in the spiritual development of a Christian is compared to the transition from childhood to manhood. Cf. Gal. iv. 1, where the same metaphor describes the various stages in the history of the Church. It occurs in many other writers. Cf. Xen., *Cyr.* VIII. 7; Hor., *Ep.* II. i. 99; Seneca, *Ep.* XXVII., "pudebat eadem velle quæ volueras puer." It is here suggested by the word τέλειον.

ἐλάλουν κ. τ. λ. Theophyl., Bengel, Olshausen, Heinrici suppose ἐλάλουν to be an allusion to the gift of tongues, ἐφρόνουν to the gift of prophecy, and ἐλογιζόμεν to the gift of knowledge. This seems forced in reference to ἐφρόνουν,

which is more closely connected with knowledge than with prophecy. But it is difficult not to admit that ἐλάλουν is a covert allusion to γλῶσσαι. The three expressions ἐλάλουν, ἐφρόνουν, ἐλογιζόμεν seem to me to refer to successive stages in the mental growth of a child, and νήπιος will include them all. This will account for the thrice-repeated νήπιος. The first stage is that in which the child babbles and is slowly learning articulate speech. If there is an allusion to the gift of tongues, we have here an additional proof that this gift consisted in ecstatic utterance. The child enters on the second stage when it learns to think, that is, to form general notions. "I ymagened" is Tyndale's rendering. Hammond, Meyer and others explain φρονεῖν not of thought so much as emotion and endeavour. Rev. Vers. has "felt." But φρονεῖν is not the generic name for emotion, though it is used for what includes emotion as well as thought. It seems to be used here in the general meaning of "thinking." "I had the mind of a child." Cf. Arist., *E'h. Nic.* II. vi. 10, τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν. The third stage in the mental history of a child is reasoning: From its general notions it draws inferences. Perhaps ἐλάλουν alludes to tongues and prophecy, ἐφρόνουν and ἐλογιζόμεν in a general way to the intellectual gift of γνῶσις.

ὅτε δὲ γέγονα, "now that I am become a man." The perf. with ὅτε is rare, but it means "ever since," *ex quo*. Cf. Hom., *Il.* xxi. 156, ὅτ' ἐς Ἴλιον εἰλήλουθα.

καταργεῖν. Cf. ver. 10. It means, not only that the man lays aside the things of the child, but also that he has brought that period of life to a close. The words τὰ τοῦ νηπίου will include something more than τὰ ἐν παισὶ νομιζόμενα (Xen., *Cyr.* VIII. vii. 3). The rendering in Cranmer's Bible is practically correct: "childishness."

V. 12. Another illustration of the change from partial to perfect. The partial is like looking at a reflection in a mirror, the perfect is like seeing the thing itself. The former verse refers to the difference between the present and the future capacity of the Christian to understand spiritual things. Now the Apostle speaks, not of the organ of knowledge (Neander), but of the difference between the present and the future revelations themselves. The object of which we see the

reflection is God (cf. 2 Cor. iii. 18). The mirror is everything that reveals God in the present state of existence, such as the visible creation (Rom. i. 20) and the life of Jesus Christ on earth, so far as it is unconnected with His glorified life in heaven (cf. 2 Cor. v. 16), and even the Gospel itself. St. John speaks of the earthly life of Jesus as the manifestation of the Father through the Word; but St. Paul regards it rather as the self-emptying of the Son. Cf. John i. 14; Phil. ii. 6, 7. Both, however, speak of Christ's second coming as a *φανερωσις* of what is now hidden. Cf. 1 John ii. 28. Even the exaltation of Christ to the right hand of the majesty was a hiding of Christ in God. Cf. Col. iii. 3. What we now see is, therefore, a reflection of Christ in the mirror of His human life.

The Apostle probably borrowed the metaphor from Philo, who says of Reason that it forms an image of God. Cf. *De Decal.* p. 198, *ὡς γὰρ διὰ κατόπτρου φαντασιοῦται ὁ νοῦς θεὸν δρῶντα καὶ κοσμοποιοῦντα*. Philo borrowed it from Plato. Indeed the whole of the Apostle's conception may be compared with the description given by Plato of the gradual development of the faculty that gazes at truth. At first the eye sees the shadows best, next the reflections of objects in the water, then the objects themselves, next the light of moon and stars, and at length he will be able to look at the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but the sun as he is in his own proper place (cf. *Rep.* VII. p. 516). But, while the philosopher connects the beatific vision with the ideas, the Apostle finds it realized only at the second coming of Christ.

*ἄρτι*, "now," usually as distinguished from the past, but also, as here and 1 Pet. i. 6, from the future. It expresses a *momentary* present, the *αἰών* that is now being but a moment compared with the world to come.

*διά*, not *ἐν*, because the image appears to be behind the mirror.

*ἔσοπτρον*, never *εἴσοπτρον*, though the word is formed from *εἰς*, *ὄπ*-. It is synon. with *κάτοπτρον*, a mirror of polished metal, bronze or silver, for the manufacture of which Corinth was famous. Glass mirrors, covered at the back with lead or quicksilver, are first mentioned in the thirteenth century.

Cf. Beckmann, *History of Inventions*, Eng. trans., Vol. II. p. 76 Bohn. Pliny, *N.H.* XXXVI. 26, does not bear out the contrary statement. The explanation of Mosheim, Rückert, etc., that the reference is to a window made of horn or isinglass-stone, is as ancient as Tertullian (*De An.* 53, "velut per corneum specular obsoletior lux"). But he has the other interpretation in *Adv. Prax.* 16, "in imagine et speculo et ænigmate." The Rabbis (cf. Wetstein, *in loc.*) represent Moses as looking at the glory of God through a transparent window, but the prophets through a translucent one. But ἑσοπτρον always means "mirror," never "window" (οἱ λίθοι οἱ διαυγοί).

ἐν αἰνίγματι, not synon. with αἰνιγματικῶς, "darkly" (Auth. and Rev. Versions), but "in a riddle;" that is, the phrase denotes, not the dimness of our vision, but the obscurity of the revelation. The ἐν carries on the metaphor of the mirror. Perhaps he has Num. xii. 8 in his mind, ἐν εἶδει καὶ οὐ δι' αἰνιγμάτων. Cf. viii. 2. The thought must be connected with ii. 7. The Gospel is a revelation of God, but not a full revelation. It is indeed ἐν μυστηρίῳ, but it is also ἐν αἰνίγματι. To borrow Leibnitz' distinction (*Meditationes de Cognitione*, etc., Ed. Erdm., p. 79), our knowledge of God in the present life is symbolical; but when Christ appears, it will be intuitive. The reason is that it will be an immediate knowledge of Christ Himself at His coming. The distinction here drawn between present γνῶσις and future εἶδος is the same as the distinction in 2 Cor. v. 7 between πίστις and εἶδος. The knowledge of which he now speaks is Christian knowledge, and that knowledge begins in faith.

πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, "face to face;" a Hebraism, it is true, but admirably adapted to express the Apostle's notion that all perfect knowledge of God comes through personal fellowship with Christ at His appearing. Cf. 2 John 12.

ἐπιγνώσομαι, "I shall know fully." The ἐπι- expresses perfect knowledge, either because full knowledge is the result of continual additions to previous knowledge (cf. ἐπαυξάνειν, ἐπιβάλλειν, etc.), or because it is attained by applying the mind to a subject. Cf. Delitzsch on Heb. x. 26, and his *Bibl. Psych.* p. 347.

Aquinas says that knowing God as we are known means

knowing His essence; and Sir W. Hamilton (*Lectures*, Vol. II. p. 375) cites the Apostle's words in support of his doctrine that the infinite is incognisable. But the words have nothing to do with these problems. For surely the relativity of knowledge, if true now and here, must be a fact always and everywhere to a finite mind.

*καθὼς καί*, that is, he will know in the same way in which he was known, immediately, intuitively, and no longer tentatively and symbolically, as if he were solving a riddle. Cf. note on iv. 7.

*ἐπεγνώσθην*. Beza, Wolf, Bengel and others adopt the hophal construction: "prout factus fuero cognoscere," as if *ἐπεγνώσθην* were synon. with *ἐδιδάχθην*. But the construction is not Greek. Cf. note on viii. 3. Some expositors think the aor. is equivalent to a fut. and explain the reference to be to the knowledge which the saints will have one of another. But this again is not Greek. The Rev. Vers. changes the pres. of the Auth. Vers. ("am known") into a perf. ("have been known"). It is better to render it as a pure aor., "was known." The Apostle places himself in the future, when the perfect will have come, and regards our present condition as past. Even now he that loves God is known of Him. But when the perfect is come at the advent of Christ, then the Christian will know God intuitively and directly, even as he was before known of God.

**V. 13.** Of ever-abiding moral excellences love is the greatest. The superiority of love over prophecy and knowledge is represented in the eternal duration of love. This suggests to the Apostle the other two eternal graces of faith and hope. The Apostle reaches the climax of his panegyric by saying that love surpasses in excellence even those moral graces which abide for ever. *Νυνὶ δέ* has, therefore, a logical force, not indeed in an adversative sense (*atqui*, Grot.), but introducing an inference: "and so we see," *nunc autem*. The *δέ* is no objection, as if *οὖν* alone would be used (Neander) to express a logical connection. Cf. note on xii. 8.

This appears to have been the earliest interpretation of the verse. It was held by Irenæus (*Adv. Hær.* II. 28 (47), 3) and Tertullian (*De Patientiâ* 12). But Chrys., who was followed by Theod. and Œcum. (not, however, by Photius), propounded

what has become the well-nigh universally adopted view, that *vvv* is temporal, that faith and hope will cease, and that the superiority of love consists in its surviving every catastrophe. In addition to what has been said above, the following considerations are in favour of the other view. *First*, if faith and hope will cease, there is no reason why the Apostle should not have mentioned other graces also, which will cease, such as temperance and the other self-regarding virtues. The words "these three" definitely limit the reference of the word "abide" to faith, hope and love. *Second*, it is unnatural to understand *μένει* relatively in reference to faith and hope, but absolutely in reference to love. The Apostle would have explicitly stated concerning love that its superiority consists in its abiding for ever and that the other graces do not abide. *Third*, the other gifts of the Spirit are represented as continuing in the Church till the parousia; so that, if faith and hope then cease, they differ in no respect from prophecy and knowledge. *Fourth*, Chrysostom argues from the nature of faith and hope that they will cease, and cites Rom. viii. 24 and Heb. xi. 1 in proof. Others add 2 Cor. v. 7. We should rather say the present passage supplements these. We now walk by faith, not at all by sight. Our present faith is the result of hearing the message concerning Christ. Cf. Gal. iii. 2, ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως. When Christ appears, we shall walk by faith because by sight. All fellowship between one person and another must be through faith, if faith is rightly understood. Chrysostom was led to deny the need of faith in heaven by his definition of faith. If it is an act of the intellect (*διάνοια*), which believes certain promises on the ground of its belief concerning the promiser, then faith ceases when the promises are fulfilled, and this is Chrysostom's notion of the nature of faith. Cf. *Hom.* 36 in Gen. xv. : ἐκεῖνο τοῖνυν ἐστὶ πίστις ὅταν ἐκείνοις πιστεύωμεν τοῖς μὴ βλεπομένοις, πρὸς τὴν ἀξιοπιστίαν τοῦ ἐπαγγελιαμένου τὴν διάνοιαν τείναντες. Nor can it be denied that the word is used in this sense in the New Test. But the theological grace of faith is much more than the assent of the intellect. The Reformers strenuously insisted on the inclusion of "fiducia" in their definition of "fides." Cf. *Conf. Augs.* XX. 13; *Apol. Conf.* II. 53, where it is said that faith is not "notitia," but "velle

et accipere oblatam promissionem remissionis peccatorum et justificationis." Similarly the Calvinists, *Second Helv. Conf.* XVI. It includes trust, the clinging of the heart to God and to a living, personal Christ. The Reformers transferred the fulcrum of the spiritual life from the intellect to the will. So also with reference to hope. The notion of an eternal progress is not inconsistent with perfection. On the contrary, it is essential to the perfection of man. But as long as progress is possible, hope has not ceased.

τὰ τρία ταῦτα, "these three" and none else. These, from the nature of things, are the only graces that abide for ever. For they are what the older theologians (*e.g.*, Aquinas, etc.) have designated the theological virtues; that is, they have for their object God as revealed in Christ. Moral goodness is divided into several virtues or graces in so far only as it acts on a different object. When the object disappears, the virtue that edact upon it ceases. Now faith, hope and love are the graces that act immediately upon God. Compassion reaches Him mediately only, through the misery of God-loved creatures. Our justice acts upon Him indirectly, as we are placed in the society of our fellows. But the object of faith is the eternally present revelation which God gives us of Himself in Christ, and the object of hope is the ever future revelation and the unexhausted fulness of God's promises, and the object of love is the infinite beauty of His goodness. Because these things are eternal, faith, hope and love abide for ever.

μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη. Winer (*Gr.* § XXXV. 3) and Buttmann (*N. S.* p. 73) deny the occurrence of the comparative in the sense of the superlative. They are, no doubt, right; though the superlative expresses the notion intended as correctly as it can be expressed in English. Strictly speaking ἡ ἀγάπη at the end of the verse is not the ἀγάπη of the preceding clause. The latter is the sentiment generally. The former is that special form of the sentiment which Christianity produces and leads to perfection. *This* love is greater than faith, greater than hope, greater even than love itself in every other form or manifestation.

In what respect love is greater than all graces the Apostle does not tell us. Hints may be discovered in the chapter. For instance, love is not merely human or angelic, but is the

highest attribute of God Himself; and love it is that exercises, in their higher forms, the graces of faith and hope. A lower form of faith in Christ is possible without love. This is the justifying faith, which consists, not in a delight in God's perfections, but in an "apprehensio meritorum Christi." A lower form of hope also precedes love,—the hope of safety and of happiness. But peaceful trust in the Heavenly Father and fellowship with Him in holiness spring from love. Hope also maketh not ashamed when the love of God is shed abroad in a corresponding love in our hearts. Cf. Rom. v. 5. Again, love is superior to faith and hope because it is the perfection of all moral goodness (vv. 4-7). There is indeed a nexus between faith in Christ and holiness. But faith is not a germ of holiness. Love, on the other hand, is holiness both in germ and in its perfect development. But St. Paul only opens the door. To enter was reserved for St. John.

### C. *Superiority of Prophecy over Tongues.*

(xiv. 1-40).

The lyric strains of the beautiful hymn to love have scarcely died away when the Apostle descends again to argument and practical exhortation in reference to the spiritual gifts. A vivid realization of the supreme excellence of love has prepared the reader to accept the doctrine of the present chapter that the showy gift of tongues, on which the Corinthians plumed themselves, is inferior to the useful gift of prophecy.

**V. 1.** διώκετε, "pursue," as in 1 Thess. v. 15; 1 Pet. iii. 11, where διώκειν is stronger than ζητεῖν. Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* p. 507, οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἀ μὴ προσήκει. In our passage ζηλοῦν is not weaker than διώκειν. The Apostle does not mean that for the Charismata we can only pray. The idea, however, is somewhat different in the two words. Love is to be *chased* with all eagerness for its own sake; but the Charismata are objects of *emulation*. To strive to excel others in Christian love will not increase our love, but to seek emulously to excel others in gifts useful to the Church is praiseworthy, if the emulation has no tinge of envy.

There is no particle connecting the verse with what precedes, because the Apostle is making a new start and, at the

outset, briefly states the sum and purpose of his digression. As, therefore, *διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην* stands at the head of a new section, not at the end of a former one, the *δέ* after *ζηλοῦτε* is not simply resumptive of xii. 31 (Stanley), but adversative. Chrys. and De Wette explain the antithesis excellently: "The Corinthians must not infer from the praise so richly heaped on love that the Charismata are of no value; on the contrary, while they ought to pursue the former, let them strive also for excellence in the latter." The praise of love has risen beyond its excellence as the best way to attain and use the Charismata. The Apostle now returns to his former subject, the necessity in the Church for such Charismata when sanctified by love.

*τὰ πνευματικά.* Cf. note on xii. 1.

*μᾶλλον*, not a comparative in the sense of a superlative. It means, "more than the other gifts." Before *ἵνα* mentally supply *ζηλοῦτε*.

**Vv. 2-6.** The gift of tongues is inferior to the gift of prophecy because it does not edify the Church.

**V. 2.** The proof is that he who utters with tongues speaks only to God; for no man understands him.

*ἀκούει*, not "hears him" (Wieseler, who infers that utterance with tongues was in a whisper; cf. note on xii. 10), but "understands what he hears." It means *τὴν δι' ὧτων ἐννοιαν*. So in class. Greek and freq. in LXX. (Gen. xi. 7; Is. xxxvi. 11) and New Test. (Mark iv. 33).

*οὐδεὶς*, except, that is, when one that has the gift of interpretation is present.

*πνεύματι*. From ver. 15, where *πνεῦμα* is contrasted with *νοῦς*, we infer that it here signifies, not the Holy Spirit, but the man's spirit, in so far as it is under the influence of the Spirit of God. *Πνεύματι* may be dat. of instrument or of place.

*μυστήρια* is generally understood in the modern sense of "mystery," a truth to us incomprehensible. But there is no reason why it should not here also have its usual meaning of "revealed truth." Hence *δέ* has its limitative sense (as in ii. 6, *σοφίαν δέ*), not introducing a climax (as in Acts xii. 9; Heb. xii. 6); that is, the clause does not mean, "nay, rather, on the contrary, it is in his own spirit that he utters, though

then indeed he utters profound and incomprehensible truths;" it means, "though I admit that in his own spirit he gives utterance to revealed truths."

**V. 3.** ὁ δὲ προφητεύων. He does not say ὁ προφήτης (as in ver. 29), that the one participle may balance the other.

ἀνθρώποις, emphatic. The teacher speaks to men as such, in their need of edification and encouragement.

οἰκοδομήν, παράκλησιν, and παραμυθίαν are proleptic accusatives: "ad ædificationem," Vulg. The opposite of οἰκοδομή is καθαίρεσις (2 Cor. x. 3). To "build up" is to produce a certain objective character. "Exhortation" and "consolation" evoke certain feelings which spring out of that moral condition. Originally παράκλησις and παραμυθία have the same meaning, "incentive," "encouragement," and sometimes also the same secondary meaning, "consolation," "comfort." Cf. John xi. 19; 2 Cor. viii. 17. The Rev. Vers. has "comfort and consolation." But the other meaning is much more natural here and in Phil. ii. 1; 2 Thess. ii. 16. The notion of affliction does not belong to the train of thought in any of these places. Παράκλησις means the incentive of exhortation and argument; παραμυθία, the encouragement of sympathy and example. Cf. 1 Thess. v. 14, "encourage (παραμυθεῖσθε) the feeble-minded," who are influenced more by kindness than by argument. So "the encouragement supplied by love" in Phil. ii. 1 is παραμύθιον. On the other hand, ἡ παράκλησις τῶν γραφῶν (Rom. xv. 4), ὁ λόγος τῆς παρακλησεως (Heb. xiii. 22); and παράκλησις, not παραμύθια, became the designation of public teaching in the Church assemblies. Cf. 1 Tim. iv. 13.

**V. 4.** ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ. He who utters with tongues builds up his own spiritual character by the exercise of his gift, though he does not himself understand what he utters. He edifies himself ecstatically, but does not present incentives and encouragements to his own mind or to the minds of his hearers. The prophet edifies the Church by incentives addressed to the hearer's reason.

ἐκκλησίαν is anarthrous, in order to emphasize the notion of "Church" by omission of any particular definition. Cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 447, *Obs.* 3. It means the universal Church as it is represented by a particular congregation of Christians.

Cf. ver. 19, ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, and Heb. i. 1, ἐν υἱῷ ("in one who is Son").

V. 5. "I do not depreciate the gift of tongues from jealousy; yea, I wish you a better gift, that of prophecy."

μείζων δέ. So **8** A B. C deficit. D reads γάρ. The more difficult reading is δέ. It must mean, "nay moreover;" that is, "I prefer your having the gift of prophecy, nay, prophecy is itself a greater gift than tongues." Cf. note on xii. 31.

ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ. Canon Evans's remark that ἐκτὸς is general, εἰ μὴ specific, is excellent. But it does not prove that the phrase is not a mixture of two exceptive formulæ, ἐκτὸς εἰ and εἰ μὴ. Similarly we have χωρὶς εἰ μὴ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ.

διερμηνεύη. D has διερμηνεύων. On εἰ with conjunctive cf. note on ix. 11.

V. 6. Application of what has been said to the Apostle's own case.

νῦν δέ, not temporary (Hofm.), but logical, introducing an instance to which the general truth just stated is applicable. Cf. John viii. 40.

ἀδελφοί, a personal address occasioned by the Apostle's intention to refer to himself. Man is grappling with man. The reference is not a mere rhetorical individualising of the statement in vv. 11, 14 (De Wette, etc.), but an allusion to the Apostle's intended visit to Corinth. The words αὐτὸς ἐγώ are not required, because the emphasis is on ἔλθω. Cf. note on iv. 19.

ἐὰν μὴ κ. τ. λ., that is, "unless the utterance take the form of a revelation," etc. The second protasis is part of the apodosis of the first protasis. Evans objects that, in that case, καί would be inserted before λαλήσω. But the Apostle does not, I think, mean that utterance with tongues would not, in any case, benefit the brethren and that a useful Charism must, therefore, be added to a brilliant one. He is speaking of an addition that would make the brilliant Charism itself useful. He supposes himself at Corinth exercising the gift of tongues, with which he was more richly endowed than most men, and shows how profitless to the Church it would be, unless he were also an interpreter of his own utterance, so as to transform it into a revelation or into knowledge. A man's spirit may, even in a state of ecstasy, receive a revelation,

which, when interpreted, becomes a prophecy; or the ecstasy may quicken the action of thought and lead to knowledge, which may be taught as a doctrine.

ἐν, "in the form of." Cf. note on ii. 7.

ἀποκαλύψει . . . διδαχῇ. Calvin, Cor. a Lap., Estius, Bengel, Meyer, De Wette, etc., rightly classify these four in two pairs. Revelation is the source of prophecy (cf. note on xii. 10); knowledge is the source of doctrine (cf. xii. 8). Cf. vv. 29-31; Eph. iv. 11.

Vv. 7-9. Illustrations from musical instruments to prove the uselessness of the gift of tongues without interpretation.

ὅμως never means "moreover" (Grot., Wolf, etc.), nor is it synon. with ὁμῶς (Wetstein, etc.), but always means "and yet," *attamen*. Chrys., Theophyl., Ecum., Hofmann think it refers to a *καίπερ* understood with *ἄψυχα*: "though they are inanimate things, yet even they," etc. So Rev. Vers.: "even things without life." But we should then expect ὅμως ἄψυχα [*i.e.* ὄντα] τὰ φωνὴν διδόντα. The transposition of ὅμως, when it properly belongs to the verb, occurs only with predicative participles or words and phrases that are tantamount to predicative participles. So in Gal. iii. 15. ὅμως ἀνθρώπου κεκυρωμένην διαθήκην, "though it be a man's covenant, yet," etc. Cf. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s.v. ὅμως, 2; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* s.v.; Stallbaum's note to Plat., *Phileb.* p. 91, ὅμως . . . κάλλιον ὄν. Winer (*Gr.* § XLV. 2 b), Buttman (*N.S.* p. 264), Grimm (*Lex.* s.v.) and Meyer consider ὅμως to be correlative to the *καίπερ* to be supplied with διδόντα, "things without life, though they give a sound, yet," etc. But in this case we should expect τὰ ἄψυχα ὅμως φωνὴν διδόντα. Cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 697 d. Besides, this makes the contrast between the facts that the instruments give a sound and yet give no distinction of notes needlessly emphatic. The words φωνὴν διδόντα serve merely to specify the kind of inanimate thing meant. There is emphasis on τὰ ἄψυχα. Otherwise the Apostle might have begun with εἴτε αὐλός and omitted from τὰ διδόντα. Neither explanation is quite satisfactory. May we not suppose that ὅμως has reference to the answer which the Apostle imagines the reader to make to his previous question? "Do you reply that the gift of tongues is choiceworthy and profitable without revelation or knowledge? And yet, though this is your opinion,

you must admit that if things without life, supposing them to emit sound, give no distinction of note, no one will know what is played." Cf. John xii. 42, ὅμως μέντοι, "though Isaiah said so, yet," etc. The force of the argument will still be what Chrys. says: "If things without life, supposing them to emit a sound, are useless, unless they are guided by reason to give a distinction of sounds, much more may we expect this to be true of men, whose prerogative is reason."

φωνή, though it properly means "a voice," including the cries of animals (cf. Arist., *Pol.* I. 2), is sometimes used of the sounds emitted by things without life (cf. Matt. xxiv. 31; John iii. 8). So also φθόγγος is used in both meanings. When distinguished or, as here, applied to musical instruments, φωνή is "the one and yet infinite" sound, φθόγγος is the same sound when broken up into distinct parts. Cf. Plat., *Phileb.* p. 17, φωνή . . . μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἴουσα καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴ πλήθει, and *Tim.* 80, ὅσοι φθόγγοι ταχεῖς καὶ βραδεῖς, ὅξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται. So M. Anton. XI. 2, εἰδὼς τὴν μὲν ἐμμελὴ φωνὴν καταμερίσας εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν φθόγγων. The opposite of φωνή is σιγή, the opposite of φθόγγος is διάστημα.

αὐλός, "pipe"; κιθάρα, "harp." The former is the generic name of the various kinds of flutes (*tibiae*), Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, etc.; the latter is the generic name of all stringed instruments (*fides*), though it is distinguished, in a narrower sense, as the small guitar from the φόρμιγξ or seven-stringed instrument of Terpander, and the λύρα or harp with large hollow shell. Cf. Böeck, *De Metris Pindari* III. xi. Wetstein cites Lucian, *De Salt.* 16, ἐν αὐλῷ καὶ κιθάρᾳ.

διαστολήν, apparently used, not for a musical "pause" (Lidd. and Scott), but as synon. with διάστημα, a musical "interval," that is, the difference in pitch between two sounds. Cf. Œcum., παραλλαγὴν καὶ ἐναλλαγὴν μέλους. Harmony consists in distinction of sounds and distinction of pitch. Cf. Plat., *Phileb.* p. 17, ἐπειδὴν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὁξύτης τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας κ.τ.λ., and Euclid, *Int. Harm.* p. 1 (cited in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*,

s.v. Music), ἡρμουςμένον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ φθόγγων καὶ διαστημάτων.

τοῖς φθόγγοις, "to the distinctive sounds;" a pure dative after δῶ, not instrumental: "If they do not apply intervals to the sounds;" that is, there must be distinction of pitch as well as of sound.

τὸ αὐλούμενον, not the instrument (Rückert), but the tune, as is clear from τὸ λαλούμενον. Cf. Arist., *De Musicá* p. 1144 D (cited by Wetstein), τὸ ἀδόμενον ἢ αὐλούμενον ἢ κιθαριζόμενον.

V. 8. The same thing is true of the trumpet even (καὶ γάρ), which is not in the proper sense an instrument of music; for it has no keys or holes, like the flute, much less the sensitiveness that makes a stringed instrument seem to be almost a living thing. The trumpet was never an accompaniment in the *συναυλία*, as the flute and harp were. Yet this simple instrument is used to summon troops and rouse their courage. Its blasts become significant in consequence of a mutual understanding between the commander and his men. If the sound is uncertain, that is, if the meaning of the call is not previously agreed upon and understood, the trumpet is useless.

πόλεμον, "battle," as in Heb. xi. 34; Rev. ix. 7, 9. It is another example of a Homeric usage either resuscitated in later Greek or surviving as a provincialism.

V. 9. γλῶσσα is understood of the tongue by Mosheim, Meyer, Osiander, Alford, Heinrici, Evans; the distinction supposed to be intended being between the tones of musical instruments and the living voice. Theophyl., Estius, De Wette understand it of the gift of uttering with tongues. The emphatic καὶ ὑμεῖς, repeated in ver. 12, favours this view and it is in accordance with the meaning we attached to ver. 6. Cf. ver. 19, ἐν γλώσσῃ. The διὰ γλώσσης of this verse is in contrast to the διὰ νοός of ver. 19.

εὐσημον· εὐδηλον, φανερόν, Hesych. It includes more than σημαντικός. Every λόγος is "significant;" it ought to be also "easy (εὐ·) to understand."

ἔσεσθε . . . λαλοῦντες, the participle and substantive verb expressing the state, not the act only: "You will be in the condition of men speaking to the winds."

**Vv. 10, 11.** An illustration to the same effect from natural sounds.

εἰ τύχοι is sometimes, like μάλιστα, used with numerals or numeral pronouns to make them indefinite. Rückert renders it "for example," as in xv. 37. But as the previous verse itself contains an illustration, it is more natural to understand εἰ τύχοι in the other sense: "There are so many—whatever the number may be."

γένη φωνῶν, "kinds of voices." Chrys., Estius, De Wette, Meyer, Heinrici restrict the meaning of φωνή here to human languages. So in 4 Macc. xii. 7, ἐν τῇ Ἑβραϊδὶ φωνῇ. But the expression "kinds of languages" is not natural, if the Apostle means the number of languages spoken amongst men (cf. xii. 10). Rather, he distinguishes the variety of utterance in nature, in the same way as he speaks in xv. 39 of the various kinds of flesh.

καὶ οὐδὲν ἄφωνον. **N A B C** omit αὐτῶν after οὐδέν. Grotius, Bleek (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1829, p. 66), Evans explain the words to mean that no creature is without voice of some kind. In favour of this is the usage of ἄφωνος, which signifies, not "without meaning" (as if ἄφωνος were synon. with ἄδηλος φωνῇ), but "without speech." The objection is that this would be simply a repetition of what the Apostle has just said or, at best, a needless addition. Probably a play on the word is intended, as in βίος ἀβίωτος. "No kind of voice is voiceless," that is, no utterance of any creature is without meaning.

**V. 11.** δύναμιν, "force" of a word, "signification." Here only so used in the New Test. Cf. Plat., *Critias* p. 113, διαπυνθανομένων τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων δύναμιν. The reference now limits itself to human languages, through the change of subject (εἰδῶ) to the Apostle himself.

βάρβαρος, "a foreigner." It is explained by Herodotus (II. 158), οἱ μὴ ὁμόγλωσσοι. Cf. Ovid, *Trist.* v. 10: "Barbarus hic ego sum quia non intelligor ulli." Contempt is, however, covertly implied in the word, which is formed in imitation of the harsh sounds of a foreign language. The same contempt causes Sophocles (*Trach.* 1060) to give to a foreign land the appellation ἄγλωσσος, and Æschylus (*Agam.* 1050) and Aristophanes (*Ran.* 681) to compare the ἄγνωτα φωνὴν βάρβαρον to the chirping of the migratory swallows.

ἐν ἐμοί, "in my opinion." So in class. Greek in the poets.

V. 12. "Since the gift of ecstatic utterance is inferior to that of prophecy because it is less useful, and since ye are eager to possess endowments of the Spirit, seek to excel in them to the edification of the Church." Mosheim and Heydenreich follow certain expositors referred to by Theophyl. in placing a stop after ὑμεῖς: "So also ye are barbarians to one another in your use of the gift of tongues." This would leave the following words without connection. Meyer supposes a trajection of οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς, as if the words were part of the ἐπεὶ clause: "Since you also are in this manner, viz., by being barbarians to one another, desirous of spiritual gifts." This is harsh, and leaves the words unconnected with what precedes. The clause must be connected with ζητεῖτε, and οὕτω will have its usual inferential signification: "therefore, seek ye also," etc.

ἐπεὶ κ. τ. λ. A hint that they were seeking gifts for ostentation. Emphasis on ζηλωταί. Emulation, not love, was in their eyes the more excellent way to attain spiritual endowments.

πνευμάτων, not quite synon. with πνευματικῶν. The word suggests that the Corinthians sought supernatural endowments, no matter what their nature might be. Cf. note on xii. 10.

πρὸς . . . περισσεύητε. Luther, Alford, Meyer thus: "Seek spiritual gifts for the edification of the Church, that ye may abound." Alford adds that he can find no instance of ζητῶ ἵνα, and thinks iv. 2 not to the point. But ἵνα can follow all verbs that signify wish, prayer, etc. The objection to the above rendering is that the Apostle's evident purpose here is, not to exhort the Corinthians to aim at excellence, but to urge them to seek gifts profitable to the Church. We must, therefore, understand the words thus: "Seek to excel unto the edifying of the Church."

περισσεύειν has here, as in viii. 8, a comparative meaning. The Corinthians were emulous of one another. This is implied in ζηλωταί. Erasmus rightly renders, "excellatis," which is preferable to the Vulg. "abundetis."

Vv. 13-7. "Therefore he who has the gift of tongues should endeavour to use it in conjunction with the gift of

interpretation. Yet, there are forms of the tongues themselves, such as prayer and psalmody, that are capable of being used intelligently and, in consequence, for edification."

**V. 13.** *First, prayer.* The words *προσευχέσθω ἵνα διερμηνεύῃ* have been explained in three different ways. (1) Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., etc., thus: "let him pray for the gift of interpretation;" *ἵνα* denoting the purport of the prayer. Cf. note on ver. 12. The objection is that in ver. 14 the Apostle speaks, not of the advantage of interpreting, but of the superiority of praying with the reason over praying with the spirit only. (2) Valla and Luther thus: "let him that speaks in a tongue refrain from praying in a tongue, unless he can interpret his utterance." But, though it may be admitted that *ἵνα* can mean *ita ut*, "in such a manner as to," it is more natural to understand it (3) in the usual telic signification: "let him that has the gift of tongues pray with tongues, but let him do so with the purpose of interpreting his utterance afterwards;" that is, he should not be content with ecstatic prayer, but should strive after the gift of interpreting his prayer.

**V. 14.** Reason for ver. 13. The gift of tongues, though it involves the activity of the *πνεῦμα*, leaves the action of the *νοῦς* in abeyance and, consequently, needs to be supplemented by interpretation.

Our understanding of this verse depends on the meanings we attach to *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς*. As to *πνεῦμα* we may at once dismiss the rendering of Erasmus, "breath," as in 2 Thess. ii. 8; for it must have some relation to the gift of tongues. Neither can it mean the Charisma itself of the Spirit (Chrys., Theod., Calvin, Grotius), for then *μου* would not have been added. It must mean the man's own spirit; that is, the man in so far as he is under the influence of the Spirit of God. Cf. notes on ii. 16; xiv. 2. The Apostle's use of the word in connection with the gift of tongues is proof sufficient that Delitzsch, Canon Evans and Beet are not justified in describing the spirit as "the quintessence of man's spirit-nature . . . towering above the *νοῦς* and the *λόγος*;" as if the Holy Spirit did not act directly on every part of our nature, not excepting the body. Such a view renders the gift of tongues the most exalted of spiritual conditions. As to *νοῦς*

many expositors render it by "signification," that is, of what is uttered in the prayer. So Theod., τὴν σαφήνειαν τῶν λεγομένων, and he is followed by Cor. a Lap., Wolf, etc. The meaning would then be that the purport of the prayer uttered in a tongue is unintelligible and, consequently, unprofitable (ἄκαρπος) to the hearers. But this rendering is impossible in ver. 15. The natural antithesis to the man's faculties under the influence of the Divine afflatus is the man's unassisted powers. Νοῦς will, therefore, mean here the human reason. It appears from this that the soul may be in prayerful communion with God without conscious thought couched in language; and no less truly, on the other hand, ecstatic utterance can be of no avail for the edification of others apart from true thoughts. Cf. Acts x. 10; Rev. i. 10. The seer's trance was akin to the mental condition of those that uttered in tongues. Heinrici aptly compares with the Apostle's words Philo's allegorical explanation of the supernatural ecstasy that seized on Abraham "about the time of the going down of the sun," which is made to signify the setting and suppression of the natural faculties of the soul.

ἄκαρπος. The course of the argument proves that the word is not to be understood in a passive sense ("my reason is not benefited"), as Chrys. and Calvin explain it. Is the word ever used passively? Here, at all events, it is active: "producing no spiritual grace," μηδενὸς ὠφελουμένου (Basil). Besides, Chrysostom's view is inconsistent with ver. 4. The word implies the ecstatic character of the utterance with tongues.

V. 15. τί οὖν ἐστίν; "what then?" Cf. Acts xxi. 22; Rom. iii. 9. It introduces an expression of personal decision. It is equivalent to the phrase λέγω δὲ τοῦτο (cf. i. 12).

προσεύξομαι τῷ πνεύματι. So B. & A D read προσεύξομαι. But the fut. indic. yields a meaning so much more satisfactory that προσεύξομαι must be accepted. So Lachm., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The best MSS. often confound ο and ω. If it were hortatory, we should have expected the plur. The former προσεύξομαι is concessive, and of similar import to μὴ κωλύετε (ver. 39); the second expresses the Apostle's preference and determination. Bleek (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, p. 69), Oslander, etc., consider prayer with the spirit and prayer with

the reason to be separate acts; and if ἄκαρπος (ver. 14) implies that he who prayed with tongues was in a state of ecstasy, this view is correct.

ψαλῶ. *Second*, from prayer the Apostle passes to the mention of *praise*, which is the second form (cf. note on ver. 13) of the exercise of the gift of tongues capable of being used intelligently and for edification. Ψάλλω, from ψάω, meant originally "to twang the strings with the tips of the fingers;" then "to sing to the accompaniment of the harp," which is the more frequent signification in LXX. Basil accordingly defines a psalm as λόγος μουσικός, ὅταν εὐρύθμως κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς λόγους πρὸς τὸ ὄργανον κρούεται (*Hom. in Ps. xxix.*), and Gregory Nyssen, ψαλμὸς μὲν ἐστὶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὀργάνου τοῦ μουσικοῦ μελωδία. Expositors take for granted that ψάλλω is used in our passage generically, as synon. with ᾄδω. Certainly in Col. iii. 16 ᾄδοντες alone occurs, while in the parallel passage, Eph. v. 19, we have ᾄδοντες καὶ ψάλλοντες, apparently an amplification only of the expression. But why may we not suppose that the Corinthian Christians, when giving forth ecstatic utterances in song, accompanied the vocal singing with strains of music on the harp? The gift of tongues may on occasion have approached the phrenzy of the Bacchanal:

λωτὸς ὅταν εὐκέλαδος ἱερὸς ἱερὰ  
παήματα βρέμῃ σύνοχα φοιτάσιν.

Eur., *Bacch.* 160.

It is especially probable that they had introduced the harp, if not the flute, into the Christian feast of the Agapé. Clement of Alexandria (*Pædag.* II. p. 193 Potter) permits the use of the harp and lyre. We can have no difficulty in thinking that the Apostle uses the word ψαλῶ metaphorically in reference to himself. He may have the Psalmist's words, which he cites also in Rom. xv. 9, in his mind, ἐξομολογήσομαί σοι ἐν ἔθνεσι καὶ τῷ ὀνόματί σου ψαλῶ. David's harping was accompanied by an intelligent confession of the Lord's goodness, and the Apostle declares that he also will play his harp, that is praise the Lord, with his reason. The powers of his soul will be the strings on which he will play. Cf. Clem. Alex. *ut sup.*, ἡ γλῶττα τὸ ψαλτήριον Κυρίου. It

is sometimes said (cf. Trench, *Syn.* § lxxviii.) that the *ψαλμοί* mentioned in the New Test. (e.g. Eph. v. 19; Col. iii. 16) were the inspired psalms of the Hebrew canon, thus distinguished from the *ὕμνοι*. But in Matt. xxvi. 30 and Mark xiv. 26 *ὑμνοῦν* is used of chanting the Old Test. psalms, and in post-apostolic times the *ψαλμοὶ ἰδιωτικοί* are distinguished from the *ἔπη δαυιδικά*.

**V. 16.** Proof from a particular instance of the statement that he who utters in a tongue without interpretation does not edify the Church.

*ἐπεὶ*, "for otherwise." Cf. note on v. 10.

*εὐλογῇς*, "if thou be blessing" God; that is, this is the purpose of the man who sings his psalm to the harp. It does not mean blessing God for the gift of ecstasy.

*ὁ ἀπληρῶν τὸν τόπον τοῦ ἰδιώτου*. In class. Greek *ιδιώτης* has two meanings: (1) "a private person," "one who is not in office," opp. to *ἄρχων* (as in Thuc. I. 115) or *πολιτευόμενος* (Dem., *Phil.* IV. p. 150), etc., and, hence, "one who has no professional knowledge," "a layman;" (2) "an unpractised, ignorant man," opp. to *δεινός* (Dem., *Phil.* I. p. 50) or *πεπαιδευμένος* (Xen., *Mem.* III. xii.). In the New Test. the second is the only meaning. Cf. Acts iv. 13; 2 Cor. xi. 6. In the present chapter it is the name which the Corinthians would give in disparagement of those that had not the gift of tongues. Theod. excellently: *οἱ ἀμύητοι*. Several explanations of the other words have been offered: (1) Cor. a Lap.: "He that occupies the seat in the public assemblies reserved for those who have no gifts." But why should the Apostle refer to such local separation, even if it had any existence at this time? (2) Aquinas and Estius consider the person that occupied the place of the unlearned to have been the minister who uttered the responses on behalf of the people. This is to transfer to the Apostolic age what belongs to much later times. (3) The only satisfactory explanation is that (in the main) of Cyril (*Cat.*) among the Fathers, Neander, De Wette, Rückert, Rothe (*Anfänge*, p. 156), etc., that we have here an allusion to the synagogue worship, in which the congregation is distinguished from the officiating minister. But in the synagogue the distinction was fixed, in the Christian Churches gifts were bestowed on all in various degrees and at various

times. The minister might become a mere hearer, and the hearer in turn an instructor. "He that fills the place of the unlearned" (as the Corinthians would designate him) is he that occupies at the time the position of a hearer. Anon he may take the place of teacher. Cf. *τάξιν ἀναπληροῦν* (Joseph., *B. J. V.* ii. 5); Acts i. 25, *λαβεῖν τὸν τόπον τῆς διακονίας ταύτης* and espec. Clem., *Ad Cor.* 63, *τὸν ὑπακοῆς τόπον ἀναπληρώσαντας* ("occupying the position of an obedient man"). The words imply the universal ministry *ἐν δυνάμει* of all Christians, and the special function of every one *ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ*. When Clement of Rome wrote his letter to the Corinthians the distinction between clergy and laity was established. Cf. Clem., *Ad Cor.* 40. But to infer from this verse that the distinction had been fixed when the Apostle wrote (so Chrys., Theod., Œcum., Theophyl., Olshausen, etc.) is the reverse of what the words justify us in inferring. It is also an anachronism to identify the *ιδιῶται* with the catechumens, though the condition of the apostolic Churches was preparing the way for subsequent developments.

*πῶς ἐρεῖ*, "how will he say?" It is a true fut. and not synon. with the deliberative subjunctive. Cf. ver. 7. The doubt is, not whether he is to say or not to say Amen, but how it will be brought about. Cf. however Wiener, *Gr.* § XL. 6.

*τὸ ἀμήν*, "the customary Amen." Another reference to what had passed into the Church from the synagogue. The "Amen" was the response (*ἐπιφώνημα*) of the congregation to the prayers of the minister, and especially to his declaration of God's promises and threatenings. Cf. Deut. xxvii. 15, where LXX. renders it by *γένοιτο*; 1 Chron. xvi. 36; Neh. viii. 6. That the usage had passed into the public worship of the Christian Churches is amply vouched for by the early Fathers. Cf. Justin M., *Apol.* I. 65, p. 97, *οὗ συντελέσαντος τὰς εὐχὰς καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν πᾶς ὁ παρὼν λαὸς ἐπευφημεῖ λέγων Ἀμήν*, and Tert., *De Spect.* 25, "ex ore quo Amen in Sanctum protuleris." Cf. Cyril of Jerus., *Cat.* xxviii. 18; Ambrose, *De Myst.* 9; Jerome, *Comm. in Gal.*, Proem.; August., *Contra Faust.* XII. 10.

*ἐπὶ*, that is, as a seal upon it; *ἐπισφραγίζων*, Cyr. (*ut sup.*). The pron. *τῇ σῇ* does not imply that the thanksgiving is "proprium et privatum" (Cor. a Lap.); but it does imply that

the minister's prayer was extemporary. There is no reason why the reference should be restricted to the Lord's Supper (Beza, etc.).

τί λέγεις, "what is the meaning of thy utterance" Cf. note on i. 12. Bleek rightly infers (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1829, p. 70) that the public prayers did not at this time consist of fixed forms.

V. 17. καλῶς, not ironical (Wetstein), as in Mark vii. 9. Ecstatic utterance might be profitable to the man himself, and the Apostle desired all to receive the gift.

μὲν ἀλλά, not δέ, in order to mark the antithesis strongly. Ἀλλά means "but what of that?"

ὁ ἕτερος, not ἄλλος, and expressing some degree of contrast between teacher and hearer. Cf. Gal. i. 6.

Vv. 18, 19. The Apostle's own preference.

V. 18. **Σ** A B D omit μου. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort; but Reiche retains it. **Σ** A D read γλώσση, B γλώσσαις. The sing. is adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg.; Westc. and Hort doubtful. **Σ** B D read λαλῶ. So Tisch. (8th ed.), Treg., Westc. and Hort. A omits it. The evidence is sufficient in favour of εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ πάντων ὑμῶν μᾶλλον γλώσση λαλῶ. Vulg. curiously omits to translate μᾶλλον: "quod omnium vestrum linguâ loquor," as if the Apostle were thanking God that he could speak the languages of all. De Wette, following A in omitting λαλῶ, thinks εὐχαριστῶ refers to the exercise of the gift of tongues: "I thank God in a tongue more than you all." Similarly Cajetan and Reiche, λαλῶν. Others, though reading λαλῶ, render: "I thank God that I speak in a tongue more than all of you." The omission of ὅτι is not a Hebraism, but occurs occasionally in class. Greek, espec. after οἶμαι. But εὐχαριστῶ must have the same meaning in this and in the previous verse; that is, it refers in both verses to ecstatic utterance of thanks. Canon Evans well observes that the style becomes abrupt and climacteric. The meaning is: "I give thanks to God—more than all of you I speak in a tongue." The Apostle exercised the gift of tongues in private even.

V. 19. For διὰ τοῦ νοός μου **Σ** A B D read τῷ νοῷ, which is adopted by most critics.

θέλω . . . ἤ. This comparative use of θέλω (*malō*) occurs

in Hom. (*e.g.* *Od.* iii. 324), and βούλομαι is freq. so used in class. Greek. Cf. 2 Macc. xiv. 42.

κατηχήσω. The late Greek κατηχέω means “to teach by word of mouth” (lit. “to sound abroad”), and in the early Church was especially used of instruction in the elements (τὰ στοιχεῖα) of doctrine. After the Apostolic age such as were under instruction with a view to baptism came to be called catechumens.

πέντε, that is, “a few.” Cf. Isā. xxx. 17.

Estius vainly strives to break the force of the argument drawn from this verse for using the vernacular in public prayers. But Cajetan acknowledges that the Apostle’s words directly discourage the use of a language not understood by the people, and Erasmus waxes eloquent in censuring the introduction of all kinds of musical instruments into the service of the Church.

V. 20. The argument closes with an abrupt exhortation, the sharpness of which is qualified by the word ἀδελφοί. Calvin joins the ver. to what follows, but incorrectly. The Corinthians set the highest value on the gift of tongues from childish ostentation, while they despised prophecy, a gift that demanded for its fitting exercise manly thought and ratiocination.

γίνεσθε, not so harsh as ἔσεσθε. They *were* childish. But he only urges them not to *become* such.

ταῖς φρεσίν, “in judgment.” The word occurs only here in the New Test. The Apostle probably wished to avoid using νοῦς, which has in the previous verse a somewhat different meaning, the conscious reason as distinguished from ecstasy. Φρήν is properly the midriff (from φράσσω). Afterwards διάφραγμα was used for midriff, when φρήν acquired its more usual metaphorical meaning of “mind.” The datives here are of reference or sphere. Cf. note on vii. 34.

νηπιάζετε, “in evil be, not boyish, but actually childish.” The Corinthians were not children in every respect. But, instead of manifesting the childlike innocence of goodness and manly vigour of judgment, they were in judgment childish and in evil wise. Vain as a child they yet had not the “noble simplicity” of the good man.

Vv. 21–25. What he has said in ver. 20 reminds the

Apostle of Isaiah's words (xxviii. 9), "Whom will he make to understand the tidings? Those weaned from the milk and removed from the breast?" Recent expositors, including Delitzsch, accept Lowth's explanation of these words: "The scoffers are introduced as uttering their sententious speeches; they treat God's method of dealing with them and warning them by His prophets with contempt and derision. What, say they, doth He treat us as mere infants just weaned? Doth He teach us like little children, perpetually inculcating the same elementary lessons, the mere rudiments of knowledge, precept after precept, line after line, here and there, by little and little? . . . God by His prophet retorts upon them with great severity their own contemptuous mockery, turning it to a sense quite different from what they intended. Yes, saith He, it shall be in fact as you say: ye shall be taught by a strange tongue and a stammering lip, in a strange country." This is precisely the connection between ver. 20 and what follows. The Apostle taunts the Corinthians, as the prophet taunts Israel, with being children in understanding; and, as the Lord threatens to speak to Israel in the to them unintelligible language of the Assyrians, so the childish vanity and ostentation of the Corinthian Christians is visited with an outburst of ecstatic cries in the Church assemblies. The tongues are an example of analogical retribution; childishness receiving childish gifts. But the Apostle discovers yet another analogy between Israel and the Corinthian Christians. The Lord spoke to Israel with the stammering tongues of Assyria as a punishment for unbelief and disobedience. From this the Apostle infers (*ὥστε*, ver. 22) that the unintelligible utterances of ecstasy in the Church must be regarded as a punishment of the unbelieving heathen of Corinth. If unintelligible speech was a symbol of the Divine retribution under the shadowy and ceremonial dispensation, much more is it so when we have the fuller revelation of God's truth addressed to the discernment of the spiritual man. Disobedient Israel is, therefore, a type, not only of the childish Christian, but also of the unbelieving heathen. A cutting rebuke to the Judaisers! The word *σημεῖον* is emphatic. This is evident from its position in the sentence, but much more from the allusion it contains to the symbolical character

of the stammering tongues of the Assyrians. Their strange speech was a sign to the Jews that God's retribution was at hand. In like manner the ecstatic cries in the Church assemblies were intended by God to be a sign to the unbelievers that the day of the Lord was near. The Apostle further infers, on the other hand, that prophecy or the intelligent exposition of Divine truth by revelation is a sign of God's grace to be bestowed on those who believe. Christian teaching may be compared to the "precept on precept" mocked of yore by priests and prophets, as they reeled with wine and staggered with strong drink. But, though despised by the self-satisfied Corinthians, it is well adapted for instructing such as have the childlike simplicity to believe (ver. 22), and for leading them on to maturity of spiritual understanding without marring the innocence of their moral childlikeness. Faith it is that makes the exposition of Divine truth effective, and unbelief not only hinders the salutary influence of Christian teaching, but actually causes the Divine method to be changed and ecstasy to be substituted for revelation of truth. Even this is not all. St. Paul sees yet a third point of resemblance between Israel and the men of his own day. As the stammering lips of the Assyrians left the Jews in their impenitence, so will the ecstatic utterances in the Church be ineffectual to lead the hearers to repentance and faith (ver. 23). The Apostle makes the supposition that the whole Church is assembled in one place and that all present have the gift of tongues, a supposition very unlikely to be realized, but here made in order to present the action and effect of ecstasy under the most favourable conditions. But the unbeliever is confirmed in his unbelief and turns to mocking the new religion. Christ, whose cross is already foolishness to the Greeks, is crucified afresh and His followers declared to be mad in consequence of the childish vanity of Christians. Moreover, the unbelieving heathen is not the only person that is alienated by the ecstatic utterances. Even the simple, little gifted Christian, the *ιδιώτης* of the Church, is morally injured and learns to scorn what he has hitherto revered. On the other hand, Christian teaching of the deeper meaning of the Gospel, which was intended for the edification of believers, not for the conversion of the heathen (inasmuch as the wisdom of the

Gospel is spoken only among such as are of mature age), accomplishes now both results. It strengthens the Christian that is as yet poor in gifts and convicts the unbeliever, who came to scoff but remains to pray.

The views adopted by various expositors of the connection and meaning of these verses seem to me to be based either on too narrow a foundation or else on a wrong interpretation of the passage in Isaiah. Thus, Wordsworth explains the prophet's words to mean that God would speak to the Jews in tongues foreign to the speakers, who are supposed to be the prophets. Chrys., Œcum., De Wette, Meyer, Alford, Shore, Heinrici, etc., say the Apostle's purpose is to show the comparative uselessness of the gift of tongues for the conversion of unbelievers.

**V. 21.** ἐν τῷ νόμῳ. Cf. note on x. 4. He is citing Isaiah. The two sides of the Old Dispensation, the legal and the evangelical, are not exactly identical with the distinction between the Books of the Law and of the Prophets. They are rather two distinct, but not separate, elements that run together through the entire course of its history. Hence the prophetic books are called "the law," and in Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 43, all the books of the Old Test. are called "the prophets." Cf. John x. 34, where the Psalms are said to be "the law." In Luke x. 26 the more limited meaning occurs.

ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις, "in the persons (or, by the mouth) of men that speak a foreign language." This is the proper signification of ἑτερόγλωσσος. Cf. Ps. cxiii. (cxiv.) 1, where Aquila has ἀπὸ λαοῦ ἑτερογλώσσου, Symmachus ἐκ λαοῦ ἄλλοφώνου, and LXX. ἐκ λαοῦ βαρβάρου. So in Polyb. XXIV. ix. 5. In our passage Grimm (*Lex.* s.v.) renders it, "qui prorsus insolita, quæ absque interpretatione ab aliis non intelliguntur, proloquitur," but without warrant. Isaiah is not predicting the gift of tongues. The Apostle makes an analogical use of the prophet's words. It is sufficient that the Lord punished Israel with the stammering lips of the Assyrians and the childishness of Christians as well as the unbelief of the heathen with the inarticulate utterances of ecstasy. It is true the Hebrew word means "stammering lips." But that is simply a derisive name for a foreign language. Cf. note on

ver. 11. LXX. has διὰ γλώσσης ἑτέρας, but Aquila (Origen, Περικλῆς) ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις, like the Apostle.

ἐν. Cf. Matt. ix. 34; Acts xvii. 31.

ἐν χείλεσιν ἑτέρων. LXX. has διὰ φανλισμὸν χειλέων, which is an incorrect rendering of the Heb. The prophet speaks, not of contemptuous, but of stammering, lips. The Apostle's rendering is not quite literal, and he has changed the order of the words. So Aquila, only that he has ἑτέροις.

λαλήσω. So Aquila. But LXX. has λαλήσουσι. The Heb. means "he will speak." The Apostle's rendering, though not literal, gives the sense, inasmuch as he adds λέγει Κύριος.

οὐδ' οὕτως, "not even then." Cf. note on xi. 28.

εἰσακούσονται. Cf. "obedio," that is, "ob-audio." Not even when God speaks in anger will Israel give heed.

V. 22. ὥστε. Cf. iii. 7; vii. 38.

εἰς, expressing the Divine purpose. Cf. Acts xiii. 47.

σημεῖον. Emphatic (against De Wette, Alford, Hofmann), and not to be restricted to miracles (Calv.). The citation in ver. 21 proves that the tongues are meant to be an external sign, of a Divine purpose; but they are not such a sign as will be a means of grace to believers. They are a sign of retribution to the unbelievers, which they, nevertheless, will often fail to understand.

τοῖς πιστεύουσιν. Hofmann aptly points out the distinction between οἱ πιστεύοντες and οἱ πιστοί. The participle directs attention to the fact that faith is the spiritual condition which determines the nature and effect of the σημεῖον. To him that believes God will vouchsafe a sign of His grace, and this will be a revelation of truths; to the unbeliever God speaks through tongues and they are a sign of His intention to punish.

V. 23. All this is applied to the actual state of the Corinthian Church.

πάντες λαλώσι γλώσσαις. According to most expositors the supposition is that all speak, not at once, but in turns, because in ver. 24 we cannot suppose that they all prophesied at the same time. The view of Ambrosiaster, Cor. a Lap., and Maier seems to me preferable. In the case of ecstatic utterances all would probably speak at the same time and tumultuously; for it is the confusion quite as much as the unin-

telligible character of the utterance that causes the onlooker to declare the speakers mad. But in the case of prophecy the nature of the gift implies self-possession and a conscious effort to edify the Church; so that the prophets must have spoken in succession. In verse 27 it is expressly forbidden to speak in tongues except *ἀνὰ μέρος*. Some, therefore, must have been in the habit of uttering simultaneously.

*ἰδιώται*. Cf. ver. 16. As the whole Church is supposed to speak with tongues, Meyer suggests that the uninitiated man comes from another congregation. We have no ground for thinking that there were more than one *ἐκκλησία* in Corinth; and, if there were, the *ἰδιώτης* cannot be supposed to have been so ignorant of the nature of the divinely bestowed gift of tongues as to call his brethren who had been endowed with it mad. De Wette, Hofmann, Hodge, etc., conclude that he is a heathen, like the *ἄπιστος*. He is *ἰδιώτης τῆς πίστεως*. The *ἰδιώτης* will then be a heathen ignorant of Christianity, the *ἄπιστος* a heathen who is hostile to it. The disjunctive *ἢ* is no objection to this. The objection is that *οἱ ἄπιστοι* is the general designation of all who are not Christians (cf. vi. 6). The word does not convey the notion of having rejected the Gospel, which is implied in *ἀπειθής* (Acts xxvi. 19), not even in Tit. i. 15. Perhaps we shall not go far wrong in suggesting that this *ἰδιώτης* is a Christian that has not attached himself to the Church (cf. note on i. 1). Such separatists would, it is not unlikely, be entire strangers to those gifts of the Spirit that were largely bestowed on the assembled congregation of Christians. Hence the Apostle can naturally set the *ἰδιώτης* with the *ἄπιστος* over against the *ἐκκλησία*.

*μαίνεσθε*, "that you are possessed," that is, by a demon. Cf. John x. 20; Plat., *Phædr.* p. 245, *ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχῇ καὶ μανία*, and Herodot. iv. 79, *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μαίνεται*. Plato (*Tim.* p. 72) has seen that *μάντις* is derived from *μαίνομαι*. Instead of ascribing the ecstasy of Christians to the Spirit of God, who had indeed bestowed the gift, the unlearned or the unbeliever would ascribe it to a demon. Teaching and prophecy, on the contrary, leads the hearers to confess that the living God is the source of Christian inspiration.

**V. 24.** The change to the sing. seems to be intentional. Derision gathers strength from numbers; conviction is deep-

ened in solitude. Perhaps also *ιδιωται* is put first in ver. 23 to intimate that even a Christian is repelled by the babel of tongues, and *ἄπιστος* put first in this verse, because even a heathen is convicted by the spiritual power of the truth.

*ἐλέγχεται*, "is convicted" of sin; *ἀνακρίνεται*, "is brought to judgment." The former corresponds to the *ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ ἁμαρτίας* of John xvi. 8, the latter to the *ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ κρίσεως*. Cf. next ver.

*τὰ κρυπτὰ . . . γίνεται*. These words indicate the manner in which the man is brought to judgment. The prophets have the gift of knowing and making known the hidden things of his heart. But the judgment is not the result of mere knowledge. The promise of Christ to send the Spirit to convince the world of sin and judgment is here fulfilled. An instance of this is the conversion of Augustine, who went to hear Ambrose and try to account for his eloquence, but was by degrees and unawares to himself drawn to the faith (*Conf.* V. xiii.). Calvin cites Heb. iv. 12. Chrysostom confines the reference too much to the detection of the persecutor's mischievous designs by the prophet. But this is parallel to the narrowness and, if I may say so, the unspiritualness of his interpretation of *δύναμις* in ii. 5.

*ὑπὸ πάντων*, emphatically repeated: There is absolutely no variance. Confusion and dissension, the besetting sins of the Corinthian Church, entirely cease under the mighty influence of inspired teaching.

**V. 25.** The result of conviction is confession. The unbeliever falls on his face in shame that the hidden sins of his heart should have been brought to light. This corresponds to the *ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ δικαιοσύνης* of John xvi. 8. Cf. note on *ἐλέγχεται*, ver. 24.

*τῷ Θεῷ*. In the Attic writers *προσκυνῶ* takes the accus., in LXX. and New Test. dat. and accus.

*ἀπαγγέλλων*, not merely by his action but also in words. The prophetic inspiration seizes him too; and so inspired, when the Church has declared the hidden evils of his heart, he in turn declares the Divine inspiration that dwells in their hearts. *Ἐν ὑμῖν* means the mystical indwelling of the Spirit. The Apostle has in his mind Isa. xlv. 14, rendered in LXX. *ἐν σοὶ ὁ Θεός*. But he intentionally shuns the pro-

phet's expression "unto thee [*i.e.*, Israel as type of Christ] shall they pray," substituting for it "he shall worship God." Cf. Rev. xix. 10.

ὄντως. It is not a fictitious or pretended inspiration, as he now confesses and perhaps always believed the phrenzy of the heathen μάντεις to have been.

Vv. 26-33. Exhortations with a view to the orderly use of the two opposite gifts of ecstatic utterance and prophecy.

V. 26. "If your use of the gift of tongues occasions your being deemed mad, and if prophecy leads to the conversion of an unbeliever and the adherence of a separatist, what then? (τί οὖν ἐστι;) How are these gifts to be exercised?" Cf. note on ver. 15.

ψαλμόν, taken from Scripture or "de proprio ingenio" (Tert., *Apol.* 39). It appears also from this passage of Tertullian that in his days sometimes one member sang while all the others sat in silence. This illustrates the words "having a psalm." At the Council of Laodicea (circa 370 A.D.) the singing of ψαλμοὶ ἰδιωτικοί in the Church was forbidden.

ἔχει, not a question (Grot.) nor meaning "keeps to himself," as if the Apostle were blaming them; but "has as his special gift which he is prepared to exercise in the assembly." Estius excellently: "in promptu habet." One has one gift, another has another; but every one has a gift. It is this variety and abundance that renders it necessary to lay down rules of order. The first rule is the general one, already implied in the nature and purpose of the gifts, that all things must be done for edification. Cf. xii. 8.

V. 27. Griesbach, Scholz and Hofmann read εἴ τε for εἴτε, "and if" for "whether." But as the tongues have been mentioned in ver. 26, the reference in ver. 27 cannot be an addition. Meyer and De Wette are undoubtedly right in thinking that the second εἴτε ("whether . . . or") before προφηται in ver. 29 has been omitted because the construction is disturbed by the intrusion of ver. 28.

κατὰ δύο, not "let only two or at most three speak at one meeting," as if the Apostle wished to discourage long services; but "let them speak only two and two together, or at most three and three together." Cf. Mark vi. 40, κατὰ ἑκατὸν καὶ κατὰ πεντήκοντα. He does not altogether forbid their speak-

ing in tongues *together*, but for the sake of order he qualifies this permission by insisting, *first*, that only two or at most three should utter together, and, *second*, that each should take a part and speak antiphonically (*ἀνὰ μέρος*, “in turns”), until they came to the end of their utterance. By means of these simple modifications the ecstatic utterances of the primitive Church passed by an easy and apparently rapid gradation into Church music; for in Pliny’s letter to Trajan mention is made of antiphonal singing among the Christians. The tradition that Ignatius in the early part of the second century introduced antiphonal music means, perhaps, that he brought about the final step in the transition. In proportion as this transition would be effected the necessity for the interpretation of the ecstatic utterance would cease. The Apostle himself limits the number of interpreters to one.

V. 28. *ἑαυτῷ* . . . *Θεῷ*, a proverbial phrase, but applied by the Apostle with a reality and fulness of meaning. Meditation is a prayer.

*ᾗ*, for the class. *παρῇ*, *sit* for *adsit*. Cf. Luke v. 17. So in Hom., *Il.* ix. 688, *εἰσί* for *παρεῖσι*.

V. 29. The prophets are not said to speak *κατὰ δύο*. Every one would receive his inspiration by and for himself. Hence the necessity for limiting the number of even prophetic speakers, notwithstanding the superiority of prophecy. Excess of this gift also might occasion confusion in the Church. It is evident that the Apostle sets a limit to the exercise of prophecy, though not so strictly as in the case of tongues. In flat contradiction to the Apostle’s injunction to judge the prophets, the “Didache,” c. 11, says, *πάντα προφήτην λαλοῦντα ἐν πνεύματι οὐ πειράσετε οὐδὲ διακρινεῖτε*, adding that to judge the utterances of prophets in the Church is the unpardonable sin.

V. 30. Before one has done speaking another is conscious of having received utterance from the Spirit of God and rises to speak. The former is to accept this as an intimation that his inspiration is for the present at an end.

*καθήμενος*. The prophets, therefore, spoke standing. This is suggestive. Among the Jews teacher and congregation sat (cf. Mark iii. 32). In Matt. xiii. 2 the standing posture of the hearers is mentioned because it was unusual. But

during prayer and the reading of the law minister and congregation stood (cf. Luke iv. 16). When men uttered their own thoughts, or listened to man's utterances, they sat; when they read the words of God or addressed God, they stood. In the Christian assemblies, likewise, all stood to pray and to prophecy. Cf. Justin M., *Apol.* I. 98, ἔπειτα ἀνιστάμεθα κοινῇ πάντες καὶ εὐχὰς πέμπομεν. He that prophesied was inspired to speak God's words to the assembly.

**V. 31** δύνασθε, emphatic. The gift of tongues was possessed by comparatively few. But the Apostle recognises in all Christians the possibility of becoming prophets. This is a reason why every one should show readiness to listen to the utterances of every other one. In the next clause the Apostle tells us what the practical advantage of this universal character of the gift is. If all prophecy, all will learn, all will be comforted. One man will impart what another cannot, and will receive from another to whom also he has given.

καθ' ἓνα may mean either "all without one exception" (as in Eph. v. 33) or "taken singly," "one by one" (as in Herodot. vii. 104, where κατὰ μὲν ἓνα is opposed to ἀλέες δέ). The latter is the class. meaning. But the former is preferable here. So De Wette. The nature of prophecy was itself enough to prove the absurdity of the supposition that several could prophesy at one time in the same assembly.

μαθάνωσι . . . παρακαλῶνται. The comfort sprang from the inspired proclamation of revealed truth.

**V. 32.** Another reason why every one that prophesies should cease to speak when the inspiration falls upon another sitting by. Not only every member of the Church has the germ of a prophet in him, but also every prophet is self-possessed and master of his utterance.

πνεύματα. Cf. note on xii. 10, διακρίσεις πνευμάτων. As in ver. 12, πνεύματα here also denotes the various forms of prophetic utterance, which are to be controlled spite of their being inspired. It is not necessary to suppose, with Hilgenfeld (*Glossol.* p. 52), that ὑποτάσσειν means "to bring an antagonist into subjection." Cf. ver. 34; Luke ii. 51. On the other hand Meyer's view that πνεῦμα means the human spirit must be rejected. It is unnatural to say that a man's own spirit is *subjected* to him. Chrys., Theod., Estius's

explanation, that one prophet is subjected to another and ceases to speak that the second may utter his revelation, does not assign to *ὑποτάσσειν* its full meaning. Stanley well observes that the Apostle distinguishes “these impulses from those of the heathen pythonesses and sibyls.” The latter were as it were a lyre played by an invisible hand.

*ὑποτάσσεται*. An instance of a pres. approximating in meaning to a perf. Cf. Luke x. 17; Heb. iv. 1, *καταλειπομένης*. So in Thuc. VI. 2, *Τιλίου ἀλισκομένου*. *Ὁ φεύγων* means “he who has been banished.” Cf. Poppo’s note on Thuc. II. 2, § 4, *ἐπαγομένοις*. The pres. expresses that the effect of the subjection continues up to the present time.

**V. 33.** That God is not God of disorder but of peace is a reason, not only for the injunction to give way to one another in the Church assemblies, but also for the general principle taught in the whole of the chapter, that variety of gifts is perfectly consistent with unity of spiritual life.

*ἀκαταστασίας*, sc. *θεός*. Cf. Rom. xv. 5, 13, 33. *Ἀκαταστασία* means, not mere confusion, but moral disorder. In 2 Cor. xii. 20 and Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 3, it is in the same series with *ἔρις*, *ζήλος*, etc. Cf. James iii. 16.

**Vv 34, 35.** The women must keep silence in the assemblies. Cf. 1 Tim. ii. 12. In xi. 5 the Apostle permits the women to pray and prophesy in the assembly under certain restrictions. The discussion of the gifts of tongues seems to have led him to withdraw even that limited permission. The ecstasy of the priestesses of Montanism sufficiently proves the sagacity of the Apostle’s precept. In the so called “Apostolic Constitutions” (iii. 6, 9) the women are permitted to pray in the Church, but not to teach, and the impiety of the Greeks, who appointed priestesses for the service of goddesses, is censured.

**V. 33.** The words “as in all the Churches of the saints” are joined with what precedes in the Vulgate and by the ancient commentators, by Maier, Alford, Treg., and in the Revised Version. Cajetan connects them with what follows, and so do Griesbach, Tisch., Reiche, De Wette, Meyer, etc. Westc. and Hort connect them with *παρακαλῶνται*. It certainly seems unnatural to say that God was God of peace in the Corinthian Church. On the other hand, if the words are

connected with what follows, then the partial permission given in xi. 5 is an exception to the rule observed elsewhere and it is difficult to account for its being given. It is not a concession to Greek sentiment. *Γυναιξὶ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴν φέρει* (Soph., *Aj.* 293). Again, to enclose the words from *καὶ πνεύματα* to *εἰρήνης* within parentheses seems to be inadmissible, because they are an additional (*καί*) notion. Upon the whole it is better to connect the clause with *ἀλλὰ εἰρήνης*. But by "peace" we must understand, not mere freedom from contention, but the profound calm of soul possessed by a believer, as in vii. 15. God is not the author of spiritual unrest, but gives inward peace. This is the universal test of Christianity. Outside the pale of the Church it is not to be found; within the Church it abounds and, spite of contentions, actually exists in some persons in all the Churches. For it is the offspring of holiness, the peculiar moral excellence of believers. "God, therefore, is not God of unrest, but God of peace, as we see to be the fact in all the Churches of the holy." We must beware of mentally supplying, with some of the Fathers, *διδάσκω* or *διατάσσομαι* after *ὡς*. Lachm. connects *τῶν ἁγίων* with *αἱ γυναῖκες*, but this places an unnatural emphasis on the adjective.

**V. 34.** *Ν* A B, Vulg. omit *ὑμῶν*. C. deficit. Meyer, Reiche, Hofmann retain it from D, but unnecessarily.

*ἐπιτρέπεται*. So *Ν* A B D, Vulg. (*permittitur*). Reiche defends *ἐπιτέτραπται* on the ground that the perfect expresses the Divine ordinance (Gen. iii. 16) and the example of holy women under the Old Test. But the word glances at the permission given in chap. xi., which is now withdrawn, and as a reason for withdrawing it the Apostle adds that it is not "usually permitted" in the Churches.

*ὑποτασέσθωσαν*. So *Ν* A B. D has *ὑποτάσσεσθαι*. If the inf. is read *ὀφείλομαι* or *βούλομαι* must be mentally supplied, as in 1 Tim. ii. 12; iv. 3. So Reiche and Meyer. The inf. would refer to subjection in the assembly, the imper. to subjection generally.

*νόμος*. Gen. iii. 16. Cf. note on ver. 21.

**V. 35.** The women are not permitted even to ask questions in the assembly. It is indecent (*αἰσχροὺν*) for them to talk (*λαλεῖν*) in public.

**V. 36-40.** He ends the discussion concerning spiritual gifts, *first*, with a sharp rebuke of their spiritual pride, and, *second*, a final exhortation to them to covet the gift of prophecy, though he will not altogether discourage the gift of tongues, provided order be observed.

**V. 36.** This is not to be restricted to the regulation concerning women (Meyer), but refers to all the points touched upon in the discussion of spiritual gifts. The Corinthians acted as if they had originated the Gospel or were the only Christian Church; that is, as if the Gospel took its colouring from local influences and were not broad as humanity itself nor destined to survive nationalities. It may be questioned whether they asked the Apostle's advice as touching the spiritual gifts, and this is suggested by the manner in which the subject is introduced in xii. 1 and by this verse.

**V. 37.** δοκεῖ, "if any one thinks that he is," etc. Cf. note on iii. 18; viii. 2.

πνευματικός, "or in any other way possessing spiritual gifts." Cf. note on xii. 1. Similarly in xiv. 1 πνευματικά is generic, including prophecy, and is not to be restricted to the gift of tongues. For ἡ thus joining a specific and a generic notion cf. iv. 3.

ἐπιγινώσκέτω, pres., "let him understand thoroughly" (ἐπι-), "let there be no mistake touching this matter;" not "let him acknowledge." Cf. xiii. 12.

ὅτι Κυρίου ἐστὶν ἐντολή On the attraction of the subject of the dependent clause into an accus. after the principal verb cf. xvi. 15 and note on iii. 20. Ἐντολή is omitted in D, and in Origen and Ambrosiaster (a strong argument, that the two have it not, in favour of the omission). The various reading ἐντολαί (Vulg.), adopted by Reiche and De Wette, tells in the same direction. The meaning does not require the word. But as **8 A B** have it, it must be retained. So Treg., Westc. and Hort.

Κυρίου, not Πνεύματος, because the Apostle's spiritual authority was conferred upon him, not by a subjective influence, as in the case of the gifts bestowed on the Corinthians, but by a direct revelation of Jesus Christ. Though both are of God, the latter has this excellence that it is unmistakable and confers apostleship. The founding of Churches and

prescribing their ritual did not devolve on the Corinthian prophets in virtue of their possessing the gifts which they had. The contrast between St. Paul's assertion of a claim to apostolical authority and the repeated disavowal of any such authority by Ignatius, and in the Epistle of Barnabas, is remarkable. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Ephes.* 3; *Ad Trall.* 3; Barn., *Ep.* 4.

**V. 38.** ἀγνοεῖ. This word is used in allusion to ἐπιγινώσκειται, but it implies here wilful ignorance, as in Rom. ii. 4, that is, a refusal to acknowledge the Apostle's authority.

ἀγνοεῖτω is the reading of B, ἀγνοεῖται of  $\aleph$  D. A is doubtful. Vulg. has "ignorabitur." Reiche and Meyer defend ἀγνοεῖτω, Lachm., Tisch., Westc. and Hort hesitatingly read ἀγνοεῖται. If the fut. indic. is adopted, the meaning must be that which Ambrosiaster gives: "he will be unacknowledged in the day of judgment, when the Lord says, Verily I say unto you, I know you not." This covert allusion to the judgment of Christ is pertinent. He that refuses to hear Christ's Apostles refuses to hear Christ Himself and incurs His displeasure.

**Vv. 39, 40.** A summary of the results of the whole discussion; comprising, *first*, the superior worth of prophecy; *second*, the toleration of ecstatic utterance; *third*, the necessity of order.

**V. 39.** τό is used with λαλεῖν to make the notion of speaking with tongues more definite.

**V. 40.** εὐσχημόνως expresses the ethical beauty of variety in unity, while κατὰ τάξιν means that every member has his own place, by his keeping which that ethical beauty of the Church is realized. Τάξις is a military term used metaphorically. Cf. Chrys., *Hom.* 10 on 1 Thess. v. 14; Aug., *De Civ. Dei*, XIX. xiii. 1: "Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio."

## SEVENTH DIVISION.

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### THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

(xv. 1-58).

WE are not told who they were that in the Corinthian Church denied the doctrine of the resurrection. The word *τινές* (ver. 12) intimates that they were comparatively few; but it suggests also that the Apostle himself had no precise knowledge of the men and their positive teaching. That they were not Jewish Sadducees, as Origen (*Comm. in Matt.* p. 118) and Calvin maintain, is evident. The Sadducees were materialists and denied the existence of soul or spirit as a substance distinct from body. Cf. Acts xxiii. 8, where their denial of the resurrection is connected with their denial of the existence of angel and spirit. According to Josephus (*Antiq.* XVIII. i. 4) the Sadducees believed that the soul ceases with the body. That men holding these views, who had joined their bitterest enemies to persecute Christ for teaching the contrary, should be members of the Church in Corinth is incredible, especially when we bear in mind that this Church had been gathered by the force of a common belief in Christ as a living Saviour, whose resurrection they believed to have taken place and whose second coming they were waiting for. Other Jews would be the more disposed for this very doctrine of the resurrection to embrace Christianity. It vindicated their position as against the Sadducees. The narrative in the Book of Acts shows that in some measure it reconciled the Pharisees, while it exasperated their opponents.

On the contrary, the more thoughtful and religious men among Greeks and Romans could not but stumble at the doctrine, and that the more readily in proportion as they were

attracted by the spiritual side of Christ's teaching. If what Plato had said was true, that the body is a prison and a tomb (*Gorg.* p. 493), then our true uprising will take place at death, and the resurrection of the body from the grave would be nothing better than a second descent of the soul into its grave. The best men and the worst do not return into the body. Wicked tyrants, like Ardiaeus, are not permitted to enter again on a state of probation, but are driven to their endless punishment in Tartarus; and, on the other hand, "the soul that has practised death all her life long is now finally released and for ever dwells in the company of the gods." We need not seek to reconcile this thought of Plato's with his belief in transmigration. For neither is that belief any approach to the Apostle's doctrine of a resurrection. That the soul should be again born to live on earth in another body is not St. Paul's conception of the change through which the body itself will pass from corruptible to incorruptible, from natural to spiritual. In fact no doctrine of Christianity appears to have evoked more stubborn opposition and more contemptuous scorn. Cf. Tert., *De Præser. Her.* 7. In the time of Origen (*C. Cels.* V. 22) some who called themselves Christians denied the doctrine of the resurrection.

Why, then, we may ask, does St. Paul defend it so vehemently and even place it in the forefront of his ministry? Why should he not admit that a belief in the immortality of the soul is sufficient to inspire a Christian with the sublimest hopes of the gospel? The answer must partly be sought in the fundamental contrast between the highest pagan idea of man and that which meets us in the teaching of Christ and His apostles. In Plato the body is the antithesis of the soul, as the source of all weakness is opposed to what alone is capable of independence and goodness. St. Paul does not recognise this contrariety. With him soul is not, as in Plato, prior to body. He, we cannot doubt, would have rejected Plato's doctrine that the body is related to the soul as the actual to the ideal, inasmuch as the body also has an ideal of perfection which it will at length attain. Neither would he have said, with Aristotle, that the soul itself is that ideal or entelechy of the body. He teaches in common with Plato that body and soul are distinct substances; but he would also

agree with Aristotle that they do not subsist independently of one another. Soul is not prior to body, but neither can it survive the body. Even when separated by death, they are not less than before parts of the man and continue to exist in some kind of interdependence. The New Testament says nothing on the philosophers' problem of the soul's immortality. Not a trace of the arguments of the *Phædo* can be detected in St. Paul's Epistles. But he teaches a nobler doctrine—that an endless life awaits men after death, a life in which body as well as soul will at the last partake.

This conception is closely connected with the Apostle's Christology or, we should rather say, springs out of it. The Son of God is become man. The spiritual has entered into human history and transformed the development of the race into a realization of Divine ideas. Nature even is endowed with supernatural and endless possibilities. Without the doctrine of the incarnation the Apostle's sublime idea of the resurrection would have been a mere play of the imagination. He would either have sunk to the low level of the gross materialism of Parsees and Jews, or else—what is more probable—have flung all such earthly notions to the winds and accepted the spiritualizing doctrine of Plato, thus sacrificing his grand conception of the consecration of all things created to the service of Christ. St. Paul's central doctrine was the union of men through faith with the living Christ, who is the quickening Spirit. In virtue of this union body and soul remain, though locally separated through death, in personal union with one another; and, as the life-giving omnipotence of Christ raises the life of the soul into the higher life of the spirit, so it changes the body, through a resurrection, from psychical to spiritual. Thus the doctrine of the incarnation gives a new and startling significance to our bodily existence and the entire course of nature, while it floods with light the darkness of death.

From this we are led to expect that the Apostle's discussion of the subject will turn on his conception of Christ's person; and such is the fact. That Christ is now living in a human body; that this Christ is a life-giving Spirit: these are the opposite but mutually dependent ideas around which the main thoughts of the chapter gather. In fact the Apostle's argu-

ment is an expansion of the words of Christ: "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 54). Cf. Iren. iv. 18 (34) 5: *πῶς τὴν σάρκα λέγουσιν εἰς φθορὰν χωρεῖν καὶ μὴ μετέχειν τῆς ζωῆς, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ τρεφομένην*; Irenæus errs only in saying "flesh" instead of "body."

First of all, the Apostle declares that his gospel rested on the facts of Christ's death and resurrection, which are proved to be facts by eye-witnesses (vv. 1-11). Now the denial of the resurrection of the dead involves our denying the resurrection of Christ (vv. 12-19). For if there is no resurrection of the dead, then (1) the Gospel is void of content and, consequently, the apostles are deceivers; and (2) the Gospel is proved to be ineffectual, and faith has no result. But in these negative arguments the Apostle only clears the ground for the direct proof. The resurrection is necessary in order that the subjection of all things to Christ and ultimately to God, in the Christian order, may be brought to pass (vv. 20-28). As a corollary to this the Apostle appeals to the consistency (1) of those that baptize for the dead (ver. 29) and (2) of such as undergo suffering for the name of Christ (vv. 30-33). The digression closes with an urgent call to the Corinthians to live righteous lives. In all this there is really but one positive argument for the doctrine of the resurrection, which is that the man Christ Jesus is the source of life. He is the first-fruits of them that fall asleep. He is the new covenant-head of the race; in Him man is exalted to the kingly authority for which God designed Him over all created things; to Him, as God-man, every power, not excepting death itself, is subjected. Not a word here of the immateriality and consequent indissolubleness of the soul. The Apostle desires to encourage men who from fear of death are all their life-time subject to bondage, and Christ Jesus is the only anchorage of man's faith and hopes.

St. Paul proceeds to meet the difficulties that surround the subject when we try to understand the manner of the resurrection (vv. 35-55). He prepares the way by showing the possibility of it from the analogy of the seed and the grain (vv. 35-38), and the physical difference of kind between one body

and another (vv. 39-44). But he offers here again only one positive reply to the objector's questions, "How are the dead raised? With what body will they come?" It is found in the contrast between the first and the second Adam, and in a new revelation concerning Christ as the ideal man, the pattern of the future body, who ought (*φορέσωμεν*) to be the pattern also of our morality and goodness. Such an argument, it is evident, can be addressed, and, indeed, has reference only to the Christian. Silence reigns in this discussion over the destiny of the wicked. The key to the whole argument is the refrain of triumph at the close. The resurrection of the dead is more than an event, it is the final moral victory won for man by our Lord Jesus Christ.

A. *That the Gospel which the Apostle preached rested on the facts of Christ's death and resurrection: facts proved by eye-witnesses.*

(1-11).

V. 1. *Γνωρίζω* cannot be synon. with *ἀγγέλλω*, "I announce" (De Wette, Meyer), nor with *ἀναμνήσκω*, "I remind" (Theod., Œcum., Theophyl., and among recent expositors, Heydenreich, Olshausen, Osiander), nor does it combine both meanings (Chrys.), "announcing again by reminding them of what has been announced before." It means "to explain the nature and import of the Gospel." Cf. John xvii. 26; Rom. ix. 22, 23. What the explanation is the Apostle tells us in *τίνι λόγῳ εὐηγγελισάμην* and the following verses. In fact the Apostle is introducing in the word *γνωρίζω*, after his discussion of the spiritual gifts, a magnificent example of his own exercise of the gift of prophecy.

*τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, "the Gospel," in its entirety; not merely the truth of Christ's resurrection (Cyr. Al., Hervæus, Rückert). The resurrection of Christ is the explanation of the entire Gospel. It is the key that unlocks the doctrines, which without it are incredible and unmeaning.

His own and his reader's relation to the Gospel is more clearly defined in four statements, which are intended to show its unique character and paramount importance. *First*, he is about to explain the nature of a message that formed the

staple of his ministry among them, and any Gospel that does not rest on the fact of Christ's resurrection is not a Gospel. *Second*, he is about to explain that which they themselves received as Gospel, and faith that does not rest on Christ's resurrection is vain (as in ver. 14). *Third*, he is about to explain the truth in which they still stand, and on which the stability of their Christian character rests; and the strongest incentive to moral greatness and spiritual force is the resurrection of Christ. *Fourth*, he is about to explain the source of their hope of rising slowly into possession and fruition of that spiritual and eternal life which flows from a living Saviour. In short, the ministry, faith, character, salvation—these are the prominent landmarks of a Gospel, the central truth of which is the resurrection of Christ.

*παρελάβετε* is restricted by De Wette to the fact of their having heard the Gospel, as in 1 Thess. ii. 13 (but not Phil. iv. 9). But this would make it tautological after *εὐηγγελισάμην*. Cf. John i. 11.

*ἐστήκατε* does not mean here precisely what it does in Rom. v. 2. This and the other verbs have in the present passage an ethical signification. It is important to keep in mind that the Apostle could not have said "ye stand," unless those who denied the resurrection of the dead believed in the resurrection of Christ.

*σώζεσθε*. The ethical import of the word is lost if, with De Wette, Meyer, etc., we regard the pres. as expressing only a certain future. The believer's salvation began when he first hoped in Christ. Cf. Rom. viii. 24, *ἐσώθημεν*, and Eph. ii. 8.

**V. 2.** Many expositors connect *τίνι λόγῳ εὐηγγελισάμην* with *εἰ κατέχετε*, "if ye hold fast with what discourse I preached to you," making this the conditional clause to *δι' οὗ σώζεσθε*. But this identifies the Gospel with the *λόγος* of the Gospel, whereas the Apostle distinguishes between them, as the external form which the glad tidings assumed and in which the offer of salvation is conveyed is distinguished from its substance (*τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ*, Gal. i. 11). This *λόγος* is the declaration of the historical fact of Christ's resurrection. By preaching this fact the Apostle makes known the Gospel, the life and soul of the fact. Besides, the Corinthians could not be said to be saved by

holding fast in their minds with what discourse the Apostle preached to them; and the words cannot mean "the discourse with which I preached." The clause must be connected with γνωρίζω. Revised Version: "I make known, I say, in what words I preached it unto you." But the plur. "words" is not a felicitous rendering, as it tends to hide the idea of the "form" of the Gospel as distinguished from its "matter."

εἰ κατέχετε, that is, he makes known the nature of the Gospel by declaring Christ's resurrection, on the supposition that they hold fast the Gospel. Their denying a future resurrection makes him doubt that some of them had a firm hold of the Gospel itself. "Adeo non erit Christianus qui eam [the resurrection of the dead] negabit," says Tertullian (*De Resurr. Carn.* iii.). This doubt in the Apostle's mind is not inconsistent with the words, "in which ye stand." He does not doubt their spiritual condition. Their lapse has not yet passed the limit of a lax hold of truth.

ἐκτὸς ἐπιστεύσατε. Theod., Calvin, De Wette, Van Hengel, etc., rightly consider this to be a conditional clause to κατέχετε, "and surely you do hold fast the Gospel, unless your faith has been from the first a vain and unreal one." The Apostle softens down the harshness of the supposition that they did not hold fast the Gospel, by adding that such a supposition could only be true if they had become Christians hypocritically, which is a supposition that need only be mentioned in order to be rejected. Alford thinks the Apostle is supposing the objective nullity of that on which their faith was founded. Εἰκῇ will then mean "without sufficient reason," and the clause will be conditional to σώζεσθε, "ye are saved, unless the Gospel is a fable." But σώζεσθε is too far to be thus connected.

εἰκῇ in class. Greek means "at a venture," "inconsiderately." It will admit of this meaning in the New Test. also, except in Gal. iv. 11, where it must mean, as Chrys. explains it, "in vain." Hesych., εἰκῇ μάτην ἢ ἀκαίρως ἢ ὡς ἔτυχεν. There is a similar transition of meaning in the English word "vain."

ἐκτὸς εἰ μή. Cf. note on xiv. 5.

ἐπιστεύσατε, "became believers." Cf. note on iii. 5.

Vv. 3, 4. γάρ, "that is to say." The Apostle states the fact which forms the λόγος or vehicle of his Gospel.

**V. 3.** *παρέδωκα*. Cf. note on xi. 2. He declared that a certain event had taken place. It is not that he had received the *διδασκαλία* from the Lord,—the teaching which was based on the fact (as Theod. explains it).

*ἐν πρώτοις*, not “among the chief doctrines” (Grot., Estius, Hammond, De Wette, etc.), nor “from the first” (Chrys., Hofmann), but “among the things to be stated first.” The facts are the foundation, the “*prima fidei capita*” (Bp. Bull), *οἷονεὶ θεμέλιος πάσης τῆς πίστεως*. Cf. iii. 10. Similarly Ignatius says, *ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχεῖά ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, τὰ ἄθικτα ἀρχεῖα ὁ σταῦρος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ πίστις ἡ δι’ αὐτοῦ* (*Ad Philad.* 8).

*παρέλαβον*. Cf. note on xi. 23. He had himself received it from the Lord Jesus in order to deliver it as the Lord’s message to the world. The word expresses the historical truth of the facts, but it intimates also their inner meaning, which is that they convey Christ’s message of salvation to the Apostle himself and through him to others. This he could not have understood and would not have accepted on the ground of tradition. The doctrine of the cross was so repugnant to him before his conversion, that nothing less than the appearing of Christ to him on the road to Damascus gave him an insight into its meaning. Pfeiderer’s notion that the persecutor expected to see the risen Messiah is quite untenable.

*ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*. Cf. Heb. v. 1; Gal. i. 4. In Heb. v. 3 *περί* is the true reading. Elsewhere *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*. But the one expression explains the other. The Apostle might have used *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* in the sense of “for our behoof;” but he could not have said *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*, if Christ’s death were only an example of self-denial, not because *ὑπέρ* must be rendered “instead of,” “in loco,” but because the reference to sin involves with *ὑπέρ* the notion of expiation. Indeed *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* in LXX. means a sin offering (cf. Lev. v. 11; vii. 37). The words are a distinct statement of the doctrine that Christ’s death was a propitiatory sacrifice for sin; and the occurrence of such a statement in this place proves that in the Pauline presentation of the Gospel this import of Christ’s death constituted an essential aspect of the Gospel. Cf. i. 17; ii. 2; Gal. iii. 1; Rom. iv. 25. Christ’s life had an ethical meaning in its obedience, and that obedience was perfected in

his death. Cf. Rom. iii. 24. The word *ὑπέρ* expresses the same notion as *τιμῆς* in vi. 20. Cf. *τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν*, v. 7. Here, therefore, as in 2 Cor. v. 21, *ὑπέρ* is *synon.* with *ἀντί*. So Pfleiderer, *Paulin.* p. 102; Baur, *Neutest. Theol.* pp. 158, 159. Cf. Iren., *Adv. Hær.* V. 1, *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν*. . . . *ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν*.

*κατὰ τὰς γραφάς*. Cf. Luke xviii. 31; xxiv. 25-27. In Acts viii. 30 sqq. direct reference is made to Isa. liii. as a prophecy of Christ's death. Before Jesus was put to death the disciples did not understand that the Messiah must die; afterwards they seem to find to their surprise that the notion of a suffering Messiah was in the minds of the Old Testament seers. That the statement of fact made by the apostles corresponds to what prophets foretold confirms, therefore, the truth of the Apostle's report, unless the apostles were deceivers. The Corinthians would know that the disciples had not been led to say that Jesus had risen from having previously understood the sayings of the prophets to refer to Messiah's death and resurrection.

V. 4. *ἐτάφη*. Cf. Acts xiii. 29. The repetition of the words "according to the Scriptures" in the next clause seems to show that the Apostle does not refer to any prediction of the burial. Theodoret cites Isa. lvii. 2, "he entereth into peace," as a prophecy of Christ's burial; and it is far from improbable that by "peace" in this verse is meant the stillness of the grave. Why does the Apostle make separate mention of the burial? In order, says Calvin, to certify the reality of His death. This is true. Even Ignatius (*Ad Smyrn.* 2) speaks of certain persons who said *δοκεῖν αὐτὸν πεπονθέναι*. Thus early did a tendency to docetism manifest itself. But the reference to the burial certifies also the reality of His resurrection. For on the third day the sepulchre was empty, as Schenkel and Renan admit. Strauss feels so keenly the force of this argument for the fact of the resurrection, that, in order to evade it, he denies that Jesus was buried, and suggests that the body was cast into the receptacle into which the bodies of criminals were after their execution usually thrown. But on such a supposition it is simply impossible to account for St. Paul's belief in the burial of Jesus. Joseph of Arimathea only availed himself of the provision of the

Roman law by which relatives or friends might be allowed to take the bodies of criminals for burial. To suppose that no one asked permission to bury the body of the great Teacher is hard indeed.

*ἐγίγερται*. The perf. expresses that Jesus was now alive after His resurrection. The distinction made by Grot. between *ἀναστῆναι* and *ἐγείρεσθαι*, "to rise from a fall" and "to awake from sleep," must not be pressed. In later Greek *ἐγείρειν* sometimes contains no allusion to sleep.

*τῇ τρίτῃ*. That Jesus rose on the *third* day is admitted by Strauss to have been a "primeval and definite" assertion of the earliest apostles; and, if Paul says the "third" day, we may be sure it was the belief also of the other apostles. But on this point Strauss virtually abandons his vision theory. The apostles, it seems, fixed on the third day because they found it so declared in the Old Testament prophecies. It was the result of deliberate agreement and conscious fraud. But could they have palmed off this falsehood on Paul? Or was he also a party to the fraud? Elsewhere Strauss proposes another explanation. He supposes three days to have been a typical expression for a short time. But this does not account for the expression "on the third day," which can mean nothing else than the next day but one (cf. Luke xiii. 32). Add to this that it is very questionable if any prophecy refers to the time. Christ gave no "sign" of it except the very obscure sign of the prophet Jonas.

*κατὰ τὰς γραφάς*. Cf. Ps. xvi. 9, 10, words which Peter (Acts ii. 25-28) and Paul (Acts xiii. 35-37) argue to be a prophecy of Christ's resurrection, inasmuch as they were not fulfilled in the case of David. In Acts xiii. 33 the Apostle cites Ps. ii. 7 probably as a prophecy of the same event, though some good expositors think *ἀναστήσας* refers to the incarnation. Cf. Isa. lv. 3.

Vv. 5-8. The Apostle passes to the evidence for the truth of Christ's resurrection. The risen Jesus was seen by trustworthy witnesses, and this had already formed part of the Apostle's testimony at Corinth. These verses were written within twenty-five years after the date of the supposed event. The Apostle Paul declares that these witnesses affirmed that they had seen Jesus after His resurrection. This is fatal to

the theory that the resurrection of Jesus is a myth gradually gathering around His memory. So stupendous a myth could not have formed and crystallized before the date of this Epistle, still less before the arrival of Paul in Corinth.

V. 5. ὥφθη Κηφᾶ. Cf. Luke xxiv. 34, ὥφθη Σίμωνι. The names Simon, Cephas, Peter seem to have been used indiscriminately (cf. Gal. ii. 7, 9). St. Paul heard that Peter had seen the Lord from Peter's own lips (cf. Gal. i. 18). If Peter did not tell the Apostle during that visit that he had seen the risen Jesus, it is quite impossible to account for Paul's believing it to have been the fact. If Peter did tell him, then the statement of St. Paul that a brother apostle declared that he had seen the Lord brings us almost to the time of St. Paul's conversion.

τοῖς δώδεκα. D has ἔνδεκα, Vulg. *undecim*, a correction made, we may suppose, because Judas could not have been present. Origen (*Contra Cels.* II. 65), Chrys., Theophyl. think Matthias is included. But there is no difficulty in understanding "the Twelve" to be a designation of the Apostolic college, in the same way as "the Eleven" in Athens meant a body of officers, and in supposing the designation was retained because the number was symbolical, as Augustine observes (*De Cons. Evang.* III. p. 25). At any rate the notion of a "glorious company of apostles" is not a later importation, though we must wait till the time of Ignatius (*Ad Magn.* 6) before we meet with the name *συνέδριον τῶν ἀποστόλων*. In the catalogues of the second century St. Paul himself is excluded from the inner circle of the Twelve.

V. 6. From the indirect he changes to the direct construction. Cf. Luke v. 14; Acts i. 4. But these appearances formed part of the Apostle's παράδοσις no less than the previous ones; for he could not have omitted to say that he himself had seen the Lord.

ἐπάνω, an adv., as in Mark xiv. 5, and having no influence on the case. Chrys. says that some rendered ἐπάνω by ἄνω ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν. Peter Martyr and Semler accept this. But to express this ἄνωθεν would have been used, and with the numeral the notion of "more than" is natural. In class. Greek ἐπάνω has neither of these meanings.

ἐφάπαξ. Theod., ὁμοῦ πᾶσιν, Vulg. *simul*. So most ex-

positors. But as the word nowhere else has this meaning, Bretschneider (*Lex.*) and Van Hengel are, I think, justified in rendering it "once." The risen Jesus appeared to some of the apostles more than once; but once He appeared to over five hundred brethren. This appearance is not mentioned elsewhere. It may have been the meeting with the brethren in Galilee announced by Jesus to the women (cf. Matt. xxviii. 10). It must have been after the day of Pentecost, when the disciples numbered a hundred and twenty.

*μένουσιν* means more than *ζῆν* or *εἶναι* (against Valcken.). Cf. the imitation of the passage in Herm. Past., *Vis.* III. 5, *οἱ μὲν κεκοιμημένοι οἱ δὲ ἔτι ὄντες*. Nor does it mean merely to "survive," as the word is paraphrased in Eus., *Hist. Eccles.* I. 12, *τοὺς πλείους δ' ἔτι τῷ βίῳ καθ' ὃν καιρὸν αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνετάττετο περιέναι*. The word *μένω* looks back to the departure of Christ from among His brethren and forward to His second coming; so that it includes the notion of "remaining," as in John xii. 34, and that of "waiting," as in John xxi. 22, *μένειν ἕως ἔρχομαι*. It has, therefore, a pathetic force, as in Soph., *Trach.* 176, *εἴ με χρὴ μένειν*, where cf. Campbell's note.

*ἐκοιμήθησαν*. The mention of the fact that some of the five hundred had died is a touch of nature, but it is more. These men had faced death in the hope of a resurrection through the resurrection of Christ. The expression "fell asleep" refers to the calm hope in which they died. The aor. expresses, not merely their condition, but also their feeling: "they went to sleep." Their death was, if possible, a stronger evidence of belief in the truth of their testimony than the living witness of those that remained. That *κοιμᾶσθαι* does not denote the unconscious state of the disembodied spirit (Usteri, Pfeleiderer, etc.), but is a metaphor for the state of the body after death is undeniable, if the Apostle believed that immediately at death the Christian is "at home with the Lord" (2 Cor. v. 8).

V. 7. *Ἰακώβω*, most probably James the Lord's brother (so Eus., *Hist. Eccles.* I. 12), not James the son of Zebedee, after whose death the Lord's brother is called James simply. Cf. Birks, *Horæ Apostolicæ*, p. 198. In Gal. i. 19 it is said that Paul had seen James, who must have told him that he

had seen the risen Lord. In the case of James, therefore, as well as of Peter, we have St. Paul's word for the early date of a testimony for the truth of Christ's resurrection. From the fact that in John vii. 5 the Lord's brethren are spoken of as unbelievers, and in Acts i. 14 as disciples, some have inferred, on insufficient grounds, that the appearing of Jesus to them after His resurrection convinced them of His Messiahship. His appearing to James is not mentioned in the canonical Gospels. But the apocryphal "Gospel according to the Hebrews" (Jerome, *De Vir. Illustr.* 2) records a vow made by James after the last supper that he would not eat bread until he should see Christ risen from the dead. After His resurrection, the story goes on, Jesus took bread and blessed it and gave it to James the Just, saying, "My brother, eat thy bread, for the Son of Man is risen from those that sleep." This "Gospel according to the Hebrews" is certainly one of the most ancient of the apocryphal Gospels. It is cited by Origen (*In Johan.* p. 64), Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* II. p. 453 Potter) and, according to Jerome, by Ignatius (*Ad Smyrn.* 3). We have here a piece of evidence confirming the Apostle's statement in the only Gospel accepted by the Ebionites, who, be it remembered, regarded Paul as an apostate from the law and rejected his Epistles. It is true the Apostle and the Ebionite Gospel do not assign the occurrence to the same date. But this inconsistency, being a proof of independence, adds to the value of this twofold evidence for the fact. James was called "the Just" by Jews as well as Christians (cf. Origen, *Contra Cels.* I. 47). No man less likely to have been deceived or to have deceived!

τοῖς ἀποστόλοις πᾶσιν. There is not much to help us in deciding whether ἀπόστολος is here used in the narrower range of meaning, of the Twelve only, or whether it includes the Seventy or others (Chrys., Theod., Meyer). It has the narrower meaning in ver. 9, and here it is natural to suppose that the reference is to witnesses of Christ's ascension. Cf. Acts i. 10. Whether St. Paul includes James among the apostles or not, it is impossible to say. It happens that the same uncertainty hangs over every other passage in which James is named with the apostles. Cf. on the question generally Bp. Lightfoot on Galatians, p. 95.

**Ver. 8.** ἔσχατον δὲ πάντων, that is, "last in point of time of all that have seen the risen Christ." Ἐσχατον is an adv. Cf. Mark xii. 22, where ἔσχατον πάντων is the true reading. Cf. Matt. xxii. 27, ὕστερον πάντων. Ignatius, however, seems to have considered it an adj. Cf. *Ad Rom.* 9, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄξιός εἰμι, ὦν ἔσχατος αὐτῶν καὶ ἔκτρωμα. De Wette is surely mistaken in making πάντων neut., and Meyer in restricting it to apostles. It means that the Apostle Paul was, and it is probably intended to intimate that he still is and will be, the last on earth to see the risen Lord. The apocalyptic vision belongs to another category.

ὥσπερ εἶ occurs nowhere else in the New Test. The word is mentioned by Longinus among the *μειλίγματα τῶν θρασέων μεταφορῶν*, and so it is here.

τῷ ἐκτρώματι. Ambrosiaster and Œcum. make ἔκτρωμα synon. with ὕστερον γέννημα, as if it referred to the fact of the Apostle's having been called last. This is rejected by Theophyl. Ἐκτρωμα can only mean "an abortion." But in what sense can the Apostle give himself this name? Omitting absurd explanations (such as that of Augustine, that it refers to his short stature), the following are worthy of consideration. (1) Theod., Est., Lightfoot (*Hor. Heb.*), Beng., De Wette, Meyer, Alford thus: "As unworthy to be called an apostle as an abortion is to be considered a man." This view is strongly supported by the next verse, and the words are borrowed, evidently in this sense, by Ignatius (*ut sup.*). (2) Hervæus, Calvin, Peter Martyr, Grotius, Heinrici thus: "An apostle whose conversion was sudden and violent." This view expresses much more fully the notion which may naturally be supposed to lie in the metaphor generally. But it labours under the difficulty that reference to the suddenness and violence of his conversion has but a slight and distant connection with the Apostle's testimony concerning Christ's resurrection. (3) Severian (*Cat.*) and in effect Hofmann thus: "All the others who had seen the risen Lord were apostles or at least brethren; Paul, on the other hand, had not yet arrived at the ripeness of the spiritual birth, but saw Jesus before his conversion." Heinrici objects that this view ignores the connection with the following verse. This may be met by saying that it is not as least of the apostles, but as the persecutor

of the Church of God that he designates himself an abortion. The strongest argument in favour of this view is the pertinence of the notion to the Apostle's present purpose. Here we have the evidence of an enemy to the truth of the resurrection. But the metaphor is not a natural one, if it refers only to his former condition. He would have called himself a persecutor or an enemy; but "abortion" must refer to some kind of change of condition. On the whole we must accept the first explanation.

*ἔκτρωμα* occurs in Aristotle and later writers. The class. word is *ἄμβλωμα*. Cf. Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 108.

*τῷ*, "the only one," among all that had seen the risen Jesus.

*ὥφθη* cannot mean a vision (Van Hengel, Strauss); for it must have the same meaning in this and the previous verses. As it is intended to be a proof of the resurrection of Christ, it must denote that He was seen with the bodily eyes in true humanity. It is true that the Apostle claims to have received visions and revelations. But his evident reluctance to speak of them is in striking contrast to the eagerness with which he repeatedly boasts of having seen the Lord. Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 1, 5-8.

Of the twelve (or thirteen) recorded appearances of Jesus after His resurrection, the Apostle here mentions six.

**Vv. 9, 10.** A digression referring to his apostleship and apostolical labours (cf. ix. 1-3). But the verses prove also the truth of the description which the Apostle has given of himself as the *ἔκτρωμα*, and connect the success of his ministry with the doctrine he preached, viz., the resurrection of Christ.

**V. 9.** *ἐγώ*, emphatic predicate: "Who is the least of the apostles? It is I."

*γάρ*. He calls himself an abortion because he persecuted the Church of God; and the consequence of his having been a persecutor when Christ appeared to him is that he is still the least of the apostles. On *ἐλάχιστος* cf. Eph. iii. 8.

*ὅς* (= *ἐπεὶ ἐγώ*). This causal use of *ὅς*, more freq. *ὅς γε*, as in Rom. viii. 32, occurs sometimes in class. Greek. Cf. Soph., *Œd. Col.* 866; Plat., *Rep.* p. 402.

*ἰκανός* usually differs from *ἄξιος* as the notion of sufficiency

or fitness to do a thing differs from the notion of moral worthiness to be permitted to do it. Cf. 2 Cor. ii. 16; iii. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 2. But when the capacity to act consists in a certain moral condition of mind and heart, *ικανός* and *ἄξιος* may be used interchangeably. Compare Matt. iii. 11 with John i. 27. So here.

*καλεῖσθαι*, that is, “to be known in the capacity of an apostle.”

*Θεοῦ*. Cf. note on xi. 22.

**V. 10.** While he is himself unworthy to be an apostle, the grace of God has made him—he will not say the greatest or most faithful of the apostles—he will express his meaning in a truism, has made him what he is. A truistic proposition may express pride, as in Pilate’s words, “what I have written I have written,” or, as here, humility.

*ἡ εἰς ἐμέ*. *Ἡ* must be retained from **8 A B**, though **D** omits it. He does not mean that the grace of God had been effectual in its operation upon him, but that, having been effectual towards him personally, it had also been effectual through him in its saving influence on others. Cf. 1 Pet. i. 10. The grace meant is his own salvation, not merely his apostleship, as in iii. 10. He constantly represents the power of his ministry as the effect of his strong and deep spiritual life.

*κενή*, “without effect.” Cf. Phil. ii. 16. His superabundant toil was the effect of grace.

*περισσότερον*, not an adj. (De Wette), but an adv., and synon. with *περισσοτέρως*, as in 2 Cor. x. 8; Heb. vii. 15. The word is an allusion to the assertion of his judaizing detractors, that he was behind (*ὑστερηκεναι*) the chief apostles. Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 5; xii. 11.

*αὐτῶν πάντων*. I see no objection to the view of De Wette (doubtfully), Meyer, Osiander and Van Hengel that he means all the other apostles together. Even this would not be an exaggeration. Cf. Rom. xv. 19; 2 Cor. xi. 23; Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 5, *ὑπομονῆς γενόμενος* [Paul] *μέγιστος ὑπογραμμός*.

*ἐκοπίασα*, not “I suffered” (Chrys., Theophyl.), but “I toiled.” Cf. note on iii. 8.

*οὐκ ἐγὼ δέ*. Grotius is certainly a bad exegete when he renders these words, “not I only, but the grace of God also.” It is true that the grace of God was *with* him; but it is also

true that without the grace of God he was nothing. Grace at once made him something and co-operated with him; in the words of the Tenth Article, grace "prevents us that we may have a good will, and works with us when we have that good will." Cf. note on iii. 9.

The  $\eta$  before  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\nu \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota$  is omitted in  $\aleph$  B D and rejected by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The meaning is practically the same.

V. 11. He returns from the digression and lays down the inference which must be drawn from the evidence of Christ's resurrection and from the Divine power of his own ministry.  $O\delta\acute{\nu}$  refers to both things, to vv. 5-8 and to vv. 9, 10. The inference is that he and the other apostles preached the same Gospel of the resurrection and the Corinthians became Christians by accepting Christ's resurrection as the fundamental truth of the Gospel which they received. The verse is inconsistent with the Tübingen theory and, as Irenæus (iii. 13, 1) observes, with what is virtually an early anticipation of that theory by Marcion. For the identity between the Apostle's Gospel and that of the older apostles must include, not only the fact of Christ's death and resurrection, which alone would be no Gospel, but the meaning of that fact. The apostles must, according to St. Paul, have preached that Christ "died for our sins," which the Tübingen writers correctly declare to be an essential doctrine of Paulinism. The men who "preached another Jesus and another Gospel" (2 Cor. xi. 4) at Corinth cannot, therefore, have been authorised to do so by any apostle. Cf. Pfleiderer, *Paulin*, p. 310.

$\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\tau\epsilon$ . The change from the pres.  $\kappa\eta\rho\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\sigma\alpha\mu\epsilon\upsilon$  to the aor.  $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\tau\epsilon$  suggests that the Corinthians were beginning to waver somewhat in their belief in the resurrection of Christ.  $\epsilon\sigma\alpha\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\tau\epsilon$  (Chrys.). It is this incipient doubt that made it necessary for the Apostle to prove the fact. Still, the aor. *may* mean "it was by believing this that ye became Christians." Cf. note on iii. 5. At any rate, Theod. Mops. is not justified in saying that the Corinthians held Christian doctrines in appearance only, but in reality maintained contrary opinions.

B. *The Denial of the Resurrection of the Dead involves our Denying the Resurrection of Christ.*

(12-19).

If there is no resurrection of the dead, Christ is not risen. If Christ is not risen, then, *first*, the Gospel is *unreal*; apostles have nothing real to preach, Christians nothing real as object of their faith (vv. 13, 14), and as a corollary it follows that the apostles are deceivers (ver. 15); *second*, the Gospel, even if we grant that it is real, is *weak*, and faith has no results (vv. 16-19).

V. 12. The argument is stated. The Apostle does not in this verse enter on the proof. "An admission of Christ's resurrection is inconsistent with a denial of the resurrection of the dead."

The form of the clause "if Christ is preached that He has been raised from the dead" is noteworthy. It is not synonymous with "if the resurrection of Christ is preached." It is not simply the attraction of the subject of a dependent clause into the principal clause, as in xiv. 37; Mark xii. 34. Christ Himself is preached. The statement concerning His resurrection is the form under which that Gospel is presented. Cf. note on ver. 2.

πῶς; "qui factum est ut?" Cf. Gal. ii. 14. So in class. Greek, e.g., Plat., *Phileb.* 50, πῶς οὐ μανθάνομεν; "How is it come to pass that?" etc.

τινες may mean "some whom I could name." Cf. note on iv. 18. Perhaps, however, it means here "some whose names I do not know, and of whose positive teaching I am in ignorance." Cf. ver. 6. In any case it implies that they were not many. Were they the "few wise men" of i. 26?

V. 13. If their denial of the resurrection of the dead rests on a preconceived notion that it is impossible for dead men to come to life again, then it is impossible that Christ, who certainly died, can have risen from the dead.

εἰ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν. The use of οὐ, rather than μή, is explained by De Wette to be occasioned by the close connection of οὐ with ἔστιν, "if it is a non-entity." It is more natural to account for the use of οὐ by the fact that the

Apostle is citing the words of an opponent. Cf. note on ver. 14.

V. 14. εἰ οὐ, not μὴ, because the Apostle is giving another's words: "if, as some allege, Christ has not been raised." This is better than to suppose οὐ was required because of an antithesis between the conditional clause and a virtually negative apodosis in κενόν (as Buttmann, *N. S.* p. 298 suggests).

κενόν, "empty," "void of content." If Christ has not died for our sins and risen for our justification, the message of the Gospel has no objective truth in fact. "*Phantasma erit totum quod speramus a Christo.*" Tert., *De Carne Christi* 5. It ceases, therefore, to be a message (κήρυγμα) and becomes a speculative doctrine (φιλοσοφία), which, in the case of a religion designed to save men, is nothing better than a κενὴ ἀπάτη, a hollow deception (Col. ii. 8). Christianity becomes an unreal system of notions, like other phantoms of the theatre, if it is not an interpretation of facts. Faith also is no more faith; for faith must act on an external fact and a living person. Cf. Rom iv. 14. Similarly it is said in 1 Pet. i. 3 that the resurrection of Christ makes hope a living hope—a hope raised from death.

ἄρα, "then really," "the fact is, however some may gloze over it." Cf. Gal. iii. 29; Heb. xii. 8. On κήρυγμα cf. note on i. 23.

V. 15. It will follow that the apostles are deceivers. This inference is not co-ordinate with that of vv. 13, 14, but a corollary to it. If Christ is not risen, Christ's apostles are convicted of lying, and that in the name of God. The supposition that the apostles were under a delusion is nowhere mentioned in the New Test. (cf. 2 Cor. iv. 2). In our day no man would call the apostles impostors. Those that deny the fact of Christ's resurrection accept the theory of Spinoza (*Ep.* 25, "ipsos evangelistas credidisse Christi corpus resurrexisse et ad cœlum adscendisse, . . . in quo tamen, salvâ evangelii doctrinâ, potuerunt decipi"), that the apostles were under a strange hallucination in believing honestly what had never taken place. The absence of all reference to the possibility of unconscious self-deception has been ascribed to the peculiar psychology of the age. Cf. Pfeiderer, *Paulin.* p. 13. But if

Greek philosophy means anything, it means that the deliverances of the senses are a principal source of delusions; and if we come down to a time not much later than that of the Apostle, Celsus has anticipated Strauss in describing the appearance of Jesus after His alleged resurrection as a phantom flitting before the disciples' eyes, and in speaking of Mary Magdalene as a *γυνὴ πάροιστρος* (cf. Orig., *Contra Cels.* II. 59; VIII. 35). But Celsus is compelled to eke out his theory by saying that Jesus was Himself a deceiver and magician. Pfeiderer argues, further, that the delusion was unavoidable in the case of Paul because he was already possessed by the idea of a suffering and triumphant Messiah. Unsatisfactory as this hypothesis of Strauss is in reference to St. Paul, it is even more unaccountable that the other disciples, who, according to Pfeiderer, believed in Jesus "in spite of the cross," should have laboured under the delusion. They at least cannot be supposed to have thrown their own images on the surrounding mountain-mist and confounded them with the gigantic form of a risen Christ. If Christ did not rise from the dead, His disciples must have been deceivers.

*εὐρίσκομεθα*. The view of the older critics that *εὐρίσκομαι* is used in the sense of *εἶναι* is not now held by lexicographers. But the apostolic Fathers use it without any emphasis on the notion of "finding" and, therefore, virtually as synon. with *εἶναι*. Cf. Ignat., *Ad Eph.* 10 and 11. In this verse, however, it is certainly not synon. with *εἶναι*, but means emphatically "we are beginning to be found out." Cf. note on iv. 2; Rom. vii. 10; 2 Cor. xi. 12; 1 Pet. ii. 22, "no deceit was detected after eager search." Class. writers would probably use *καταλαμβάνω* or even *λαμβάνω* (Plat., *Gorg.* p. 473). The meaning is helped by the use of the pres. tense: "we are beginning one after another to be found out."

*ψευδομάρτυρες τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The apostles were God's witnesses, sent by Him to testify to what they had seen. But, if Christ did not rise from the dead, then they abuse their high prerogative and utter in God's name what they know to be untrue. *Θεοῦ* is subjective genit.

*ἐμαρτυρήσαμεν*, a pure aor., regarded from the time at which the falsehood of their testimony is detected.

*κατά* has occasionally the neutral meaning, "concerning." Cf. Dem., *Phil.* II. p. 68, *καθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκώμιον*.<sup>1</sup> But this meaning is not found in the New Test. The apostles were sent to testify for God, *ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ, κατέναντι Θεοῦ* (2 Cor. ii. 17). If Christ was not raised, their testimony was a deliberate falsehood and, consequently, against God, whom they professed to represent. The words are virtually equivalent to *ψεύδεσθαι κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Xen., *Apol.* 13). Cf. Mark xiv. 56; James iii. 14; Ignat., *Ad Trall.* 10, *καταψεύδομαι τοῦ Κυρίου*.

*εἴπερ*, an emphatic "if," increasing the uncertainty of the opponent's allegation. Cf. Hermann, *Ad Vig.* p. 834.

*ἄρα* implies that the Apostle is stating the opinion of others, not his own: "if really, as you say." Cf. Stallbaum's note to Plat., *Rep.* p. 358.

*νεκροί*, not *οἱ ν.*, because the supposition is that death in its very nature involves the impossibility of a resurrection. The supposition is formally stated in ver. 16. Hence also the pres., not the fut.: "if we maintain that dead men cannot come to life." Cf. Thuc. III. 65, *εἰ . . . ἐμαχόμεθα . . . ἀδικοῦμεν*, "if we fought, we admit we should have been guilty of having wronged you." In ver. 52 we have *οἱ νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται*, "the dead will as a fact rise." But *νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται* is the same thing as *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν*, ver. 13. Buttmann (*N.S.* p. 78) has shown the incorrectness of Winer's statement (*Gr.* § XIX. 1) that *νεκροί* is usually anarthrous in Greek writers.

**Vv. 16-18.** A second (or, including the corollary immediately preceding, third) consequence of denying the resurrection of Christ will be the uselessness of the believer's hope. This also is introduced with a formal declaration of the connection between the denial of the resurrection of the dead and denial of the resurrection of Christ.

**V. 17.** Not a repetition of the inference drawn in ver. 14. The Apostle intentionally makes a distinction between *κενός* and *μάταιος*, between the absence of reality and the loss of future results.<sup>2</sup> The former involves that the Gospel is not

<sup>1</sup> In Lidd. and Scott's *Lex.* under this head are placed Plat., *Apol.* 37 B and *Prot.* 323 B; but in both passages the context requires the meaning "against."

<sup>2</sup> The distinction is not always observed. Cf. Soph., *El.* 331, *θυμῷ ματαίῳ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι κενά*.

the wisdom of God, the latter that it is not the power of God. Now the results of Christ's death are comprised in "our justification" (Rom. iv. 25); so that the words "ye are yet in your sins" will mean that their sins are not forgiven and that they are not justified through faith in Christ. The Apostle always represents Christ's resurrection, not merely as "the proof that His death was accepted by God" (Wordsworth), but as part of His redemptive work. In the Epistle to the Romans St. Paul takes for granted that Christ is risen, and from His resurrection proves that justification is through faith; in our Epistle he assumes that man is justified through faith, and shows that this involves the truth of Christ's resurrection. "To be in sin" includes much more than "to have sin;" it means that sin is the sphere of the man's whole moral being. It is the opposite of "being in Christ" and corresponds to St. John's expressions "being in darkness," "in the world," "in the evil one." Cf. John viii. 24.

V. 18. Not only believers that are alive are still unjustified, but those who died in faith in Christ have perished. The Apostle adds this because dying in faith was the Christian's greatest triumph; for it meant certain conviction that Jesus Christ was Lord of the dead as well as of the living (Rom. xiv. 9). His resurrection was a conquest over death, not a mere escape from the bonds of death. The Apostle wrote at the time when the first generation of Christian believers were gradually dying off. The great majority of those that had seen the Lord still remained, but some had fallen asleep. Milton imagines the dismay of Adam at the first sight of death. Great must have been the triumphant joy of those who first witnessed the victory of dying Christians. It is not unlikely that the Apostle's conversion began in the influence of the first Christian martyr's peaceful end. He had seen "how a Christian can die." The thought of Stephen and James the son of Alpheus having perished in their sins, if it could not convince the gainsayer, appealed with irresistible force to Christians.

*Agar.* Cf. note on ver. 14. Whether *deu* can stand at the head of a clause in class. Greek is a debated question.

*an anastrophe* δὲ Χριστοῦ is an instance of an epithet without the article being used with a subject that has the article.

Cf. 1 Thess. iv. 16, οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ. But there is some difference in meaning. Οἱ κοιμηθέντες οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ means "those who have fallen asleep and are in Christ;" οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ means "those whose sleep is a sleep in Christ." Cf. 1 Tim. vi. 17, τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι, "those whose wealth is a wealth in this world." Cf. Thuc. II. 62, τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπερφρονος ἐχυρώτεραν παρέχεται.

ἀπώλοντο, aor., "perished" in the act of falling asleep, as they thought, in Christ. Cf. ver. 6. There is no allusion to the large number who had fallen asleep in Corinth as a chastisement for unworthy behaviour at the Lord's Supper.

**V. 19.** He sums up the sad condition of the Christians, "if the dead rise not."

ζωῇ, here used for βίῃ of the period or condition of life, not in its more strictly correct meaning, the principle of life. It is here "vita quam vivimus," not "quâ vivimus." Cf. Luke xvi. 25; Heb. vii. 3; Herm. Past., Mand. 3, ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ζωῇ; and so occasionally in class. Greek, e.g. Arist., Eth. Nic. I. 10, ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, "of one's condition."

ἡλπικότες ἐσμεν, "we have set our hope and continue to hope." Cf. Bernhardt, IV. S. p. 378. So in John v. 45. Similarly οἱ πεπιστευκότες (Acts xv. 5) is synon. with οἱ πιστεύοντες (Acts ii. 44), and τοῖς ἡγαπηκόσιν (2 Tim. iv. 8) with τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν (1 Cor. ii. 9).

ἐν Χριστῷ must be placed before ἡλπικότες, as in **8 A B D**. The position of μόνον is decisive against the rendering "in this life only" (Vulg., *in hac vitâ tantum*). So Tert., *De Resurr.* 24, "in istâ tantum vitâ;" and so Chrys. evidently understood it. But μόνον clings to the verb even when it belongs to the other words as well. Cf. Matt. xiv. 36. We need not, therefore, confine its reference to ἡλπικότες (Neander): "if we hope only, without ever seeing the fulfilment of the hope." Μόνον qualifies the whole clause: "if in this life we have hoped in Christ, and if that is all."

ἐλεεινότεροι, "most pitiable." So Rev. Vers. excellently. The notion is apparently, not that the Christians are the most wretched of men as being ever exposed to danger and death (Alford and most expositors), but that they are most to be pitied as men whose vast hopes are doomed to bitterest disap-

pointment. But a difficulty meets us. Will not the Christian love goodness even if there is no life after death? The answer is twofold. *First*, love of goodness is not the same thing as happiness. He who loves goodness most may be the worthiest object of pity. The conception of an ideal happiness, in its nature absolute and independent of place or time, is foreign to the Apostle's practical thought. He must add, with Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* I. 7), ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ—in a complete life. Instead of ἀντάρκεια, "self-sufficiency," St. Paul speaks of a sufficiency from God (2 Cor. iii. 5), and a power to do all things through Christ. Remove, therefore, the living Christ and the entire edifice of Christian joy falls to the ground. *Second*, the Apostle teaches that goodness itself is the fruit of those peculiar gifts which God bestows only through the death and resurrection of Christ. The highest conceivable form of "hoping in Christ only in this life" would be the imitation of His life on earth, without justification, without forgiveness, without the indwelling of Christ in the soul. But this, according to St. Paul, is an impossible attainment. The effort to attain it would result only in knowing Christ after the flesh, not after the Spirit that informed and ennobled even His earthly life, and in imitation of the outward appearance without possessing and being possessed by the inward power. The strange absence from the Apostle's teaching of reference to the life of Jesus as the ideal life and to the Christian course as an imitation of it is inexplicable, if he does not represent the risen, living and glorified Christ Jesus as the source of all moral goodness. We know Christ after the flesh no more. Even His life on earth is transformed into a supernatural life by the reflection upon it of the life in heaven. The Lord is the Spirit.

ἐλλεινότεροι. For the comparative apparently in the sense of a superlative cf. note on xiii. 13; Matt. xiii. 32.

C. *Direct Proof: The Resurrection of the Dead necessary that the Christian order of the subjection of all things to Christ may be realized.*

(20-34).

The resurrection of the dead is necessitated by the relation in which Christ stands to the redeemed and to God. This

relation is determined by the great Pauline conception of a series of subordinations, a conception that has already more than once in this Epistle formed the basis of important theoretical and practical deductions (cf. iii. 21-23; xi. 3). The true moral order of things consists in their right subordination. There is no *τάξις* without a *ὑπόταξις*. The lower terms of the series vary according to the nature of the case. In one instance the apostles are the last term, in another the woman, and here again all creation. But the highest terms are always the same, Christ and God. In the Apostle's present argument all things are subordinated to man, man is subordinated to Christ, Christ is subordinated to God. This threefold subordination must be realized in facts, that God may become actually what He necessarily is by native right and inalienable prerogative, all in all. For in relation to man Christ is king; in relation to God Christ is subject. Man is subject to Christ because Christ is subject to God. But this kingship of Christ is brought to pass, not by power, but by union. Christ is become man, yea, the man. As Adam was the first man, Christ is the second man. The relation of Adam to his offspring is not in these verses further explained. But we are told that it is the source of death to the race, as in Rom. v. also we are said to have died in Adam because in Adam we sinned. The race is, in a true sense, one man; or, to use the term which the federalist divines placed in the fore-front of their theology, Adam is our covenant-head. Now Christ, in virtue of His incarnation, is the new head of humanity, and the fruit of this union is life through faith. This headship exists, not provisionally and for the sake of making it possible for Christ to be an atonement through death, but permanently, as the only adequate realization both of God's conception of man and of Christ's subordination to God. Life is, therefore, the sum of all the results of the new covenant. The resurrection of the dead is part of the mediatorial work of Christ, and on His accomplishing this work depends His kingship over man as the vicegerent of God. Moreover, if the kingly authority of Christ proves the resurrection of the dead, so also does His subjection to His Father, which is not a legal fiction, but the realization of the Father's prerogative that God shall be all in all. The resurrection of

the dead is a victory over an enemy and a winning of humanity to God.

The Apostle keeps closely to this conception and its bearing on the truth of the resurrection. All other though kindred questions are thrust aside, such as the nature of our relation to Adam, the coming in of the fulness of the Gentiles, the engrafting of the wild olive tree, the millennium and the final doom of the wicked. It is worthy of note that the early writers, such as Pseudo-Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Methodius, who held the doctrine of a resurrection of the flesh, make no use whatever of this the Apostle's most weighty argument.

V. 20. Christ's resurrection having been proved by witnesses and the denial of it shown to be the destruction of hope, the Apostle connects Christ's risen life with the resurrection of the dead.

ἐγένετο must be omitted, as in 8 A B D. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Ἀπ.ρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων will be, not indeed in apposition to Χριστός (Meyer), but an explanatory predicate. Cf. ἔχθρος, ver. 26. The comma after νεκρῶν is better away: "Now Christ has been raised from the dead as the first-fruits of them that have fallen asleep." His resurrection is not a solitary occurrence, affecting only Himself. It is the resurrection of the head of a new humanity and a pledge, therefore, of the resurrection of the dead.

νυνὶ δέ, "but now as things are," *atqui*, introducing the statement of a fact. Cf. Rom. iii. 21.

ἀπαρχή, "first-fruits." Humanity is as the terebinth and oak of which, after felling, a stock remaineth, and the holy seed of Christ is that from which the new life shoots. He is the first sheaf carried into God's temple, and God's acceptance of the first sheaf is a sure pledge of harvest. The metaphor of the first-fruits and the other metaphor of "the first-born from the dead" (Col. i. 18) mean, not only that Christ is prior in point of time, but also that He is the earnest of the resurrection. How He is the earnest is told us in the following verses. The final consummation will be attained when the Son is subjected to the Father and God is all in all. But the first step in this development of the ages is the resurrection of Christ; and it resembles the last. For His

resurrection no less than His final action as Mediator is a dedication of Himself and of humanity to God. This is symbolized in the offering of the first-fruits of harvest to the Lord. Most expositors in these days deny that any allusion to the presentation of the first sheaf of the barley harvest before the Lord is intended by the Apostle. Hesychius explains ἀπαρχή by πρῶτος. Grimm (*Lex.*) says the Schol. on Eur., *Orest.* 96, paraphrases ἀπαρχή by τὸ πρῶτον τῇ τιμῇ. But all this deprives the Apostle's words of their naturalness, beauty and force. Chrys. thinks the reference is to the first sheaf; and the idea is admirably put by Cox, *The Resurrection*, pp. 62, 88. The resurrection of others, such as Lazarus, which occurred before the resurrection of Christ, ought to present no difficulty. They returned into their mortal life to die again. Christ rose into the spiritual life, which cannot die.

τῶν κεκοιμημένων. Cf. notes on ver. 6 and ver. 51.

V. 21. Christ's resurrection is the pledge of the resurrection of men inasmuch as He is the cause of it. From the metaphor of the first-fruits, which implies only an emblem of God's blessing on humanity, the Apostle passes to the source of the blessing, and this he finds in the unity of the race under one head, even Christ. As death came through the oneness of the race in a man, so also the resurrection of the dead is through man. But ἐπειδή means much more than resemblance (Krauss), and more than fitness or congruity. It expresses the necessity that there should be a new head of the race and an organic centre of life. The necessity arises from our need of redemption. *Because* through one man sin came into the world, through union with a new source come redemption and through redemption life. Cf. Rom. v. 12.

ὁ before θάνατος must be omitted, as **8 A B D.**

V. 22. In ver. 21 he has argued that the resurrection must be through man. Now he adds that so in fact it is. The man through whom as head of the race comes death is Adam; the new head of humanity and the new source of life is Christ.

πάντες . . . πάντες. That the former πάντες comprises all men cannot be denied, and Van Hengel is not justified in restricting its range of meaning to believers, who will be made alive in Christ. It is a much more difficult question whether the second πάντες is equally extensive. Chrys., Theod., Am-

brosiaster, Calvin, Meyer, De Wette, Olshausen, etc., think it is; Augustine, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, Rückert, Hofmann, Heinrici, etc., confine it to believers. The key to the whole paragraph is the notion of Christian subordinations, in which only believers, who are in union with Christ, are included. In relation to those that sleep Christ is the first-fruits. But it cannot without manifest harshness be said that Christ is the first-fruits of those who perish; neither can they be said to rise ἐν Χριστῷ, in mystical union with Christ (against Olshausen and Meyer). They are among the enemies (Phil. iii. 18), whom Christ will put under His feet. Moreover, the analogy between Adam and Christ must include more than physical death and a physical quickening, and more than "the two natures we have in us even before we believe, the worse and the better self we have contending in us for the mastery" (Cox, *ut sup.* p. 73). For death and life in St. Paul's theology mean perdition and salvation, and men are saved by faith. In accordance with this the Apostle says in Rom. viii. 11 that our mortal bodies shall be made alive through the indwelling spirit of Christ Jesus, which cannot be said of the unbeliever. There is no real unfairness in considering the former πάντες to be more extensive than the latter, if we bear in mind that the conditions of entrance into the one class and the other are totally different. They are not stated here. But we have them in Rom. vi. 5-11, where the Apostle seems as if he anticipated this objection to the analogy which he has instituted between Adam and Christ. Both alike are heads of humanity. But they are unlike in this (as also in other things, Rom. v. 15), that men are in Adam by nature, in Christ by faith.

Origen (*De Princ.* i. 6), De Wette, Neander, Krauss, Grimm (*Zeitschr. f. Wiss. Theol.*, Vol. XVI. pp. 380 sqq.) have inferred from the words "all shall be made alive" that the Apostle teaches the doctrine of a final restoration of all, which some of them explain to be the meaning of ἀποκατάστασις τῶν πάντων, Acts iii. 21. But this is inconsistent with what the Apostle subsequently says of the subjection of all things to Christ, and the putting all things under His feet, besides that it is inconsistent with 2 Thess. i. 9; Acts xxiv. 15.

ἐν, not synon. with διὰ (Œcum., Erasm., Grot.), which would

make this ver. almost a repetition of ver. 21; nor merely denoting the possession of a common nature (Alford), which would be true of us in relation to all men; much less signifying only "by following the example of Adam and Christ" (Van Hengel); but expressing union, in the one case a union of covenant only, in the other a mystical union of person and life (cf. Eph. i. 10). Nothing can be inferred from this verse in favour of either the Traducian or the Creation theory.

**V. 23.** He now states explicitly the doctrine of the Christian series of subordinations as it manifests itself in the circumstances of the resurrection from the dead. God—Christ—Men. These are the terms of the series, this the place of each term in the series. Christ is the connecting link between men and God. He acts as man's representative when He rises from the dead, and He presents to God those whom He has raised.

τάγματι, properly a passive noun meaning "an arranged thing;" hence it is often used as a military term for "a regiment or troop of soldiers." But it is a mistake to suppose it has not also the meaning of "grade," that is, the difference between one company and another. Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 37, where ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι means "each in his own grade," whether captain of a thousand or captain of a hundred. Similarly Theophyl. on 1 Cor. vii. 20 uses the word: ἐν οἷῳ βίῳ καὶ ἐν οἷῳ τάγματι καὶ πολιτεύματι, that is, rank, social position. Τάγμα is related to τάξις as the place of each term of a series is related to the series. The word ἕκαστος includes the three terms of the Christian series—God, Christ, Man. Each of them occupies *his own place* in the economy of the resurrection and judgment. The word really contains the main thought of the paragraph. Heydenreich, Rückert, De Wette, Maier, etc., consider τάγμα to be synonym with τάξις in the sense of sequence only in time. But there is not, I believe, an example of this meaning. Tertullian (*De Resurr. Carn.* 48) explains it of order of merit. Theod. and Œcum. think it means that the good are to be raised among the good, the wicked among the wicked. But all these explanations do not bring the word into the main stream of the argument. As these events are the final acts in the development of Christ's mediatorial kingdom, the Apostle

connects them with Christ. The first act is the resurrection of Christ; the next His second coming, when those who are Christ's will be raised; the third will be the delivery of the kingdom to God the Father.

ἐπειτα, "after this" (= μετὰ τοῦτο, as in ver. 6). Cf. John xi. 7. He does not say that the one event follows the other immediately, nor does he say how soon it will follow. The answer to the question "when?" God has kept to Himself. Cf. Acts i. 7.

οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, "they that are Christ's," not as being His work (Chrys. on iii. 21, Theophyl., Œcum.), nor His followers in the days of His flesh, but the subjects of Christ the mediatorial King. It is the subordination still. None but true Christians have this designation of being Christ's (against Meyer). Cf. Rom. viii. 11; Gal. v. 24. They are "the dead in Christ," 1 Thess. iv. 17.

ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, not merely "at the time of His coming" (as in Matt. xix. 28, ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ), but also "involved in" (Alford), "as the result of." The parousia is certainly the second coming. The Vulg. renders it *qui in adventu ejus crediderunt*, as if the Apostle meant to say that all who believed in Christ in the days of His flesh will rise from the dead before other believers. So also Schöttgen (*Hor. Heb.* p. 662), Van Hengel. But the word *παρουσία* is not in the New Test. used of the incarnation, not even in 2 Pet. i. 16. It is so used in the early Fathers, e.g., Ignat., *Ad Philad.* 9. Hence the phrase ἡ δευτέρα παρουσία. Cf. Just. M., *Dial. c. Tryph.* 52, προεφητεύθη ὅτι δύο τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίαι ἔσονται. Cajetan thinks the words distinguish those who will be true Christians at Christ's coming from such as will then prove themselves to have been hypocrites. But this is already implied in οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The words denote the power that will raise the dead and change the living. That Christ rose Himself as first-fruits is not enough to transform the present into the new, spiritual mode of existence. His second coming also is necessary.

V. 24. The next act is the last, that Christ should deliver the kingdom to God.

εἶτα, not "at that time," but "after this," as in vv. 7, 24.

τὸ τέλος. The word occurs thus absolutely also in Matt.

xxiv. 6, 14; Mark xiii. 7; Luke xxi. 9; and in these passages it means the end of the present αἰών, synon. with συντέλεια αἰῶνος (Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49), which, again, is the end of all things (1 Pet. iv. 7), when the day of judgment is come. This is in accordance with the belief of the Jews, who taught that one αἰών or series of αἰῶνες ends at the coming of Messiah (cf. Heb. ix. 26) and another at the day of judgment (cf. Bertholdt, *Christol. Judæor.* p. 119). It does not, therefore, signify here either the end of the Gospel dispensation and of the divinely instituted means of salvation (Grot., Billroth, etc.), or the end of the eschatological events (De Wette), or the end of the resurrection (Theod., Œcum., Beng., Meyer). If it meant any one of these, something would have been added to τέλος.

ὅταν cannot be explanatory of τέλος, "the end consists in," etc. It denotes the time when the end comes.

The received reading παραδῶ is defended by Reiche and Heinrici, because it must have been read by the authors of the oldest Latin Versions, the Itala and Vulgate, as well as by Greek and Latin Fathers (*tradiderit*), especially as it is found in Origen, Tertullian and Ambrosiaster. But Ⲭ A D read παραδιδῶ, B παραδιδοῖ, which is adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., but Westc. and Hort adopt παραδιδῶ. One of these two forms must be accepted. But παραδιδοῖ also is, not opt., but subjunctive from παραδιδόω. Cf. Mark iv. 29; xiv. 10, 11; John xiii. 2; in all of which Treg. and Westc. and Hort read παραδοῖ. Cf. Buttmann, *N.S.* p. 40. It follows that the end is simultaneous with the delivering the kingdom to God the Father; and this again takes place when Christ has destroyed all rule and put all enemies under His feet. The inference is that τέλος signifies the end of the mediatorial kingdom of Christ. God's purpose in subordinating man to Christ has been accomplished. The versicle "of whose kingdom there shall be no end" is taken from the salutation of Gabriel to Mary (Luke i. 33). But no inference can be fairly drawn from it on the theological question. The words διαμένοντα βασιλέα καὶ θεὸν εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας occur in the Arian Creed of the Council held at Antioch A.D. 341. Words of like import are incorporated in the Creed of Cyril of Jerusalem, A.D. 350, and afterwards in the enlarged form of the Nicene Creed,

oecumenically adopted at Chalcedon, A.D. 451. Cf. 2 Pet. i. 11; Rev. xi. 15.

τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρί, "to God the Father." But *καὶ* is, not "even," but "and:" "to Him who is God and Father." As God He is the source of all authority over Christ and over men; as Father He is the source of their being. As He is God, it is right the kingdom should revert to Him; as He is Father, Christ and men will rejoice in delivering the kingdom to Him who is Love. This combination of Θεός and Πατήρ without the genit. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is of some weight in favour of joining these genitives, when they do occur, with the Θεός as well as with the Πατήρ.

καταργήσῃ, sc. ὁ Χριστός, the subject of παραδιδοῖ, not ὁ Θεός, as it is understood by Bengel and Van Hengel. The aor. denotes that the καταργεῖν takes place before the kingdom is delivered to God.

ἀρχή, "rule;" ἐξουσία, "authority;" δύναμις, "power." A comparison with Rom. viii. 38; Eph. i. 21; iii. 10; Col. i. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 22, proves that these words signify different orders of angels, a conception which we find in the pre-exilic books of the Old Test. But whereas the Old Test. designates the angels for the most part by means of attributives (e.g., "the shining ones," Ezek. i. 4), St. Paul uses abstract names, under the influence of Philo, who formed his angelology by combining the Platonic theory of ideas with Jewish notions. The angels are in Philo the personification of Divine ideas. Cf. *De Somn.* p. 638, Vol. I. Mang., ἀθανάτοις λόγοις, οὓς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους. But the Apostle gives no further account of the angelic orders. All we can infer is that ἀρχή signifies the highest, ἐξουσία a lower, and δύναμις a still lower rank; and that these distinctions are true of the fallen no less than of the holy angels. Here it is evident from ver. 25 that he refers to evil angels. Cf. Eph. vi. 12, where the ἀρχαὶ and the ἐξουσαίαι are connected with "the spiritual hosts of wickedness." So Chrys., Theod., etc. On the other hand Calvin explains the words to mean "lawful powers ordained by God;" Grotius, "the empires of the world;" Rückert, *De Wette*, Osiander, Meyer, "all adversaries of Christ of every kind." The most unnatural explanation is that of Olshausen, that all sovereignty, even the sovereignty of the Son Himself, is meant.

**V. 25.** The reign of Christ has already begun, inasmuch as all things are in course of being subjected to Him, either of their own free choice, or else by the exercise of His constraining power. A kingdom is implied in the words *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. De Wette and Pfleiderer (*Paulin.* p. 265) wrongly date the beginning of Christ's reign from the second coming. Cf. Mark xvi. 19; Eph. i. 19–23. Alford is still more mistaken in saying that Christ is not king before the *τέλος* arrives. If it were so, the first act of the king would be to deliver the kingdom to God. This verse means that Christ reigns until He has put, after long protracted warfare, all enemies under His feet. The reign of Christ, therefore, is not a millennium of peace, but a perpetual conflict ending in a final triumph. Cf. Zech. xiv. 17–19.

*δεῖ* expresses the necessity that arises from the fitness of the Christian order of subordinations.

*ἄχρις οὗ*. **Σ** A B D omit *ἄν*. So in Rom. xi. 25; Gal. iii. 19. Cf. note on xi. 26. It is inserted in Ps. cix. (cx.) 1, which verse the Apostle is here citing.

*θῆ*, sc. *ὁ Χριστός*. So Chrys., Rückert, Meyer, De Wette, etc. Beza, Grotius, etc., consider *ὁ Θεός* to be subject. But putting all enemies under His feet and destroying death is the final victory of Him who destroys all rule and authority and power. Christ's mediatorial reign will close when He shall have put all enemies under His feet.

*αὐτοῦ* after *ἐχθρούς* is omitted in **Σ** B D. A has it. "*The enemies*" is more forcible. Christ's enemies are the enemies of God. In conquering those who revolted from God's first obedience, Christ acts as His father's vicerent.

*ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας*. Cf. Josh. x. 24; 1 Kings v. 3. The Apostle is citing Ps. cix. (cx.) 1, not accommodating the words to a purpose foreign to that of the Psalmist (Van Hengel), but resting his prediction of Christ's victory on a prophecy concerning Messiah. Peter uses the same words as a Messianic prophecy (Acts ii. 35), and Christ Himself (Matt. xxii. 44), neither can the Pharisees gainsay Him. Cf. Heb. i. 13; x. 13.

**V. 26.** *ἔσχατος ἐχθρος*, an explanatory predicate: "as the last enemy Death is destroyed." Death has not, it appears from this, been destroyed at the second coming and at the resurrection of those that are Christ's. The Apostle seems, it

must be acknowledged, to teach that there will be two resurrections, the former of believers only, the latter of all others, when at last "death itself will die." The first resurrection is the redemption of the body for which believers groan (Rom. viii. 23). Similarly the Apostle John says that the followers of Jesus (not the martyrs only; for *καὶ οἵτινες* introduces others), will rise and reign with Christ a thousand years, and this is the first resurrection, but that the rest of the dead will not rise till the thousand years are ended (cf. Rev. xx. 4, 5). This is not inconsistent with the words of Christ in Matt. xxiv. 28-31, which have reference to the second coming and the resurrection of the elect. In Matt. xxiv. 31 a transition is unquestionably made from the resurrection of saints, which takes place at the coming of Christ, to the general judgment, which takes place after that event (*ὅταν ἔλθῃ*, the aor. subj. being a futurum exactum). How long after we are not told. The words in Barn., *Ep.* 15, *ὅταν ἐλθὼν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καταργήσῃ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ ἀνόμου καὶ κρινεῖ τοὺς ἁσεβεῖς*, contain the doctrine of two resurrections. Cf. Thomasius, *Dogmengesch.* p. 281. But St. Paul gives no encouragement to materialistic views of Christ's reign on earth, such as were advocated by Justin M. (*Dial. c. Tryph.* 80), Irenæus (*Adv. Hær.* V. 33-35) and Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* III. 24), though they are right in their doctrine of two resurrections.<sup>1</sup>

No inference as to the final restoration of all (Origen, *De Princ.*, I. vi.) can be fairly drawn from *καταργεῖται*, which may or may not imply a cessation of existence. It includes it in xiii. 10; it does not include it in reference to death itself in 2 Tim. i. 11.

V. 27. The proof that death, the last enemy, is destroyed is that God has subjected all things under the feet of Christ. Only He who has subdued all things can destroy death.

*ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ.* Meyer, Osiander, Alford think these words refer, not to a declaration in Scripture (De Wette), nor to

<sup>1</sup> I may add that my interpretation of the Apostle's words is not the result of having adopted any theory on the general question. I know next to nothing of millenarian literature. But after reading Bp. Waldegrave's *New Testament Millenarianism* (2nd ed., 1866), and Dr. Brown's *Second Advent* (6th ed., 1867), I am not convinced that the Apostle does not teach the doctrine of two resurrections. Neither of these writers, so far as I have observed, touches upon the argument that death is not destroyed at the Advent.

God's announcement at the creation of the world (Van Hengel), but to the Divine proclamation which will be made when all things have been subjected. *Εἴπη* will then be a *futurum exactum*. This view explains *δῆλον*. That God Himself is not subjected to Christ is manifest; for it is God that announces, as supreme ruler, the accomplishment of the subjection of all things to Christ. Notwithstanding this, the words "He subjected all things under His feet" are a citation from Ps. viii. 7. The Psalmist speaks of the subjection of all things to man. This subjection the Apostle finds realized in Christ, the man, the head of the race. We have a similar application of the words in Heb. ii. 6-9. Some editors (so margin of Rev. Vers.) enclose *δῆλον . . . τὰ πάντα* in parentheses, which makes the clause quite purposeless. It is true that *ὅταν ὑποταγῇ* (ver. 28) denotes the same act as *ὅταν . . . ὑποτέτακται*. But the subjection of Christ to God is proved by the fact that it is God who has subjected all things to Christ, God Himself being, therefore, excepted and alone excepted from subjection.

**V. 28.** Having declared what will occur before and up to the end, the Apostle repeats in another form that, when the end comes, Christ will deliver the mediatorial kingdom to God the Father. The subjection of Christ as God-Man to the Father is the final subjection and the ultimate reason of creation, redemption and judgment. The mediatorial kingdom is delivered to the Father that God may be all in all. Hence the personality of the God-Man will not be affected by this final act (against De Wette). The Sabellianism of Baur (*Vorles. über Neutest. Theol.* p. 206), who says that in the Apostle's Christology Christ is Son of God in reference only to the work of redemption, has no foundation in this verse, which, in fact, implies the opposite. The cessation of His human mode of existence or its absorption in Deity would not be called a subjection of Him to God. Christ will cease to be mediator in a redemptive scheme, but will for ever be the medium of communion, the Word of God and the Lord Jesus Christ. The subjection of Christ to God will be brought about, not merely because there will be no more need of atonement and intercession, but because it will constitute the final consummation of the Christian order of subordinations. Christ is king as vice-

gerent of God. His kingship, therefore, involves that the kingdom will be delivered to the Father. But Christ is also Son, and sonship implies the possibility of subjection, even when it is necessarily accompanied by equality in nature. His kingship and his subjection rest on his sonship. For only the co-equal Son can be the fit vicegerent of God. Because He is Son, His highest reward and joy will consist in being subjected to the Father's supremacy. The Arians appealed to this verse; and expositors have been apt to represent His subjection as in some way derogatory to Christ. Chrys., for instance (and he is followed by Œcum., Theophyl., Estius), asks what can be more absurd and unworthy of God than to inflict on His Son at some future time a subjection greater than that of taking the form of a servant: and he reduces the notion to a mere concord between the Father and the Son (*ὅταν ὁμονοίῃ μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς ἀκριβείας*). From a similar motive Augustine (*De Trin.* I. 16 and 20) explains it to mean that Christ will lead the saints to a contemplation of God the Father, and manifest God's power to the unbelievers. So also Hilary, *De Trin.* XI. 21 sqq., who, however, explains the kingdom, not of any authority, but of the persons of the believers. Theod., Ambrose (*De Fide*, V. 14), Œcum., etc., think it means that Christ appropriates to Himself the subjection of the Church. But the Jewish belief connected together the subjection and the glorification of Messiah; that is, that at the end of the world He would deliver His kingdom to God and for ever sit at God's right hand. As the willing subjection of the Church to Christ will be its greatest glory, so also the subjection of the Son will be the Son's highest honour. In Christ, in the Church, in every saint, God will fully and ever-increasingly reveal Himself. This is "the glory of God the Father," which is the final purpose attained through the glory of the saints and the Church.

*τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* cannot mean merely "that God may be everything in all men" (Bengel), as if the expression were parallel with *τὸ ὅλον αὐτοῖς ἦν καὶ τὸ πᾶν Ἀπελλῆς* (Polyb. V. xxvi. 5). This does not account for the *ἐν*. *Πᾶσιν* must be neuter, as it means the *πάντα* subjected to Christ. Cf. Rom. xi. 36; Eph. i. 23.

**Vv. 29-34.** The Apostle has now proved the resurrection

of the dead from the fundamental conception of the relation between Christ and those who are Christ's, on the one hand, of the relation between Christ and God, on the other. This, it appears to me, is the only direct proof offered by the Apostle of the doctrine of the resurrection. Then follows a series of questions having reference to the practical consequences of denying it. These verses (29-34) bear the same relation to the foregoing proof of the resurrection which verses 12-19 bear to the previous proof of the resurrection of Christ. They are intended to show that, if there is no resurrection of the dead, his preaching is vain, and their faith is vain; and that not only because it was the resurrection of Christ that made his preaching and their faith effectual (as in vv. 12-19), but also because it is their own resurrection or change that will bring them into actual fruition of the glorious results of the ministry and of faith.

V. 29. *ἐπεὶ*, that is, "if the dead do not rise." It corresponds to ver. 12 (cf. note on v. 10). In Rom. iii. 6 *ἐπεὶ* stands without *ἄρα*, as here. So in the classics, *e.g.*, *Thuc.* II. 89.

*τί ποιήσουσιν*, "what will they be doing?" "what will their act prove to be?" "what shall we say is the meaning and purpose of baptism for the dead, if used by men that deny the resurrection?" Cf. Mark xi. 5, *τί ποιεῖτε λύοντες* "what do you mean by loosing," etc. So in class. Greek, *e.g.*, *Æschyl.*, *Suppl.* 384, *οὗτος τί ποιεῖς*; which is explained in the next words, *ἐκ πόλου φρονήματος*; The fut. tense expresses, not a future act, but men's opinion of the character of a present act. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* II. p. 376, *ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται*, "we shall infer that he is," etc. *ἔσται* is synon. with the previous *τιθῶμεν*. Winer (*Gr.* § XL. 6) and Canon Evans render *τί ποιήσουσιν*, "what will they have recourse to?" But cf. note on *νεκροί*, ver. 15. It would seem that, when an opinion concerning a future act is expressed, the pres. is used; and when an opinion concerning a present act is expressed, the fut. is used.

*οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι*, mid., "who get themselves baptized." Cf. note on *ἀδικεῖσθε*, vi. 7. This also shows that *τί ποιήσουσιν* refers to the purpose of their baptism.

*ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*, "for the dead." In interpreting this

famous *cruæ* much depends on every man's opinion of what is natural. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that all those interpretations must be rejected which explain "baptizing" of anything else than the sacrament of baptism, or which take ὑπέρ in any other than a metaphorical meaning, or which explain "the dead" to denote any other thing or person than men that have departed this life; and I have no other reason for rejecting these interpretations than that they appear to me forced and unnatural. I put on one side, therefore, the following explanations: (1) Beza's rendering, "who wash the dead in order to burial;" (2) the rendering of Cocceius, Van Til, Ewald, etc., "who wash themselves from ceremonial defilement contracted by touching a dead body;" (3) that of Bellarmine, Lightfoot (*Hor. Heb.*), etc., "who undergo the baptism of affliction and martyrdom;" (4) that of Aquinas, De Lyra, etc., "who are baptized for mortal sins;" (5) that of Luther, Calovius, Piscator, Vossius, "who are baptized over the tombs of the martyrs;" (6) that of Melancthon, Bengel, etc., "who are baptized on the point of death;" not to mention a score of ingenious absurdities. Four interpretations are left us worthy of consideration. (1) Le Clerc, Hammond, Olshausen thus: "who are baptized to fill the place of the dead." Ὑπέρ can mean this. Cf. Dion. Hal. VIII. 87, ὑπὲρ (*in locum*) τῶν ἀποθανόντων ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀντιάτας πολέμῳ στρατιωτῶν ἡξίουں ἐτέρους καταγράφειν. But the notion of new converts coming in to fill the broken ranks or to make up the number of the elect is too foreign to the subject of the resurrection. (2) John Edwards of Cambridge (*Enquiry into Four Remarkable Texts*, 1692) proposed the rendering, "who allow themselves to be baptized as converts to Christianity because they have observed the heroic behaviour of the Christian martyrs." This view has been maintained by a few recent expositors. St. Paul himself would be such a convert, and several other instances are mentioned in the early martyrologies. But this interpretation is open to the following objections. *First*, οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι is not in the apostolic age the name for "converts," but οἱ πιστεύοντες. Cf. Acts ii. 44. The reference must be, not to the faith signified, but to the symbolical act of baptism. *Second*, ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν is far from being a natural expression

to denote the moral influence of martyrdom. How much more appropriate the expression in 1 Pet. iii. 1, διὰ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ἀναστροφῆς . . . κερδηθήσονται! (3) Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Œcum., and, in modern times, Erasmus, Hammond, Cor. a Lap., Estius, Wordsworth, etc., explain it to mean “baptism in hope of the resurrection of the dead.” Against this view it may be objected, *first*, that though baptism is a symbol of our spiritual burial with Christ and of our resurrection into newness of life (Rom. vi. 4), the New Test. does not in any special way connect it with our belief in the resurrection of the body; *second*, that, if this is the meaning, the Apostle’s question is by no means a formidable one; for the opponent can reply that, even if there be no resurrection of the dead, baptism is significant of present blessings; *third*, that the ellipse in ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν for ἐπὶ προσδοκίᾳ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν is awkward, especially if we read ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν after βαπτίζονται. (4) Tertullian in two places (*De Resurr. Carn.* 48; *Contra Marc.* V. 10) says the Apostle refers to the custom of administering baptism vicariously. Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxviii. 6) mentions a tradition that it was customary among the Cerinthians, when any of the catechumens died unbaptized, for some of their surviving friends to be baptized as their representatives, that the dead might not suffer the penalty of the unbaptized. He adds that tradition interpreted the Apostle’s words to be an allusion to this custom, though Epiphanius himself accepts the explanation that the dying are baptized in the hope of a resurrection. Chrysostom says the custom prevailed among the Marcionites, but will not admit any allusion to it in these words. Ambrosiaster agrees with Tertullian. But both are careful to add that the Apostle’s argument does not imply that he approved of the custom. It would have answered his purpose almost as well, says Tertullian, to argue from the heathen custom of praying for the dead on the Kalends of February. Hervæus accepts the same explanation, giving it in Ambrosiaster’s words. After Scaliger and Grotius it is adopted in recent times by Rückert, De Wette, Meyer, Neander, Stanley, Alford, Heinrici, Renan (*St. Paul*, p. 241), Hausrath, etc. The objection that it is unnatural to suppose the Apostle would draw an argument from a superstitious custom or mention it without a word of dis-

approval will affect different minds variously. It means that the Apostle ought not to use an *argumentum ad hominem*. But two things should be borne in mind. *First*, he has already proved the doctrine of the resurrection. The two questions of the present verses are each of them an appeal to a personal sense of consistency. In the latter of the two questions he convicts himself; in the former he convicts others, of inconsistency, in acting as they do, if the dead rise not; and he is careful to separate the others from himself ("what will they be doing?" not "what shall we be doing?") and *καὶ ἡμεῖς* is an emphatic antithesis to others. *Second*, the custom referred to was not a mere superstitious vestige of the heathen lupercalia (as Scaliger would explain it), but rested on a doctrine, which, though erroneous and anti-Pauline, the Apostle may have tolerated in the Church—the doctrine afterwards known as that of the *opus operatum*. The living was baptized for the benefit of the dead because it was believed that the act of baptism without faith was efficacious to remove guilt. This is the logical consequence of the doctrine. If the virtue of a sacrament is in the act of due administration, not in the recipient's faith, it *may* be efficacious when administered upon a duly appointed representative; and if so, it *may* (provided other considerations do not bar the way) benefit a person after death. From the same source arose the custom, prohibited by more than one Council, of administering the Eucharist to the dead. The only serious objection to this interpretation of the verse is the difficulty of supposing that the custom above mentioned had established itself so early in the Church. But every religion except Christianity rests on the supposed efficacy of external rites. It is only a man that has passed through a mighty revolution of his spiritual nature that will at once understand the Apostle's great doctrine of faith. It is quite in keeping with St. Paul's magnanimity and breadth to tolerate the doctrine of the *opus operatum* and its ceremonial consequences, though in the same epistle he severely censures the unbrotherly, litigious spirit of the Corinthians. Mr. Beet suggests that in St. Paul's day such a custom of vicarious baptism need not have meant that the dead man received any benefit from the rite. This relieves our interpretation of one difficulty, but involves us in another. For why

should the survivors have received baptism instead of the dead if the rite had no signification? Even Socrates' dying command to offer a cock to Æsculapius meant more than the performance of an omitted rite. And how is the Apostle's argument any longer pertinent?

εἰ ὅλως . . . ἐγείρονται. As ἐπεὶ contains the protasis to the first question, this conditional clause must be joined, as protasis, to the second question.

ὅλως, "at all," emphasizing the hypothesis and so forming a correlative to καί which emphasizes the consequent clause: "if there is no resurrection at all, why do ye go so far as even to baptize for the dead? If your disbelief in a resurrection is so complete, it would not be surprising that you should omit all care for the dead; much more strange is it that you bestow upon them a Christian sacrament." The Greeks believed that the souls of the dead were benefited by the funeral honours paid to the body. This wide-spread feeling would find its way into the Church and render the administration of a sacrament on behalf of the dead easy of introduction.

For βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν we must read with **ABD** and Vulg. βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.

**Vv. 30–32.** The apostles too, if the dead rise not, have no incentive to encounter dangers for the sake of Christ.

**V. 30.** τί; The asyndeton adds vividness to the question. The καί must be connected with ἡμεῖς, not with τί or κινδυνεύομεν. Not only those that get themselves baptized for the dead, but we also, who do not, are equally with them inconsistent, if there is no resurrection of the dead.

**V. 31.** From the dangers he encountered in common with the other apostles, he passes to his own state of mind as preacher of the Gospel. He dies daily. This is more than an expression for bodily dangers (against Calvin, Meyer, De Wette); more than the ἐνεκά σου θανατούμεθα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν of Rom. viii. 36. It expresses the utter self-denial with which he devoted himself to the work of preaching Christ—an unceasing self-sacrifice of such a kind as could not fail of success in making converts. In proof of his declaration that his life was a constant dying unto himself and the world, he calls to witness the glorious results of his ministry at Corinth, self-sacrifice being a necessary condition and infallible guarantee of

ministerial power. While these results proved his self-denial, his self-denial proved his belief in the resurrection of the dead. It is true that men have denied themselves because they believed the soul to be immortal. The noblest sentiment of a heathen moralist is to be found in the words of Socrates, that philosophers above all men try in every sort of way to dis sever the soul from the body. Cf. Plat., *Phædo*, p. 64. "The philosopher," he adds, "dishonours the body" and, in a sense approaching that in which the Apostle speaks of dying daily, "practises death all his life long." At first it would seem as if the Apostle took a lower position than that of Socrates. But, *first*, to the Apostle's mind the conceptions of a future state and of a resurrection coalesce into one. The heathen philosopher had recognised the distinction between soul and body; but the theologian of Christianity proclaimed the higher truth that both constituted a personal unit. He does not speak of the immortality of the soul, but of the future life of the man. *Second*, in the Apostle's account of human nature the conception of man's personality again is included under a still higher conception, that of Christ's relation to men as the head of restored humanity. But this involves, as we have seen, the resurrection of Christ and of those that are Christ's. To insist on the immortality of the soul merely would not cover the ground which Christianity has won for ethical speculation; and to teach the native worth of virtue without reference to a future life, would be to lay aside the peculiarly Christian motive that springs from the death and resurrection of Christ.

Expositors cite Cic., *Tusc.* I. 15. But his "*sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*" means the hope of posthumous fame, a very different thing from the Apostle's notion.

*νή*, the affirmative particle that introduces an oath. But, though Augustine (*De Serm. in Monte*, I. xvii.) argues from this verse that oaths are on occasions lawful, there is here properly speaking no oath, as the Apostle does not call God to witness.

*ὑμετέραν*. So *8BD Vulg.* A has *ἡμετέραν*, which is defended by Griesbach and Rückert. But Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort rightly adopt *ὑμετέραν*. It is equivalent to an objective genit., "my boast of you." Cf. 2 Cor. ix. 3, τὸ καύχημα ἡμῶν τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν. So in Thuc. I. 33,

φόβῳ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ, "from fear of us;" 69, αἱ ὑμετέραι ἐλπίδες, "the hopes reposed in you." Cf. note on xi. 24.

καύχῃσιν. He boasts of the Corinthians as his converts. Cf. 2 Cor. vii. 4. Now this his just boast proved that he possessed the true qualifications of a preacher of the Gospel, and one of them was that he should be ever dying to himself and living to God.

ἀδελφοί is inserted by Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. from **8** A B Vulg. Though they are his "children," they are also his "brethren."

ἦν . . . ἡμῶν. This clause not only explains the nature of his boast, that he rejoices in their conversion, but also adds a feature of his Christian boasting which of itself implies the truth of the resurrection. For this boast is not a transitory feeling, but a possession (ἔχω) deposited with Jesus Christ, who is his guarantee for the future recompense of the reward.

**V. 32.** κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, that is, "according to the sentiments of the natural man," not those implanted by the Spirit of God. Cf. note on iii. 3. In chap. ii. the Apostle means by the natural man the very highest type of character developed in those in whom there is no supernatural indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Here, however, he seems to refer to the sensualists of Corinth. He looks at pagan society as it is. We may suppose that he is not thinking of such men as Socrates was or as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius will so soon prove to be. To aim at an ideal life, as Epictetus did, without reference to a future immortality is necessarily a rarer thing among Christians than among the heathen. Christians cannot in their inmost thought sever the virtue of being like Christ from the heaven of being with Him. For this reason, though there is probably as wide a difference between the highest and lowest types of moral character in the Church as there was in pagan Greece and Rome, the difference is not of the same kind. The most saintly and the most carnal of Christians are alike in their utter powerlessness to escape from the mighty shadows and fierce light of eternity. "The sound of glory was ringing in the ears" of saintly George Herbert. Yet the power to forget heaven and "eternal hopes and fears," without losing his virtue, was the nearest approach that a pagan moralist made to Christian goodness.

ἐθριομάχῃσα. That this is to be understood metaphorically is proved almost to a certainty by the fact that St. Paul was a Roman citizen and by absence of all reference in the Book of Acts and in 2 Cor. xi. to so miraculous a deliverance as exposure to the beasts of the amphitheatre would involve. Tertullian (*De Resurr. Carn.*, 48), Œcum., Hervæus and, among recent writers, Pressensé and others maintain that it is an allusion to the tumult at Ephesus mentioned in Acts xix. We may admit sufficient time after the tumult had subsided for the Apostle to write the present chapter, as it is not said in Acts xx. 1 that he left immediately. But if that persecution drove him from Ephesus, he could not have told the Corinthians (xvi. 9) that a great and mighty door was opened to him and that he intended remaining in Ephesus till Pentecost. If he alludes to the tumult raised by Demetrius, he must have left Ephesus for other reasons unknown to us and to the last unexpected by him. Ignatius (*Ad Rom.* 5) borrows the metaphor and adds a pathetic force to it, being as he then was on his journey to Rome with the certainty of being thrown to the lions. Θριομαχῶ was said, not only of armed gladiators, but also of unarmed prisoners (against Estius and apparently Evans). Cf. Ignat., *Ad Ephes.* 1, et al. As the Apostle is writing at Ephesus, the aor. ἐθριομάχῃσα must be translated by the perf., "have fought."

εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται is better joined to what follows, as εἰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον κ. τ. λ. forms the protasis to τί . . . ὄφελος;

φάγωμεν . . . ἀποθνήσκομεν. The words occur in LXX., Isa. xxii. 13. But words of similar import occur in Wisd. ii. 6, ἀπολαύσωμεν τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν. Cf. Herodot. II. 78: "Seeing this image of a corpse, drink and be merry, for such wilt thou also be." They correctly describe the ethical position of the Cyrenaics. Cf. Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.* II. p. 256, who cites among other authorities Athenæus XII. 544, [Ἀρίστιππος] ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι, ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβλήσθαι καὶ μονόχρονον αὐτὴν εἶναι, . . . ἐνὶ μόνῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνων τῷ παρόντι. The Epicureans also, though they regarded repose of mind (ἀταραξία) as the highest kind of pleasure, sometimes said, with more consistent logic, περὶ γαστέρα τὸ ἀγαθόν. It is always the creed

of a few, but in times of terrible calamities it becomes the practice of the many. During the plague at Athens licentiousness was the offspring of despair. Cf. Thuc. II. 53. A similar feeling of insecurity, though not so violent, was not less depressing in the ages which witnessed the civil wars in Rome, the Roman conquests in Greece and, after the reign of Augustus, the numerous changes under subsequent Cæsars. The best known exponent of practical Epicureanism is Horace, especially in the Odes (*e.g.* I. ii. 8; II. xi. 13-17). Cf. Prof. Sellar, *Virgil*, p. 10. We cannot go far astray in recognising the operation of the same causes in the Apostle's day. But it should be remembered that the Stoics drew an opposite inference from the same premises. Cf. M. Anton. II. 2, ὡς ἤδη ἀποθνήσκων τῶν μὲν σαρκίων καταφρόνησον.

**V. 33.** πλανᾷσθε. Cf. note on vi. 9.

φθείρουσιν . . . κακά. Jerome (*Comm. in Gal. iv. 24*) says the words are taken from a comedy of Menander. Socrates (*Hist. Eccles. III. 16*) infers from the words that St. Paul was acquainted with the dramas of Euripides. Lachmann preserves the metre (a Senarius) by reading *χρήσθ'* and so does Clem. Alex., *Strom. I. p. 350* Potter, whose words (*ἰαμβεῖῳ συγκέχρηται τραγικῷ*) confirms the assertion of Socrates. The Apostle summons a heathen poet to his aid against the vicious teaching of heathen moralists. A citation from Menander in this place would be specially apposite. For Menander seems to have been held in high repute by the Romans—such as the citizens of Corinth were at this time—and he was himself an Epicurean in his morals.

ὁμιλίας, "company" (Rev. Ver.), not "communications" (Auth. Ver.), nor "discussions" (Heinrici). It is the same advice we have in one of Menander's *Sentences* (Dübner's *Menandri Fragmenta*, pp. 21 and 90), ἀνδρὸς πονηροῦ φεύγε συνοδίαν ἀεί. The doubts of some in the Corinthian Church concerning the resurrection of the dead was the consequence of their too intimate intercourse with their heathen neighbours.

ἡθῆ occurs only here in the New Test. and that in a citation from a heathen poet. Christians instinctively avoided a word fixed to a heathen idea.

**V. 34.** ἐκνήψατε, "wake out of your drunkenness." Cf. Plut., *Dem. 20*, μεθύων ἐκνήψας. The Apostle describes their

sensual reasonings as a drunken fit. So Chrys., ὡς πρὸς μεθύοντας καὶ μαινομένους. The metaphor in Eph. v. 14 is a different one.

δικαίως, not "as is right you should do," *ut par est* (Grimm, *Lex.* s.v.), but "in a righteous manner," synon. with ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ (Acts xvii. 31), and that, again, not to limit the meaning of the verb, as if there were an unrighteous awakening (Heinrici), but "awake in the way of righteousness," "so as to be righteous," what is expressed negatively in μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε. Thuc. often uses adverbs proleptically, ἀπίστως for ὥστε εἶναι ἄπιστον, etc. "Awake to righteousness" is a good rendering.

μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε, "and do not go on sinning." The awaking to righteousness must be followed up by a continuous effort to live a righteous life. Their life of sensuality was the consequence of their despair, and they could not believe in a future life because of their practical libertinism.

ἄγνοσιν, "ignorance," synon. with ἄγνοϊαν (Eph. iv. 18). But ἄγνοσιν ἔχειν means more than ἄγνοεῖν. It regards the ignorance as a positive quality and makes it tantamount to unbelief. So Clement of Rome (*Ad Cor.* 59) makes it synonymous with "the darkness of our pre-Christian state." Their culpable ignorance of God is at the root of men's disbelief of the resurrection. The Apostle is referring not only to God's power (cf. Matt. xxii. 29), but also to the relation in which God stands to man and the necessary subjection of all things, even the Son Himself, that God may be all in all. In Rom. i. 28 and 1 Thess. iv. 5 he characterizes the Gentiles as not having God in their knowledge. Some of the Christians in Corinth were no less estranged from God than the heathen. This allusion to the heathen lies in τινές. "Some of you are cherishing that ignorance of God which belongs to the heathen; and while it is natural in them, it is a shame to Christians." For this reason he will not name them or he wishes to intimate that they are men whom he knows not and with whom he has had nothing to do.

πρὸς ἐντροπὴν κ. τ. λ., "I speak this to move you to shame" (Rev. Ver. excellently), *ad pudorem incutiendum* (Grimm, *Lex.* s. v.). Cf. note on vi. 5. He has identified the state of mind that admits doubt concerning the resurrection of the dead with heathen agnosticism. But to be an agnostic

ought to be a Christian's shame. The argument for the resurrection of the dead from the subordination of all things to man, of man to Christ, of Christ to God, is a new revelation of God. To deny it is to acquiesce in agnosticism.

λαλῶ is the reading of  $\aleph$  B D, λέγω that of A. *Ααλῶ* reminds them that they are listening to a prophet's voice.

#### D. *The Proof confirmed by Analogies.*

(35-44.)

The fact of the resurrection of the dead has been proved *a priori*, and the denial of it reduced to a pagan agnosticism of which Christians ought to be ashamed. But how is resurrection possible? To understand the Apostle's reply to the question we must lay firm hold of these two things: *first*, that he is speaking of the man, who is dead, not of the mass of matter undergoing dissolution in the earth; *second*, that his purpose is to point out analogies to the fundamental conception on which his proof rests, viz., the conception of a progress that is not checked but realized through death. Now in the relation between the seed and the plant we recognise: (1) that death is, in some cases at least, necessary to the perpetuation of life; (2) that this perpetuation involves a development; (3) that this development is not automatic, but the consequence of a creative and beneficent act of God; (4) that in this creative act God appropriates indefinite material to produce the development of definite kinds. Again, the analogy of the various kinds of flesh teaches us (5) that this limiting of the limitless in the formation and development of kinds consists in differentiating their physical constitution. Finally, the analogy of the various kinds of glories in sun, moon and stars intimates (6) that such a differentiation of nature implies a difference also in sphere of action. To apply all this to the subject in hand, it means (1) that the believer's relation to Christ involves development; (2) that this development implies death as one of its conditions; (3) that this development is brought about through God's creative and beneficent act; (4) that it is a development within the limits of kind; (5) that it involves a change in mode of existence; (6) that it necessitates and secures transference of the entire man from this world into another sphere.

**V. 35.** Chrys., De Wette, etc., consider these two questions to be of different import. Meyer thinks the second is an explanation of the first. The δέ neither proves (Alford) nor disproves (Maier) the latter view. Cf. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 169. In Hom., *Il.* I. 362, τί κλαίεις ; τί δέ σε φρένας ἔκετο πένθος ; the two questions mean the same thing : but in *Il.* V. 704, τίνα πρῶτον ; τίνα δ' ὕστατον ; the two questions have opposite meanings. Chrysostom's view seems to me correct, because ver. 36 suggests the possibility and necessity of a resurrection, and consequently answers the first question, whereas ver. 37 is an answer to the second question respecting the nature of the future body.

πῶς, not "in what manner?" but "how is it possible?" The δύναται is supplied in John vi. 52. Cf. note on ver. 12. Hence the pres. ἐγείρονται and ἔρχονται are not here used to transfer a future action into present time (Meyer, De Wette), but denote opinion respecting a future action : "How are we to suppose the resurrection of the dead possible? And with what kind of body are we to suppose they will come?" Cf. note on ver. 15.

ἔρχονται, not synon. with ἐκπορεύονται ἐκ τῶν μνημείων (John v. 29), as Rückert and Osiander explain it. The question of the objector implies that, in consequence of dissolution, no trace of the body remains. Neither is it a rhetorical expression for "appear," *prodeunt in lucem* (Meyer, De Wette, Van Hengel). Rhetoric is out of place here. Though the question is put in the mouth of a critic, the Apostle uses a word that contains a covert allusion to his own doctrine that God will bring with Christ those that have fallen asleep in Him. When Christ comes, the saints will come. The Apostle is speaking of the *man* after death. "With what kind of body, then, since the body that was is dissolved, are we to suppose they will come?"

**V. 36.** ἄφρων, "dull," "senseless man," the opposite of φρόνιμος. Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 19. The question was put by a clever, knowing critic. The Apostle charges him with stupidity and senselessness in not understanding that life springs out of death in the birth of every plant. Hence σύ (which it is needless and awkward to connect with ἄφρων, as Meyer does) is emphatic. The man did not see what was taking

place at his feet in the grain which he himself had sown; and "stupidity" consists in not seeing what is close at hand.

*ἄφρων*. The nom. must be accepted. So  $\aleph$  A B D. Cf. Luke xii. 20; Heb. i. 8. In class. Greek also the nom. is sometimes used for the voc., but with *οὔτος* or the art. Cf. Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 67. In omitting the art. the New Testament diction assimilates itself to the Homeric. Cf. Hom., *Il.* I. 231, *δημοβόρος βασιλεύς*.

*ζωοποιεῖται . . . ἀποθάνη*. These words are used in preference to *βλαστάνει* and *διαλύεται*, as Chrys. remarks, to make the analogy between seeds sown and men dying the more evident. Cf. John xii. 24. This, then, is the Apostle's answer to the first question. The possibility, yea the necessity of a resurrection is illustrated by the sprouting of seeds, which put forth, not though they die, but because they die. The analogy of seeds sown, breaking up into their elements, germinating in a new life, suggests that death may be necessary to the future life of men. The analogy is not between the dissolution of the seed and the dissolution of the dead body in the grave. For this would not apply to the body of Christ nor to the bodies of the believers that shall be alive at His coming. In fact, this would not be an analogy, but two instances of the same process, that of germination. The seed germinates. But a human body buried in earth does not germinate. It does not require modern science to prove that there is no such thing as the germ of a new humanity in a dead body, and nowhere does the Apostle hint at such a thing. His words imply the reverse. For if he meant by the resurrection of the dead the germination of the dead body, and nothing more, then the future body would be psychical, not spiritual, and the life to come would be only a repetition of the present earthly life. This was the theory of the Pharisees, but it is not St. Paul's doctrine, and cannot be; for it really involves as its logical consequence that the future life will in turn be followed by death and, therefore, that the endless existence of man will be an infinite succession of alternate periods of life and death.

**V. 37.** The short answer to the first question leads to a longer discussion of the second. The analogy between the resurrection of the dead and the sprouting of seeds is ad-

vanced a step further. The new life of the plant is a development. From a naked grain there is progress to the plant luxuriantly clad in leaves.

ὁ σπείρεις. De Wette says ὁ is for εἶ τι. Certainly ὁ stands for ὅτι in Hom., *Il.* I. 120. Others think it is accus. of nearer reference: "as to what thou sowest." It is more natural to suppose a change of construction. He began apparently with the intention of making ὁ σπείρεις subject to ἐστι. But, omitting ἐστι, he repeats σπείρεις as if he had not written ὁ σπείρεις. He does this to emphasize the notion of sowing; for sowing itself implies that the seed will undergo a change to become a plant: ἐξ οἴου οἶον.

γυμνὸν κόκκον. Cited by Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 24, ἅτινα πεσόντα εἰς τὴν γῆν ξηρὰ καὶ γυμνὰ διαλύεται. Cf. 2 Cor. v. 3.

εἰ τύχοι. Cf. note on xiv. 10.

V. 38. The emphatic words are "God gives." (Δίδωσιν precedes αὐτῷ in  $\aleph$  A B). This emphasis is increased by καθὼς ἠθέλησε. In the life of nature there is an ultimate factor, which resists further analysis. It is the creative will of God (cf. iii. 6). The Divine will is also beneficent. The change is a gift. We need not suppose the Apostle personifies the seed as the recipient of a gift. Here, as before, he inserts a word which is more properly applicable to the resurrection of men. Believers receive this gift among all the blessings that flow from union with Christ. The aor. ἠθέλησε denotes the first act of God's will determining the constitution of nature. The pres. δίδωσιν expresses the unceasing activity of God in the production of every single growth. The all-pervading activity of God acts uniformly. Nature is "for ever shattered and the same for ever." Origen supposes reason (λόγος) resides in the dead body. St. Paul says it resides in God.

καί, "et quidem," of more exact definition. Cf. note on iii. 5.

σπερμάτων. The plur. denotes the various kinds of seed. τὸ before ἴδιον is omitted in  $\aleph$  A B D. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The difference is the same as that between "its own body, not another body," and "a distinct body of its own, not indefinite matter." The latter is evi-

dently the Apostle's meaning. He introduces here the conception of identity of kind. If the seed is rye, the plant is rye. However vast the changes through which the thing passes, they are all within the limits of the kind to which the thing belongs. Why it is that a seed always produces its own kind is a question which science has not yet answered. The Apostle ascribes it to the self-limiting creative will of God. The doctrine of the transmutation of species does, of course, weaken the analogy. It does not destroy it altogether, because the transmutation, if it occurs at all, is brought about too slowly to be perceptible to the eye. We see only wheat springing from a grain of wheat; and this is enough for the Apostle's purpose. The analogy is not the proof.

**V. 39.** The asyndeton shows that the words are intended to be explanatory of the latter clause in ver. 36. If so, we cannot accept the view of Chrys., Theod., Œcum., Ambrosiaster, Estius, that the Apostle's purpose is to show, by the analogy of material things, that one saint differs from another in the glory of heaven. So also Augustine, *Ep.* ccv. 7. Nor can we accept the explanation of Calvin, Meyer, Kling, Van Hengel, etc.: "As one flesh differs from another, so also the future body differs from the body that dies." This would involve a difference in kind, not a higher form of the same species. It is not a difference, but the identity of the man in all the changes through which he may pass, that connects the verse with what immediately precedes. The same flesh is not all flesh; that is, when any matter has been assimilated by any creature, it is no more indefinite matter, but is that specific creature or a part of it. Physical life is thus continued by constant limitation of unlimited matter. If we recognise the operation of this law in plants and animals, why may we not admit it also in the case of man, not only before death, but also after death, not only in repairing the present body, but in the formation of a new, spiritual and heavenly body? If this is the Apostle's meaning, the doctrine taught in our passage is identical with what he tells us in 2 Cor. v. 1-4. On any other view the two passages seem to me to be irreconcilable. This interpretation is consistent also with Rom. viii. 11, where, we must bear in mind, the Apostle says *θυητά*, not *νεκρά*. Our present mortal bodies will be quickened into new life, not

by the germination of flesh, but by the powerful energy of the supernatural element, the spirit, which dwells in the persons of the believers. The future body will be as truly the same body which we now have as the present body is identical with the body we had at our birth. The identity depends, not on numerical sameness of particles, but on relation to the man.

The analogy of the various kinds of flesh points, not only to a limitation, but also, within the given limits, to a law of progress. The flesh of the lower creatures becomes the food of other and higher creatures; fishes, birds, cattle, food of men. But the flesh of men is of a higher kind, that is, it subserves more various and more perfect purposes, than the flesh of quadrupeds; quadrupeds are a higher kind than birds, birds than fishes. Thus the same indefinite matter by being repeatedly limited, attains a more perfect form.

*πάσα σάρξ* is predicate, *ἡ αὐτὴ σάρξ* is the subject.

*σάρξ* is not synon. with *σῶμα*, but denotes the indefinite matter which becomes *σῶμα* when a specific form is impressed upon it. The use of the word *σάρξ* in this verse tells nothing in favour of the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, as Estius argues.

*κτηνῶν*, from *κτάομαι*, properly "cattle," *pecora* (so Vulg. and Beza). Cf. Gen. i. 25; ii. 20, where *κτῆνα* are distinguished from *θηρία* as graminivorous quadrupeds from beasts of prey. But the Apostle uses the word here symbolically for all quadrupeds.

*πτηνῶν* . . . *ἰχθύων*. This is the order of the words in **NA B**, and adopted by all critics.

The Apostle's classification is borrowed from Gen. i. 24-26 and Ps. viii. 8. It resembles that of Pliny, who classifies animals according as they dwell on the land, in the air, and in the sea. It was the obvious classification before Linnæus and Cuvier classified animals according to structure and function.

It may further be observed that the Apostle's stringent separation of species from species is not irreconcilable with the theory of evolution, though its force as an analogy is weakened by that theory. But it is irreconcilable with automatic evolution, that is the denial of a Divine fiat separating the species and prohibiting retrogression. In fact the idea of development, which is distinct from the idea of evolution but

may be included in it, helps the Apostle's analogy. For if life never generates itself and yet is in the truest sense generated and progresses from lower to higher forms, why may human development not advance from the present form of life through death into still higher stages?

V. 40. Not only is there difference of kind, but there is also difference of sphere. What does he mean by "bodies celestial?" Dismissing the allegorical interpretation of Tertullian, and the view of Chrys., Ambrosiaster, etc., that the Apostle is speaking of the difference between the condition of the good and the wicked in the other world, and the view of Augustine and others that he refers to the different degrees of glory in heaven, which things have no connection with the present argument, I am compelled to reject also the explanation mentioned, but not adopted, by Theophylact and recently advocated by Meyer, De Wette, Stanley, Alford, etc., that the Apostle means the bodies of the angels. Meyer refers to Phil. ii. 10, where, however, the words *ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων* are neuter, and express "a personification of universal nature" (Bp. Lightfoot). In the present passage there is not even a personification. To speak of the angels in this connection would not, it is true, disturb the analogy. But the asyndeton in ver. 41 and the mention of sun, moon, and stars prove that these are meant by "bodies celestial;" the *οὐράνια στοιχεῖα* of Justin M., *Apol.* II. 5. We need not suppose that the Apostle ascribes life and sensation to them, after the manner of Philo. There is not a trace in the New Test. of the Greek notion that the stars are living creatures, as Hilgenfeld (*Galaterbr.* pp. 71, 75) and Grimm (*Lex.* s. v. *ἐπουράνιος*) allege. The word *σώματα* is used to express distinction of kind. The word denotes a totality, a distinct species, in accordance with its derivation from *σῶς*, *integer*.<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plat., *Phileb.* p. 29, *ταῦτα . . . εἰς ἓν συγκεῖμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα*. The word is no argument in favour of the meaning assigned to "bodies celestial" by Canon Evans, "bodies dwelling on the planets."

*δόξα*. From difference of physical constitution the Apostle has passed to difference in sphere of action. Some things

<sup>1</sup> The derivation is doubted by Curtius (*Grundz.* p. 382) because in Homer *σῶμα* always signifies "a carcase."

attain their perfection on earth. Their glory is terrestrial. Other things demand a higher and larger sphere in which to shine. Their glory is celestial. The word *δόξα* means "glorious appearance," "beauty of form and colour," a Hebraistic use of the word (Isa. xi. 3), as in Acts xxii. 11 et al., unknown to classic writers. The notion of "lustrous appearance" is introduced to suggest a new analogy. If sun, moon and stars are glorious in a sphere immeasurably larger than earth, may not man, who can investigate their laws and tell their nature and movements, require for his full development a sphere still nobler and higher?

V. 41. As in ver. 39, so here the Apostle proceeds from the higher to the lower. To unscientific observers the sun is more glorious than the moon, the moon than the stars (cf. Gen. i. 16), and one star than another. Cf. M. Anton. VI. 43, *τί δὲ τῶν ἀστρῶν ἕκαστον; οὐχὶ διάφορα;*

V. 42. The resurrection of the dead exhibits the operation of the same principle which is the rule of God's action in nature—development through death.

*σπείρεται.* Van Hengel, Winer (*Gr.* § LVIII. 9, *b. γ*) and Heinrici's opinion that the passive is here used in an impersonal sense is refuted by ver. 44. It would mean that the act of sowing is in corruption. The subject is *σῶμα*. So Meyer, De Wette, etc. But Calvin, Neander, Van Hengel, Heinrici and in part Reuss rightly decline to restrict the reference to the burial of the dead body in the earth, which is the interpretation of Irenæus (v. 7, 2), Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* V. 10), Origen (*Contra Cels.* V. 19), Chrys., Theophyl., Œcum., Grot., Bengel, Meyer, De Wette, etc. It is true that Van Hengel is no less mistaken in restricting it to the notion of procreation. The Apostle is contrasting the present state from birth to death with that which follows the resurrection. This is proved, I think, by the line of argument, if we have traced it rightly; by the meanings of "corruption," "dishonour," "weakness;" and by the evident reference in the word *ψυχικός* to the living, not to the dead, body. (1) The argument is that the analogies of nature point to a development of man from the present mode of existence through death to a higher. The Apostle is speaking throughout of the man as to his body, not of the flesh in the grave. If it

were otherwise, the analogy would require us to maintain that dissolution is necessary to the formation of the future body. (2) Expositors consider *φθορά* to mean dissolution, *ἀτιμία* to be an euphemism for foulness, and *ἀσθένεια* to denote the immobility of a dead body. If so, *φθορά* and *ἀτιμία* are really synonymous. Besides "weakness" is not the most natural expression for the stillness of death. But if "sowing" comprises the present condition of man, from first to last, *φθορά* will mean the decadence that can be arrested only by constant repair, *ἀτιμία* the animal side of generation, birth, life and death, *ἀσθένεια* the infirmities of infancy, sickness and old age. Asyndeton is frequent, when the objects enumerated run, as here, in pairs. Cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 792.

*ἐν φθορᾷ*, "in a state of corruption." Such is man as to his body from the first; he begins to die when he begins to live. The word *ἐν* expresses the closest possible relation between *σπείρεται* and *φθορά*, things that stand in the strongest possible contrast. Beza, Grotius, Platt explain *ἐν φθορᾷ* by *φθαρτόν*, "corruptible," which is as much too weak as *ἐφθαρμένον* is too strong. The body is from its origin, not only liable to corruption, but in a state of corruption, which, however, is for a time held in check by the forces of life. Before man sinned the body was *φθαρτόν*, now it is *ἐν φθορᾷ*, in the future life it is *ἀφθαρτόν*, not only alive, but also incapable of death.

V. 43. *ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ*. "Dishonour" surely does not mean *τί εἰδεχθέστερον τοῦ νεκροῦ διαρρύνεντος*; (Chrys.). The word expresses the estimation in which a thing is regarded; and, if it refers to the body after death, it must mean indignities cast upon it by the living. Cf. Soph., *Antig.* 206, 210, where *αἰκισθεὶν* *ἰδεῖν* is opposed to *τιμῆσεται*. The Apostle would then be referring to the contempt that, in the estimation of the Stoics—of all, in fact, except the Christians—attaches to the body when the soul has departed. But if the reference is to the present state of existence, in which the body, though the temple of the Holy Ghost, is nevertheless "the body of our humiliation," the contrast between "dishonour" and "glory" is very effective (cf. Phil. iii. 21). "Glory will then mean, not merely brightness and beauty of appearance, the *congruentia partium* (Augustine, *De Civ.* XXII. 20) and

*d's claritatis* (Aquinas), but the glorified state in which the bodies of the redeemed will be fashioned anew and made conformable to the body of Christ in His exaltation.

*ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ*, that is, in the helplessness of childhood, the infirmities of life, the utter prostration and collapse of the vital powers in death. Christ is said to have been crucified *ἐξ ἀσθενείας* (2 Cor. xiii. 4); for He had taken upon Him the sinless weakness of our nature, which is the consequence of sin. Other men have, in addition, sinful infirmities; some also diseases or deformities, which fall to the lot of individual men but are not the universal heritage of the race. These Christ had not.

*ἐν δυνάμει*, that is, in perfect health, activity, fulness of development, and exemption from subjection to the present laws of matter.

V. 44. The words *ψυχικόν* and *πνευματικόν* are not an epitome of the qualities already mentioned (Meyer), which are, so to speak, external and accidental conditions of the body. The Apostle now proceeds to a difference arising from the relation in which the body stands, not to outward objects, but to the inner, governing principle. To mark this change in point of view, he adds *σῶμα* and repeats it. The body, though liable to decay, dishonour and infirmity, is adapted in its present condition to be the instrument of the soul; and the body in the future state will be a fit organ for the activities of the spirit. "Soulsh body" and especially "spiritual body" are paradoxical expressions. It is evident from the following verses that "spiritual" is synonymous with "heavenly," and "soulsh" with "earthly;" that to have a spiritual body is to bear the image of the heavenly; and that this is brought to pass by the power of Christ. The distinction, therefore, between "soulsh" and "spiritual" is not based on a psychological difference, but, in perfect accordance with the use of the words in other passages, *ψυχή* denotes the natural life and faculties of man and includes the *νοῦς*, which in St. Paul's writings is distinguished, not from *ψυχή*, but from *σάρξ*, whereas *πνεῦμα* denotes the supernatural life and heaven-bestowed energies of the regenerate. The body is soulsh in so far as it is fitted to be the organ of the natural; spiritual, in so far as it will be fitted to be the organ of the supernatural powers, which are the result of the

indwelling of the Spirit of God. Cf. Theophyl., τὸ τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος καταπλουτοῦν ἐνέργειαν. If, with Reuss and others, we consider the ψυχή to be only the principle of the physical life, on which the vital functions depend, the instincts and appetites, the πνεῦμα will denote the higher faculties of ratiocination and will. But these no less than the sensual powers require a bodily organism in the present state of existence; and Reuss, somewhat inconsistently, explains πνεῦμα of the vital principle communicated to the regenerate. Even now the πνεῦμα, the Divine nature, dwells in the believer and changes him from a ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος into a πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος, but his bodily organism is at present adapted only to be the instrument of his natural powers. Ψυχικός implies an adaptation of the lower product, the body, for the service of a product of higher order, the soul. In the future state the body will have been adapted for the service of the still loftier powers of spirit. Moreover, its adaptation for the present service of the soul is the sowing of it, that is, the initial step in its adaptation for the future purposes of the spirit. An organism fitted to be the seat of mind, to express emotion, to carry out the behests of will is already in process of being adapted for a still nobler ministry. But the ulterior stages in this Divine adaptation of the body for its final redemption are hidden from our eyes behind the veil of death. We only know, *first*, that the Apostle does not teach the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh; and, *second*, on the other hand, that he does not teach that the future body is a new creation independent of the present organism. The exact relation of the future body to the present body we do not know.

εἰ ἔστιν σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἔστιν καὶ πνευματικόν is the reading of  $\aleph$  A B C D, Vulg. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. But Reiche, Osiand., Van Heng., Hofm. omit εἰ. The meaning is not very different. But the insertion of εἰ makes the existence of the psychical body more or less a proof of the existence of a spiritual body. The latter is the perfect development of the former; and the existence of the former, with its marvellous capabilities, suggests and, to a mind that believes in the living and good God, demonstrates the future existence of the latter. The resurrection of the dead is an instance of the universal law of progress.

E. *The Proof confirmed by Scripture.*

(45-49).

Analogy has pointed to a law of progress that operates in reference to men through death. The Apostle now rises clear above analogies and discovers in Scripture also the conception which constituted his proof of the resurrection and to which his analogies have led up.

V. 45. He is, no doubt, citing Gen. ii. 7, *καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*. But he interweaves with the words of Scripture, which refer to man at his creation, his own inference. He adds *πρώτος* and *Ἀδάμ*, as Bengel remarks, “*ex naturâ oppositorum*.” To give his readers to understand he is not citing word for word, he says *οὕτως*. Cf. Thuc. I. 22, *ἐχομένῳ ὡς ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται*. The inference the Apostle draws is one of the central doctrines of his anthropology. Scripture says that man became a living soul. But, though it may be true that the human soul has peculiar powers or that the powers it has in common with the animals have a wider compass, to be a living soul is not the end and perfection of man, who was made in the image of God. His inalienable possession of the Divine image both marks the homogeneity of the race and proves that man is destined to attain a height of glory greater than that of his creation. To explain in what this glory consists the Apostle again introduces his doctrine of the two heads of the race, Adam and Christ. In virtue of His relation to Adam, man is what he became at his creation. But Christ is the source of the glory that surpasses the glory of nature, the honour for which man is ultimately designed. The argument is similar to that of Heb. ii. 8, 9; and this resemblance renders it probable that the Epistle to the Hebrews was written by a disciple of St. Paul. The scriptural statement, “Man became a living soul,” is expanded into “The first man Adam became a living soul;” and the opposite truth, which this statement involves, is expressly added, “The last Adam became a quickening spirit.”

*εἰς*. Cf. note on vi. 16. The ordinary construction also occurs. Cf. i. 30.

ψυχὴν. If the above interpretation be the true one, we must beware, *first*, of limiting the meaning of ψυχὴ to the lower, sensational powers of the soul (so Estius, Oslander, etc.), and, *second*, of saying that man became ψυχικός by reason of the fall (Hervæus, Olshausen, etc.). Jewish interpreters assign a peculiar force to the word “became,” as if the language of Moses implied that God had made man spiritual, but that he “became,” through his disobedience, psychical.

ὁ ἔσχατος. The second man (ver. 47) is the last. But the Apostle avoids the expression “the last man” and says “last Adam,” because these two, Adam and Christ, stand in a peculiar relation to the race. Adam was τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (Rom. v. 14). The antithesis occurs in the later rabbinical writings: Adam is the first, Messiah is the last. Perhaps Hofmann’s suggestion is not too fanciful, that the Apostle intended the paradox, “The last First One,” that is, the last Head of the race.

πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, “quicken,”<sup>1</sup> “life-giving spirit;” that is, Christ is become the source of all supernatural gifts. “Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” The soul can only be the subject of life; the spirit is a source of life (cf. John vi. 63). Those who receive the spirit from Christ have, therefore, in themselves a life-giving power (cf. John vii. 38, 39). It was in virtue of the life-giving spirit within Him that Christ had power, not only to lay down His life, but also to take it again (cf. John x. 18). This spirit, says St. Paul here, produces the future body of the redeemed (cf. Rom. viii. 11). The expression “living soul” occurs frequently, never “living spirit.”

Other explanations are the following:—

(1) That the bestowal of the Holy Spirit on Christ is meant. So Severian (*Cat.*), Theophyl., Œcum., who cites Methodius to the same effect. The designation of the Holy Spirit, inserted in the enlarged form of the Nicene Creed adopted at Chalcedon (A.D. 451), τὸ ζωοποιόν, was undoubtedly taken from this verse. Cf. Athanasius, *Def. Nic. Symb.*, ad fin.

<sup>1</sup> The Revisers have here excluded the expressive word “quicken,” probably because it is ambiguous. But they admit it in Eph. ii. 5; 1 Pet. iii. 18. “Quick” is etymologically connected with *vivo* and *bios*, as “cow” is with *βοῦς*.

(2) That the Apostle refers to the assumption of a human spirit or soul by Christ. So Cor. a Lap. and others. But the Apostle's evident intention to distinguish between  $\psiυχ\acute{\eta}$  and  $\piνεϋμα$  sufficiently refutes this interpretation.

(3) That the Apostle means that Christ became a quickening spirit at His resurrection. So Ambrosiaster, Grotius, Estius, Kling, Meyer, Heinrici, R. Schmidt (*Paulin. Christol.* p. 108), Pfleiderer (*Paulin.* p. 132), Sabatier (*L'Apôtre Paul*, deuxième ed., p. 292). It is to my mind a much more natural interpretation of the passage, that He became a quickening spirit when He became the second Adam at His incarnation. As Adam was created a living soul, so Christ's person was essentially the source of all supernatural grace. His incarnation was the intrusion of a Divine force into humanity. So Theophyl. rightly:  $οὐσιωδῶς$ . This does not necessitate our thinking that Christ's body was naturally immortal. That He should die was not a miracle; the incarnation was. Meyer's objection that Christ's body was  $\psiυχικόν$  till His resurrection has very little force or rather tells somewhat on the other side. His body equally with the bodies of the redeemed was a body of humiliation, though He was Himself at the same time a life-giving spirit; and it was through the power of that spirit that His body became a spiritual body at his resurrection. Cf. note on vi. 14. We must not limit the reference of "life-giving" to the life of the risen body (Meyer). The statement is general.

V. 46. Van Hengel, anticipated in this by Cæcum., thinks the meaning is that the appearance of the spiritual in the world in the person of Jesus Christ is subsequent to the appearance of the natural in the first Adam. But the only connection between this and the doctrine of the resurrection would be an analogy; and if the historical Christ were meant, the expression would have been  $ὁ πνευματικός$ , not  $τὸ πνευματικόν$ . Chrys., Theophyl., Estius, Rückert, Meyer, De Wette, Alford, Robertson, Kling, Cox, etc., consider it to be a general statement to the effect that the less perfect precedes the more perfect in all the works of God; as if the Apostle were replying to a querulous objection, "Why did not the highest form of perfection appear at the dawn of human history?" If this were the meaning, the words would be

explanatory of ver. 45 and would not, therefore, begin with *ἀλλά*. Moreover, *τὸ πνευματικόν* does not mean perfection in general, but one kind only of perfection, that which has been revealed in Christ as the second Head of humanity. The following verses also show that *τὸ ψυχικόν* denotes the first Adam and the natural body, *τὸ πνευματικόν* the second Adam and the spiritual body. It may be readily admitted that the Apostle had the universal law of progress in the background of his thoughts. Still this is not what he actually says. The history of man is a progress from Adam to Christ, from soul-ish to spiritual, from the present life to the future.

V. 47. Recognising a law of progress, not of retrogression, in the relation of the psychical and the spiritual to one another, the Apostle connects it with the subject of the resurrection by identifying the psychical with the earthy, the spiritual with the heavenly. The first man is not only psychical, but also of the earth earthy; the second man is not only spiritual, but also from heaven. This is said to show that the development which attains perfection in a higher sphere than the present demands for its realization the introduction into humanity of a supernatural element. Progress is not mere evolution.

*ἐκ γῆς* and *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ* denote origin. Van Hengel argues from Luke xi. 13; xx. 4; 2 Cor. v. 2; Gal. i. 8 that *ἐκ* sometimes expresses quality, dignity. But these passages do not bear him out; and this would make *ἐκ γῆς* synon. with *χοϊκός*.

*χοϊκός*, properly "clayey," *πήλινος*, *γῆϊνος* (Hesych.), but here used vividly to express man's terrestrial nature. Because he is of the earth in his origin, that is, as to his body, there is a terrestrial side to his nature and sphere of action. The derivation from *χέω* must not be applied here, though it was in Philo's mind: *ὁ δὲ γῆϊνος ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης ἦν χούνην κέκληκεν ἐπάγη*. Calvin's explanation "*terram sapiens*" is correct, but too narrow. From *χοϊκός* we may infer, as corollaries:

(1) That man in his sinless state had a body capable of dying. If he had continued sinless, his body would have been rendered immortal by a Divine act, and we gather from Gen. iii. 22 that eating of the tree of life was the appointed sacrament of immortality. This is consistent with Rom. v. 12. In the case of man sin brought death, not mortality, into the

world. Philo (*De Mund. Op.*, p. 32, Vol. I. Mang.), like St. Paul, describes the earthy man as naturally mortal as to his body. This is the view of Augustine (*De Gen. ad. Litt.* VI. 24, et al.), Ambrosiaster, Estius, Grotius (*De Satisf. Christi*, c. i.), Bp. Bull (*State of Man before the Fall*, p. 123, Oxf. Ed.), and Meyer. Its correctness is confirmed by the side-light it throws on another subject, the voluntariness of Christ's death. As Christ was sinless death was not a necessity to Him, though He had a mortal body; and as He was Divine as well as sinless, death was impossible to Him without a voluntary act of "laying down" His life.

(2) We infer also that the Divine image in Adam consisted, negatively, in sinlessness and, positively, in a potential and rudimentary goodness; by no means in the full perfection of human nature. Christ does infinitely more than restore our original state. Cf. *Wisd.* viii. 1, *γῆγενής πρωτόπλαστος*.

ὁ Κύριος appears after *δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος* in A, Tertullian, etc.; and Bengel, Olshausen, Wordsworth retain it. But as it is wanting in *ⲁ B C D*, Lachm., Tisch., Reiche, Treg., Westc. and Hort are justified in omitting it. Neander, Van Hengel and others have said that Tertullian (*Contra Marc.* V. 10) accuses Marcion of having fabricated the reading *Κύριος* and substituted it for *ἄνθρωπος*, to avoid the inference that Christ's body was born of woman. Tertullian only says that Marcion omitted *ἄνθρωπος*. The reading *ἄνθρωπος ὁ Κύριος* is independent of Marcion. The insertion of *ὁ Κύριος* may have arisen from the notion that the Apostle is referring to Christ's second coming. So Theod. and many others. But the Apostle is speaking of Christ here as the spiritual Head of humanity. He introduces His heavenly origin in order to show the supernatural and Divine character of the renewed humanity that begins in Christ. The reference is, therefore, to His incarnation. So Athanasius, *Orat. I. Contra Arian.* 44; Bp. Bull, *Judic. Eccl. Cath.* V. 5. We cannot, however, admit that the Apostle intended to say that Christ's body came down from heaven. This would be fatal to the cogency of the argument, which depends on Christ's being Head of the race. It is necessary to St. Paul's Christology that Christ should be "made of woman" (*Gal.* iv. 4). Cf. *Rom.* i. 4. While this early Marcionite and Apollinarian error is refuted by the

evident purpose of the passage, the view of Baur, Pfleiderer, Beyschlag, etc., that the Apostle represents Christ as being already man in His pre-existent state, is disproved by ver. 45. If the spiritual and human existed in Christ before He created the world, the psychical is not first and the spiritual is not last.

It is not at all improbable that the Apostle had Philo's words in his mind. For Philo (*Leg. Alleg.*, *passim*; *De Mund. Op.*, *ut sup.*) distinguishes between the οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος and the γήινος ἄνθρωπος. But according to him the heavenly man is first, the earthy second. The reason of the difference is that he considered the heavenly man to be an idea in the mind of God, whereas St. Paul represents the man from heaven as a person, who has entered into the historic development of the human race and forms its crown of perfection. Cf. Babington, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, I. p. 47. The argumentative form of ver. 46 ("not . . . but") makes the controversial allusion to Philo extremely probable.

After οὐρανοῦ Origen reads οὐράνιος. But Adam was terrestrial because he had been created out of the dust of the earth, Christ was not heavenly because He had come down from heaven. In relation to Adam ἐκ denotes origin of existence, in reference to Christ it means origin of assumed condition. To add οὐράνιος would be inconsistent with the Apostle's doctrine of Christ's pre-existence.

V. 48. Another step in the argument and an approach to the conclusion. The headship of Adam involves identity of nature and of character with those who are his; the headship of Christ involves identity of nature and character with those who are in union with Him. Because Adam was ψυχικός and χοϊκός, all men in their natural state are terrestrial; because Christ is ἐπουράνιος and πνευματικός, all believers are in their supernatural state spiritual and heavenly. The indefinite word τοιοῦτοι is purposely chosen. The Apostle has not in this discussion mentioned the sin of Adam and the consequent sin of his race, nor the obedience of Christ and the consequent righteousness of believers. Now, however, at the close of his great argument, he uses a word that suggests an allusion to this moral resemblance in so far as it bears upon the question, on the one hand, of the mortality, and, on the other hand, of the immortality, of men. Hence, though it would be

incorrect, I think, to restrict the reference to mortality and immortality, as Augustine does (*Ep. ccv. Consentio*), Œcum. and Theophyl. unduly press to the front the reference to sin and holiness, which is not directly brought forward before ver. 56.

V. 49. B has *φορέσομεν*, and Theod. speaks decidedly in its favour. But *ⲛ A C D* read *φορέσωμεν*. So Chrys. says, *συμβουλευτικῶς*. Tert. (*Contra. Marc. V. 10*): "præceptive, non promissive." Vulg., *portemus*. So Cyprian (*Adv. Jul. 10* et al.), Ambrosiaster, etc. The weight of evidence is not quite so strong in favour of the subjunctive here as in Rom. v. 1. Yet it cannot be put aside, unless we suppose it is an instance of itacism. Internal probability on the one side or the other there is none. On the whole, though *φορέσομεν* is a safe reading, because it is only less comprehensive, we are justified in reading *φορέσωμεν*, with Lachm., Tisch (8th ed.), Treg., Westc. and Hort. Canon Evans, reading *φορέσωμεν*, renders it by "we are to bear," adding that the sense is much the same as "we shall bear." But is this subjunctive in independent sentences usual in prose? The covert allusion to moral character in ver. 48 makes it natural to understand *φορέσωμεν* as an exhortation. In Phil. iii. 21 the Apostle says that Christ will transform the body of our humiliation and conform it to the body of His glory. But in ver. 11 of the same chap. he represents this change, which takes place at the resurrection, as the consummation of his hopes, the practical result of faith and effort. This may, therefore, be justly included in the exhortation of our passage, especially as the aor. is the tense. If he had meant only a holy life, probably the present would have been used. But he regards the resurrection state as a garment to be put on once for all. *Φορέω* is properly the frequentative form of *φέρω*, and is often used of those things which we always have about us, clothes for instance, of which *φέρω* is seldom used. Cf. Lobeck, *Phryg.* pp. 585, 6; Grimm, *Lex.* So in Matt. xi. 8; James ii. 3. The allusion to wearing a garment is not lost in the metaphorical use of the word. Cf. Soph., *Antig.* 705, *μὴ ἐν ἡθροσ φόρει*. The Apostle means the same thing in this ver. and in Col. iii. 10, "having put on the new man." Believers are already such (*τοιούτοι*) as the Heavenly One is. But the

resemblance is ideal, not yet fully realized. Cf. note on v. 7. The word *εἰκών* also requires that we should understand more by the words than mere change of the body from psychological to spiritual. In 2 Cor. iii. 18 the words *τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα* signify the growing likeness of the believer to Christ in holiness; and in Rom viii. 29 the context demands a much wider meaning for *εἰκὼν* than resemblance to Christ in body. At the resurrection the saint will be the image of the God-Man, even as the God-Man is of His Father, or, as Gregory of Nyssa says, *καθάπερ εἰκὼν εἰκόνοσ*.

*ἐφορέσαμεν* . . . *φορέσωμεν*. The forms in -εσ- are late, in LXX., etc. The class. forms are *ἐφόρησα*, *φορήσω*. Cf. Veitch, *Greek Verbs*, s. v.

F. *The change from Psychological to Spiritual necessary and universal.*

(50-54).

V. 50. *τοῦτο δέ φημι*, "but this I affirm," that is, what follows I wish to impress upon you. If he had said *λέγω*, he might have intended the words to be explanatory of what precedes (so Reuss, Heinrici, etc.). But *φημί* expresses the notion of affirming in order to correct a misapprehension. The Apostle wishes to sever himself from the Jewish theory of a resurrection of the flesh. Billroth, Olshausen and Krauss understand the words to be a concession to the upholders of the doctrine of a merely moral resurrection. But in that case he would have used *ὁμολογῶ*, as in Acts xxiv. 14, or a word of similar import, not *φημί*. Hence *ὅτι* means "that," not "because" (Beza), as if *τοῦτο* referred to what precedes.

*σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*, that is, human nature in its present material, mortal, corruptible state. The phrase is synon. with one meaning of *ψυχικός*, but conveys the notion of frail in addition to that of natural. Cf. Polyænus, *Strateg.* III. xi. 1, where *ἀνθρώποις αἷμα καὶ σάρκα ἔχουσιν* is explained by *τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως ἡμῖν κεκοινωνηκόσι*. The Apostle marks the contrast between the glory and power of God's kingdom and the weakness of mortal, human nature. Man, as now constituted, is too feeble to wield the sceptre over the vast and mighty forces of the other world, which are to be subjected to him. So Theod.

(τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν), Severian, and virtually to the same effect Calvin, De Wette, Meyer, etc. The ethical meaning (Irenæus, V. ix., Methodius, Chrys., τὰς πονηρὰς πράξεις, Ambrosiaster, Photius, and many modern expositors) brings the verse into excellent connection with φορέσωμεν. But, *first*, it would require τοῦτο γάρ φημι, and, *second*, though σὰρξ has often an ethical signification, σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα has not. Cf. LXX., Sir. xiv. 18, γενεὰ σαρκὸς καὶ αἵματος, and Eph. vi. 12, where see Harless' note (p. 535), and Heb. ii. 14.

βασίλειαν. Cf. Phil. iii. 20, ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς, 2 Tim. iv. 18, τὴν ἐπουράνιον, Heb. xi. 16, ἐπουρανίου. Cf. note on iv. 20.

κληρονομεῖ. Lachm. reads κληρονόμησει after C D. But A B have the pres., which expresses with οὐ an impossibility arising from the nature of the thing. The abstract nouns "corruption" and "incorruption" are used to express the mutually exclusive and antagonistic nature of the two conditions of being "corrupt" and of being "incorrupt." Death cannot live. Hence also the force of the word "inherit," in allusion to God's covenant with Abraham. It is introduced pertinently into an argument directed against the men that prided themselves on being the heirs of the covenant and looked forward, as Abraham himself did not (cf. Heb. xi. 16), to an inheritance suitable only for flesh and blood. But the antagonist cannot be the heir; corruption, which is the enemy, cannot have the right, even if it had the fitness, to inherit the kingdom of God. The ethical signification of "corruption" is here, but in the background. It is not the prominent notion. The early expositors were led to an exclusively ethical sense by their materialistic conception of the resurrection. For instance, Irenæus (V. xii. 3) and Tertullian (*De Resurr. Carn.* 35) held that the risen body would be of flesh and blood, materially identical with the present body. This doctrine appears in the earliest Creed of the Roman Church, was maintained by all the sub-apostolic writers, and defended by Methodius, Epiphanius, Jerome, and others. The expression "resurrection of the flesh" was finally adopted to confront the Origenistic doctrine that the body would be raised a spiritual or at least æthereal one. But it is in direct contradiction to the Apostle's language. Indeed the author

of the Fragment "On the Resurrection," ascribed to Justin Martyr, has expressed his materialistic notion of the resurrection in words the very reverse of what the Apostle says: τὸν θεὸν ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τὴν φθορὰν ἀφθαρσίαν ποιεῖν.

**V. 51.** Three remarkable differences of reading occur in this verse (1) πάντες [μὲν] οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα. (2) πάντες [μὲν] κοιμηθησόμεθα, οὐ πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα. (3) πάντες ἀναστησόμεθα, οὐ πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα. The third of these readings is found in D, Vulg. (*resurgemus*), Tert.<sup>1</sup> (*De Resurr. Carn.* 42), and is mentioned by Augustine (*Ep.* cciv., et al.) and Jerome (*Ep.* cxix. et al.) as being the reading of Latin, but not of Greek MSS. The meaning will be that the wicked will rise no less than the just, but that the just only will be changed. So Ambrosiaster and in more recent times Dean Colet. But the Greek evidence in favour of the reading is weak; and the entire discussion has reference to believers. The second reading appears in **8** C, and is accepted by Augustine (*ut sup.*). Lachm. adopts it. The first reading is that of A (?) B. Reiche shows that the evidence for it is decisive. So Tisch. (8th Ed.), Treg., Westc. and Hort, Meyer, Heinrichi, etc. It is the only reading consistent with 1 Thess. iv. 15-17, where the Apostle undoubtedly declares that some will live till the coming of Christ and not die. Moreover, a negative clause ("we shall not be changed") cannot be joined with the words that immediately follow, "in a moment," etc.

πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα. Does this mean "none of us shall sleep," or "all of us shall not, but some of us shall, sleep?" Meyer, Winer (*Gr.* § LXI. 5 f.), Ewald, Kling argue that the negative particle must belong to the verb, and that the trajection of οὐ (that is, πάντες οὐ for οὐ πάντες) is inadmissible. According to this view the meaning is that the Apostle himself and all other Christians that will not have died before the coming of Christ will not die, but will be changed. The objections to this interpretation are the following: *First*, the limitation of the meaning of "all" to "all that shall not

<sup>1</sup> Sabatier's opinion that the context of the passage in Tert. requires the first of these readings, though now generally accepted, is, I venture to think, erroneous. Tert. infers that only the living shall be changed from the Apostle's supposed statement, "we shall *not* all be changed."

have died before the coming of Christ," is arbitrary and, when we consider that the word "all" is emphatic in the verse, unnatural. *Second*, the Apostle's object is to show that, though flesh and blood cannot, yet all believers will, in a higher condition, inherit the kingdom of God. The apprehension supposed in the passage to be felt by some believers is the opposite of that which the Apostle allays in 1 Thess. iv. 13-17. The Thessalonians feared that their brethren, who had fallen asleep, would not share in the glory of Christ's second coming, and the Apostle assures them that the dead in Christ will arise and even anticipate the entrance of the living into the heavenly kingdom. Here, on the other hand, the difficulty is to understand how the living at the coming of Christ can inherit the kingdom, inasmuch as flesh and blood cannot. The Apostle replies that, though all will not fall asleep, yet all will be changed. Christians in Corinth expected, or had expected, to live till the day of the Lord should be revealed (cf. i. 8). In the early part of his stay among them the Apostle wrote his First Epistle to the Thessalonians, in which he makes known "the word of the Lord," that the dead would rise and the living be caught up to meet the Lord in the air. It is difficult to believe that he withheld this truth at the time from the Corinthian believers. We may surely infer that their expectation of the Lord's second coming was the direct result of St. Paul's oral teaching. They needed not, therefore, to be now told that all who survived till Christ came would escape death and be caught up to meet him. The mystery that still remained to be revealed was that the living would be caught up not in their present, terrestrial condition, but after a change brought about by the power of God.

The question, however, is whether πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα will grammatically admit of being rendered, "Some of us shall not sleep." Of the instances cited by expositors some are certainly not to the point; *e.g.*, in Rom. xii. 4 the οὐ belongs to τὴν αὐτήν, not to the verb, and some such expression as "but different offices" must be mentally supplied. Again, in Josh. xi. 13 πάσας τὰς πόλεις οὐκ ἐνέπρησεν means that Israel did not burn *any* of the cities, not that they did not burn *all*; and in Sir. xvii. 30 οὐ δύναται πάντα εἶναι means "it is impossible." Meyer says that Num. xxiii. 13, πάντας

δὲ οὐ μὴ ἴδῃς, is not relevant, because οὐ μὴ has a tendency, which οὐ has not, to attach itself to the verb, and Van Hengel admits the force of the argument. But the real question is, not whether πάντες οὐ can stand for οὐ πάντες, but whether πάντες can be used in a negative sentence (the negation belonging to the verb), be the negative particle what it may, to express the same notion as τινές. This question must be answered in the affirmative from Num. xxiii. 13. If the Apostle had said οὐ πάντες κοιμηθσόμεθα, the words might<sup>1</sup> have implied that, though all will not sleep, some will. But the uncertainty as to the time when Christ would appear rendered it necessary to avoid asserting, even by implication, that some would not remain till the second coming.

From what has been said it is evident that the word "mystery" does not mean here τὰ ἀπόρρητα (Origen, *Contra Cel.* V. 19), but has its usual meaning of "a truth made known by revelation." It may be compared with ἐν λόγῳ Κυρίου of 1 Thess. iv. 15. But to the Thessalonians the Apostle communicated only a portion of the word of the Lord, that is, only what was calculated to allay their fears. Now he makes known another portion apparently of the same revelation, that believers left till the coming of Christ shall be changed. But here also a part only of this secret counsel of God is divulged. The nature of the change is not revealed. We know from ver. 44 that it is a change from a psychical to a spiritual body. In Phil. iii. 21 it is called a μετασχηματίζειν, and the result is said to be that the body of the believer is conformed to the body of Christ's glory. It stands in contrast to the change into decay and death, which will come over all created things else. Cf. Heb. i. 12.

V. 52. ἐν ἀτόμῳ and ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ mean the same thing and are to be connected with ἀλλαγησόμεθα. Cf. Soph., *El.* 106, ῥιπῇ ἄστρων. The change will be instantaneous and complete. This he says to show them that the dead will have no advantage over the living. To be steadfast, unmoveable, abounding in the work of the Lord amidst the trials of life on earth will not fail of a reward in a glorious transformation equal to the glory of the holy dead, who are now with the Lord and whom God will bring with Him at His coming.

<sup>1</sup> Might; for οὐ πᾶς might, on the contrary, be a Hebraism for "no one."

ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ σάλπιγγι, "at the last trump." We may gather from 1 Thess. iv. 16 that these words are intended to account for the wondrous change wrought on the living and the dead at the coming of Christ. Nothing less brings it to pass than the immediate operation of God's power. The metaphor of a trumpet is borrowed from the history of solemn manifestations of God under the Old Testament. Cf. Exod. xix. 16, *φωνὴ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἤχει*, which sound of trumpet, as we learn from Heb. xii., was the signal to the people of the descent of the Lord upon the mountain and was the immediate cause of their terror. So in Zech. ix. 14, *Κύριος παντοκράτωρ ἐν σάλπιγγι σαλπιεῖ*. When Jesus raised Lazarus, He cried with a loud voice (cf. John v. 28). This explanation of the metaphor is better than that of Ambrosiaster, that by the trumpet is to be understood the signal to battle. The Apostle calls it the last trump, not in allusion to the rabbinical notion of seven stages in the process of the resurrection—a notion that rests on the anti-Pauline materialistic doctrine that flesh and blood will be raised—nor merely as denoting the trumpet of the last day or the trumpet that sounds at the end of the world (Estius, Meyer, Alford), but to signify that this will be the last manifestation of God to men in this their earthly condition. The trumpet that sounded on Sinai when the law was given will again sound to announce the coming of the Lord. This explanation includes that of Theod. Mops., Severian (*Cat.*) and Jerome, that the Apostle is expressing the same notion as St. John in Rev. xi. 15, without, of course, supposing that either alludes to the other.

*σαλπίσει . . . ἀλλαγησόμεθα*. The Apostle adds these words, not to assure his readers that what he has mentioned will infallibly take place, but to give the order in which the three great acts of the last day will follow one another. The first will be the sudden signal of God's presence. Then the dead in Christ will rise. Last of all, the living will be changed. This is the order also in 1 Thess. iv. 14–17. The "Didache" (c. 16) reverses the order. The Apostle seems to attach some importance to the fact that the dead will rise before the living are changed. He declares it to be part of a revelation from the Lord (1 Thess. iv. 15). But why this order and why does he here state it? This at least may be said: the living will

witness the resurrection of the dead, and those that are raised will witness the change of the living. Both will, thereupon, be caught up together to meet the Lord.

*σαλπίζει*, late fut. The Attic fut., which, judging from the analogy of other verbs denoting sound, would be *σαλπίζομαι*, does not occur. In LXX. *σαλπιδ* occurs. *Σαλπίζει* is here impers. (cf. *ἐπειδὴν δὲ σημήνην*, Xen., *Anab.* II. ii. 4). In 1 Thess. iv. 16 the *σαλπιγκτής* is said to be an Archangel; and this again intimates that the trumpet proclaims the presence of God.

*ἐγερθήσονται*. So  $\aleph$  B C. A D read *ἀναστήσονται*.

*καί*, "and then," with a slightly inferential force. It is the *καί* consecutivum. Cf. Matt. viii. 8; James iv. 7.

V. 53. In the previous verses the Apostle has declared the change of the living as a revelation. He proves now that it must be. Because flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, the mortal must pass through a change from psychical to spiritual, before it can enter into the life to come.

*τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο*. Tertullian (*De Resurr. Carn.* 51) argues that the verse implies a resurrection of the flesh, "*cutem ipsam tenus*;" and Chrys., Theod., Theophyl., Hervæus, and some modern expositors think the Apostle's object is to state the identity of the dying body with the body that will be raised. But a comparison of the verse with 2 Cor. v. 2-4 shows that *ἐνδύσασθαι* refers, not to the dead, but to the living. In that passage the Apostle speaks of the living, clothed with the present body as with a garment, and earnestly desiring, not to lay the garment aside by dying, but to put on the spiritual body as an upper garment is put on over a lower one, that mortality may be swallowed up of life. Cf. 2 Pet. i. 14, where dying is described as "a putting off of the tabernacle." The emphatic *τοῦτο* contains a personal application of the doctrine concerning the future change to the Apostle himself. He points, to borrow Theodoret's words, as it were with his finger to "this my body." It is this personal exultation at the prospect of living to the day of Christ that the Apostle corrects in the pathetic language of his Second Epistle, when he sees the outer man perishing and intimates the probability of the earthly house being dissolved. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 16-v. 10.

Expositors try to discover a difference between "this cor-

ruptible" and "this mortal." Hervæus, for instance, thinks incorruption is an attribute of all that will be raised, immortality an attribute of the just only. Bengel says "corruptible" refers to the dead, "immortal" to the living, which would imply that *φθαρτός* means "corrupted." But repetition of the same thought and even the same words is in harmony with the slow and solemn march of the whole of this triumphant pæan. The stately step of the passage is in striking contrast to the rapid movement of the more argumentative portions of the chapter.

V. 54. The words *τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσεται ἀφθαρσίαν καί* are omitted in *NC* and *Vulg.* So *Lachm.* In *A* the two clauses are transposed. But *BD* and *Peshitta* have the above words first. So *Tisch.*, *Treg.*, *Westc.* and *Hort.*

*νίκος*, later form of *νίκη*. But *BD* have *νεῖκος*, and *Tert.* (*ut sup.*), *Cyprian* (*Test.* iii. 58), etc., read "in contentionem." There are other instances of confusion between *νίκος* and *νεῖκος*.

*γενήσεται ὁ λόγος.* *Hofm.* renders: "then will the word be spoken," and cites *John* x. 35, which is not a parallel passage; for *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐγένετο* means, not only that the word of God was spoken, but that it was spoken as a message. For *λόγος* in the sense of a Divine declaration cf. *1 Thess.* iv. 15; *John* xv. 25. For *γίγνεσθαι* in the sense of "to be fulfilled" cf. *Matt.* vi. 10; *Mark* xi. 23. *Chrys.* rightly: *τότε ἡ γραφή πληροῦται.* The Apostle is citing *Isa.* xxv. 8. But *LXX.* reverses the meaning of the Hebrew by rendering it *κατέπιεν ὁ θάνατος ἰσχύσας.* *Aquila* has *καταπόντισει τὸν θάνατον εἰς νίκος.* *Theodotion*, apparently borrowing the Apostle's rendering, has *κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νίκος.* *Symmachus*: *καταποθῆναι ποιήσει τὸν θάνατον εἰς τέλος.* That *St. Paul* had the rendering of *LXX.* in his mind is almost certainly proved by his using the word *καταπίνω.* But he intentionally corrected it. He put the verb, however, in the passive.

The reference in this verse also is to the change of the living. In *2 Cor.* v. 4 dying is expressly excluded from the meaning of the word *καταπίνεσθαι.* Deathless change is called a swallowing up, an absorption, of the mortal by the principle of life in Christ. Indeed the words of the prophet himself may be understood of an escape from death rather than

of a resurrection of the dead. Cf. Cheyne's *Isaiah Chronologically Arranged*, p. 125. But even if Isaiah speaks of the time when death itself must die, which seems to be the use made of his words in Rev. xxi. 4, his prophecy is also fulfilled, though not finally, in the absorption of mortality by life. This view accounts for the retention by the Apostle of the word *καταπίνειν* from LXX., even when he corrects the translation.

G. *Refrain of Triumph and Concluding Exhortation.*

(55-58).

V. 55. The order of the clauses in  $\aleph$  B C, Vulg. is *ποῦ . . . νίκος; ποῦ . . . κέντρον;* So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. The clause *ποῦ . . . νίκος;* is omitted in A. For *ἄδη*, which is an early reading,  $\aleph$  B C D Vulg. repeat *θάνατε*. So Lachm., Tisch., Treg., Westc. and Hort. Van Heng. and Wordsworth wrongly retain *ἄδη*. The Apostle is borrowing the words of Hosea xiii. 14 and evidently has the rendering of LXX. in his mind, *ποῦ ἡ δίκη σου, θάνατε; ποῦ τὸ κέντρον σου, ἄδη;* But he has altered two words. (1) For *δίκη*, "judgment," "arraignment," he has written *νίκος*, "victory," not because he quotes from memory (Reuss), but to continue the notion already expressed in *εἰς νίκος*. The Heb. דְּבָרִים may be the plur. of דָּבָר, "word," or of דִּבְרָה, "destruction." Cf. Gesenius, *Lex.* s.v. LXX. appears to have adopted the former rendering, in the forensic sense of "law-suit." So Aquila, *ποῦ εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι σου;* The Apostle prefers the latter meaning. So also Symmachus, who has *πληγή*, and the Vulg., which has *mors*. It is the more probable rendering. (2) For the *ἄδη* of LXX., the Sheol of the Hebrews, the Apostle writes *θάνατε*. It is remarkable that the word Hades does not occur in St. Paul's Epistles; and when we find him using *ἄβυσσος* instead in Rom. x. 7 and actually substituting *θάνατος* for it in this passage, it is difficult to suppose its absence is accidental. In writing to Greeks he may have shunned the ill-omened name, which, we are told by Plato (*Crat.* p. 403), the common people dreaded to utter. But, in addition to this, the Apostle's own conception

of death and of the future state is so far removed from the Greek myth of Hades,

ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ  
ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἶδωλα καμώντων,  
(Hom., *Od.* xi. 475, 6),

that he strikes out, as Socrates also begged the poets' pardon for doing (Plat., *Rep.*, p. 387, *διαγράφωμεν*), the very name that brought in its train "the sapless shades, the shrilling cries, of flitting ghosts passing like smoke beneath the earth." A similar antipathy to the Greek conception meets us in Philo (*De Cong. Quær. Erudit. Grat.*, p. 527, Vol. I. Mang.), who bids us distinguish between the mythical and the true Hades, the former a place only, the latter a moral condition, the life of a wicked man. Chrys. (*De Cœm. et Cruce*, p. 398) says that before Christ came death was called death and Hades, but since He died for the life of the world, it is a sleep. The Apostle states his conception of Death in the words immediately following: The sting of death is, not Hades, but sin.

τὸ νίκος, "thy victory." Death has conquered us; Christ has conquered the conqueror. Hervæus excellently: "Ubi est victoria tua quâ omnes sic vicerat ut etiam Dei filius tecum configerat teque non vitando sed suscipiendo superaret?"

κέντρον, "sting," death being represented as a venomous serpent; not "goad," as if death were only "driving" men to destruction (Flatt, Billroth, Heinrici). The word must signify, not merely what imparts to death its bitterness, but what gives death its power of wounding mortally. The Heb. word rendered κέντρον properly means "a cut," then the instrument that cuts.

V. 56. The two questions in ver. 55 give the Apostle an opportunity to introduce the only element that seems wanting hitherto to the completeness of his doctrine of the resurrection, the characteristic Pauline notion of the moral relation in which believers stand to Christ and, through Christ, to all Christ's enemies. The sting with which death, the last enemy, kills is sin. This is precisely what the Apostle teaches in Rom. v. 12. That he reiterates the doctrine in the present passage proves that he himself at least saw no irreconcilable contradiction between his treatment of the doctrine of sin in

the Epistles to the Romans and to the Corinthians. In both places he declares that death comes through sin. But to say that the sting of death is sin involves that the strength of sin is the law. Death follows sin, not simply as a physical, but essentially as a moral consequence (cf. Rom. v. 16; vi. 23). The inference is that victory over sin is possible only through the propitiation, which is Jesus Christ (cf. Rom. iii. 25). The headship of the second Man has no real existence apart from His atonement. Christ acts as a quickening spirit through redemption. In this way the Apostle connects the resurrection of believers with the death of Christ as well as with the power of His heavenly life. Thus to make the judicial intent of Christ's death the key-stone of the discussion is an unmistakable sign of Pauline thought. For this reason we must reject the view of Chrys., Severian (*Cat.*), Augustine (*De Perf. Instit.* 6, et al.) and several modern expositors, that law is here said to be the strength of sin because it quickens and invigorates the habit of sin.

V. 57. *διδόντι*, pres., not (as Meyer, Alford, etc.) to denote the certainty of the future resurrection, but to express that even now we have forgiveness of sins. If the sting of death is sin, victory over death must be forgiveness of the sin.

*τὸ νίκος*, "that victory" which death has gained and Christ turns into a defeat through His atoning death. The New Test. represents the resurrection, not as a mere event, but as man's final conquest over every form of evil. The question is transferred from the material into the moral sphere; another proof that the subject of the chapter is not the general resurrection, but the resurrection of believers. The Apostle's purpose is to encourage timid Christians in the conflict against sin with the certain hope of victory at last.

V. 58. The concluding exhortation, based on the whole discussion, and connecting it with the instructions that immediately follow respecting the collection for the poor saints in Jerusalem. Hofmann and others begin the next chap. with this verse, but not so happily; because the words "steadfast, unmoveable" are not to be connected with "in the work of the Lord."

*ὥστε*, "therefore." Cf. note on iii. 21.

*ἀγαπητοί*, "beloved ones." Under the influence of the hopes and triumphs now recounted, the Apostle's soul melts

into tenderness. A still greater change of tone from excited indignation to sympathetic gentleness occurs in 2 Cor. vii. 1. There it is produced by an enumeration of God's promises.

ἑδραῖοι. Cf. note in vii. 37.

ἀμετακίνητοι. The generic term is ἑδραῖοι, "steadfast." The word "unmoved" denotes resistance to the special attempt to overthrow their faith in the doctrine of the resurrection. It is implied that an attempt of the kind has been intentionally made in the Corinthian Church. Cf. vv. 32-34.

περισσεύοντες. Faith in a resurrection produces a consciousness of boundless and endless power for work. In the case of a believer, youth's large dreams never contract into commonplace achievement. The thought of finality in life and work gives place to the hope of an eternal enlargement of sphere, ever-increasing powers, ever more effective service. Περισεύω has always a comparative meaning. Here it expresses the thought of infinity of aim. We have had several intimations in the course of the Epistle that the Apostle considered the root of the evils that were sapping the Christianity of the Corinthians to be spiritual lethargy. From this sprang their pride, their factions, their tolerance of immoral lives, their intolerance of honest errors of judgment, their unspiritual conception of truth, and their impatient scorn of doctrines not materialistic.

ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ Κυρίου, that is, in doing the work which the Lord Jesus Christ entrusts to them, and which, therefore, is rendered to Him. They must give an account of their stewardship. Resurrection involves judgment.

εἰδότες, "inasmuch as ye know." They knew by this time, from the Apostle's argument, that quick and dead will appear before Christ. Faithfulness will be rewarded with participation in Christ's glory; for the fire will test every man's work (cf. iii. 13; iv. 5). The Apostle began the discussion by declaring that, if there is no resurrection of the dead, his preaching and their faith are equally vain. He closes his argument with an appeal to their Christian conscience and their conviction that, because there will be a resurrection, their humble toil (κόπος, cf. note on iii. 8) from day to day in the work of the Lord will be no more in vain than their faith in Christ, no more in vain than the ministry of apostles, no more in vain than Christ's death and atonement.

## EIGHTH DIVISION.

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### SUNDRY PERSONAL AND INCIDENTAL MATTERS.

(xvi. 1-24).

#### A. *Of the Collection for the Church in Jerusalem.*

(1-4).

It was customary among the Jews of the Dispersion to send contributions to their poorer brethren in Palestine. Cf. Ewald, *Geschichte* etc. VI. 438. The Apostle has himself been already, with Barnabas, the bearer of alms from the Gentile Churches to the Church in Jerusalem (cf. Acts xi. 30). One purpose of the free associations (*ἐξαιρέσεις*) in the Gentile world was to help the poor, not only members of the same association, but members of other associations belonging to the same guild; and it is in allusion to these benefit clubs that Tertullian speaks of "arca" and "stips" in connection with the Church's provision for the poor. Afterwards also the Apostle laid the injunction on the Churches of Galatia to give alms to their brethren in Judæa. Bp. Lightfoot supposes, not without reason, that they did not respond heartily to the appeal. No allusion is made to the alms of the Galatian Churches, except in this place. The Apostle was more successful in inducing the Churches of Macedonia and especially Achaia to make the contribution. He was himself the bearer of their alms (cf. Rom. xv. 26; 2 Cor. ix. 1-5; Acts xxiv. 17). Nothing is known of the causes of the poverty of the Jewish Christians. It is clear that the community of property, if indeed the theory was sanctioned and the practice was established at the first (Acts ii. 44), had failed and been abandoned. Augustine surmises that the poverty of the Church

in Jerusalem was the direct consequence of the attempt to introduce such community of goods. From the expression *τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἀγίων* (Rom. xv. 26) we may infer that all the members of the Church were not poor. It is not, therefore, true to say that the Jewish Christians were at this time Ebionites. To say the least, only some of them were bound by a vow of poverty; and it is not likely the Gentile Churches would give alms to maintain the practice of religious poverty. We may, perhaps, suppose that the effect of the famine in the time of Claudius (Acts xi. 28) had not yet entirely disappeared. In addition to this we know from 1 Thess. ii. 14 that the Christian Jews had recently suffered persecution at the hands of their countrymen. Rückert thinks the Apostle interested himself on their behalf in order to reconcile the Judaists among the Christians. This conjecture—for it is nothing more—is inconsistent with the stipulation made by James, Cephas and John, that Paul and Barnabas should continue to remember the poor Christians of Judæa, before they would consent to their going to the Gentiles.

**V. 1.** *περί*, not to be connected with *ὥσπερ διέταξα*, but introducing a new subject (cf. viii. 1; xii. 1). The Corinthian Church had already promised to make the collection (cf. 2 Cor. viii. 10). I infer that it was mentioned in the letter sent by the Corinthians to the Apostle. They may have asked for instructions as to the most effective method of carrying out their intention.

*λογίας*. The word now occurs for the first time. Elsewhere the Apostle uses *χάρις* (ver. 3), *κοινωνία* (Rom. xv. 26), *εὐλογία* (2 Cor. ix. 5), *λειτουργία* (2 Cor. ix. 12), *ἐλεημοσύναι* and *προσφοραί* (Acts xxiv. 17). In the form *συλλογή* (sc. *χρημάτων*) the word passed into the language of the Church. Chrys. adds *ἔρανος* in his paraphrase, the nearest approach in heathen Greece to the Christian "collection." But the word was avoided by the Apostle because he was not now asking the Corinthians to contribute to a common purse, but to make a special gift of money to strangers. The notion of charity to the poor as such is not a heathen idea. The word *ἐλεημοσύναι* would have Jewish associations in its meaning. The Apostle prefers coining a word to using *ἔρανος* or *ἐλεημοσύναι*.

διέταξα. The aor. refers to one occasion, probably when he visited Galatia on his second missionary journey, three years before. The collection of the Galatian Churches, if it was made at all, must have been already transmitted to Jerusalem.

Γαλατίας. Bengel's note has been often cited, but something similar appears in Chrysostom. "He sets before the Corinthians the example of the Galatians, before the Macedonians the example of the Corinthians, before the Romans the example of the Corinthians and Macedonians."

οὕτω, "thus," as he directs in ver. 2.

V. 2. κατὰ μίαν σαββάτου, "every first day of the week." For κατὰ cf. note on xvi. 31. Εἰς is used for πρῶτος by a Hebraism. Cf. Joseph., *Ant.* I. 1, αὕτη μὲν εἴη πρώτη ἡμέρα· Μωσῆς δὲ αὐτὴν μίαν εἶπεν. Philo allegorizes on this in *De Mund. Op.*, p. 3, Vol. I. Mang. Σαββάτου is the reading of  $\Sigma$  A B C D and must be adopted. So Lachm., Tisch., etc. But σαββάτων would also mean "a week." Cf. Matt. xxviii. 1; Mark xvi. 9; Luke xviii. 12; Acts xx. 7. The Jews do not appear to have had a distinct name for every day of the week. Cf. Winer, *RWB*, s.v. *Woche*. The day of rest lent its name to the whole week, and every day was named in reference to the day which consecrated all. The Apostle designates the Lord's Day by its Jewish name. It is not named in the New Test. the Sabbath. Ignatius (*Ad Magnes.* 9) says the generality of Christians did not sabbatize (μηδὲν σαββατίζοντες). In Rev. i. 10 the name is ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα. Similarly in "Didache," c. 14, κατὰ κυριακὴν Κυρίου, where the redundant expression proves that ἡ κυριακή had already become a merely formal designation. In Barn., *Ep.* 15, the antitype of the Jewish Sabbath is said to be, not the Lord's Day, but the millennium. Justin Martyr (*Apol.* I. 67) does not hesitate to use the heathen name Sunday (τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένη ἡμέρα), because the usual name, "The Lord's Day," would have been unintelligible to the person whom he was addressing. But the Jewish Sabbath must have been well known to the Emperor, and would, therefore, have been used by Justin if the Christian "Day of the Lord" was in any way identical with the Sabbath. So also Tertullian (*Ad Nationes* I. 13) speaks of the Day of the Sun in addressing the Gentiles. Cf. *Apol.* 16, "die Solis

lætitia indulgemus." Pliny's statement (*Ep.* X. 97) that the Christians were accustomed to meet "*stato die*" implies that the day was fixed by the Christians themselves. We may infer that the writers of the New Test. and the early Church did not regard the Lord's Day as in any sense a perpetuation of the Jewish Sabbath. The inference is supported by what is told us in Eus., *Hist. Eccles.* III. 27, of the Ebionite Christians, who kept holy the seventh day and commemorated the resurrection of Christ on the first day with their brethren who did not observe the Sabbath. The two days must, therefore, have been distinct in idea. Our passage is the earliest mention of a religious use of the first day of the week. Its observance was at last decreed by Constantine, A.D. 321.

παρ' ἑαυτῷ, "at his own house." Cf. Herodot. VI. 86, θέσθαι παρά σε. The act. τιθέναι also occurs in this sense of depositing money.

θησαυρίζων, "storing," that is, adding somewhat to the amount of his contribution. The Apostle does not enjoin a public collection in the Church (as Estius, Hodge, etc., suppose), not because the Christians had no public assemblies on the Lord's Day, but probably because they transferred to the Lord's Day the Jewish observance of not giving or receiving money on the Sabbath (Philo, *De Virtut.* p. 569, Vol. II. Mang.). The reason why he enjoins them to lay by on the Lord's Day must be sought in the previous discussion concerning the resurrection. The doctrine of the resurrection is an assurance that their labour will not be in vain; and the proof of that doctrine is the resurrection of Christ, which is, therefore, fitly commemorated by good deeds. He speaks in the spirit of the Athenians who considered nothing else a festival than doing their duty. Cf. Thuc. I. 70; Orig., *Contra Cels.* VIII. 21. In the time of Tertullian (*Apol.* 39) the money intended for the poor was laid aside once a month.

ὁ τι may be subject of εὐδῶται (as in Hdt. VI. 73, εὐδῶθη τὸ πρῆγμα) or accus. of nearer reference, "in whatever he may prosper." Cf. Rom. i. 10, εὐδωθήσομαι. The Vulg. has *quod ei placuerit*, a meaning which εὐδοῦσθαι never bears. The only possible meaning is that every man should lay in store a fitting portion of the gains he made in business. The Churches of Macedonia were giving above their power out of

their poverty (cf. 2 Cor. viii. 2, 3). The Corinthians are asked to give out of their abundance and only what may be over and above.

ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ. The motive usually assigned for the Apostle's wish not to have collections after his arrival is his anxiety to devote the time of his stay at Corinth to the more important duty of spiritual edification. This is hardly satisfactory, as he expected to tarry awhile, if not also to winter, at Corinth, which would afford ample time. Perhaps he wished by not even collecting the money himself, no less than by appointing members of the Church to convey the gift to Jerusalem, to obviate the possibility of his being charged with misappropriating it.

V. 3. ὅταν δὲ παραγένομαι, "but as soon as I arrive" (cf. xv. 28). The distress in Jerusalem was urgent. This is an additional reason for making the collection before he came.

οὕς ἐάν. Cf. note on vi. 18.

δοκιμάσητε. Cf. 2 Cor. viii. 22. The Apostle nominated and the Church confirmed his choice, in accordance with the autonomy of the Christian ἔρανος.

δι' ἐπιστολῶν. Most expositors from Chrys. and Ambrosiaster to De Wette and Meyer connect these words with πέμψω. Calvin, Beza, Estius, and the Revised Version connect them with δοκιμάσητε. In the latter case the meaning is that the Corinthian Church will authorize the messengers to act on its behalf; in the former case the Apostle undertakes to give the messengers letters of introduction to the Church in Jerusalem. It is difficult to see what apostolical authorization to bear a gift from one Church to another the messengers need have. On the other hand, the Apostle's extreme care to avoid the possibility of being charged with dishonesty by his unscrupulous enemies (cf. 2 Cor. viii. 20) would render it advisable, perhaps indispensable, that the Church should accredit the messengers by letter. That the messengers should be approved by the Church was important to him at Corinth; that the Church should send a written statement by them would be important to him at Jerusalem. Churches were in the habit of giving letters of commendation (cf. 2 Cor. iii. 2). The plural ἐπιστολαί may denote one letter or several letters (cf. Poppo's note on Thuc. I. 129).

τούτους, emphatic: their own delegates and no others.

χάριν, "gift of kindness," as in 2 Cor. viii. 7 compared with ver. 9. The Corinthians could not read this without being reminded of that "gift of kindness" to which the name is most fittingly applied, the grace of their Lord Jesus Christ, who being rich for their sakes became poor.

V. 4. ἄξιον. Expositors explain it of the amount of the gift. But the word may mean "becoming," as in 2 Thess. i. 3. The Apostle hesitated to go himself from a sense of delicacy and fear of being obtrusive, not from any notion that it would be unworthy an Apostle to carry a small sum. He did go, however. Cf. Rom. xv. 25; Acts xxi. 17.

B. *Of the Apostle's Intention to come to Corinth.*

(5-9).

V. 5. His previous intention was to come direct to Corinth (2 Cor. i. 15) and proceed from Corinth to Macedonia, then return from Macedonia to Corinth and be escorted by the Corinthians on his way to Judæa. It would seem from iv. 19 (where see note) that this was his plan when he wrote the former part of this Epistle. He changed his mind, he tells them in 2 Cor. i. 23, in order to spare them. He wished to give them time, while he would be in Macedonia, to heal their divisions, to deliver to Satan the incestuous man, and to amend their conduct in the assemblies of the Church. He went from Ephesus to Troas, crossed into Macedonia (2 Cor. ii. 12, 13), where he wrote the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and by a detour in Illyricum came at last to Corinth in the beginning of winter. Cf. Acts xx. 3; Rom. xv. 19.

V 6. διέρχομαι, pres., to express that he is now preparing to come; not here pres. for future, as in Luke xxiii. 29. Cf. Rom. xv. 25, πορεύομαι, "proficisci cogito" (Fritzsche), John xi. 8, ὑπάγεις.

πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Πρὸς with accus. often means "with," but implies, not merely nearness (as with dat.), but intercourse. Cf. Xen., *Mem.* II. iv. 7, πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, "in amicorum consuetudine;" John i. 1; Gal. i. 18. Osiander is incorrect in

thinking a verb of motion must be supplied. Cf. Bernhardt, *W.S.* p. 265; Winer, *Gr.* § XLIX. h.

τυχόν, "perhaps;" that is, if he need not accompany the messengers to Jerusalem. Here only in the New Test., but occurring in class. writers. Cf. xiv. 10, εἰ τύχοι.

προπέμψητε. Cf. Acts xv. 3; xvii. 10; Rom. xv. 24; 3 John 6. The ὑμεῖς is emphatic: "you who now grieve me." The Apostle hoped his wintering with them would confirm their loyalty and cement their friendship.

οἷ, "whither." So in Matt. xxviii. 16; οἷ for οἷ is late Greek. Cf. Rutherford's *Phrynichus*, XXX. It is startling to find that the Apostle has some thoughts of tarrying a considerable time in Corinth. His protracted absence made it impossible to send the collection partly made before Pentecost to Jerusalem before winter. All this lends an air of plausibility to the complaints of some at Corinth. He considers it necessary to rebut the charge of fickleness (cf. 2 Cor. i. 17).

V. 7. If he had come to Corinth, as he intended at first, on his way (ἐν παρόδῳ) to Macedonia, he could not have remained long in Corinth. A short stay was unadvisable in the present state of feeling in that Church.

ἄρτι, "just at present;" that is, so long as things continue in their present condition. We cannot infer from the word ἄρτι that he had previously paid them a short visit subsequently to the stay of eighteen months recorded in Acts xviii. 11, nor that he is declaring his intention to pay them a short visit at a future time. The opposition implied in ἄρτι is between the actual state of the Corinthian Church and its supposed condition when the Apostle formed the design now relinquished of visiting Corinth *in transitu*. The phrase ἐν παρόδῳ occurs in Thucydides and Polybius.

ἐπιτρέψῃ. So  $\aleph$  A B C, Vulg. (*permiserit*). D has ἐπιτρέπη.

V. 8. The Epistle was, therefore, written at Ephesus shortly before Pentecost. There is no intimation in Acts xx. 1 that the Apostle left Ephesus earlier than he intended in consequence of the tumult that had arisen in the city.

V. 9. The metaphorical meaning of θύρα has so completely put out of sight the natural meaning that the adjectives μεγάλη and ἐνεργής need occasion no difficulty. It means

opportunities to preach the Gospel without hindrance. These opportunities were ample (*μεγάλη*) and the Apostle made effectual use of them (*ἐνεργής*). Cf. Acts xix. 11–20.

*ἀνέωγε*, “stands open.” Good Attic writers prefer *ἀνέωγμαι*, but *ἀνέωγα* occurs in Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, etc.

*ἀντικείμενοι*. The muttering of the storm that burst in the tumult of Demetrius (cf. Acts xix.). Immediately when ampler opportunities offer for preaching the Gospel, adversaries suddenly arise.

### C. *Of the coming of Timotheus and Apollos to Corinth.*

(10–12).

V. 10. Cf. note on iv. 17. The Apostle had sent Timotheus from Ephesus to Macedonia, and desired him to continue his journey to Corinth. Timotheus was on the journey when St. Paul wrote our Epistle. We should have expected, therefore, *ὅταν* rather than *ἐάν*,—“when” rather than “if he comes,” unless we render *ἐάν* by “when,” a Hebraism that occurs sometimes in Hellenistic Greek. But if Timotheus heard in Macedonia of the hostile attitude of many in the Corinthian Church towards the Apostle, he would naturally feel as much reluctance to visit Corinth as the Apostle himself. In fact he did not come.<sup>1</sup> For he was with the Apostle at Philippi shortly afterwards, when the Second Epistle to the Corinthians was written (cf. 2 Cor. i. 1). He is with the Apostle when he writes the Epistle to the Romans from Corinth (cf. Rom. xvi. 21).

*βλέπετε ἵνα*. The class. phrase would have been *ὁρᾶτε ὁπως*.

*ἀφόβως*. Adverbs are sometimes predicates after *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, both when they are used impersonally with *τινι*

<sup>1</sup> On this point the arguments of Bp. Lightfoot in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. II. pp. 198, seqq., are to my mind convincing. “Timotheus is represented in the Acts (xix. 22) as being sent with Erastus into Macedonia, as if the sacred historian were not aware of his journey being continued to Corinth.” Again, “If Timotheus had actually visited Corinth, he must have brought back some information as to the state of the Church there.” But “there is not the slightest inkling of any knowledge obtained through Timotheus on any subject whatever.” Once more, “In one passage where St. Paul is enumerating visits paid to the Corinthians, the name of Timotheus does not occur (2 Cor. xii. 17, 18).”

and when they are personal verbs. Cf. Ast., *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 395. Various reasons have been assigned for Timotheus' fear,—his youth (Meyer), his timid disposition (De Wette, Alford), etc. In addition to these the present distracted condition of the Church in Corinth would cause him anxiety.

V. 11. The Apostle claims for Timotheus for his work's sake the love and respect which some at least were willing even in Corinth to accord to the Apostle himself.

ἐν εἰρήνῃ, that is, with the blessing of the Church, "peace be with thee." Cf. Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.* 65, ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἀναπέμψατε. It denotes much more than safety. Cf. i. 3; Acts xv. 33. The Apostle wished Timotheus to return without delay to Ephesus, intending probably to leave him there while he would be in Macedonia and Achaia. As Timotheus did not come to Corinth, this plan was frustrated.

μετὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν. We do not know who the brethren were. Erastus, who had accompanied Timotheus from Ephesus, could not be one of them; for his home was in Corinth.

V. 12. It appears, then, that Apollos had returned from Corinth (iii. 6) to Ephesus, where now he was with the Apostle. St. Paul's friendliness is only more admirable than the wise caution of Apollos, who held back lest some in Corinth might make his presence an excuse for dissension. If Paul and Apollos were leaders of opposite factions, would either of them have acted as each is here said to have done? Cf. note on i. 12.

θέλημα. Cf. note on vii. 37. It is followed by ἵνα, which expresses the object of the wish. Cf. Matt. xviii. 14; John vi. 39, 40.

μετὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, that is, the brethren that carried the Epistle from Ephesus to Corinth. Stanley argues with great plausibility that they were Titus and his companions, mentioned in 2 Cor. viii. 18, 22, 23. At least the Apostle learnt from Titus how his Epistle had been received in Corinth (2 Cor. ii. 12; vii. 6). The alacrity of Titus contrasts with the reluctance of Apollos. Cf. 2 Cor. viii. 17.

εὐκαιρίῃ, "when he has a good opportunity." A vague expression is used to avoid stating what was probably the cause of the extreme reluctance shown by Apollos to comply with the Apostle's entreaties. Σχολάζω expresses the more

definite notion of "having leisure." So *εὐκαιρία*, which is classical (*εὐκαιρῶ* does not, I think, occur before Polybius), has a wider range of meaning than *σχολή*.

D. *A Summary of the Practical Lessons of the Epistle.*

(13, 14).

These verses are not connected with what immediately precedes or follows. The state of the Corinthian Church presents itself before the Apostle's mind—a state of spiritual lethargy, vacillation, childish weakness and selfishness. In the forefront of his exhortation the Apostle places watchfulness or rather, perhaps, wakefulness; for *γρηγορεῖν* (synonymous with *ἀγρυπνεῖν*, Eph. vi. 18) is the peculiarly Christian alertness which Christ in His later ministry urges upon His disciples (cf. Matt. xxiv. 42; xxv. 13). It assumed especially the form of watching for the coming of the Lord or against the approach of the Enemy (1 Pet. v. 8); then, in a more general sense, it meant that activity and energy of soul which constitutes the power of the religious life in its realization of spiritual things and in prayer. It is the Christian form of the spirit's search for truth, which makes agnosticism keenly painful. In the next place, the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians to maintain steadfastness in faith. Because Christ has revealed God, the Christian is not only watching for a revelation to come, but also calm and strong of faith in the revelation given. But the Corinthians were vacillating (cf. xv. 58). Again, an insecure grasp of the verities of faith left them morally weak. The voice of conscience was not heard; sin was less loathsome than it had been; temptations were gaining the mastery. The third exhortation of the Apostle is, therefore, that they should quit them as men and be strong. (Some expositors consider all these words to be military metaphors. This narrows the meaning too much). Finally, selfish factions were the natural result of their moral weakness, and the parting exhortation of the Epistle is that they should live in the atmosphere of Christian love.

V. 13. *γρηγορῶ* is formed from the perf. *ἐγρήγορα* and does not occur in Attic writers. Cf. Rutherford's *Phrynichus*, XCV. *Κραταῖω* is Hellenistic for *κρατύνω*. Cf. Ps. xxx. (xxxi.) 25.

E. *A kindly recommendation of Stephanas and others to their brotherly regard.*

(15-18).

V. 15. οἶδατε . . . ἐαυτούς is undoubtedly parenthetical. It gives the reason for the exhortation that follows.

ἀπαρχή, "first-fruits." This is usually explained to mean that the household of Stephanas were the first converts in the province of Achaia. But how could this be, seeing that Dionysius and Damaris had already believed in Athens, before the Apostle came to Corinth? Cf. Acts xvii. 34. Similarly the Thessalonians, according to a strongly attested reading, are said in 2 Thess. ii. 13 to be the first-fruits of Macedonia, though they were not the first converts there. The expression seems, therefore, to be used of whatever bears a promise of the coming harvest, and it does not mean only the first sheaf. To the Apostle's mind the pledge of a future Church came not in Athens, but in Corinth, and with the conversion of a whole family. Cf. Ælian, *Var. Hist.* I. 31, where *τρωκτὰ ὠραῖα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπαρχὰς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων* seems to mean "ripe apples, and the other *best* native fruits."

εἰς . . . ἐαυτούς, "laid themselves out for service to the saints." In 2 Cor. ix. 1 the collection for the Church in Jerusalem is called *ἡ διακονία ἣ εἰς τοὺς ἁγίους*. But, while this is probably included in the work done by Stephanas, we need not restrict it to this. Heinrici's surmise is natural, that the Church met in the house of Stephanas. Afterwards it met in the house of Gaius. Cf. Rom. xvi. 23. The words *ἔταξαν ἐαυτούς* do not denote earnestness so much as a voluntary setting themselves apart to the work. Cf. Plat., *Rep.* II. p. 371, *ἐαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι*, "who take the duty upon themselves." We may perhaps recognise in this spontaneous service the beginning of office in the Corinthian Church, especially when such faithfulness and zeal received the Apostle's special approval (cf. 1 Thess. v. 12). But Ritschl is not justified in inferring that the family of Stephanas were presiding officers in the Corinthian Church. It is in Clement's Epistle that we first meet with government by presbytery in Corinth.

V. 16. *ἴνα*. Cf. note on i. 10.

*καὶ ὑμεῖς*, "that you also, on your part, may put yourselves in subjection to such men (*τοιούτοις*) as have shown zeal in serving you."

*ὑποτάσσησθε*. The slight play on *τάσσω* and *ὑποτάσσω* is intentional.

*συνεργοῦντι*, not "labouring with me," nor "labouring with the household of Stephanas," but generally "labouring in the common work of the Gospel." Cf. Col. iv. 11; 3 John 8.

*κοπῶντι*. Many work, a few toil.

V. 17. We may fairly suppose that Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaicus had been the bearers of the letter of the Corinthian Church to the Apostle. They were, consequently, the slaves of Chloe (cf. i. 11). Fortunatus is a Latin name. The Fortunatus mentioned by Clement (*Ad Cor.* 65), more than thirty years after this, may have been another person. Achaicus is a name that seldom occurs. It was given to L. Mummius. But the Christian Achaicus was probably a slave. Slaves often received their name from the country of their birth. That there were slaves among the Corinthian Christians we know from vii. 21.

*τὸ ὑμῶν ὑστέρημα*, not "that which was lacking on your part" (Revised Vers.), but "my lack of you." *Ἑμῶν* is objective genit. B C D read *ὑμέτερον*. But the meaning is the same (cf. note on xv. 31). An antithesis is intended between *παρουσία* and *ὑστέρημα*. The presence of these brethren supplied the want which the Apostle felt in consequence of his absence from Corinth. I do not see what could be lacking on the part of the Corinthians which Stephanas and his two friends could supply at Ephesus.

V. 18. *ἀνέπαυσαν*, "refreshed." Cf. 2 Cor. vii. 13.

*τὸ ὑμῶν*, not "they refreshed your spirit by bringing this my Epistle to you" (Grot), nor "they refreshed your spirit by bringing your letter to me," but "they refreshed your spirit by refreshing mine" (so Theophyl., Osiand., De Wette, etc.).

*ἐπιγινώσκετε*, "acknowledge fully." Cf. *εἰδέναι*, 1 Thess. v. 12. He means that such men, though slaves, should be held in highest honour in the Church. Cf. xiii. 12.

F. *Salutations.*

(19, 20).

V. 19. αἱ ἐκκλησίαι, plur., because every congregation of believers is a Church. Cf. vii. 17.

Ἀσίας, that is, Proconsular Asia, comprehending Mysia, Lydia and Caria. Cicero (*Pro Flacc.* 27) includes Phrygia also, which is excluded in Acts ii. 10; xvi. 6. Ephesus, where the Apostle had been now sojourning for three years, was the capital of the province. During two of the three years "he reasoned daily . . . so that all they which dwelt in Asia heard the word of the Lord" (Acts xix. 9, 10). Even if the Asia of the New Test. is not Proconsular Asia, but only Lydia, from the Caicus to the Mæander (which is not quite satisfactorily proved by Lewin, *Life of St. Paul*, Vol. I. p. 192), it will still contain Laodicea, Hierapolis and Colossæ.

Ἀκύλας καὶ Πρίσκα (named also Πρίσκιλλα in Acts xviii. 2). They were Jews, who had been living in Rome. When compelled to quit Rome in consequence of the banishment of the Jews under Claudius, they came to Corinth, where the Apostle worked with them at his trade (cf. Acts xviii. 1-3). They left Corinth in the Apostle's company and were now dwelling in Ephesus. After this we find them again in Rome.

σὺν . . . ἐκκλησίᾳ is explained by the older expositors (Chrys., Theod., Calvin, Grot.) and Rückert to mean that all the members of this family were believers. But the word σὺν is fatal to this interpretation. The meaning undoubtedly is that a Christian congregation was in the habit of meeting in Aquila's house in Ephesus, as afterwards in Rome. Cf. Acts xii. 12; Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15. Similarly the house of Philemon, another wealthy man was the home of a Christian Church (Philem. 2). The Christians, like some other ἐρα-νισταί, met in dwelling-houses. Bp. Lightfoot (on Col. iv. 15) says there is no clear example of a separate building set apart for Christian worship within the limits of the Roman Empire before the third century.

V. 20. πάντες, not the Christians that met in Aquila's house only, but all the Christians in Ephesus sent their greetings.

ἐν φιλήματι ἁγίῳ, "in a holy kiss." The ἐν is not quite synon. with an instrumental dat. The salutation is a holy kiss. On this Hebrew mode of salutation as it passed into the Christian Church cf. Rom. xvi. 16; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 26. Justin M. (*Apol.* I. 65) says the kiss was given at the end of the prayers and before the celebration of the Eucharist. At a subsequent time it followed the oblation. From Tert., *De Orat.* 14, we know that it was meant to be a token of peace; it sometimes went by the name of ἡ εἰρήνη, and in Cyprian (*Ep.* 54) the Eucharist itself is called "pax," when given to the lapsed. It was, therefore, peculiarly fitting that the distracted Church of Corinth should not omit this Christian salutation. It is called a holy kiss, not to mark its sincerity and distinguish it from the kiss of Judas (Chrys. *Hom.* 30 in 2 Cor.; Origen in Rom. p. 683), but to denote its religious and Christian character. It is τὸ ἐν Κυρίῳ φίλημα (*Const. Apost.* II. 57, ad fin.), ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι μυστικόν (Clem. Alex., *Ped.* III. p. 301 Potter). Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 23, μὴ ὑπολάβῃς τὸ φίλημα ἐκείνο σύνηθες εἶναι τοῖς ἐπ' ἀγορᾶς γινομενοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν φίλων. For this reason it was allowed to fall into desuetude with reluctance. Abuse of it was guarded against, by kissing, for instance, the covered hand only.

### G. Concluding Warning and Prayer.

(21-24).

V. 21. ὁ ἀσπασμός, "the (usual) salutation" at the end of a letter. The Apostle dictated the body of his Epistles to an amanuensis (cf. Rom. xvi. 22). He wrote the salutation with his own hand for authentication (cf. 2 Thess. iii. 17). The Epistle to the Galatians, entirely or in part, and the Epistle to Philemon he wrote with his own hand (cf. Gal. vi. 11; Philem. 19).

Παύλου, not genit. after ἀσπασμός (Kling), but in apposition to the genit. of the personal pronoun implied in the possessive ἐμῇ (cf. Jelf, *Gr.* § 467, 4).

V. 22. οὐ φιλεῖ, a positive notion: "hates." Cf. note on vii. 9. Hence the Apostle here uses φιλῶ, which expresses natural affection, rather than ἀγαπῶ, the usual word for

Christian love. He is thinking of a deep-seated antipathy, a malignant hatred of Jesus Christ, such a hatred as filled the heart of the Emperor Julian, or provoked Voltaire to utter the terrible words, "Ecrasez l'infâme." Cf. Luke xxiii. 18. The Apostle does not accuse the Corinthian Christians of hating Christ. He states in a brief, solitary sentence the possible consequence of faction and sensuality and selfishness.

ἦτω, late for ἔστω. Stallbaum substitutes ἔστω for it in Plat., *Rep.* II. p. 361. Cf. James v. 12. The imperative is concessive. Cf. note on vii. 15. For the crime of hating Christ there can be no other punishment than that the curse imprecated on Christ should fall on the imprecator: "Be it so." For ἀνάθεμα cf. note on xii. 3. So πόμα for πῶμα, x. 4.

Μαράν ἀθά, East Aramæan (the dialect of Jerusalem) for "Our Lord is come," or "will come." If the former, the reference is to the incarnation; if the latter, to the second coming. The latter is the more probable meaning. Cf. Phil. iv. 5, ὁ Κύριος ἐγγύς. Certain and swift vengeance overtakes the blasphemer. But the words have a meaning apart from their connection with this anathema. The Apostle's spirit is filled, as he closes his great arguments, with a solemn, joyful hope of the Lord's coming. The enthusiasm of the gift of tongues takes possession of him and impels him to mystic utterance. His words from hallowed associations carry with them a meaning beyond what meets the ear. The air is filled with awe-inspiring voices premonitory of the coming of the Lord.

"The Spirit came upon us. From our lips  
Burst the strange mystic speech of other lands.  
We too cried Abba! Lord of Sabaoth!  
We too could raise the Hallelujah chant;  
And from our feeble tongues in wondrous tones,  
As of the voice of trumpet, loud and long,  
The mighty Maranatha smote the air."

(Dean Plumptre.)

Hence the word Maranatha soon came to be used with Amen at the end of a public prayer. Cf. "Didache" 10.

V. 23. But the spirit of the prophet is subject to the prophet. From mystic utterance the Apostle calmly passes to the closing prayer that the grace of Christ should abide with

them. The risen Christ is the source of all spiritual blessings. Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 9. The *μετά* here expresses more than the dative of i. 3. It means ever-abiding intercourse, which is the strongest possible contrast to the utter rejection implied in the anathema of ver. 22, and the anticipation by faith of the second coming of the Lord to which *maran atha* refers. It is "the grace of Jesus Christ," inasmuch as the love of God becomes an actual gift to man through Christ.

V. 24. After solemn warning and sharp rebuke, as their father in Christ Jesus, he assures them of his love. It embraces all, even those that stirred a factious spirit against his authority; for his authority over them sprang from their common union with Christ Jesus.

The subscription in the received text has no MS. authority older than the eighth century. The notion that the Epistle was written from Philippi arose probably from a misunderstanding of *διέρχουμαι*, ver. 5. The subscriptions (*ὑπογραφαί*) to St. Paul's Epistles are ascribed, in their simplest forms, to Euthalius, deacon of Alexandria in the fifth century.

## ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

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### i. 4.

εὐχαριστῶ. Cf. Rutherford's *Phrynichus*, XI.: "The meaning *gratias agere* is first attached to the verb in Polybius."

### iii. 9.

οἰκοδομή. It should have been noticed that Aristotle uses the word in the meaning of οἰκοδόμησις, "the act of building," not as synon. with οἰκοδόμημα, "a house." Οἰκοδομεῖν will give us οἰκοδομία, which is used in class. Greek in both meanings, but not οἰκοδομή.

### iii. 11.

κείμενον. The rule that κείμαι is the perfect passive of τίθημι is observed in Attic Greek, in which τέθειμαι is always middle in meaning. But in the New Test. τέθειμαι occurs as a passive verb (Mark xv. 47, in A B C D). We are therefore justified in combining the intransitive with the passive meaning of κείμενον in our passage.

### iv. 1.

ὑπηρέτας. On the patristic use of the word cf. Canon Bright's *Canons of the First Four General Councils*, Notes, p. 63.

### iv. 13.

περικάθαρμα. De Wette's objection to the supposition that the Apostle alludes to the custom of offering sacrifice to avert

disease, *viz.*, that the custom had ceased long before the Apostle's time, seems to be refuted by a prohibition of this very thing in the recently discovered "Didache," or "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," chap. 3, *μὴ γίνου περικαθαίρων*. The form of the prohibition in the "Apostolical Constitutions," VII. 6, shows that a human sacrifice is meant in this prohibition: *οὐκ ἔσῃ . . . περικαθαίρων τὸν υἱόν σου*. It is evident that the custom existed after the Apostle's day.

## iv. 18.

*ἐρχομένου*. In Attic *ιών* is the pres. part. of *ἔρχομαι*, not *ἐρχόμενος*, and for *ἐλεύσομαι* (ver. 19) *εἶμι* would be used.

## viii. 6.

*δι' οὗ*. Cf. Philo, *De Cherub*. Vol. I. p. 162 Mang.: *ὄργανον δὲ λόγον Θεοῦ δι' οὗ κατεσκευάσθη [ὁ κόσμος]*.

## xii. 10.

*γένη γλωσσῶν*. The apparent discrepancy between the Apostle's description of the spiritual gifts and the account in the Book of Acts has been turned into an argument against the Lukian authorship of the Acts; but the argument has very little force. If a writer in the second century, having St. Paul's Epistles before him, wished to prove that St. Paul was in perfect agreement with the other Apostles, would he not have been careful to identify the results of their preaching with the results which he found ascribed to St. Paul's ministry?

## xiii. 3.

*οὐθέν*. This form of *οὐδέν* is said to occur in an inscription as early as B.C. 378. Cf. Rutherford's *Phrynichus*, CLX.

## xiv. 5.

*ἐκτὸς εἰ μή*. For a similar pleonastic use of the negative cf. Dem., *De Cor.* p. 241, *πλὴν οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦς*.

## xiv. 23.

*ἰδιῶται*. The view suggested in the commentary that the Apostle means "separatists" receives some measure of con-

firmation from the fact that *ιδιώτης* was used as the designation of a person who was not member of an *ἐκκλησία*.

xiv. 34.

*ἐπιτρέπεται*. The word may allude, not only to the Christian Churches, but to the Jewish synagogue. Cf. Vitranga, *De Syn. Vet.* p. 46: "Mulier in synagogâ non leget propter honorem cœtus."

pp. 386, 387.

The Apostle's conception of the personal unit consisting of body and soul may be contrasted also with the Stoical comparison of the body to the weaver's shuttle or the driver's whip or the writer's pen. Cf. M. Anton. X. xxxviii.

xv. 21.

The student will not fail to observe the difference between this doctrine of St. Paul and the theory that Christ's humanity was necessary only as the altar is necessary to hold the sacrifice.

xv. 50, p. 450.

The enemies of the Church understood the Christian doctrine of the resurrection in a thoroughly materialistic sense. The ashes of martyrs were cast into rivers in order to make their resurrection an impossibility. Cf. Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.* V. 1. Popular Christian legends, on the other hand, declare that the bodies of martyrs are not entirely destroyed, that their resurrection may be possible.



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